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Some Technical Vocabulary of Rhetorical Invention in the Treatise of Anonymous Seguerianus, Hermogenes' "On Stasis", and Book Three of the [Pseudo-]Hermogenic Work "On Invention"

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SOME TECHNICAL VOCABULARY OF RHETORICAL INVENTION
IN THE TREATISE OF ANONYMOUS SEGUERIANUS,
HERMOGENES' *ON STASIS*, AND BOOK THREE OF THE
[PSEUDO-]HERMOGENIC WORK *ON INVENTION*

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Speech Communication

by
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B.A. Oral Roberts University, 1983
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December 2001

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DEDICATION

My own plans are made. While I can, I sail east on the *Dawn Treader*. When she fails me, I paddle east in my coracle. When she sinks, I shall swim east with my four paws, and when I can swim no longer, if I have not yet reached Aslan's country, or shot over the edge of the world in some vast cataract, I shall sink with my nose to the sunrise....

-- Reepicheep

This project is dedicated to Jutta, who spent so many nights and weekends as a single mother in order to see me finish.

And to Dante, who made it so much more difficult.

And to my father, whose pleasure in my progress lightened the load.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This particular dissertation has been an island exile from the human community, and it is without one instant of wistfulness, melancholy, or nostalgia that I board my little bark and hoist sail again for inhabited shores, where human conversation on trivial matters transpires beneath electric lights. My haste notwithstanding, I was raised a Southerner, and a Protestant, so there is a chivalric sense of duty which boils in my blood and causes me, even though panting for departure, to stop and give thanks to some deserving souls who have eased my exile.

Primarily, to Dr. Harold Nixon, thanks are due. When I first approached him several years ago and begged him to tutor me in Greek, he said yes with a nonchalance which betrayed a profound lack of insight regarding the vast burden of ignorances he was, in me, about to assume. I have since enlightened him: I've dragged him across Alcatraz, St. Helena, Patmos, and the Chateau D'If en route to Constantinople. He never flinched. There is no way to express adequately my appreciation for the hours of patient corrections, meticulous preparations, and unerring assistance he has provided me as I slogged my way through Byzantine obscurities and slaughtered Greek beauty. He was encouraging while correcting me, and graciously detailed in his explanations of where I had (so often) gone (so very) wrong. I find it unimaginable that I shall ever go more than a few lines in any Greek text without recalling my debt to him; he has opened for me a door onto endless wonders. Μὲν πολύμνηστος δὲ μετὰ μύριος χάριτος.

Dr. Ken Zagacki was my supply line, my first line of contact with the scholastic community that I spent so much of this dissertation so very far away from. As my director, he too inherited in me a wider vista of difficulties than he bargained for, I suspect. He was the one who, through emails and parcel post, kept the contact going and the chapters flowing. My time abroad sometimes reduced him to running errands for me, but he never complained. I have appreciated his commitment and service to this project; he was always reliable and efficient; his comments were always exactly on target. As it was in the days of my Master's Thesis, so it is here: I am greatly indebted to him for the academic freedom he gave to my curiosity. He was willing to allow me to explore any but the most ridiculous harbors in my search for a way into the hidden heart of Byzantium. His trust that I could, in the end, lash it all together in a sensible fashion went neither unnoticed nor unappreciated.

This dissertation benefited as well from the thoughtful input of my remaining committee members, Dr. Andrew King, Dr. Jim Honeycut, and Dr. Gail Sutherland, all of whom should receive medals for facing with courage the morass of technicalities found between these covers. Their questions and comments inspired new directions of thought for me and provided worthwhile finishing touches to this project.

Only those who have actually done research in the Middle East can appreciate the difficulty of the task. While I was there, material was often extremely difficult to come by, and I must mention two friends -- Rev. Renee Kiel and Ms. Robin Renfro -- who were godsend. Both invested their own time and effort to track down rare

and much needed materials for me in the libraries where they were busily engaged in their own studies. Both mailed me photocopies of book chapters or articles that were absolutely essential to the progress of my research. I am very much in their debt, and honored to call them friends.

Another friend of mine, Corey New, showed up in the final stages of this project to serve as something of a personal secretary and logistical assistant as I leapt through the Grad School hoops. His good humor, steady character, and reliable judgment (except about politics, religion, art, and literature) are among those qualities which have made him one of my oldest and most treasured friends.

I must also mention another dear friend: Sister -- almost Saint -- Avé, who is perhaps the best listener I have ever found in my far flung wanderings. Her quiet, attentive consideration of my ramblings was exemplary to me. Her occasional advice was, quite simply, never wrong.

Yet a further debt is owed to my old and dear friend Fr. Jim Young. When, in the later stages of this project, my ancient computer simply quit, overwhelmed by the complexity of the tasks I was requiring of it, Fr. Young put into my hands (at some sacrifice to himself) an Apple laptop computer possessed of such speed and memory that I very nearly shorted out the keyboard as I wept for joy over the machine. Suddenly, I could open a Greek text and an English text at the same time. I could do a search in Hermogenes' *Stasis* without shutting down my word processor. *Τεθαύμακα!* -- And not least at the extraordinary quality of friends who have graced my life.

Finally, I must register another debt, most difficult to gauge, to my wife Jutta. She was an absolute pre-requisite for this dissertation. The embarrassing truth is this: German is her native language, her English is at least as good as mine, and her French is better. I've gone to her repeatedly when I could not puzzle my way out of a *phrase française* or figure out what the third "der" (OK, sometimes the first "der") referred to in some hideous nineteenth century German subclause. In all these years, she never once made fun of me (at least not to my face), and all that superlative help in the translations is, of course, nothing compared to the steady encouragement of her consistently good company. At least my Greek is better than hers, though, I painfully confess, even that isn't as good as her Latin.

And then there are a couple of formalities: This dissertation was completed in part with financial consideration and technical support from the *Thesaurus Linguae Graece Project*, for which I am extremely grateful. Without their assistance, the research done here would have been simply impossible.

This dissertation was also completed, in part, through access granted the author to the library of the *École Biblique* of Jerusalem, Israel, for which I am, again, extremely grateful. Fr. Kevin and his staff were helpful and efficient, and I appreciate their dedication and their maintenance of such a fine facility.

The errors are my own, but everything else I stole from those colleagues, friends, and family listed above.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DK

Dilts, Mervin R. and Kennedy, George A., eds. 1997. *Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises from the Roman Empire: Introduction, Text, and Translation of the Arts of Rhetoric*, attributed to Anonymous Seguerianus and to Apsines of Gadara. (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill Publishing). See Bibliography.

GBWW

The Great Books of the Western World, Vols. 1-54, Mortimer J. Adler, ed. (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica), 1986.

GS

The complete Greek-English lexicon of Liddell, Scotts, and Jones. The so-called "Great Scott".

ML

The intermediate Greek-English lexicon of Liddell and Scotts. The so-called "Middle Liddell".

Soph

The Roman and Byzantine lexicon of E. A. Sophocles.

ABSTRACT

From the debates of the Christian councils to the homilies of the local priests, from the opaque scripting of the Byzantine epistle to the clarities of stasis theory, from the entertaining fictions of declamation to the promulgation of Byzantine cannon law, the citizens of Byzantium were never far from the rhetorical, and they themselves knew it. But the development of rhetorical theory in the Greek West has gained little attention, and what has been given to it has generally concentrated on questions of style. This dissertation examines some of the most basic qualities of that theory of rhetorical invention which Byzantium inherited and made its own, and which served as the foundation of its theoretical approach for a thousand years.

The present study attempts to provide a basic in-road to Byzantine rhetoric by comparing and contrasting the technical vocabulary of rhetorical invention (such as *epicheireme* [ἐπιχείρημα], *enthymeme* [ἐνθύμημα], *development* [ἐργασία], *artistic proof* [ἐντεχνος πίστις], *inartistic proof* [ἀτεχνος πίστις], etc.) as it is employed, first, in the treatise of Anonymous Seguerianus and then in the inventional corpus of Hermogenes of Tarsus (whose works became the standard textbooks of Byzantine rhetoric).

By examining alterations in the vocabulary of rhetorical invention surrounding Hermogenes' reconstitution of the subject, one accomplishes two important tasks. First, such an examination lays out in a detailed and specific manner some of the changes in rhetorical theory which are represented in the Hermogenic

inventional (as opposed to the *stylistic*) works, thus contributing to a more complete view on the history and development of rhetoric. Second, such an examination, once completed, provides the rhetorical theorist with an absolutely essential foundation upon which to build an understanding of rhetoric in Byzantium. This understanding of the Byzantine alterations in technical vocabulary provides a tool with which the rhetorician may investigate and interrogate Byzantine texts with respect to their critical outlook, their development, and their deviation from the Hermogenic norm.

**CHAPTER ONE:
THE NATURE AND CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION**

Section I. The Nature of the Question

A. Presentation of the Question

The shortcomings of our description would probably disappear
if for the psychological terms
we could substitute physiological or chemical ones.
--Freud¹

The divine ray is unable, in any way, to bring light to us
unless it is hidden, covered with the covering
of various sacred veils....
--Pseudo-Dionysius²

If the tension between the laboratory and the monastery,
between absolute explication and unspeakable encounter, does not
occupy a major chapter in any history of the contemporary era, then
that history is poorly written. The Renaissance's (and the next
generations') simultaneous exploration of science and magic is so
well documented as to be cliché. Witness, for example, Newton's
alchemy period, or recall William Gilbert's peculiar vocabulary about
the earth's magnetic field.³ But science and magic parted company

¹*The Pleasure Principle*. GBWW translation, p. 662.

²καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ δυνατόν ἑτέρως ἡμῖν ἐπιλάμψαι τὴν θεαρχικὴν ἀκτῖνα, μὴ τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τῶν ἱερῶν παραπετασμάτων ἀναγοχικῶς περικεκαλυμμένην..... *Celestial Hierarchies* I.ii; PG 3.121. Unless otherwise indicated, translations are my own.

³ After insisting that his conclusions are based in a "great multitude of experiments", Gilbert goes on to explain that the earth is animate, has a soul (and a will), and chooses "with her astral magnetic mind" to spin around her axis. Perhaps Gilbert's contemporaries saw in his essay, *De Magnete*, a workable synthesis between the Copernican machine and the Ptolemaic Intelligences commanding the spheres (he was the first Englishman to back Copernicus), but the modern reader is apt to be struck by the emergence of his rather idiosyncratic conclusions -- mingled with other acceptably scientific ones -- from a process of "much experimentation"; unless, in some deconstructional sense, Gilbert is

early. Trendy syntheses between the now estranged worlds of science and transcendence emerge periodically,⁴ but most often in the contemporary world the relationship is neutral at best, and occasionally antagonistic, with the empiricists insisting that what they can't explain is simply brute knowledge awaiting better methodology and the mystics insisting that they know what cannot be explained, and most of what can be explained isn't much worth knowing. Both seem to view the synthesizers with suspicion: the empiricists smelling fraud, the mystics sensing Simony. Rhetoricians have long walked in this treacherous middle ground, offering none of the parties endorsements, selling arms equally to all sides, and attempting in their own way to deal with the tension between verifiable public certainty and individual interior certainty by examining the way we talk about what we know, don't know, feel, hope for, want, and want to avoid.⁵ No easy task, this.

It is for that reason -- the difficulty of the rhetorical task -- that the neglect of the Byzantine perspective on rhetorical theory is so egregious. The loss is ours, particularly at this time. The Byzantines might have much worthwhile to teach a world where the

portrayed as an ardent environmentalist or, perhaps, a Neo-Druid. See especially Book V.12. I have used the translation in GBWW.

⁴*Chariots of the Gods, The Dancing Wu-Li Masters, The God Particle, The Holy Grail: A Beginner's Guide*, to name just a few of the more recent titles from within the contemporary New Age attempt at synthesizing science and mysticism.

⁵A good rhetorician might note, e.g., that I have just juxtaposed "verifiable" and "individual" in the above configuration, and wonder what this says about a culture which speaks of such a juxtaposition without so much as a pause for thought, while simultaneously touting individualism as one of the crown jewels of its political credo.

tensions between the local and the global (the provincial and imperial, the educated Byzantine might have said) are given frequent and extensive attention. Or, they might have insights to offer about the nature of negotiated meanings maintained in the midst of transcendent belief founded in words about a -- about *the* -- Word. Such a tension came close to defining them, and it is not without its obvious echoes in our own practical and hermeneutical debates on the place of community, authority, morality, faith and compromise in discovering (creating?) meaning in human interaction. But the development of rhetorical theory in the Greek West has gained little attention, and what has been given to it has generally concentrated on questions of style.⁶ Little has been done with the more substantive aspects of composition, especially invention.

Despite this absence of attention Byzantium has received in contemporary rhetorical scholarship, rhetoric was a pervasive aspect of the Byzantine world. Kustas notes:

Modern editors of Byzantine texts often in their commentaries venture to describe the rhetorical habits of the authors they treat, in acknowledgment of the fact that the strong hand of rhetoric directs the great bulk of medieval Greek literature.⁷

From the debates of the Christian councils to the homilies of the local priests, from the opaque scripting of the Byzantine epistle to the clarities of stasis theory as a foundation of a theoretical education in philosophy *and* a practical one in politics, from the

⁶See, e.g., MAAS (1912), or ORTH (1928, and 1929). We shall take up this issue in more detail shortly.

⁷KUSTAS (1967), p. 1.

entertaining fictions of declamation to the promulgation of Byzantine cannon law, the citizens of Byzantium were never far from the rhetorical, and they themselves knew it. The Byzantines produced, for example, a series of polemics which demonstrate a clear and probably conscious development of audience analysis.⁸ Their religious debates were real and about issues which would as much -- no, more so -- affect their daily lives as our debates about education and taxes affect our own.⁹ Eloquence was respected -- as was orthodoxy -- and preachers who spoke the truth well were admired. And yet, as we shall see, little beyond the Byzantine considerations of style has been forwarded by contemporary rhetorical scholars. Much work remains to be done in this field.

No single study, of course, can remedy the dearth of scholarship which rhetoricians -- with a few notable exceptions -- have bestowed upon Constantinople. Nor can any one voice argue convincingly for the general inclusion of Byzantium in our ongoing debates about argumentation and debate. Certainly, it is to be hoped that the present study might encourage a broader, deeper, and more complete consideration of the history of rhetoric and, perhaps, inspire contemporary rhetoricians to include the Greek West more fully in their reflections on and commentaries about our traditions

⁸See, e.g., SAHAS, Daniel (1990) and KOLBABA, Tia (1995).

⁹DICKIE's (1995) discussion on the pervasiveness of the Evil Eye -- a concept still very much alive today in the Arab communities of the Middle East, both Moslem and Christian -- provides a fine perspective on contextualizing the intertwined nature of the spiritual and the secular in Byzantium. Or for a somewhat different approach to the same topic, see FÖGEN's (1995) discussion of magic in Roman secular law and Byzantine canon law.

and present discussions. It is, however, symptomatic of our lack of acquaintance with Byzantine rhetoric that, prior to consulting the Byzantine texts directly, a significant amount of more basic work needs to be done. If we are hoping to bring Byzantium more fully into the view of contemporary rhetoricians, it is first necessary to step back, and give a good deal of attention to the theory of rhetoric as it was received in the Greek West. Kennedy observes that before one can grasp the concept of argument "in the later Greek and Byzantine periods, one must consciously reject what is found not only in Aristotle but also in Boethius and the Latin tradition".¹⁰ The statement may be a slight exaggeration -- Byzantine rhetoric is an organic growth springing from its Aristotelian roots, not a new species of plant -- but his point is not to be taken lightly: the walls of Constantinople do not fall to the poorly equipped or the ill-informed.

This study will examine some qualities of that theory of rhetorical invention which Byzantium inherited and made its own, and which served as the foundation of its theoretical approach for a thousand years. This will be done by noting how this theory of invention, which served as the foundation of Byzantine rhetoric, differed from earlier, Hellenistic, theoretical perspectives; the study will focus on the technical vocabulary of invention, and concern itself largely with Book 3 of Hermogenes'¹¹ Περὶ εὐρέσεως (On

¹⁰KENNEDY (1983), p. 90.

¹¹Questions of authorship will be discussed more fully, below.

Invention). This Hermogenic work remains untranslated,¹² leaving it inaccessible to most modern rhetoricians, even though it was one of the five central texts of the Byzantine rhetorical corpus.¹³ The view of argument which is outlined in this text, and in Hermogenes' *Περὶ στάσεων* (*On Stasis*), will be compared with earlier theoretical perspectives on invention.

This contrast is important in itself, if one wishes to understand Byzantine rhetoric; once established, however, this contrast also serves as a tool to assist one who might wish to examine and explore Byzantine texts themselves, with an eye toward reviewing their sources and theoretical perspectives more carefully and more accurately. As an example, we shall, once these distinctions are established, give some very brief attention to the *Bibliotheca* of Patriarch Photios of Constantinople, remarking on its critical outlook, and posing questions raised about that outlook in light of our studies.

The texts with which this dissertation largely concerns itself reflect schools of thought which were influential in rhetorical theory in the second century, and later in the sixth.¹⁴ To better understand them and their connection, it is first necessary to consider some general information, previous studies, and background to the elements involved in the question.

¹²In English. There is a French version by Michel PATILLON (1997).

¹³ Cf. KENNEDY (1983), chapt. 2.

¹⁴All dates given are A.D. (C.E.) unless otherwise indicated.

B. Background of the Question

1. The Hermogenic Transition

The works of Hermogenes of Tarsus (born c.160) are a watershed moment in the development of rhetorical theory. So much so, that one may reasonably talk about pre-Hermogenic and post-Hermogenic (or simply "Hermogenic") perspectives, though cautiously: the watershed does not occur within Hermogenes' life.

Our sole source of biographical information about Hermogenes is found in Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists* (2.7). If Philostratus is to be believed, and there is little reason to doubt him, Hermogenes was something of a prodigy. Marcus Aurelius, touring the provinces, made a special effort to hear him speak when the orator was only fifteen. For reasons unspecified, Hermogenes lost the ability to speak publicly -- the implication is a failure either of nerves or of inspiration. He died at a goodly age. It is presumably after the decline in his performance prowess that Hermogenes turned to a more mundane life of scholarship. Traditionally, five treatises on rhetorical theory have been received which bear his name.¹⁵ Authors from the 14th century, without citing their sources, suggest that his works were composed early in his life, but after the visit of the emperor.¹⁶

¹⁵These include: Προχρυσνάσματα, Περί στάσεων, Περί εύρέσεως, Περί ιδεών, Περί μεθόδου δεινότητος.

¹⁶KENNEDY (1983), pp. 79-80.

Hermogenes' works appear not to have immediately gained command of the field, but slowly emerged as the dominant theory.¹⁷ By the sixth century, however, he is clearly the central figure in rhetorical theory. Patterson notes that his works were, by that time, organized and ordered into the sections with which we are generally familiar today.¹⁸ Kustas observes that, "After the end of the fifth century there is hardly any Byzantine intellectual who is not touched by [Hermogenes]".¹⁹ Kennedy speaks of his work *On Stasis* as "the fundamental rhetorical textbook from the Fifth to the Fifteenth Century"²⁰ in the Greek West. These points summarize the general perspective on Hermogenes' role as the cornerstone of Byzantine rhetoric.²¹

To speak, then, of a Hermogenic perspective in Greek rhetoric, is to speak of the period from sometime near the end of the fifth century forward: a period that begins some two centuries after Hermogenes' life. It is the perspective generally considered to have served as the basis of all Byzantine rhetorical theory.

It is not my intention in this dissertation to provide a general perspective on Hermogenic rhetorical theory, of course. That ambitious task has been partially undertaken by others, and with some

¹⁷KUSTAS (1973), pp. 6ff.

¹⁸PATTERSON (1970), p. 7.

¹⁹KUSTAS (1973), p. 5.

²⁰KENNEDY (1983), p. 74.

²¹For an overview, JENKINS (1963).

success.²² Rather, the present project has as its goal the far more modest work of examining and establishing the alterations in the vocabulary of rhetorical invention which accompanied the Hermogenic transition.

Pre-Hermogenic rhetorical theory²³ differed in a number of subtle but significant ways from the outlook which followed that transition. The most profitable way to study the alterations established by the Hermogenic corpus is probably through examination of the specific technical vocabulary employed to discuss rhetoric. Patillon speaks of his long held conviction "that there is no serious theory of discourse without continual reference to the linguistic";²⁴ by linguistic, he means, among many other things, the development of vocabulary. Patillon correctly identifies Hermogenes' perspective on style as central to the orator's overall theory and the most

²²PATILLON. See bibliography.

²³This, of course, was not itself a monolithic system, and a more precise definition of the period relevant to this study will be taken up at the proper time. Here, it is sufficient to note that the primary text employed in this dissertation as a representative of the Pre-Hermogenic point of view is a compendium of competing theoretical outlooks. For the definitive secondary text on Hellenic and Hellenistic rhetoric, see KENNEDY (1963). For a perspective on Hellenistic rhetoric with an emphasis upon the Latin West, see KENNEDY (1972), and CLARK (1963).

²⁴"...qu'il n'est pas de théorie du discours sérieuse sans une constante référence à la linguistique". PATILLON (1988), p. 7.

original²⁵ of his contributions. He, therefore, concentrates most of his own research on matters of style and presentation.²⁶

There were, however, changes going on in other of the canons of rhetoric²⁷ as well. After style, Hermogenes most dramatically affected the canon of invention, though only limited attention has been given to this heuristic alteration, as we shall see. While the same vocabulary was often employed by Hermogenes and the pre-Hermogenic authors, subtle differences in meaning sometimes accompanied that identical vocabulary. On the other hand, terminology was also abandoned, and at the same time, of course, the restructuring of the subject by Hermogenes introduced new vocabulary. The nature of the distinctions between Hermogenic and Pre-Hermogenic rhetoric is the focus of this study, and will be considered in some depth in the following chapters. What is important to note, at present, however, is simply that the Hermogenic transition took

²⁵For a different perspective on style than the one Patillon offers, see HAGEDORN (1964) who argues that Hermogenes' theory of style is largely derivative of earlier sources, most notably, Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

²⁶PATILLON, 1988. Patillon also notes, in an earlier work (1985), that Hermogenes' *On Invention* is concerned in part with issues of style, especially the canon of *τάξις*. As he summarizes in his later work: "J'ai avancé l'idée, dans ma thèse, que le texte transmis dans le corpus hermogénien sous le nom de *Περὶ εὐρέσεως* provient d'un ensemble défini par les tâches de l'orateur et qu'il nous propose, d'une part, un développement sur l'invention, d'autre part, un développement sur l'élocution". (1988, p.10.)

²⁷The standard Canons of Classical Rhetoric, outlining the rhetorical task, are: *εὐρεσις* (invention, discovery, classification), *τάξις* (arrangement of the material), *λέξις* (style), *ὑπόκρισις* (delivery), *μνήμη* (memory). The contents of the Canons and their relative importance differed from one period to the next, and between various schools within any given period in the history of rhetoric.

place, and that it altered in some way the technical vocabulary previously employed to discuss rhetorical invention, and that rhetorical theory after this transition is considered the foundation of Byzantine rhetorical thought and education.

2. Vocabulary of Invention in the Transition

Both Kennedy and Kustas examine some aspects of the general conceptual shift which took place under the influence of Hermogenes' works,²⁸ and while they disagree on some points,²⁹ both make passing reference to certain alterations in the Hermogenic use of particular words. Neither gives organized, detailed attention to the precise Hermogenic changes to the vocabulary employed in rhetorical theory, though Kennedy's discussion is more helpful on this front,³⁰ especially in his considerations of the Hermogenic text *On Invention*. More detailed discussion of some vocabulary, especially that of *Stasis*, may be found in Heath's excellent translation, notes and commentaries,³¹ although Heath also discusses the relationship

²⁸KENNEDY (1983), ch. 2; KUSTAS (1973), *passim* (esp. pp. 5-11, for an overview).

²⁹E.g., KUSTAS argues for Hermogenes as a competing school of theoretical vision, overwhelming the rival Minucianus. KENNEDY holds a more conservative perspective, noting that while Hermogenes opposed the views of Minucianus, there were no "great philosophical differences about the nature and functions of rhetoric" between the two, but only disagreements about rather less significant matters (p. 76). HAGEDORN (1964) is even more conservative, arguing that Hermogenes is in fact precisely in line with the tradition which immediately preceded him (*passim*, but see esp., e.g., pp. 23, 39-41, 77f). N.B., however, that Hagedorn's article, the only one actually devoted to exploring Hermogenes' relationship to the previous tradition, is limited exclusively to the orator's view of style.

³⁰KENNEDY (1983), 73-96.

³¹Malcolm HEATH (1995).

of the Hermogenic vocabulary to past perspectives of the tradition only tangentially.

Less ambitious studies outside of the idea of style have been done, though these, too, are usually devoted to examining stasis theory,³² either its general development or some ambiguous aspect of its character. Conventional wisdom held stasis theory to be a contribution of the Stoics, but as early as 1950 O. A. L. Dieter clearly demonstrated the Aristotelian roots of the theory in his etymological analysis of the term *στάσις* and its attendant vocabulary.³³ Dieter is perhaps to be faulted for forwarding, in places, what amounts to an argument that the vocabulary of Aristotle's theories of physical motion (taken from his *Physics*, his *Parts of Animals*, and his *Generation of Animals*) was consciously adopted by rhetoricians to serve as theory-based metaphors for the motion of the will. Dieter's discussion of this particular angle of his theory constitutes something of an *argumentum ad ignoratum*. Nevertheless, his more general premise, that stasis predates the

³²Stasis theory is, today, usually discussed as a part of the canon of invention. Hermogenes states in his introduction to *περὶ στάσεων* (1.9), "ἔστι δὲ σχεδὸν ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ περὶ εὐρέσεως, πλὴν ὅσον οὐ πάντα ἔχει τὰ περὶ εὐρέσεως" [This subject (stasis) is almost identical with the theory of invention, except that it does not include all the elements of invention]. Translation: Malcolm HEATH (1995). For an overview of stasis theory, KENNEDY (1983), 73-86; RUSSELL (1983), ch. 3.

³³DIETER, (1950). Unfortunately, Dieter, though he never mentions him by name, views Hermogenes as a corrupter of the Platonic Ideal of Aristotelian stasis, so to speak. See esp. p. 369, fn. 37. His arguments for the Aristotelian roots of stasis are not, however, weakened by his lack of appreciation for Hermogenes, though careful readers of his article will, ironically, find comprehension of Dieter's points greatly enhanced if they bring a previous knowledge of Hermogenes with them to Dieter's analysis.

Stoics, was well received and followed by more scholarship, reinforcing the Aristotelian roots of stasis.³⁴ Enos notes, in passing, the presence of at least the general idea of stasis in Plato's *Gorgias*,³⁵ e.g., and Kennedy, in his translation and exhaustive commentary on the *Rhetoric* devotes a number of pages to the Aristotelian roots of stasis.³⁶ With the exception of Dieter, however, none of these studies gives serious attention to the technical vocabulary involved in the theory of stasis. Even Dieter concentrates on the etymological aspects of the terms, and their relation to one another in Aristotle's works. No discussion about the terminological alterations between Hermogenes and earlier perspectives on stasis is presented.

Some studies have undertaken such a comparison, either broadly or more narrowly focused. Nadeau³⁷ discusses the broader development of stasis theory, starting with Hermagoras of Temnos (fl., first century B.C.), the first rhetorician whose systematic presentation of stasis we can reasonably reconstruct. Nadeau proceeds from Hermagoras on to Hermogenes, providing a summary consideration of the various theorists associated with the development of stasis theory.

³⁴NADEAU, (1964), in the introduction to his translation of Hermogenes' *Stasis* also cites Aristotle as the original source of stasis theory. See also THOMPSON (1972), who seeks to ground an Aristotelian view of stasis more firmly in Aristotle's rhetorical works. Thompson provides, however, no discussion of the technical vocabulary involved, working primarily with the conceptual frameworks of stasis.

³⁵ENOS (1993), p.96.

³⁶KENNEDY (1991). See e.g., p. 104f, n.237, esp.; p. 265ff.

³⁷NADEAU (1959).

With respect to vocabulary, Nadeau provides a general, helpful, but introductory sketch of the primary terms of stasis. He correctly points out that the alterations made by Hermogenes were most dramatic in the area of organization and subordination of the discovery process; that is, in regard to ordering the νοήσῃ as a logical progression of contrary possibilities which will derive στάσις ἐκ τοῦ κρινόμενου.³⁸ Hermogenes did not introduce a new theory of stasis, but he did reconstitute a received theory, and it is the Hermogenic re-ordering which became the standard textbook in Byzantium.

More narrowly focused, one of Heath's articles³⁹ provides a more detailed consideration of the differing ideas behind four specific terms within stasis theory, concentrating on shifting meanings of, and the relationships between, αἴτιον (cause, reason, responsibility or blame), συνέχον (from συνέχω, to occupy, engage, constrain, bring about), κρινόμενον (the thing considered, the matter to be judged), and ζήτημα (the question raised). He examines these terms with an eye toward illuminating the varying perspectives on the cause, or source or location, of the στάσις as that cause was perceived -- often inconsistently -- in differing schools of thought.

³⁸Νόησις is an analysis or sifting and implies, to some degree, conceptual ordering, an intuition of relation: of what leads to what. Such analysis arrives at the στάσις, the central point on which the argument hangs. Κρινόμενον is a slightly more problematic word, with much debate among the rhetoricians being given to its place and meaning. Briefly, it is the matter to be adjudicated, the kernel of circumstance which, if properly interrogated, reveals the stasis. See Malcolm HEATH (1994) for more detailed discussion of κρινόμενον, its various shades of meaning, and its location within stasis theory.

³⁹Malcolm HEATH (1994).

He is especially interested in discovering the various views of τὸ κρινόμενον, the source from which the stasis appears.

P. H. Richter⁴⁰ establishes the text and provides a (German) translation, and notes on one of Hermogenes' Byzantine commentators. His work, too, offers some passing commentary on the relationship of κρινόμενον and ζήτημα, but he is quick to note that his own text is an incomplete summary of a detailed original, and its fragmented nature allows for few definite conclusions.⁴¹

Patillon, in his writings, provides a more comprehensive review of Hermogenic stasis theory,⁴² including a brief section devoted to its context in the over-all Hermogenic perspective,⁴³ and a helpful discussion of Hermogenes' general place in the tradition,⁴⁴ though the latter concentrates primarily on Hermogenic reorganization of the Hermagorean analytical aspects (νόσις) of the approach toward τὸ

⁴⁰RICHTER (1926).

⁴¹Man sieht...der Bearbeiter von Ph (his text) habe aus den, z.T. gewiss sehr eingehenden und ausführlichen, Scholien seiner Vorlage nur einzelne Merksätze herausgehoben, die sich jetzt nur noch schwer gedanklich soweit in Verbindung bringen lassen, dass ihr ursprünglicher Zusammenhang und damit der Sinn und die Zugehörigkeit der von ihnen gegebenen Erklärungen deutlich werde. [One sees that the editor of Ph has excerpted only single sentences from scholia which were, in part at least, certainly profound and detailed. The sentences we have can now, only with great difficulty, be connected to one another so that their original context and therefore their meaning and relationship to one another is clarified.] RICHTER (1926), p. 160.

⁴²M. HEATH (1995) pp. 69-79, and KENNEDY (1983), pp. 82-85, both provide a fine, quick overview of the Hermogenic system of stasis, to complement PATILLON's 1988 presentation on pp. 43ff, but esp. pp. 48-55; also PATILLON (1997), pp. 56-77.

⁴³PATILLON (1988), pp. 47-48.

⁴⁴PATILLON (1988), pp. 56-78.

κρινόμενον. Nevertheless, there is helpful discussion in Patillon⁴⁵ of the vocabulary of Hermagoras, and Hermogenes' adaptation of that technical vocabulary in his own theory of stasis.

The most in-depth work is that of Malcom Heath, mentioned above, who provides an introduction, commentary, exemplary texts, and a very fine glossary in his English translation of Hermogenes' *On Stasis*. The work is extremely helpful, and serves equally well as an introduction to *Stasis*, or a deeper consideration of the technical vocabulary within the text.

It will be noted that, when the issue is one of invention (as opposed to style), the Hermogenic perspective on rhetorical theory is quickly truncated in the literature, with stasis theory dominating the discussion. The Hermogenic corpus justifies, to some extent, concentrating upon stasis theory as central to Hermogenes' view of rhetorical invention. As Patillon correctly points out, Hermogenes insisted that command of stasis theory was a preliminary task of the orator.⁴⁶ An equation of Hermogenic stasis theory with a Hermogenic inventional theory must be avoided, however: "This subject [of stasis] is almost identical with the theory of invention, except that it does not include all the elements of invention",⁴⁷ Hermogenes observes in the opening of his *On Stasis*. Invention is larger than stasis alone.

⁴⁵PATILLON (1997) pp. 67ff.

⁴⁶PATILLON (1988), p. 47.

⁴⁷ST 1.11-12. The translation is Heath's.

Clearly, the literature has room for a more focused and deliberate examination of specific adaptations, alterations, and creations, relative to earlier rhetorical theory, which can be found in the technical vocabulary of Hermogenes' γραφῶν εὐρετικῶν.

Section II. Consideration of the Question

A. Justification: Why the Question Matters

By examining alterations in the vocabulary of rhetorical invention surrounding Hermogenes' reconstitution of the subject, one accomplishes two important tasks. First, such an examination lays out in a detailed and specific manner some of the alterations in rhetorical theory which are represented in the Hermogenic *inventional* works, thus contributing to a more complete view on the history and development of rhetoric. Second, such an examination, once completed, provides the rhetorical theorist with an absolutely essential foundation upon which to build an understanding of rhetoric in Byzantium -- an area which has been neglected at best, and often ignored, by contemporary rhetoricians.

B. Method: Answering the Question

The question will be addressed in two distinct stages, first examining certain aspects of the Greek conceptual development of rhetorical invention in the era just before and after the founding of Constantinople, then contrasting this with the era which began immediately afterwards. These two periods, one in the dénouement of the united Roman Empire, one in the opening scenes of Byzantium's thousand-year reign, represent the two dominant schools of thought --

the latter inherited by the Byzantines -- regarding the nature of rhetorical invention.

More specifically, the first stage of the study will examine the technical vocabulary present in debates and discussions on invention which were prominent in the rhetorical schools in the era just prior to the Hermogenic transition. The specific texts involved in this examination will be discussed below.

The second stage will focus on a consideration of the technical vocabulary of invention which was employed in the Hermogenic texts. I am not, of course, attempting to prove that Hermogenes made a difference in the overall perspective of rhetorical theory. That is both well known and well documented, as we have seen. Rather, the major contribution of this study is to offer a detailed and deliberately narrow focus on the specifics of *how* that change was reflected in some of the technical vocabulary surrounding rhetorical invention.

This dissertation, thus, follows a standard methodology of developmental criticism based on philological considerations, chief among them, vocabulary comparison. The basic method of vocabulary comparison is an ancient one; Patriarch Photios of Constantinople, in fact, opens his famous ninth-century *Bibliotheca* with a review of one work which employed the methodology -- at least in part -- to great success,⁴⁸ and it has continued to play an effective role in a broad range of scholarship to this day. Numerous studies might be cited

⁴⁸BB 1.1a-2a.

where the method is employed to assist with questions of authorship,⁴⁹ dating of texts,⁵⁰ the accuracy and variations of texts,⁵¹ and textual histories.⁵² Language grows, develops, adapts and changes. When such matters are considered, it serves as little surprise that by simply comparing the vocabulary -- both the words and the means in which they are used -- or any other aspect of language, an enormous amount of information about two texts might be ascertained.

In order to consider in more detail the application of the method to the rhetorical artifacts in the present study, it is, of course, first necessary to discuss the texts themselves.

1. Texts Examined

The heuristic technical vocabulary of three of the fundamental works of rhetorical theory in the periods under review were chosen for consideration. Two of the texts are by (or attributed to⁵³)

⁴⁹SIDERAS (1987), e.g.

⁵⁰E.g., RUIJGH (1998); or GRISHIN (1981).

⁵¹E.g., TZIATZI-PAPAGIANNI (1997); or THIEL (1977), or REINER and KOVACS (1993).

⁵²E.g., SERIKOFF (1987); or SCHISSEL (1926); or ORTH (1929). See also, KENNEDY (1983), pp. 89-90 for passing reference to vocabulary development as an argument against Hermogenes' direct authorship of *Invention*.

⁵³Questions of actual authorship, while important in themselves, are of less concern to the present study. Far more significant is the fact that the Hermogenic texts, especially, were widely used and respected, and were, throughout the Byzantine era, viewed as Hermogenes' work. Also important is the fact that the two sets of texts (Anonymous Seguerianus' and the Hermogenic corpus) represent the standard views for the schools of thought with which they are associated, pre-Hermogenic and Hermogenic.

For the record, the author of Anonymous Seguerianus is, as the designation indicates, unknown. Furthermore, there is serious debate

Hermogenes while the remaining work is an anonymous treatise which summarizes a series of discussions and debates on rhetorical invention prior to the Hermogenic transition. The Hermogenic works represent the standard texts which altered the inventional landscape of rhetorical theory.

The authors and works to be considered are:

Work 1: The Anonymous Seguerianus, τέχνη τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου [The art of political speech], frequently abbreviated AnSg⁵⁴;

Work 2: Hermogenes, περὶ τῶν στάσεων [On stasis or On issues], frequently referred to simply as Stasis or St;⁵⁵

as to the authorship of the Hermogenic text *On Invention*, with scholarly opinion today generally accepting the claim that the author of the work was not Hermogenes. Suggestion is made, based in part upon vocabulary analysis, that the text belongs to the third century. PATILLON (1990) argues that the author wrote after Apsines' *On Figured Problems*, and identifies him as the sophist Aspasia, mentioned in Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists* (III.33), but all identifications are speculative. For more, see also the discussion in PATILLON (1988), 10f.

The author of *Invention*, whoever he (or she) may be, presents a work generally consistent with Hermogenes' outlook as presented in *Stasis*, though we shall, in the course of this study, note exceptions to that rule. In this dissertation, I will -- perilously -- assume the author of *Invention* to be masculine, and refer to him interchangeably as "the Hermogenic author" (emphasizing his general consistency with Hermogenes) or "[Pseudo]-Hermogenes", emphasizing the generally accepted, but by no means conclusive, view of authorship which holds the field today. I will speak of "Hermogenes" primarily in relation to *Stasis*, where his authorship remains unquestioned.

⁵⁴ The abbreviation "AnSg" stands in for both the work and the unknown author. The date is c. 190. Regarding AnSg: I have mostly used the critical text in DILTS and KENNEDY, which is accompanied by a somewhat uneven translation into English (the first ever into any modern language). References cited in this dissertation are to paragraph numbers from the more readily available edition of C. Hammer (post L. Spengel), *Rhetores Graeci*, vol. i Leipzig: Teubner, 1894, pp. 352-398. These paragraph numbers are conveniently displayed in the DILTS and KENNEDY text as well.

⁵⁵ *Stasis*: dated c. 200; I have used the critical text of Rabe (1913). Citations are by section and line number. Malcolm HEATH (1995) provides an English translation and extensive, superb, commentary. There is an earlier translation by Nadeau, 1964.

Work 3: [Pseudo]-Hermogenes, *περὶ εὐρέσεως* [*On invention*], frequently referred to simply as *Invention* or *Inv.*⁵⁶

AnSg summarizes the teachings of several schools of thought popular in his time, contrasting their perspectives and discussing their similarities. The author identifies his sources with regularity and consistency, and seems to provide no original commentary. The text does not appear to be a series of lecture notes, as is the case with, for example, the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle or Apsines. AnSg is ideal for the present purposes, providing, as it does, a tight summary and outline of rhetorical invention in the exact period in question. Dilts and Kennedy remark that the AnSg text, along with Apsines' *τέχνη ῥητορική*, "are probably the best surviving representatives of how rhetoric was taught in most Greek schools in the second and third centuries after Christ".⁵⁷ They consider AnSg "the best source we have in Greek for the debates among rhetoricians about rhetorical invention in the early empire",⁵⁸ and specifically remark on the text's independence from the Hermogenic tradition.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ *Invention*: dated some time, probably, in the third century; I have again used Rabe (1913). Citations are by book, section, line. Patillon has a French translation. I am unaware of any translation in English or German.

⁵⁷ DILTS and KENNEDY [hereafter, DK] (1997), p. ix. Apsines' work is far more a practical handbook of examples, and is virtually unconcerned with issues of theory, as DK note in passing, p. x.

⁵⁸ DK, p. x.

⁵⁹ DK, p. ix.

AnSg specifically identifies ten different authors as his sources:⁶⁰ "Alexander, son of Numenius", Apollodorus of Pergamum, Theodorus of Gadara, Neocles, Harpocraton, Zeno (of Athens?), Aristotle, Plato, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Chrysippus. Of the 253 sections in the work, 55 are specifically attributed to one (or more) of the above authors, with 20 citations of Alexander,⁶¹ four of Apollodorus,⁶² three of Theodorus,⁶³ twelve of Neocles,⁶⁴ four of Harpocraton,⁶⁵ two of Zeno,⁶⁶ two of Aristotle,⁶⁷ and one, each, of Plato,⁶⁸ Chrysippus,⁶⁹ and Dionysius.⁷⁰ In addition, there are 12

⁶⁰Which is not to say that he directly consulted all ten authors. Several seem to be taken second-hand from what others say; the Apollodoreans, e.g., seem to have their theoretical position presented from Alexander's point of view. Alexander, Neocles, Harpocraton, and Zeno seem to be AnSg's main (and primary) sources.

⁶¹Not 19, as DK mistakenly indicate in their introduction. It is worth observing that the introduction, notes and, especially, the glossaries and indices of the DK text are beset with numerous errors and should be approached with caution. Alexander is specifically cited in paragraphs 3, 30, 49, 50, 51, 62, 116, 121, 125, 129, 133, 135, 136, 144, 146, 155, 169, 200, 221, 222.

⁶²AnSg generally refers to "the Apollodoreans" as a school rather than quoting Apollodorus directly. See 26, 50, 113, 124.

⁶³As with the Apollodoreans, AnSg refers to "the Theodoreans" as a school. The citations are in 49, 103, 134.

⁶⁴46, 116, 125, 147, 149, 154, 157, 160, 170, 198, 214, 223.

⁶⁵8, 104, 159, 243.

⁶⁶48, 156.

⁶⁷102, 208.

⁶⁸207.

⁶⁹207.

⁷⁰253. Dionysius is actually quoted by Harpocraton, appearing within a section AnSg clearly identifies as coming from Harpocraton.

citations of "They" or "Some" (as in, "Some say... but Alexander replies...") as a source.⁷¹ Some of these citations are easily identifiable as the views of the Apollodoreans or Theodoreans,⁷² but the antecedent of others remains unclear.⁷³

AnSg seems to employ Alexander as his baseline text, often noting whether his other sources are in agreement or disagreement with Alexander,⁷⁴ though Neocles plays an almost equal role, as we shall see. While he specifically and frequently identifies his sources, a large part of AnSg's summary is not directly attributed to any of the above authors.

Dilts and Kennedy, analyzing the vocabulary and stylistic considerations of the text, forward what they consider to be a reasonable -- though admittedly speculative -- assignation of sources for the ambiguous paragraphs within AnSg. The scheme DK employ involves the verb tenses; there are, however, some serious difficulties with the underlying rationale and the application of their perspective. They note in their introduction⁷⁵ that passages specifically attributed to Alexander regularly employ the first-person plural. They then note that there are occasional but abrupt shifts to the second-person singular within the text. In one such

⁷¹3, 37, 52, 61, 79, 101, 112, 132, 134, 143, 158, 199.

⁷²See, e.g., 3, or 134.

⁷³See, e.g., 51, and N.B. footnote 62 in the translation of that section.

⁷⁴DK xi.

⁷⁵DK xiii.

shift,⁷⁶ Neocles is the identified author. They conclude, therefore, that those passages in which the second-person singular occurs generally involve Neocles as the source. Though speculative, the reasoning is, to this point, sound. The difficulty comes with the reversal of their premise and evidence within their application, i.e., within their notes, they almost exclusively apply their perspective by assigning any first person-plural passages to Alexander -- a conclusion clearly not supported by their argument. Nor indeed is this approach supported by the text; DK seem to take no notice of the fact that Neocles himself clearly uses the first-person plural on several occasions (cf., e.g., 210ff). We may, therefore, cautiously endorse DK's conclusions when they assign a passage to Neocles based upon the presence of a second-person singular verb. We should be more reserved in embracing their (more numerous) assignments of an Alexandrian genesis of a passage based solely upon the presence of a first-person plural verb. We shall give more direct consideration to the DK attributions as the need arises in our textual inquiries.

With the obvious exceptions of Aristotle, Plato, and Dionysius -- none of which serve directly as major sources for AnSg -- none of the authors cited by AnSg have complete texts which have survived, though Alexander authored an important work on figures of speech which is largely intact. There are a few other fragments of his

⁷⁶AnSg 41-47.

writing, according to Spengel.⁷⁷ None of the works which served as the basis of AnSg's compendium seem extant. Apollodorus and Theodorus are both well known, though their ideas are familiar to us mostly through their students, as well as through some later discussions of their points. Each of the authors headed a competing school of thought, centered largely on the theory of what constituted an ideal form of argument. The discussion was concerned with the structure of the parts of the speech.⁷⁸ The Apollodoreans insisted upon a formal consistency which grouped the parts together into a pure and chronological presentation, while the Theodoreans viewed an inter-mingling of the structures as a desirable thing in most circumstances.

Three⁷⁹ of the remaining authors mentioned by AnSg -- Neocles, Harpocration, and Zeno -- are all tentatively identified by Dilts and

⁷⁷See s.v. Alexander (author #0594), *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae Canon of Greek Authors and Works*.

⁷⁸The four general "parts of a speech" -- προοίμιον (proem, 843), διήγησις (narration, 285), πίστις (proof, 787), and ἐπίλογος (epilogue, 445) -- must not be viewed as one would, today, see the introduction, body, and conclusion of a speech. In order to understand the debate between the Apollodoreans and Theodoreans, it is necessary to recognize that the "parts of the speech" are tasks, or goals to be accomplished within the oration.

⁷⁹DK do not mention Chrysippus at the one point in the AnSg text where he is named, and the author is overlooked in their introduction to and comments on AnSg's sources and citations; they do mention him in one other footnote, in reference to Neocles' definition of pathos (AnSg 223, DK fn. 219 in the translation). They also footnote his one definite appearance in the text (AnSg 207) with a reference to the Arnim Fragmenta, though this same note (DK fn. 208) includes a somewhat puzzling cross-reference to a Quintilian passage which seems at best tangentially related to the statement footnoted. Nevertheless, given their Arnim reference, it is to be assumed that DK equated the Chrysippus named in AnSg with the philosopher Chrysippus of the first century before Christ. Cf. *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae Canon of Greek Authors and Works*, author #1264.

Kennedy⁸⁰ as belonging to the second century, and on this basis, coupled with the theoretical issues with which the anonymous author is concerned, they suggest a date of composition sometime around the end of the second century, or early in the third.⁸¹

Hermogenes, on the other hand, is of course most famous for his *περὶ ἰδεῶν λογοῦ* (*On the classifications [or ideas] of style*, commonly referred to simply as *On Style* or *On Ideas*). The Hermogenic works considered in the present study, however, represent the fundamental aspects of the heuristic, rather than the stylistic, restructuring which the Hermogenic corpus introduced. *Stasis* is well known, while *On Invention*, a much longer work, is much less well known. Within *Invention* are several original sections, and while we shall index the whole work in our vocabulary analysis, we will find our own interests focused primarily on Book 3, which deals directly with argumentative strategies and structures.

The works under consideration -- the AnSg text and the two Hermogenic texts -- represent two different perspectives on the heuristic aspects of rhetorical theory: before and after the Hermogenic transition. By comparing the technical vocabulary of each work, one may grasp some of the fundamental shifts in theory which took place after the founding of Constantinople, and which were

⁸⁰Neocles is somewhat problematic; the other two are more easily identified. See the discussion in DK's introduction, pp. x - xv.

⁸¹DK, p. xii.

taught in Byzantium, from the Hermogenic corpus, during her imperial reign.

2. Procedure Employed

A schematic flow chart of the research procedure is presented in Figure 1.1. The process begins by examining the three works (highlighted in the gray boxes near the center of the chart) of the authors under consideration. By a close reading of these works and an examination of translations, glossaries, and commentaries (where these were available) the heuristic technical vocabulary of each of these authors was noted, as the figure indicates with arrows flowing to the right of each work.

Each term isolated in this fashion was then lemmatized (reduced to its root form) and its attendant conceptual vocabulary (when it existed) was added to a single list. For example, in 85.5 AnSg uses the term ἀνασκεύασαι [will overcome, refute]. The lemma (or root) of this term is, of course, ἀνασκευάζω [I overcome, refute]; from this term, by recourse to the standard lexicons (ML, GS, Soph), we are able to discover both the noun, ἡ ἀνασκευή [refutation], and the adjective/adverb modifiers ἀνασκευαστικός -ή -όν /-κών [refutational / refutationally]. All three lemmatized terms (ἀνασκευάζω, ἀνασκευή, ἀνασκευαστικός) were then placed upon the list of technical vocabulary concerning invention.

To take a more familiar example, English will often employ the same root in the formation of nouns, verbs, and modifiers. Thus, the noun "danger", the verb "endanger", the adjective "dangerous", and




Figure 1.1
Methodological Procedure

the adverb "dangerously" all share a common root: "danger".

Furthermore, in English we may complete a (very roughly) equivalent idea with each of these terms:

"Danger lies beyond that door";
"You will endanger yourself if you walk through that door";
"Beyond that door is something dangerous";
"If you walk through that door, you're living dangerously".

Greek, as an inflected language of course, has the same ability and to a much higher degree of sophistication. For these reasons, simply isolating the terms actually employed in the works under consideration would have been inadequate to conduct the present study; where one author, out of stylistic preference, might always employ the noun, another might consistently choose a participle form of the verb to express the same idea.

Thus, once isolated, it was necessary to lemmatize each term, and then list the attendant grammatical lemma variations with the lemma of the original word. To return to our English example, when one technical term (say, "endangering") was recognized, its root had to be identified ("to endanger"), along with any conceptually attendant root words (dangerous, dangerously, danger). In this way, when one technical term was identified, several words were generally added to the list of technical terms.

Both authors, AnSg and Hermogenes, were considered in this fashion, and the technical terms each employed were combined into a single list to produce a Technical Vocabulary Grand List (TVGL), also highlighted in gray, like the authors, on the flow chart. One-thousand and ninety-one discrete entries are found on the TVGL. The

list is reproduced as Appendix I. For the sake of convenience, each term on the list has been assigned a unique reference number; when a specific term from the TVGL is mentioned within this dissertation, its attendant reference number will generally be given, usually in parentheses just after the term. Where a term occurs several times within a paragraph (or within a few lines of each other), only the first occurrence may be followed by a reference number. In addition to this reference number, one will also find, in Appendix I, a two-letter designation identifying the "conceptual family" to which each term belongs. Thus, to return to our example above, not only would the terms "danger", "dangerous", "dangerously" and "endanger" appear individually in the TVGL in alphabetical order, but each term would also receive, for convenience sake, an individual reference number (say, for example, 23, 24, 25, and 31). Finally, each of these terms would receive a shared, common, two letter designation (say, for example aG), identifying it as belonging to the same conceptual family as other terms with this same designation. The TVGL is reproduced in Appendix II, there indexed by conceptual family. This idea of the conceptual family will be taken up in greater detail in Chapter Two.

Once the technical vocabulary was recognized in each of the authors, and the TVGL was formed, the second step in the process was to compile a complete index linked to each of the works under consideration. Every Greek word (with the exception of articles, particles, and pronouns) in each of the works was noted, lemmatized, and referenced. This full index of each of the author's works is

indicated in Figure 1.1 by the box to the left of the name of that work. Given, then, the list of 1,091 technical terms, and the complete indices formed of each of the author's works, the next logical step was to cross reference the two.

Each TVGL term was looked up in the full index of each of the works, and every occurrence noted. This cross referencing produced an Index of Technical Vocabulary (ITV). The ITV is intended to contain every reference to every occurrence of every word that is both present on the TVGL and appears in any of the three works under consideration. In this process of indexing, every effort was made to be thorough. When one is dealing with a language as vigorously inflected as Greek, however, and a bulk of texts this large, it becomes impossible -- even in an age of computer searches -- to guarantee that either the TVGL or the ITV is uncompromisingly exhaustive. What can be reasonably forwarded is a claim that the Technical Vocabulary Grand List is a fair, reasonably representative, and moderately complete sampling of the technical terms dealing with rhetorical invention in the authors under our consideration, and that the ITV presents the vast majority of the occurrences of those terms in the same authors.

The ITV is divided into AnSg and Hermogenic references, and appears as Appendix III, and Appendix IV, respectively. Thus, every time AnSg uses any form of any term appearing on the TVGL, that occurrence will be noted in Appendix III, listed after its lemma. Likewise, any use of any form of any term on the TVGL in the Hermogenic corpus will be found in Appendix IV.

Once the ITV was completed one could, by reference to the standard lexicons, the glossaries of critical commentaries and texts, and the author's own texts, compare one author's use of a given term with that of another author as well as that of the more standard, non-technical use of that same term. Through such an examination, similarities and differences in the use of the TVGL terms by the Pre-Hermogenic authors and Hermogenes could be deduced and considered in some particularity. Beyond specific uses, general patterns of usage might also be discerned. This examination and its conclusions form the bulk of the dissertation.

Once these steps are completed, one may see more clearly the technical vocabulary as it stood when it became the foundation of Byzantine rhetoric.

Section III. Summary and Conclusion

In his discussion of Byzantine style as an image of the progression of Christian ideals, Kustas notes:

Byzantine rhetoric is an outgrowth from trends within the Second Sophistic movement, to which in time were grafted Neoplatonic and Christian conceptions of the function of language.... However, *no extended analysis has so far been made of the underlying principles of Byzantine rhetorical philosophy and their historical development.*⁸²

His observation from thirty-five years ago has been addressed in part through his own work and the contribution of Kennedy,⁸³ though on the whole his comments might have appeared yesterday. This study is

⁸²KUSTAS (1967), p. 1. Emphasis added.

⁸³KENNEDY (1983).

intended as a small contribution toward a remedy of the problem he outlined.

The question before us is a significant one, though a difficult one. Its exploration, though complex, may offer new information on the development of an instrumental aspect of rhetorical theory in a neglected period -- a period which, if explored in a careful and thorough academic fashion, might shed better light on some of the very questions and tensions⁸⁴ which contemporary rhetoricians often feel belong exclusively to our own era, here in the fading rays of the Enlightenment.

The work will proceed, then, on this outline: Chapter Two will present a statistical review of the use of the technical vocabulary in AnSg and Hermogenes. Chapter Three will discuss the use of that heuristic vocabulary in AnSg. Chapter Four will consider its use in the Hermogenic corpus. Chapter Five will present a comparison and contrast, where pre- and post-Hermogenic distinctions in the usage will be noted, outlined, argued for, and explained. Chapter Six will conclude the dissertation with a summary of differences, discussion of future directions for the study, and applications of the data.

⁸⁴See introduction, Section I.A, above.

CHAPTER TWO: THE TVGL DATA IN CONTEXT

If you want to hear
the essence of modernity, listen to those chords,
infernal, apocalyptic, and grossly sensual.
This is the authentic voice of the *fin de siècle*.
--Camille Paglia¹

This brevity in writing is called a comma.
We define comma as "what is smaller than a colon"...
--Demetrius²

It may be observed about most of language, but it is especially true about the language of criticism and composition: the vocabulary is notoriously cultural, self-referential, and metaphoric. We speak of sparkling prose (a compliment), or prosaic poetry (an insult). We speak of a dense article, flat characters, flowing passages, and a plot with loose ends. In the critical setting, the terms and phrases (flat, or dense, or loose ends, e.g.) take on a particularly technical task. Locating the occurrences and assessing the importance of that specifically technical vocabulary within any critical writing is a challenging task under the best of circumstances.

The terms, for example, may be used outside their technical sense: one may refer to a flat landscape as well as a flat character. Bearing this in mind, one is confronted with the first of a number of difficulties in vocabulary analysis as a method of

¹Sex, Art, and the American Culture (1992), p. 7f. She is discussing disco influences in the works of the singer Madonna.

²ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη βραχύτης κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν κόμμα ὀνομάζεται. ὀρίζονται δ' αὐτὸ ὧδε, κόμμα ἐστὶν τὸ κώλου ἑλαττον... DEMETRIUS, Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, [On Style], 9.

comparing large texts. Simply counting the number of occurrences of a given word in a given text tells one little. The word "flat" may occur eleven times within a text, but the question of how many of these occurrences reflect a critically technical use ("a flat character") and how many reflect a more common employment of the same term ("a flat landscape") remains a mystery when examining raw numbers alone.

Additionally, when one is comparing works, one must consider not only the number of occurrences a word has in a given work, but also its *relative frequency* within that work. Relative frequency notes how often a word occurs as a percentage (average number of occurrences per 100 words), a permillage (average number of occurrences per 1,000 words), or perdeximillage (average number of occurrences per 10,000 words) of the total work, and generally provides a more accurate gauge of an author's treatment of a subject.³ For example, the term ἐμπνεΐα (478), occurs only 8 times in AnSg, while occurring 13 times in Hermogenes' *Invention*. These raw numbers notwithstanding, the term is *more common* in AnSg, since the AnSg text is significantly shorter than *Invention*. When the *relative frequency* of the words is taken into account, one discovers that the occurrences of ἐμπνεΐα within AnSg account for about

³GOULET, e.g., reports in simple percentages while The Perseus Project, both in their printed and online material, reports in perdeximillage. Of course, the choice is only one of convenience: a matter of where one wishes to place the decimal point in order to simplify and clarify the reporting by eliminating as many zeros as possible. E.g., 0.0017 percent becomes a more readable 0.017 permill, and 0.17 perdeximill. The present study employs permillage (parts per thousand), which is abbreviated with the sign "m‰".

0.091% of the text (or, 0.91 m%), while the frequency for *Hermogenes* is only 0.064% (or, 0.64 m%). Given these numbers, we see that the term is more common in AnSg than in *Invention*. The answer, therefore, to the question of who more frequently uses the term is: AnSg does.

In the present chapter, author use of the TVGL terms will be presented. Such a presentation will involve a closer examination of the context in which the authors were writing, as well as the texts which they have written, in order to arrive more firmly at a knowledge of the changes in the technical vocabulary of invention which accompanied what we have, in Chapter One, referred to as the "Hermogenic transition".

The first section of the chapter will be devoted to establishing definitions and context. The second section of Chapter Two will consist of a general report of the use of the terms: their presence and frequency in the works, followed by a discussion of conceptual families, and a report on their use, as well.

Section I. Definitions and Context

Turning our attention, then, to definitions, "invention" is perhaps the logical place to begin. As stasis theory gained influence in the Latin West, it was subsumed under the canon of invention⁴ and it was this idea of invention which came to inform the Renaissance -- and later -- generations of rhetoricians, down to the present day.

⁴KENNEDY (1972); CLARK (1963); KENNEDY (1983), p. 52.

In the Greek West, however, the formalization was slightly different, and may be viewed schematically (in a somewhat idealized form⁵) in Figure 2.1. Greek rhetoricians, by the early centuries of this period, were often teaching a tripartite scheme⁶ based upon what they saw as three challenges, or tasks (ἔργον, 477; pl.: ἔργα) faced by the rhetor: analysis (νόσις, 671), invention (εὕρεσις, 509), and interpretation of the elements, or style (ἐρμηνεία, 478).

Analysis was a review of the rhetorical situation,⁷ and might include a consideration of εἶδος (class, 344), in which the rhetorical difficulty would be classified according to the dominant means of persuasion, τρόπος (manner or mode, 1012) in which the rhetorical difficulty would be examined with regard to its likely subject matter, and στάσις (stasis or issue, 896) in which one would locate the central point or persuasive fulcrum in the circumstances of the present rhetorical challenge.

Invention, under this scheme, generally included⁸ discussion of the parts of the speech and what was relevant to each, as well as adaptation of the general (contemporary rhetoricians would recognize them as largely Aristotelian) elements of argumentative strategies

⁵Figure 2.1 presents a generalization of the ἔργα; there is a distinctly Hermogenic aspect to its outline, but overall, it is a-historical. Hellenistic rhetorics had largely done away with the logos, pathos, ethos elements of the persuasive resources, as we shall see. The figure is, further, greatly simplified, particularly as regards the three aspects of stasis and the seven ideas of style.

⁶KENNEDY (1983), p. 52.

⁷See the discussion in HEATH (1995), pp. 8ff.

⁸KENNEDY (1983), p. 52; HEATH (1995), 7f.




Figure 2.1
The Rhetorical Ἔργα

such as the familiar logos-pathos-ethos division of persuasive resources. Additionally, consideration might be given to *περίστασις* (782), the circumstantial components of the rhetorical situation, though some considered *περίστασις* a matter of analysis rather than invention.

In style, the third and final task, attention was given to "interpreting" these constitutive elements properly, in other words, to issues of presentation and (far more) literary excellence, as the theorists understood it. By the sixth century this meant almost exclusively a consideration of the "ideas" or "types" of style as discussed in Hermogenes' *Περὶ ἰδεῶν*, *On Ideas*.⁹

The categories of the three *ἔργα* (477) were somewhat fluid, and the titles might vary.¹⁰ Additionally, the distinctions between analysis and invention were not always firm. Hermogenes, for example, clearly thinks of his *Stasis* as a work examining one aspect of *εὐρεσις* (509) as he himself makes perfectly clear in his introduction: "This subject (stasis theory) is almost identical with the theory of invention, except that it does not include all the elements of invention".¹¹ In spite of this direct observation on the part of Hermogenes, his work on stasis was eventually considered

⁹WOOTEN (1987), xvii; KENNEDY (1983), p. 52.

¹⁰Zeno, e.g., identified the three *ἔργα* as *νόησις*, *εὐρεσις*, and *διάθεσις*, with the latter incorporating every aspect of verbal delivery and organization of the material. Cf. HEATH's discussion in the introduction to his translation, esp. pp. 7-11.

¹¹ἔστι δὲ σχεδὸν ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ περὶ εὐρέσεως, πλὴν ὅσον οὐ πάντα ἔχει τὰ περὶ εὐρέσεως. ST 1.10, Tr: Heath.

an aspect of analysis (νόησις, 671) rather than invention (εὕρεσις). This transpired as later Greek rhetorical theorists codified the three ἔργα. Hermogenes' three main works (*Stasis, Invention, Ideas*) were then employed as the textbooks representing (respectively), each of those fundamental tasks of analysis (νόησις), invention (εὕρεσις), and style (ἐρμηνεία, 478).¹²

Given this tripartite classification, we see that stasis, for example, could be viewed as a sub-category of νόησις (671), quite distinct from εὕρεσις (509), invention, which was the second task of the rhetorician. So what, exactly, does "invention", or "inventional", or "heuristic" mean in the present study? Does it or does it not include the topics under νόησις?

I have chosen to cast a wide net, rather than limit the present study to a strict historical-linguistic accuracy. There are two reasons which serve as my justification for this choice. First, the idea of a strict "historical-linguistic accuracy" is largely fictional. The schema in Figure 2.1, if presented to any actual, individual Late Antique rhetorician (Latin or Greek) would do little more than begin a controversy of classifications, with one pointing out sins of omission while another highlighted inaccurate inclusions. As a general model summing up a general perspective, it serves us well. To opt for a strict historical accuracy, however, would necessitate choices which would place us firmly in one or the other of various competing historical camps of rhetorical

¹²KENNEDY (1983), p. 52; see esp. note 1.

organization. Is *τῶς* (1980) a matter of invention or presentation? Are the Aristotelian resources of persuasion a matter of *εὕρεσις* or of *νόησις*? Such debates are not the concern of the present study.

Which brings us to the second reason for casting a wide net when defining "invention". The present study is interested in examining the alterations within inventional theory which are reflected in the Hermogenic corpus, and which thus served as the foundation of Byzantine rhetoric. The larger the sample of our technical vocabulary -- so long as it remains manageable -- the higher the chance that we will be able to discern patterns within that sample. Thus, when I use the term "invention" and its cognates, I am referring to what, for many later Greek rhetoricians, would have been (at least) two distinct categories: *νόησις* (analysis), and *εὕρεσις* (invention, proper). By so doing, I incorporate the technical vocabulary of the parts of a speech, stasis, mode, and class into the TVGL as part of the widely defined area of "invention" -- the art of "generating effective material for a particular rhetorical situation".¹³ Patillon, in his discussion of the works of Hermogenes, casts a similarly wide net, defining invention as "the search for and discovery of the material which one might use in the discourse"¹⁴ and identifying it broadly with anything that, in modern terms, would be called "research".¹⁵

¹³COVINO and JOLLIFFE (1995), p. 22.

¹⁴ "L'invention consiste à rechercher et à découvrir les matériaux qui seront utilisés dans le discours." PATILLON (1997), p. 28.

¹⁵"C'est ce que nous appelons aujourd'hui la recherche des idées." PATILLON (1997), p. 28.

If, however, the goal of the present chapter, as stated above, is a consideration of "the technical vocabulary of and about invention",¹⁶ in the pre-Hermogenic and Hermogenic works, then a second term, in addition to "invention" needs defining. What exactly constitutes a *technical* term? I have generally chosen terms which represent classifications, types, species and subspecies of the aspect of the rhetorical situation under consideration by the authors. Thus, one will find τρόπος (1010, mode) listed on the TVGL, as well as ἄδοξος (10, disreputable), which Hermogenes identifies¹⁷ as a species of τρόπος. Πάθος (708, emotion, passion) appears on the TVGL as well as φόβος (1058, fear), which AnSg notes¹⁸ is one of the four species of pathetic motivation identified by Neocles.

Finally, we may turn our introductory attention to the authors themselves. Though AnSg has been, in Chapter One, referred to as a "Pre-Hermogenic" work, the author (very probably) lived and wrote at the same time as (or even after) Hermogenes, chronologically. The most likely date for AnSg is sometime toward the end of the second century.¹⁹ Nevertheless, AnSg takes "no account of the

¹⁶For the sake of convenience, I shall hereafter refer simply to "technical vocabulary" or "technical use" of certain terms. It should be understood that I mean technical use or vocabulary as limited to the consideration of *inventional* aspects of rhetoric, as just defined.

¹⁷ST 1.109.

¹⁸222-224.

¹⁹DK, pp. xiii.

restructuring of the subject [of rhetoric] by Hermogenes in the late second century",²⁰ for reasons cited earlier: Hermogenes, though not without influence, did not become the standard of rhetorical instruction for several centuries after his death. If the date assumed by scholars for the text is correct, then AnSg represents a view of rhetorical composition in the period preceding the establishment of the Hermogenic standards, and may be generally viewed as solidly "pre-Hermogenic" with respect to the theoretical outlooks the work presents.

Of course, this distinction does not make the text part of a world view completely removed from Hermogenes, and there is, thus, significant overlap in the vocabulary and theoretical perspective of the two groups, the Hermogenic corpus on one hand, and the pre-Hermogenic work on the other. For example, AnSg, as we have seen, presents ideas summarized from a number of earlier writers (Hermogenes is notably not among them) commenting on what he perceived to be the central concerns of rhetoric in his day, and yet he clearly organizes his treatise along the same general divisions of a speech with which Hermogenes is acquainted. Nevertheless, there are subtle, but recognizable differences present in the technical vocabulary and its use.

²⁰DK, p. ix.

Section II. The Presence of the Technical Vocabulary within the Texts

A. The Complete Data: Raw Count of Occurrences

The author's use of the TVGL terms is here reported in two tables. Table 2.1 presents the complete data for each of the 1,091 terms on the TVGL. Column headings in Table 2.1 are as follows:

Rf - Reference number.

This is the reference number to the term on the TVGL, as it appears beside that term in Appendix I.

Fq - Frequency in the given work.

This column reports the raw number of occurrences of any form of the lemma in the work in question. For example, some form (or forms) of ἀσάφεια (183) appears seven times in AnSg, but does not appear in *Stasis* or in *Invention*; αὐξησις (204) appears 12 times in AnSg, 3 times in Hermogenes' *Stasis*, and does not appear at all in *Invention*. An empty cell indicates that no form of the lemma occurs in the work, as in, e.g., ἄδοξία (9), which has no occurrences in AnSg or *Invention*, though the term does appear once in *Stasis*.

m% - permill (or millage) in the given work.

This column reports the relative frequency of the occurrences of any form of the lemma; the number given represents a measure of average occurrences per 1,000 words. For example, the term πάθος (708) occurs 21 times in AnSg, which represents an average of 2.4 occurrences in every one-thousand words. By way of contrast, in Hermogenes' *Stasis*, the same term appears 5 times, averaging only 0.48 occurrences per thousand words of the text. The word occurs

Table 2.1.1
Summary of Author Use: TVGL

Rf	An Sg		I N V		Ct
	Fq	m%	Fq	m%	
1		-		-	
2	3	0.34		-	HS
3	2	0.23	5	0.25	
4		-		-	A
5	1	0.11		-	
6	2	0.23		-	
7		-	7	0.34	HZ
8		-		-	
9		-		-	HS
10	1	0.11		-	
11		-		-	
12		-	3	0.15	HZ
13	1	0.11		-	A
14	3	0.34	9	0.44	
15	2	0.23	4	0.20	
16		-		-	
17		-		-	
18		-	2	0.10	Hi
19	1	0.11	11	0.54	
20		-		-	
21		-		-	
22		-		-	
23	13	1.48	45	2.21	
24		-		-	
25	1	0.11		-	
26		-	8	0.39	Hi
27		-		-	

28	1	0.11			
29		-			Hi
30		-			Hi
31		-			Hi
32		-			HZ
33	3	0.34			
34	3	0.34			
35		-			
36	1	0.11			A
37		-			
38		-			
39	1	0.11			
40	1	0.11			
41	2	0.23			
42	1	0.11			A
43		-			
44		-			
45	1	0.11			
46		-			
47		-			
48	1	0.11			A
49	1	0.11			A
50		-			
51	1	0.11			
52		-			Hi
53	7	0.80			
54	14	1.60			A
55	1	0.11			A
56		-			

[illegible][illegible]

Table 2.1 cont.

123	-	-	1	0.05	Hi
124	-	-	-	-	-
125	-	-	-	-	-
126	2	0.23	-	-	-
127	1	0.11	14	0.69	-
128	2	0.23	21	1.03	-
129	-	-	-	-	-
130	-	-	-	-	-
131	3	0.34	2	0.10	-
132	-	-	-	-	-
133	-	-	-	-	-
134	-	-	-	-	Hs
135	-	-	-	-	-
136	-	-	-	-	-
137	1	0.11	2	0.10	-
138	-	-	8	0.39	Hs
139	-	-	-	-	-
140	-	-	5	0.25	Hs
141	-	-	-	-	-
142	-	-	-	-	-
143	-	-	-	-	-
144	2	0.23	-	-	A
145	-	-	-	-	Hs
146	1	0.11	-	-	-
147	-	-	-	-	-
148	-	-	-	-	-
149	-	-	-	-	-
150	-	-	-	-	-
151	1	0.11	2	0.10	-
152	-	-	-	-	-
153	1	0.11	-	-	A
154	-	-	-	-	-
155	17	1.94	12	0.59	-

156	-	-	-	-	5	0.25	Hi
157	3	0.34	-	-	2	0.10	-
158	-	-	-	-	5	0.25	Hi
159	13	1.48	-	-	4	0.20	-
160	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
161	2	0.23	-	-	-	-	A
162	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
163	-	-	-	-	1	0.05	Hs
164	-	-	-	-	2	0.10	Hi
165	-	-	-	-	4	0.20	Hs
166	2	0.23	-	-	-	-	A
167	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
168	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
169	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
170	-	-	-	-	1	0.05	Hi
171	5	0.57	-	-	8	0.39	-
172	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
173	1	0.11	-	-	6	0.29	-
174	-	-	-	-	1	0.05	Hs
175	1	0.11	-	-	3	0.15	-
176	-	-	-	-	2	0.10	Hi
177	-	-	-	-	3	0.15	Hs
178	1	0.11	-	-	-	-	A
179	-	-	-	-	2	0.10	Hi
180	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
181	1	0.11	-	-	-	-	A
182	-	-	-	-	21	1.03	Hs
183	7	0.80	-	-	-	-	A
184	6	0.68	-	-	-	-	A
185	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
186	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
187	-	-	-	-	1	0.05	Hi
188	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 2.1 cont.

189	1	0.11	-	A
190	1	0.11	-	A
191		-	-	
192		-	-	
193		-	-	Hs
194		-	0.34	Hi
195		-	-	
196		-	-	
197	4	0.46	0.29	
198		-	-	
199		-	-	
200	1	0.11	-	A
201		-	0.15	
202	3	0.34	0.10	
203		-	-	
204	12	1.37	-	
205	1	0.11	-	A
206		-	-	
207	2	0.23	-	A
208		-	-	
209		-	-	Hs
210		-	0.05	Hi
211	1	0.11	0.15	
212		-	-	
213		-	-	
214		-	0.10	Hi
215		-	-	
216	7	0.80	0.10	
217	2	0.23	0.05	
218		-	-	
219		-	-	
220	4	0.46	-	
221		-	-	

222		-		
223	3	0.34		
224	1	0.11		
225		-		Hz
226		-		
227	2	0.23		
228		-		Hs
229		-		
230		-		
231		-		Hi
232		-		
233		-		
234	1	0.11		
235		-		Hz
236		-		
237		-		
238	4	0.46		
239		-		
240	1	0.11		
241		-		Hs
242		-		
243		-		Hi
244	2	0.23		A
245	1	0.11		A
246		-		
247	1	0.11		
248	1	0.11		
249	1	0.11		
250		-		
251		-		
252		-		
253	1	0.11		A
254	5	0.57		

Table 2.1 cont.

255	-	-	3	0.15	Hz
256	-	-		-	
257	3	0.34	6	0.29	
258	2	0.23		-	A
259	3	0.34	2	0.10	
260	1	0.11		-	A
261	-	-		-	
262	-	-		-	
263	-	-		-	
264	-	-		-	
265	-	-		-	
266	7	0.80	9	0.44	
267	-	-		-	Hi
268	1	0.11		-	A
269	-	-		-	
270	-	-	1	0.05	Hi
271	-	-	1	0.05	Hi
272	-	-		-	
273	-	-	1	0.05	Hi
274	-	-		-	
275	1	0.11		-	A
276	-	-		-	
277	-	-	10	0.49	Hi
278	-	-	16	0.79	Hi
279	-	-		-	
280	-	-	1	0.05	Hz
281	-	-		-	
282	-	-		-	
283	1	0.11	1	0.05	
284	1	0.11	3	0.15	
285	4	0.46	10	0.49	
286	-	-		-	
287	24	2.74	5	0.25	

288	8	0.91							
289	4	0.46						2	0.10
290	6	0.68						2	0.10
291	76	8.67						48	2.36
292		-							-
293		-							-
294		-							-
295		-							-
296	2	0.23						12	0.59
297		-							-
298		-							-
299		-							-
300		-							-
301	2	0.23						1	0.05
302		-						3	0.15
303		-						5	0.25
304		-							Hi
305		-							Hi
306		-							-
307		-							-
308		-							-
309		-							-
310		-							-
311	4	0.46						10	0.49
312		-							-
313	9	1.03						38	1.87
314	4	0.46						13	0.64
315		-						2	0.10
316		-							Hz
317		-							-
318		-							-
319		-							-
320		-							-

[illegible]

354	1	0.11				-	A
355		-				-	
356		-				-	
357		-				-	Hs
358		-				-	
359		-				-	
360		-				-	
361		-				-	
362	1	0.11			1	0.05	
363		-			1	0.05	Hi
364		-			8	0.39	HZ
365	2	0.23			8	0.39	
366	1	0.11			1	0.05	
367		-				-	Hs
368	4	0.46				-	
369		-				-	
370	1	0.11			2	0.10	
371	1	0.11				-	A
372		-			2	0.10	Hi
373		-			1	0.05	Hi
374		-				-	
375		-				-	
376		-				-	
377		-				-	
378	2	0.23				-	A
379	2	0.23			3	0.15	
380	1	0.11				-	A
381	1	0.11			13	0.64	
382	2	0.23			9	0.44	
383		-				-	
384		-				-	Hs
385	4	0.46			35	1.72	
386		-				-	

Table 2.1 cont.

387	4	0.46	1	0.05	
388	1	0.11	4	0.20	
389		-		-	
390		-	7	0.34	Hi
391		-	3	0.15	Hz
392		-		-	
393		-		-	
394	7	0.80	35	1.72	
395	2	0.23	1	0.05	
396		-		-	
397		-		-	
398		-		-	
399	2	0.23	11	0.54	
400		-	23	1.13	Hz
401		-	3	0.15	Hi
402		-	1	0.05	Hi
403		-		-	
404		-		-	
405		-		-	
406	1	0.11		-	A
407		-		-	
408		-		-	
409	1	0.11	10	0.49	
410	3	0.34	5	0.25	
411		-		-	
412	4	0.46	2	0.10	
413	1	0.11		-	A
414		-		-	
415		-		-	
416	3	0.34	4	0.20	
417		-		-	
418		-		-	
419	1	0.11		-	A

420		-		-	
421		-		-	HS
422		-	2	0.10	Hi
423		-		-	
424		-		-	
425	2	0.23		-	A
426		-		-	Hi
427	1	0.11	6	0.29	
428		-		-	
429		-		-	HS
430		-		-	
431		-		-	
432		-		-	HS
433	9	1.03	2	0.10	
434		-		-	
435		-		-	HS
436		-		-	
437	2	0.23		-	A
438	2	0.23	1	0.05	
439		-		-	
440	4	0.46		-	A
441		-		-	
442	1	0.11		-	A
443		-		-	
444		-		-	HS
445		-		-	
446	2	0.23		-	A
447		-		-	
448		-		-	
449		-		-	
450	5	0.57	1	0.05	
451	3	0.34		-	A
452	1	0.11		-	A

[illegible][illegible]

Table 2.1 cont.

519	1	0.11	1	0.05	
520		-		-	
521		-	2	0.10	Hi
522	11	1.26	29	1.42	
523	10	1.14	3	0.15	
524		-		-	Hs
525		-		-	
526	2	0.23	2	0.10	
527		-		-	
528	16	1.83		-	A
529		-	1	0.05	Hi
530		-		-	
531		-		-	
532	3	0.34		-	A
533	7	0.80		-	
534	2	0.23		-	
535		-	1	0.05	Hi
536	5	0.57	1	0.05	
537		-		-	
538		-		-	
539		-	9	0.44	Hs
540	2	0.23	1	0.05	
541		-		-	
542		-		-	
543		-		-	
544		-		-	
545	1	0.11	3	0.15	
546		-		-	
547		-		-	Hs
548	4	0.46	45	2.21	
549	3	0.34	5	0.25	A
550		-		-	
551	13	1.48	38	1.87	

552		-	6	0.68	
553		-		-	
554		-		-	
555		-		-	Hs
556		-		-	Hi
557	1	0.11		-	
558		-		-	
559	1	0.11		-	A
560	3	0.34		-	
561		-		-	
562		-		-	
563	2	0.23		-	
564		-		-	
565	6	0.68		-	
566		-		-	Hs
567	17	1.94		-	
568		-		-	
569	3	0.34		-	A
570	1	0.11		-	A
571		-		-	Hi
572		-		-	
573		-		-	
574		-		-	
575	2	0.23		-	
576	4	0.46		-	
577		-		-	
578	2	0.23		-	
579		-		-	
580	9	1.03		-	
581		-		-	Hi
582		-		-	
583		-		-	
584		-		-	

Table 2.1 cont.

585	29	3.31	5	0.25	Hi
586		-	2	0.10	Hs
587		-		-	Hs
588		-		-	Hs
589	1	0.11	7	0.34	
590		-		-	
591	67	7.65	109	5.35	
592	1	0.11	3	0.15	
593	4	0.46	2	0.10	
594		-		-	
595		-		-	
596		-		-	
597	2	0.23	33	1.62	
598	4	0.46	27	1.33	
599		-		-	
600		-	1	0.05	H2
601	4	0.46		-	A
602		-		-	
603		-		-	
604	3	0.34	11	0.54	
605		-	2	0.10	Hi
606	4	0.46	2	0.10	
607		-		-	
608		-		-	
609		-	1	0.05	Hi
610		-		-	
611		-		-	
612	1	0.11		-	A
613	2	0.23		-	A
614		-		-	
615	1	0.11		-	A
616	7	0.80	24	1.18	
617	1	0.11	2	0.10	

618	1	0.11		-	
619		-		-	Hs
620		-		-	
621		-	1	0.05	H2
622	1	0.11		-	
623	8	0.91		-	
624		-		-	
625		-		-	
626		-	5	0.25	H2
627	1	0.11	2	0.10	
628		-		-	
629		-	1	0.05	Hi
630	4	0.46		-	A
631	5	0.57		-	A
632		-		-	
633	1	0.11		-	A
634		-		-	Hs
635		-		-	Hs
636	1	0.11		-	
637		-		-	Hs
638	1	0.11	2	0.10	
639		-		-	Hs
640		-		-	Hs
641		-	1	0.05	H2
642		-	1	0.05	Hi
643		-		-	
644	4	0.46	6	0.29	
645		-		-	
646		-		-	
647		-		-	Hs
648		-	2	0.10	Hi
649		-		-	
650	1	0.11		-	A

Table 2.1 cont.

651	-	-	-	-	-
652	-	-	-	-	-
653	2	0.23	2	0.10	-
654	-	-	-	-	-
655	1	0.11	3	0.15	-
656	-	-	-	-	-
657	-	-	-	-	-
658	-	-	-	-	-
659	-	-	-	-	-
660	-	-	1	0.05	Hi
661	-	-	-	-	-
662	-	-	-	-	-
663	-	-	-	-	-
664	1	0.11	-	-	-
665	-	-	-	-	-
666	-	-	-	-	-
667	1	0.11	-	-	A
668	-	-	-	-	-
669	-	-	5	0.25	Hi
670	7	0.80	31	1.52	-
671	-	-	-	-	-
672	-	-	-	-	-
673	-	-	-	-	-
674	3	0.34	9	0.44	-
675	-	-	-	-	Hs
676	-	-	7	0.34	Hs
677	8	0.91	51	2.51	-
678	-	-	-	-	-
679	-	-	-	-	-
680	-	-	28	1.38	Hs
681	8	0.91	2	0.10	Hi
682	-	-	-	-	-
683	-	-	-	-	-

684	3	0.34	-	-	A
685	-	-	-	-	-
686	-	-	-	-	-
687	-	-	-	-	-
688	-	-	-	-	-
689	-	-	-	-	-
690	-	-	-	-	-
691	-	-	-	-	Hs
692	-	-	-	-	-
693	-	-	-	-	-
694	-	-	-	-	-
695	1	0.11	-	-	A
696	-	-	-	-	-
697	4	0.46	2	0.10	-
698	1	0.11	1	0.05	-
699	7	0.80	6	0.29	-
700	-	-	1	0.05	Hs
701	1	0.11	-	-	A
702	-	-	-	-	Hs
703	-	-	-	-	Hs
704	10	1.14	18	0.88	-
705	-	-	-	-	-
706	17	1.94	-	-	-
707	11	1.26	1	0.05	-
708	21	2.40	1	0.05	-
709	-	-	-	-	-
710	-	-	9	0.44	Hi
711	1	0.11	-	-	A
712	1	0.11	-	-	-
713	-	-	11	0.54	Hi
714	-	-	1	0.05	Hi
715	-	-	-	-	-
716	3	0.34	-	-	-

Table 2.1 cont.

717	-	-	-	-	HS
718	-	-	-	-	HS
719	12	1.37	30	1.47	
720	-	-	-	-	
721	1	0.11	1	0.05	
722	-	-	-	-	
723	1	0.11	-	-	A
724	-	-	-	-	
725	-	-	-	-	
726	-	-	-	-	
727	-	-	-	-	
728	7	0.80	-	-	A
729	-	-	-	-	
730	-	-	-	-	
731	-	-	-	-	
732	-	-	-	-	
733	-	-	6	0.29	Hi
734	-	-	-	-	
735	1	0.11	-	-	A
736	-	-	-	-	
737	2	0.23	-	-	
738	-	-	-	-	
739	-	-	-	-	
740	3	0.34	-	-	A
741	1	0.11	-	-	A
742	-	-	-	-	
743	5	0.57	-	-	A
744	-	-	-	-	
745	3	0.34	-	-	A
746	14	1.60	8	0.39	
747	3	0.34	4	0.20	
748	-	-	-	-	
749	-	-	-	-	

750	-	-	-	-	
751	-	-	-	-	
752	-	-	-	-	
753	7	0.80	6	0.29	
754	-	-	-	-	
755	1	0.11	-	-	A
756	-	-	-	-	
757	3	0.34	-	-	A
758	-	-	-	-	
759	5	0.57	-	-	A
760	-	-	-	-	
761	-	-	-	-	
762	1	0.11	-	-	A
763	-	-	-	-	
764	1	0.11	-	-	A
765	2	0.23	-	-	A
766	-	-	-	-	
767	-	-	-	-	
768	1	0.11	-	-	A
769	-	-	-	-	
770	-	-	-	-	
771	-	-	-	-	
772	-	-	-	-	
773	-	-	-	-	
774	9	1.03	9	0.44	
775	-	-	-	-	HS
776	-	-	-	-	Hi
777	-	-	-	-	Hi
778	5	0.57	30	1.47	
779	2	0.23	-	-	A
780	-	-	1	0.05	Hi
781	-	-	-	-	
782	3	0.34	16	0.79	

Table 2.1 cont.

783	1	0.11	-	A
784	7	0.80	4 0.20	
785		-	-	
786	1	0.11	-	A
787		-	-	
788		-	-	
789		-	-	
790		-	2 0.10	Hi
791		-	-	
792		-	-	Hs
793	6	0.68	4 0.20	
794	5	0.57	-	A
795		-	-	
796		-	2 0.10	H2
797	36	4.11	1 0.05	
798	7	0.80	-	A
799	4	0.46	-	A
800		-	1 0.05	Hi
801		-	-	
802		-	-	
803		-	-	
804		-	6 0.29	Hi
805		-	1 0.05	H2
806		-	1 0.05	Hi
807		-	-	
808		-	-	
809		-	-	
810		-	-	
811		-	5 0.25	Hi
812		-	-	
813		-	5 0.25	H2
814	1	0.11	-	
815		-	-	Hs

816	1	0.11	-	
817	73	8.33	133 6.53	A
818		-	-	Hs
819		-	-	
820		-	-	
821	2	0.23	5 0.25	
822	2	0.23	-	A
823	1	0.11	-	A
824	2	0.23	-	
825	1	0.11	35 1.72	
826		-	-	
827		-	-	Hs
828		-	-	Hs
829		-	-	
830		-	1 0.05	Hi
831		-	-	
832		-	2 0.10	Hi
833	2	0.23	7 0.34	
834		-	-	Hs
835		-	1 0.05	Hi
836		-	-	Hs
837	3	0.34	-	A
838	2	0.23	2 0.10	
839	8	0.91	-	A
840		-	-	
841		-	-	
842		-	-	
843		-	3 0.15	H2
844		-	20 0.98	Hi
845	1	0.11	16 0.79	
846		-	-	
847		-	-	
848		-	-	

Table 2.1 cont.

849	1	0.11		-	A
850	6	0.68	1	0.05	
851		-		-	
852	1	0.11		-	A
853	54	6.16	41	2.01	
854	1	0.11		-	A
855		-		-	Hs
856		-		-	
857		-	1	0.05	Hi
858		-		-	Hs
859		-		-	Hs
860	1	0.11		-	A
861		-		-	
862	3	0.34		-	A
863	7	0.80	34	1.67	
864		-		-	
865		-	4	0.20	Hi
866		-		-	
867		-		-	
868		-		-	
869		-	39	1.92	Hi
870		-		-	
871		-		-	
872	2	0.23		-	A
873		-	2	0.10	Hi
874		-	4	0.20	Hs
875	1	0.11		-	A
876	2	0.23		-	
877		-		-	
878		-		-	
879		-		-	
880	2	0.23	2	0.10	
881	3	0.34	5	0.25	

882				-					
883	3	0.34				1	0.05		Hs
884		-				18	0.88		
885	4	0.46				1	0.05		
886		-					-		
887		-					-		
888		-					-		
889	9	1.03					-		
890		-					-		
891	2	0.23					-		A
892		-					-		
893	1	0.11				8	0.39		
894	2	0.23					-		A
895		-					-		
896	5	0.57				8	0.39		
897		-					-		
898		-					-		
899		-					-		Hs
900	2	0.23					-		
901		-					-		
902		-					-		
903		-				3	0.15		Hs
904		-					-		
905		-					-		Hs
906		-					-		
907		-					-		
908		-					-		
909	2	0.23					-		A
910		-					-		
911		-					-		Hs
912		-					-		
913		-					-		
914		-					-		

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Table 2.1 cont.

981	4	0.46	-	4	0.20	A
982		-	-			Hi
983		-	-			
984	1	0.11	-			A
985		-	-			
986		-	-			
987	6	0.68	-			A
988		-	-			
989		-	-			
990		-	-			
991	1	0.11	-			A
992		-	-			
993	1	0.11	-			
994		-	-			
995	3	0.34	-	8	0.39	
996		-	-	1	0.05	H ₂
997		-	-			
998		-	-	2	0.10	Hi
999		-	-	1	0.05	Hi
1000		-	-			
1001	3	0.34	-	30	1.47	
1002		-	-			
1003		-	-	2	0.10	Hi
1004	9	1.03	-	19	0.93	
1005		-	-			
1006		-	-			
1007		-	-	1	0.05	H ₂
1008	1	0.11	-			
1009	21	2.40	-	22	1.08	
1010	1	0.11	-	7	0.34	
1011	7	0.80	-	1	0.05	
1012	10	1.14	-	37	1.82	
1013	1	0.11	-	1	0.05	

1014		-				
1015		-				
1016		-				
1017	1	0.11				
1018		-				
1019		-				Hi
1020		-				
1021		-				H ₂
1022		-				
1023		-				
1024		-				Hi
1025	13	1.48				
1026		-				
1027		-				Hi
1028	2	0.23				A
1029		-				
1030	1	0.11				
1031		-				
1032	7	0.80				
1033		-				Hi
1034	1	0.11				A
1035		-				
1036		-				H ₂
1037	1	0.11				A
1038		-				
1039		-				
1040	1	0.11				A
1041		-				Hi
1042		-				
1043		-				Hi
1044	4	0.46				
1045		-				
1046		-				

Table 2.1 cont.

1047	-	-	-	-	-	-
1048	-	-	-	-	-	-
1049	1	0.11	-	-	-	A
1050	-	-	-	-	-	-
1051	-	-	-	-	-	-
1052	2	0.23	-	2	0.10	-
1053	-	-	-	-	-	-
1054	-	-	-	4	0.20	Hi
1055	-	-	-	-	-	-
1056	-	-	-	-	-	-
1057	-	-	-	-	-	-
1058	7	0.80	-	-	-	-
1059	-	-	-	-	-	-
1060	7	0.80	-	-	-	A
1061	-	-	-	-	-	-
1062	-	-	-	-	-	-
1063	2	0.23	-	-	-	A
1064	-	-	-	-	-	-
1065	1	0.11	-	-	-	A
1066	-	-	-	-	-	-
1067	-	-	-	-	-	-
1068	-	-	-	-	-	-
1069	-	-	-	-	-	-
1070	-	-	-	-	-	-
1071	1	0.11	-	-	-	A
1072	-	-	-	-	-	HS
1073	-	-	-	5	0.25	Hi
1074	5	0.57	-	4	0.20	-
1075	-	-	-	-	-	-
1076	3	0.34	-	14	0.69	-
1077	1	0.11	-	1	0.05	-
1078	-	-	-	-	-	-
1079	-	-	-	-	-	-

1080	-	-	-	-	-	-
1081	1	0.11	-	-	-	A
1082	-	-	-	-	-	-
1083	-	-	-	-	-	-
1084	-	-	-	-	-	-
1085	-	-	-	-	-	-
1086	1	0.11	-	-	-	A
1087	-	-	-	-	-	-
1088	-	-	-	1	0.05	Hi
1089	4	0.46	-	2	0.10	-
1090	-	-	-	-	-	-
1091	-	-	-	-	-	-

only once in the entire text of *Invention*, representing a meager 0.05 occurrences per one-thousand words of that text.

Ct - Category.

This column presents a quick guide to any lemma that is unique to one of the three authors, based on the following code:

A: term unique to AnSg (as in, e.g., ἀνανέωσις, 63).

Hi: term unique to *Invention* (as in, e.g., ἀνακαλέω, 52)

Hs: term unique to *Stasis* (as in, e.g., νομικός, 675)

H_z: term unique to Hermogenes, but occurring in both of the Hermogenic works (as in, e.g., ἀνθορισμός [79], which occurs in both *Stasis* and *Invention*, but has no occurrences in AnSg).

An empty cell in this column indicates a term which is not unique. It may be that the term does not occur in any of the authors (as in, e.g., ἀγωνιάω, 4), or that the term occurs in both AnSg and Hermogenes (as in, e.g., ἀκέφαλος, 28, which occurs in both AnSg and *Invention*).

It will be noted that Table 2.1 indicates 149 terms which are unique to AnSg. Furthermore, Table 2.1 indicates 225 terms unique to Hermogenes, 76 of which occur only in *Stasis*, 102 of which occur only in *Invention*, and 47 of which occur in both Hermogenic works, but are without occurrences in AnSg.

Such numbers present the first tangible indication of textual locations where one might begin to investigate and outline how the Hermogenic transition was reflected in the heuristic vocabulary of the works we have chosen to examine. Even before that more

particular search begins, however, it is necessary to narrow the field, and sharpen the focus. This is best done by introducing the idea of conceptual families.

B. The Complete Data: Conceptual Families

It will be recalled that the TVGL was assembled in a three-step process which involved: 1) identification of a technical term (usually, though not always, a noun) in the literature; 2) a discovery of the lemma, or root, of that technical term; 3) gathering lemmas which were related, conceptually, to the original lemma. Thus, when a lemma such as "representation" (ἡ διατύπωσις, 285) was identified, the verbs and modifiers related to that term -- in this case "to represent" (διατυπώω, 284) and "representational" (διατυπωτικός, 286) -- were also added to the TVGL. Together, the three terms may be thought of as a grammatical grouping, or, more accurately, a "conceptual family". Bringing terms together into conceptual families has two pronounced advantages.

First, Greek grammar is such that ideas may be expressed with far more flexibility than is found in English. When a politician says, "The poor want true opportunity, not false promises", that politician is using an adjective (poor) as a substantive -- as a noun representing a class or group -- and is signaling this use by placing the definite article directly before the adjective. Politicians similarly employ participles as substantives, when, after a hurricane or tornado they say, "*Those suffering* tonight in Florida should know that help is on the way". Greek employs this same principle, using various parts of speech as nouns, but with a

much greater frequency and diversity. For this reason, exploring a Greek writer's use of a concept may well necessitate a broader grammatical range than would a similar vocabulary study in English. For the sake of completeness, then, it is wise to view the terms on the TVGL as members of a conceptual family when exploring an author's use of a given concept (such as "representation").

Second, conceptual families sharpen the focus on those areas where unique terminology is employed in one of the works. For example, the term στοχασμός (899, "a goal, an aim, a conjecture") is one of those 225 terms which are unique to Hermogenes. When we look closer, however, we discover that the adjective of this term (στοχαστικός, 900, conjectural) occurs both in Hermogenes and in AnSg. Thus, this idea, viewed as a conceptual family, ceases to appear uniquely within Hermogenes. On the other hand, where whole conceptual families do remain unique to an author or work, such uniqueness stands out far more strongly than the uniqueness of any individual term. Such conceptual uniqueness serves as a moderately firm indicator of an area where one might find some reward in an investigation of how heuristic concepts and vocabulary were changing.

On the TVGL, found in Appendix I, each listing includes, in addition to its reference number, a two letter designation. These two letters identify the conceptual family to which a term belongs. Members of the same family are usually next to each other alphabetically, though there are exceptions. Προμιαστέον (1061), for example, is in the same conceptual family (KP) as προμιαζομαι

(850). This fact would not be immediately clear by simply scanning the TVGL in Appendix I. Thus, the TVGL is reproduced in Appendix II, this time grouped by conceptual families. There are 340 conceptual families present in Appendix II. Any phrase (more than one word) found on the TVGL is assigned its own family designation, even when a term (or terms) within that phrase are also present on the TVGL. For example, ἄτεχνος πίστις (inartistic proof, 798) is assigned its own family designation (jV), even though πίστις ("proof", 789) is also listed on the TVGL, and has its own conceptual family (jU).

A summary of author use of the conceptual families is presented in Table 2.2, employing essentially the same format and abbreviations as those found in Table 2.1, with the single exception that the Rf (reference number) has been replaced by "Fam" for "conceptual family" as a reference point

Where conceptual families are discussed in the text of this study, they are, for the sake of convenience, generally associated with some particular term (usually the primary noun) from within the family. This term may be thought of as representing the whole vocabulary range of that family concept. For example, the conceptual family a0 contains three terms: ἀμφιβάλλω (to make a thing doubtful, uncertain, 38), ἀμφιβολία (ambiguity, 39), and ἀμφίβολος (ambiguous, 40). When discussing the a0 family, therefore, one will find the discussion associated with the noun ἀμφιβολία. For example: "AnSg discusses ἀμφιβολία (ambiguity, a0) as a function of the conclusion. In fact, it is recommended that the speaker seek out

Table 2.2
Summary of Author Use: Conceptual Families

Fam	An sg		I N V		Ct
	Fq	m8	Fq	m8	
aA	7	0.80	2	0.10	
aB		-		-	Hs
aC	8	0.91	5	0.25	
aD		-	7	0.34	Hs
aE	1	0.11		-	Hs
aF	1	0.11	3	0.15	
aG	3	0.34	9	0.44	
aH	2	0.23	6	0.29	
aI	1	0.11	11	0.54	
aJ	14	1.60	53	2.60	
aK	1	0.11	1	0.05	
aL		-	15	0.74	Hi
aM	6	0.68	2	0.10	
aN	1	0.11		-	A
aO	2	0.23	1	0.05	
aP	3	0.34		-	
aQ	1	0.11	1	0.05	
aR	1	0.11		-	A
aS	1	0.11	1	0.05	
aT	1	0.11	10	0.49	
aU		-	2	0.10	Hi
aV	22	2.51		-	
aW	16	1.83		-	A
aX	4	0.46		-	A
aY	4	0.46	3	0.15	
aZ	2	0.23		-	A
bA	1	0.11		-	A

bB		-			
bC		-			
bD	1	0.11			
bE	1	0.11			
bF	3	0.34			A
bG	2	0.23			
bH		-			Hs
bI		-			Hs
bJ		-			Hs
bK		-			Hi
bL		-			Hs
bM	1	0.11			
bN	1	0.11			
bO		-			Hs
bP	3	0.34			
bQ		-			Hi
bR	2	0.23			
bS	3	0.34			
bT		-			Hs
bU	1	0.11			
bV		-			Hs
bW		-			Hs
bX	2	0.23			A
bY		-			Hs
bZ	1	0.11			
cA	1	0.11			
cB	18	2.05			
cC	16	1.83			
cD	2	0.23			A
cE		-			Hs

Table 2.2 cont.

cF	2	0.23	1	0.05	
cG	6	0.68	14	0.69	
cH		-	1	0.05	HZ
cI	1	0.11	8	0.39	
cJ	1	0.11	2	0.10	
cK		-	21	1.03	HZ
cL	13	1.48		-	A
cM	1	0.11	1	0.05	
cN	1	0.11		-	A
cO		-		-	Hs
cP	4	0.46	13	0.64	
cQ	1	0.11	3	0.15	
cR	18	2.05	2	0.10	
cS		-	1	0.05	HZ
cT	1	0.11	5	0.25	
cU	2	0.23	1	0.05	
cV	7	0.80		-	
cW		-		-	Hs
cX	3	0.34	9	0.44	
cY	1	0.11	15	0.74	
cZ	4	0.46	30	1.47	
dA	1	0.11	1	0.05	
dB		-		-	Hs
dC	3	0.34	1	0.05	
dD	1	0.11		-	
dE	2	0.23	1	0.05	
dF	2	0.23	1	0.05	
dG	8	0.91	10	0.49	
dH	6	0.68	2	0.10	
dI	7	0.80	9	0.44	
dJ		-		-	Hs
dK	1	0.11		-	A

dL		-			1	0.05	Hi
dM		-			2	0.10	Hi
dN	1	0.11				-	A
dO		-			26	1.28	Hi
dP		-			1	0.05	HZ
dQ	5	0.57			13	0.64	
dR	32	3.65			7	0.34	
dS	6	0.68				-	A
dT	80	9.13			50	2.46	
dU		-				-	Hs
dV	4	0.46			13	0.64	
dW		-				-	Hs
dX		-			8	0.39	Hi
dY		-				-	Hs
dZ	4	0.46			10	0.49	
eA	13	1.48			53	2.60	
eB	10	1.14			92	4.52	
eC	1	0.11				-	A
eD	1	0.11				-	
eF	1	0.11			7	0.34	
eG		-			1	0.05	HZ
eH		-			5	0.25	HZ
eI	19	2.17			11	0.54	
eJ	12	1.37			20	0.98	
eK	1	0.11			5	0.25	
eL		-				-	Hs
eM	14	1.60			1	0.05	
eN	1	0.11				-	A
eO	1	0.11				-	A
eP		-				-	Hs
eQ	1	0.11			1	0.05	
eR	2	0.23			17	0.84	

eS	5	0.57	1	0.05	
eT	2	0.23	2	0.10	
eU		-	3	0.15	Hi
eV	2	0.23		-	A
eW	3	0.34	3	0.15	
eX	3	0.34	22	1.08	
eY	4	0.46	35	1.72	
eZ	5	0.57	5	0.25	
fA		-	7	0.34	Hi
fB		-	3	0.15	Hz
fC	9	1.03	36	1.77	
fD	2	0.23	37	1.82	
fE		-	1	0.05	Hi
fF	1	0.11		-	A
fG	4	0.46	15	0.74	
fH	5	0.57	2	0.10	
fI	3	0.34	4	0.20	
fJ	1	0.11		-	A
fK		-	2	0.10	Hi
fL	2	0.23		-	A
fM	1	0.11	7	0.34	
fN		-		-	Hs
fO		-		-	Hs
fP	9	1.03	2	0.10	
fQ	2	0.23		-	A
fR	6	0.68	1	0.05	
fS	1	0.11		-	A
fT	2	0.23		-	
fU	5	0.57	1	0.05	
fV	43	4.91		-	
fW	4	0.46		-	A
fX	3	0.34		-	A

fY	2	0.23
fZ	20	2.28
gA	-	-
gB	11	1.26
gC	8	0.91
gD	-	-
gE	-	-
gF	2	0.23
gH	6	0.68
gI	4	0.46
gJ	8	0.91
gK	8	0.91
gL	1	0.11
gM	1	0.11
gN	21	2.40
gO	-	-
gP	2	0.23
gQ	16	1.83
gR	10	1.14
gS	2	0.23
gT	5	0.57
gU	2	0.23
gV	1	0.11
gW	-	-
gX	20	2.28
gY	6	0.68
gZ	1	0.11
hA	1	0.11
hB	11	1.26
hC	-	-
hD	21	2.40
hE	-	-

hF	2	0.23	3	0.15	
hG	6	0.68	46	2.26	
hI	9	1.03	39	1.92	
hK		-	1	0.05	Hi
hL	29	3.31	5	0.25	
hM	68	7.76	11	5.80	
			8		
hN	5	0.57	5	0.25	
hO	6	0.68	60	2.95	
hP	7	0.80	12	0.59	
hQ	5	0.57	5	0.25	
hR	4	0.46		-	A
hS		-	1	0.05	H2
hT	8	0.91	26	1.28	
hU	9	1.03		-	
hV	1	0.11	8	0.39	
hW	10	1.14		-	A
hX		-		-	Hs
hY	1	0.11		-	
hZ		-		-	Hs
iA	1	0.11	2	0.10	
iB		-		-	Hs
iC	1	0.11	1	0.05	
iD		-	1	0.05	H2
iE	4	0.46	6	0.29	
iF	1	0.11	2	0.10	
iG	3	0.34	6	0.29	
iH	1	0.11		-	
iJ	1	0.11		-	A
iK	7	0.80	36	1.77	
iL	11	1.26	67	3.29	
iM	8	0.91	30	1.47	
iN	3	0.34			A

iO		-		Hs
iP	1	0.11		A
iQ	5	0.57	3	0.15
iR		-		Hs
iS	18	2.05	25	1.23
iT	49	5.59	2	0.10
iU	1	0.11	9	0.44
iV	1	0.11	12	0.59
iW	3	0.34		-
iX	14	1.60	31	1.52
iY	7	0.80		A
iZ		-	6	0.29
jA	1	0.11		A
jB	2	0.23		Hi
jC	4	0.46		A
jD	5	0.57		A
jE	20	2.28	12	0.59
jF		-	1	0.05
jG	12	1.37	6	0.29
jH	5	0.57		A
jI	2	0.23		A
jJ	2	0.23		A
jK	1	0.11		A
jL	9	1.03	9	0.44
jM		-		Hs
jN	5	0.57	35	1.72
jO	2	0.23		A
jP	7	0.80	5	0.25
jQ	4	0.46	16	0.79
jR	1	0.11		A
jS		-	2	0.10
jT		-		Hs

Table 2.2 cont.

jU	36	4.11	4	0.20	
jV	7	0.80		-	A
jW	4	0.46		-	A
jX		-	6	0.29	Hi
jY		-	12	0.59	HZ
jZ	1	0.11		-	
kA		-		-	Hs
kB	1	0.11		-	A
kC	77	8.79	13	6.78	
			8		
kD	3	0.34	35	1.72	
kE		-		-	Hs
kF		-	1	0.05	Hi
kG	2	0.23	9	0.44	
kH		-	1	0.05	HZ
kI		-		-	Hs
kJ	5	0.57	2	0.10	
kK	11	1.26	4	0.20	
kL	8	0.91	4	0.20	
kM		-	23	1.13	HZ
kN	1	0.11	16	0.79	
kO	1	0.11		-	A
kP	62	7.08	42	2.06	
kQ		-		-	Hs
kR		-	1	0.05	Hi
kS		-		-	Hs
kT	1	0.11		-	A
kU	3	0.34		-	A
kV	7	0.80	34	1.67	
kW		-	4	0.20	Hi
kX	2	0.23	41	2.01	
kY	3	0.34		-	
kZ		-	1	0.05	HZ

lA	4	0.46			
lB	11	1.26			
lC	3	0.34			
lD	5	0.57			
lE	2	0.23			
lF		-			HZ
lG	2	0.23			-
lH		-			Hs
lI	1	0.11			A
lJ		-			15 0.74 Hi
lK		-			1 0.05 HZ
lL		-			-
lM	1	0.11			6 0.29 Hs
lN	2	0.23			16 0.79
lO	2	0.23			7 0.34
lP		-			1 0.05 HZ
lQ		-			1 0.05 HZ
lR	10	1.14			7 0.34
lS	2	0.23			11 0.54
lT	3	0.34			-
lU	20	2.28			2 0.10 A
lV	2	0.23			-
lW		-			1 0.05 Hi
lX	3	0.34			-
lY	4	0.46			-
lZ	12	1.37			-
mA	3	0.34			69 3.39
mB	12	1.37			3 0.15
mC	1	0.11			17 0.84
mD	6	0.68			-
mE	3	0.34			-
mF	5	0.57			11 0.54
					31 1.52

Table 2.2 cont.

mG	9	1.03			22	1.08	
mH	22	2.51			22	1.08	
mJ	18	2.05			45	2.21	
mK	1	0.11			2	0.10	
mL	1	0.11			4	0.20	
mM	8	0.91			25	1.23	
mO		-			34	1.67	Hz
mP	13	1.48			8	0.39	
mQ	2	0.23			1	0.05	
mR	8	0.91			9	0.44	
mS	2	0.23				-	
mT	1	0.11				-	A
mU		-			19	0.93	Hi
mV	4	0.46			5	0.25	
mW	3	0.34			2	0.10	
mX	7	0.80			4	0.20	
mY	7	0.80				-	A
mZ	3	0.34				-	A
nA	1	0.11				-	A
nB		-			5	0.25	Hz
nC	5	0.57			4	0.20	
nD	3	0.34			14	0.69	
nE	1	0.11			1	0.05	
nF	1	0.11				-	A
nG	1	0.11				-	A
nH		-			1	0.05	Hi
nI	4	0.46			2	0.10	

ἀμφιβολία if there is any question as to...." Ἀμφιβολία should be understood here as a reference to the entire conceptual family. Where, then, a two letter family reference (rather than a specific number) is contained in the parenthetical material after a word, the reference in question may be to *any member* of the identified family, not necessarily to the specific word mentioned. By contrast, parenthetical identification given in the form of a number always represents the *specific* word under discussion. Identification by conceptual family is by far the more common practice of the present study.

Turning, then, to Table 2.2, it will be noted that no conceptual family is without at least one occurrence in at least one of the texts under review. Given the way the TVGL was formed, this is, of course, to be expected. What is of interest, however, is to note that Table 2.2 reveals 65 conceptual families which are unique to AnSg.²¹ Furthermore, another 89 families are unique to Hermogenes, 36 with occurrences only in *Stasis*,²² 27 only in *Invention*,²³ and an additional 26 families occurring in both *Stasis* and *Invention*, but not in AnSg.²⁴ This means that 154 of the 340

²¹ aN, aR, aW, aX, aZ, bA, bF, bX, cD, cL, cN, dK, dN, dS, eC, eN, eO, eV, fF, fJ, fL, fQ, fS, fW, fX, fY, gF, gH, gI, gL, hA, hR, hW, iJ, iN, iP, iY, jA, jC, jD, jH, jI, jJ, jK, jO, jR, jV, jW, kB, kO, kT, kU, lI, lT, lV, lX, lY, mC, mD, mT, mY, mZ, nA, nF, nG.

²² aB, bI, bL, bO, bT, bY, cO, cW, dB, dJ, dU, dW, dY, eL, eP, fN, fO, gD, gE, gO, gW, hC, hX, hZ, iB, iO, iR, jM, jT, kA, kE, kI, kQ, kS, lH, lL.

²³ aL, aU, bC, bK, bQ, dL, dM, dO, dX, eU, fA, fE, fK, gA, hE, hK, iZ, jF, jS, jX, kF, kR, kW, lJ, lW, mU, nH.

²⁴ aD, bB, bH, bJ, bV, bW, cE, cH, cK, cS, dP, eG, eH, fB, hS, iD, jY, kH, kM, kZ, lF, lK, lP, lQ, mO, nB.

conceptual families -- over 45% -- represent technical vocabulary not shared between AnSg and the Hermogenic works.

Once again, there is some indication here of differing approaches and vocabulary having gathered around inventional theory, but (extreme) caution is in order. These numbers tell us almost nothing about such a distinction, and cannot even be viewed with complete reliability. To take one quick example, the fD (ἐνστάσις, denial) family has 2 occurrences in AnSg (giving it a 0.23 m%), 8 in *Stasis* (0.76 m%), and 37 in *Invention* (1.82 m%). With occurrences in both groups, the family is not, therefore, considered unique to either the Pre-Hermogenic or the Hermogenic works. A closer examination, however, reveals that the two occurrences of the fD family in AnSg²⁵ do not involve a rhetorically technical use of the term. Pragmatically, then, with respect to its appearance as a technical term within the texts, the fD family is, in fact, uniquely Hermogenic, without a single technical occurrence in AnSg. The numbers alone would never indicate this.

What the numbers do offer, however, is a chance to focus on likely places to begin a more detailed -- and text centered -- review of the works, in order to discover direct textual expression of the distinctions between the Hermogenic and Pre-Hermogenic use of heuristic vocabulary. Clearly, unique terms are one place to begin, but in a search for the details of differing heuristic vocabulary,

²⁵AnSg 47, where the verb form of the term is used in the common meaning of "to place, present, set." In *On Invention* the term is a species of λύσις, (hO) refutation.

one should not neglect those families where high relative occurrences in one group are set against very low relative occurrences in another, as in the example of the fD family, given just above. Of course, other, shared terms, with differing shades of meaning appear once one begins to contextualize the vocabulary and engage the texts, as we shall see.

CHAPTER THREE:
SOME TECHNICAL VOCABULARY IN AnSg

Every man with a bellyful of the classics
is an enemy to the human race.
-- Henry Miller¹

An exhaustive textual review of the use of each occurrence of each member of all 340 conceptual families in each of the three works is, of course, impractical here. What can be done, using the data of Chapter Two as a guide, is to examine certain theoretical aspects of invention in each of the works and carefully compare the use of some of the technical vocabulary employed. Additionally, selected conceptual families may also be reviewed, as the need is indicated by context, or hinted at by the above numbers.

The most detailed textual attention will be given to those terms most directly related to the ideas of proof, argument, and evidence in AnSg; we will take up these same concepts in our examination of Hermogenes, in Chapter Four.

Kennedy forwards the general observation that both the content and the organizational structure of the AnSg text are essentially Aristotelian, though, of course, with adaptations.² AnSg is not "directly indebted to Aristotle,"³ and neither of his two citations of *The Rhetoric* conclusively indicate a direct knowledge of the

¹*Tropic of Cancer* (1934), p. 276.

²KENNEDY (1972), p. 616f.; KENNEDY (1983), p. 90; DK, p. ix.

³DK, p. ix.

work; one, in fact, may indicate the opposite.⁴ What is clear, however, is that the sources on which AnSg relies are informed by the traditional Aristotelian view of proof and evidence.

Aristotle's views within *The Rhetoric* are commonplace and require no explanation here.⁵ They may be summarized graphically in Figure 3.1, where the well known division of proof into the categories of artistic and inartistic may be seen, with their attendant subdivisions. Of special note is the subdivision of artistic proofs into the Aristotelian species of logos (λόγος, 589), pathos (πάθος, 706), and ethos (ἦθος, 531), with the first further divided into the enthymeme (ἐνθύμημα, 392) and example (παράδειγμα, 725) as methods of accomplishing the logical species of proof. Question marks indicate matters where facts or relationships are not especially clear from the Aristotelian text as it has come down to us.

Of concern to the present study is the fact that AnSg inherits and substantially employs these structures and this vocabulary from Aristotle when discussing the issues of proof and evidence.

Furthermore, AnSg's treatise is organized around the standard parts (or tasks) of the speech: the proemium, the narration, the proof, and the conclusion. Each part is considered in relation first to invention, then to arrangement and, finally, to style -- an approach that makes the treatise novel in regard to its

⁴DK, p. ix.

⁵A fine, discussion of Aristotelian theory may be found in ERICKSON, ed. (1974).




Figure 3.1
Proof in Aristotle

organization.⁶ In the chapter on proof, AnSg provides some vivid detail on the views of each of his two primary sources, Alexander and Neocles. A careful consideration of this discussion is essential if one wishes to understand the technical use of heuristic vocabulary within AnSg.

Section I. Alexander on Artistic and Inartistic Proofs

True to the Aristotelian perspective, both Alexander and Neocles⁷ seem to divide their idea of proof into ἑντεχνοῦς πίστις (artistic proof, 797) and ἀτεχνοῦς πίστις (inartistic proof, 796). AnSg opens his discussion of πίστις (proof, jU) with a summary of Alexander's position. Alexander's discussion of artistic and inartistic proof may be summarized in Figure 3.2. Alexander, AnSg tells us,⁸ held the following view:

Some pisteis are non-artistic [ἀτεχνοῦς], some artistic [ἑντεχνοῦς]; those are non-artistic which we provide from material at hand and those are artistic which we derive from the art <of rhetoric>. Non-artistic proofs are, for example, witnesses, decrees, contracts, oracles, such things, as many as are written down. They are called "non-artistic" since nothing comes from the thought of the speaker....⁹

⁶KENNEDY (1972), p. 617.

⁷With respect to Neocles, see below, Section II.

⁸AnSg's representations of an author's (or a school's) position are, where we have the opportunity to verify them, accurate. I therefore take it, as an assumption, that his summaries represent a true and accurate account of his sources' points of view. Throughout the remainder of this study, I shall present his summaries as the true opinions of his sources. Unless otherwise noted, when reference is made to an author's remarks or opinion, it should be understood that such a reference is to the author's position as reported in AnSg.

⁹AnSg 145. DK translation.

The view is, of course, Aristotelian orthodoxy to the extreme.

Consider the following passage from *The Rhetoric*:

As for proofs, some are artificial [ἐντεχνοῖς], others inartificial [ἀτεχνοῖς]. By the latter I understand all those which have not been furnished by ourselves but were already in existence, such as witnesses, tortures¹⁰, contracts, and the like; by the former, all that can be constructed by system and by our own efforts. Thus we have only to make use of the latter, whereas we must invent the former.¹¹

The fundamental parallels require no amplification. Even Alexander's remark "as many as are written down" (...τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅσα ἔχγραφα) reflects the Aristotelian limitation of inartistic proofs to those things which could be read out by the clerk, in accordance with Athenian court procedures.¹²

Alexander goes on to observe that the task (ἔργον, gB) of the speaker with respect to ἀτεχνοῖς πίστις (inartistic proofs, jV) is to reinforce and amplify (αὐξω, cR) those which support the case, while minimizing and undermining the credibility (ἀξιοπιστία, bR) of those that do not. He concludes: "Overall, invention in the case of these proofs is non-artistic, but the use is artistic".¹³ Aristotle might take exception to the expression employed by Alexander here, but the general point is one with which he would be sympathetic; in the final chapter of Book I, Aristotle spends some significant time

¹⁰I.e., the sworn testimony extracted from slaves by torture, which was the only legal testimony a slave could offer under Athenian law. Cf. the note on this term in Kennedy, 1991.

¹¹1.2. Loeb translation.

¹²Cf. KENNEDY (1991), esp. fn. 247.

¹³AnSg 145. DK translation.

addressing the creative use to be made of the documentary evidence introduced in a court case, (documentary evidence is synonymous with inartistic proof for Aristotle),¹⁴ and Alexander is doing little more than drawing the logical conclusion: artistic use will be made of inartistic proofs.

Alexander makes a further distinction when he notes the difference between the demonstrative (which is certain in its conclusions) and the evidentiary (which is confident, though not certain, in its conclusions):

Pistis is speech leading to concordance [or, agreement; συγκατατίθημι, 1G]. Pistis differs from apodeixis in that apodeixis has true premises and a valid conclusion, while pistis is neither always true nor persuasive and seems to lead to a conclusion but does not always do so, and apodeixis is more appropriate for philosophers¹⁵, pistis for orators.¹⁶

The distinction highlighted here is also Aristotelian in nature. Aristotle called the logically valid process which led to positive conclusions (of a scientific nature) ἀπόδειξις (demonstration, cC), though his technical use of the term is not always consistent.¹⁷ Nevertheless, he contrasted this with those processes which led to confident, though not positive, conclusions. This latter process

¹⁴Cf., Rht 1.14 and 1.15.

¹⁵Which would, of course, include "natural philosophers" or what we today would call "scientists."

¹⁶AnSg 144. DK translation. [Bracketed portions are my own comments.]

¹⁷The term is not infrequently employed of "argument" in general in both Aristotle and later authors. See, e.g., the discussion in Rht 1.1.11ff.




Figure 3.2
Proof in Alexander

Aristotle considered under the title of πίστις (proof, jU).¹⁸

Alexander is clearly of the same mind on the topic.

There are, however, some significant deviations between Alexander and Aristotle. No reference is made to the logical, pathetic and ethical species of artistic proof. In place of this distinction, Alexander observes: "In the case of artistic proofs there are, first, two species: paradeigm [παράδειγμα, example, iX] and enthymeme [ἐνθύμημα, fC]."¹⁹ The text immediately follows this comment (at 147) with the beginning of a more extensive summary of Neocles' perspective on πίστις (proof, jU). AnSg returns to Alexander in 155 where, in a discussion on Neocles' view of example (παράδειγμα), we are also given Alexander's and Zeno's definition by way of comparison. In brief, Neocles' view is that the παράδειγμα (example, iX) is an objective likeness, Alexander's position is that the παράδειγμα is a linguistic construct, and Zeno holds that the παράδειγμα is any mental association which the orator is able to inspire between the present situation and some past event or events. The three differences are not unimportant, and we shall return to them shortly. What must first be noted, however, is Alexander's reordering of artistic proof.

We are given little more in the way of direct exposition on Alexander's considerations of ἐντεχνοῦς πίστις (artistic proof, jW) -- only that he sees it being composed of the species of παράδειγμα

¹⁸In Rht 1.2.

¹⁹AnSg 146. DK translation.

(example, iX) and ἐνθύμημα (enthymeme, fC). These two Alexandrian species of artistic proof are, of course, the same as Aristotle's methodological aspects of logos. This neglect of pathos and ethos, in itself, is not unusual for the period and may reflect the influence of Hermagoras, who also minimized the ethical and pathetic species of Aristotelian proofs.²⁰

While we have Alexander's definition of παράδειγμα (example, iX) in 155, there is no attribution of a similar definition for enthymeme (ἐνθύμημα, fC), unless 158 represents Alexander's position. The citation given by AnSg at 158 is to "some" (ὥς δὲ ἔνιοι, ἐνθύμημά ἐστι...). DK assign paragraph 158, which offers a rather distinct definition of enthymeme, to Neocles, though Neocles' own definition of enthymeme is clearly presented in 157. Certainly it is possible (as DK evidently here assume) that AnSg has lifted a contrasting definition from Neocles' own text and presented it in 158; on the other hand, Harpocration is the named source of 159, where his definition of enthymeme is presented. It seems perfectly reasonable, therefore, to suppose that the text of 158 is actually taken from some source besides Neocles or Harpocration, so that AnSg would then present three contrasting definitions of an enthymeme from three different sources. He employs just this pattern in his discussion of example (παράδειγμα), immediately above, in 154

²⁰For discussion of various aspects of Hermagoras' theory, see NADEAU (1959), M. HEATH (1994), Kennedy (1963), p. 303-321; regarding pathos and ethos, note, esp., p. 304, 316

(Neocles' definition), 155 (Alexander's definition), and 156 (Zeno's definition), as we have seen.

That section 158 would represent Alexander's position (sandwiched, this time, between Neocles' definition in 157 and Harpocration's in 159) is a possibility, and would make the passages on enthymemes in 157-159 more consistently parallel with the passages on example in 154-156. The definition in 158, of the enthymeme as a conclusion of an epicheireme, would be, furthermore, generally consistent with Alexander's definition of a topic in 169.²¹ Admittedly, however, AnSg sometimes speaks of Alexander more respectfully -- employing his patrimony (Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ὁ τοῦ Νουμηνίου) -- than he does with his other sources, and he seems generally to use Alexander as his baseline source. Such considerations weigh against a generic attribution, like the one given in 158, being used to identify an Alexandrian quote. Perhaps Alexander is not the direct source, but 158 represents a definition of the enthymeme consistent with his own. If 158 in some way reflects Alexander's view, this would draw the epicheireme (ἐπιχείρημα, fZ) into Alexander's discussion of artistic proofs, where it would serve as the source (or presupposition) of an enthymematic conclusion. On the other hand, if 158 is not a reflection of Alexander's view (and there is no compelling evidence that it is), we are left with no other definite details regarding his position on the nature of artistic proofs.

²¹To be discussed below.

Section II. Neocles on Artistic and Inartistic Proofs

Neocles' position appears somewhat more complicated. His views on artistic and inartistic proof are summarized in Figure 3.3. No direct mention is made of Neocles' views on ἄτεχνος πίστις (inartistic proof, jV), though the Greek text implies a contrast when the discussion of ἐντεχνος πίστις (artistic proof, jW) begins:

...καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρος μὲν οὕτως· Νεοκλῆς δὲ οὕτως· ἐντεχνοὶ μὲν εἰσι πίστεις, ὥς καὶ ἡ χρῆσις καὶ ἡ εὕρεσις ἐπὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν. Εἶδη δὲ αὐτῶν δύο, τό τε ἀπὸ τοῦ πάθους καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος.²²

DK translate:

...And Alexander <defines pisteis> in this way, but Neocles as follows: pisteis are artistic whose use and invention lie with the speakers. There are two species of them, one from pathos and one from evidence.

The interpolation ("<defines pisteis>") they provide is a possible one, though by no means a necessary one. While it is true that the Alexandrian discussion of the basic definition of pisteis is suspended here (until 155), the most immediate antecedent for the οὕτως would be Alexander's definition of the species of artistic proof (example and enthymeme) just presented. Given that AnSg follows this statement with an immediate definition of Neocles' species of artistic proof, it is perfectly reasonable to offer the alternative translation:

...And while (μὲν) Alexander <divides artistic proof> in this manner, Neocles, on the other hand (δέ), <does so> in this manner: artistic proofs are, in fact, those where both the use and the invention come from the speaker. And there are two

²²AnSg 146-147.




Figure 3.3
Proof in Neocles

species of these, one from the emotions, and one from the facts.

The nine sections following the quotation contain a discussion of Neocles' perspective and use of these two species of artistic proof. The interpolations offered in this latter translation emphasize Neocles' entry into the discussion at the point where artistic proof is already under consideration;²³ this artistic proof in Neocles is clearly in contrast to *something*, and the only reasonable deduction is that it stands in contrast to inartistic proof, as summed up by Alexander in 145. The textual phrase ἐντεχνοὶ ... εἰσι πίστεις (artistic proofs are... [emphasis added]) clearly implies such a contrast, and the preceding text offers inartistic proofs as the only candidate for such a contrast. In other words, we may reasonably conclude, and with textual evidence, that Neocles' view of inartistic proof, though never directly discussed in AnSg, is, like Alexander's, the standard Aristotelian perspective.

As for Neocles' division of artistic proof, we see, as we saw in Alexander, a striking deviation from Aristotle. Pathos (πάθος, iT) is still present in Neocles, but logos (λόγος, hM) and ethos (ἦθος, gR) have once again disappeared. In their place is the peculiar division of "proof by fact" (πρᾶγμα, kC).²⁴

²³A perspective further justified by the parataxis which seems obviously to link the two occurrences of οὕτως.

²⁴The Greek term is versatile, and means a fact, a thing, an event, a practice, a circumstantial quality (of something). DK translate it as "evidence" but it appears clear that, for Neocles, pathos is also "evidence". Heath, in his translation of Hermogenes' *On Stasis* renders the word either "act" or "event", and the term does represent "act" as one of the six elements of "circumstance" (περίστασις, jQ), as we shall see. This, however, does not appear to

Neocles' sole remark on pathos is that this species of proof "produces belief about what is under discussion by the emotion of the speaker."²⁵ He then cites an emotive cry from Demosthenes' *De Corona*, and immediately moves on to *πράγμα*, or proof by fact.

Πράγμα is sub-divided into three methodological processes (or tropes, *τρόπος*, *mJ*) in which such "proof by fact" occurs: by example (*παράδειγμα*, *iX*), by probability (*εἰκός*, *eJ*), and by sign (*τεκμήριον*, *mD*). A *τεκμήριον* that is incomplete, or abbreviated, is a *σημεῖον* (*lB*) or a "limited sign." All of these are Aristotelian terms²⁶ referencing the subdivisions of *logos*, and are intimately related to one another -- and intricately distinguished from one another -- in the *Rhetoric*.²⁷ Figure 3.4 presents a summary of Aristotelian commentary on these logical terms. Aristotle's distinctions are two: the nature of the reasoning involved, and the nature of the conclusions which may be drawn. Probability (*εἰκός*) and sign (*τεκμήριον*) both argue from the universal to the particular, with the former reaching probable conclusions (since its universal premise is only partially, or probably, true) and the latter reaching

be a concern of Neocles in the present context; I have, therefore, here, generally gone with "fact" as the English term to denote *πράγμα*.

²⁵AnSg 148. DK translation.

²⁶Though Aristotle says that the "limited *τεκμήριον*" has no true name, his discussion consistently makes use of *σημεῖον* (originally, a token; an omen from the gods) in this context; well before the time of AnSg the word had clearly assumed the technical meaning discussed here.

²⁷The discussion is found in 1.2.14-19. See, especially, Kennedy's (1991) notes on these sections. The terms are also considered in detail in the *Prior Analytics*, 70a-b.




Figure 3.4
Aristotelian Distinctions in Logical Vocabulary

incontrovertible conclusions (since its premise is invariably true). A partial or fallible sign (σημείον) is reasoning from a particular to a universal, reaching a probable conclusion. The example (παράδειγμα) argues from particulars to a particular case, and reaches a probable conclusion.²⁸

While these technical terms are present in Neocles' discussion of proof by fact (πράγμα, κC), the system has contracted in some significant ways: the subtlety of the Aristotelian tensions between premises and methods of reasoning is virtually gone. Aristotle's central concern with the vocabulary seems to have been the relationship between universals and particulars, but this theoretical concern is not in evidence in Neocles. A preoccupation with the nature of the conclusions does remain, but given the loss of Aristotelian distinctions in the reasoning processes, coupled with a retention of the Aristotelian distinctions regarding the nature of the conclusions, a certain confluence of terms naturally follows. Neocles notes that rhetoricians "have become accustomed to

²⁸Examples are provided in Figure 3.4; note that τεκμήριον represents syllogistic validity, while εἰκός does not. In brief, human experience notes that there are some exceptions to the universal, or general, premise that makes up the line of reasoning which is found in εἰκός; no such exceptions exist in τεκμήριον. This, of course, makes τεκμήριον a type of ἀπόδειξις -- which Aristotle observes in his discussion (see, esp., 1.2.16-20). While it is tempting to classify both σημείον and παράδειγμα as simple induction, Aristotle saw an important logical distinction between the two, as the former reasoned to a universal while the latter reasoned to another particular. Examples (παράδειγμα) do not involve universals, while all the material for enthymematic premises -- signs (τεκμήριον, σημείον) and probabilities (εἰκός) -- do. For Aristotle, therefore, the enthymeme must involve some universal consideration, whether specifically stated or not.

use *semeion* [σημεῖον] instead of 'probability'....²⁹ In section 152, Neocles defines σημεῖον as "a limited τεκμήριον" ("τεκμήριον ἥδη καταλαμβανόμενον"), but καταλαμβάνω is a complex term,³⁰ and Neocles does not specifically state the nature of this limitation, though in the discussion which follows, σημεῖον and εἰκός (probability) are consistently linked, and generally treated as synonyms. We are told, for example, that there are "three species of probabilities and signs" (εἰκός and σημεῖον),³¹ which are then listed. In the discussion, it is clear that εἰκός and σημεῖον may be taken to mean any argument with a probable conclusion.

Neocles does appear to share, without alteration, Aristotle's view of the τεκμήριον (mD) as an irrefutable sign leading to an absolute conclusion.³²

In addition to the differences in Aristotelian vocabulary outlined above, Neocles presents some distinctions not found in Aristotle. We are told, for example, that some rhetoricians use the term εὐλόγος (reasonable, gF) instead of εἰκός (probability, eJ), but Neocles objects to this equation, arguing that "what is reasonable [εὐλόγος] differs in that it has more of a basis for being true or not."³³ This idea and terminology is absent in Aristotle. The

²⁹AnSg 152. DK translation.

³⁰To bind, force, compel, condemn, convict, keep under, repress, arrest, check -- are just a few of the shades of meaning given in GS. Aristotle does not refer to a "limited τεκμήριον" at any time.

³¹AnSg 153. DK translation.

³²AnSg 151.

³³AnSg 149. DK translation.

concept, Dilts and Kennedy note, is likely Stoic in origin, with εὐλογος representing a proposition which has many reasons to be accepted as true.³⁴ AnSg 149 represents the only two occurrences of εὐλογος in the text.

Another synonym for εἰκός (probability, eJ) offered in the same section is πιθανός (persuasive, kK); about this we are only told, somewhat cryptically, "It [εἰκός, presumably] is also called 'persuasive' [πιθανός], differing only in purpose."³⁵ Πιθανός does not occur again with this meaning within AnSg.

Following his discussion of εἰκός (probability, eJ) and τεκμήριον (infallible sign, mD), Neocles naturally turns his attention to the third of his methodological aspects of "proof by fact" (πράγμα, kC), namely, παράδειγμα (example, iX).

Aristotle divided παράδειγμα into the historical and the fictional, and, as we have seen, associated παράδειγμα with inductive reasoning from particulars to a particular.

In 154-156, AnSg presents three competing definitions of παράδειγμα, as was briefly mentioned above. The first is clearly attributed to Neocles, who defines the term as an objective likeness

³⁴See fn. 145, in the DK translation of AnSg 149.

³⁵AnSg 149. DK translation. Λέγεται δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πιθανὸν ἐπινοία μόνον διαφέρον. The τὸ αὐτὸ is presumably a reference to τὸ εἰκός though, technically, it might also have τὸ εὐλογον as its antecedent. In either case, the exact sense of the phrase is by no means entirely clear. One prominent editor of the manuscript, Ulrich von Willamowitz, read ἐπωνυμία for ἐπινοία, rendering a more intelligible phrase that would end "differing only in name" as opposed to the DK "differing only in purpose." See the relevant textual apparatus in DK.

in circumstances which is applicable to the question under consideration and which leads to a reasonable conclusion. Alexander's definition is then offered, by way of contrast. For Alexander, the παράδειγμα is "language drawing from the particular either to (another) particular or the universal, or from like to like..."³⁶ While Alexander does, here, consider the question of particular and universal with regard to defining παράδειγμα, his definition is markedly different from Aristotle's, and seems to reduce παράδειγμα to a combination of induction, simply, and comparison.³⁷ It is also worth noting that, for Alexander, the heart of παράδειγμα lies in the linguistic constructions which lead the mind along, rather than in any objective similarity of circumstances.

A final definition of παράδειγμα offered by AnSg is that of Zeno, for whom a παράδειγμα is simply a "reminder of something that has happened for comparison with what is now under discussion."³⁸ For Zeno, the central aspect appears to be the remembrance, and thus

³⁶AnSg 155. DK translation. Emphasis mine.

³⁷One matter of interest here is the fact that Alexander clearly seems to be engaged in a more theoretical consideration of the subject matter than is Neocles -- an observation that is borne out in the discussion of topics, almost all of which seems to derive from Alexander. For that reason, we are again struck with AnSg's omission of any definite discussion of Alexandrian theory on the enthymematic division of artistic proofs. We are given, as we shall see, some tantalizing comments concerning the epicheireme, but on the whole, details of Alexander's perspective on the entire enthymematic division remain a mystery.

³⁸AnSg 156. DK translation.

anything the rhetor does to highlight a relevant aspect of the past is παράδειγμα.

Peculiarly, AnSg follows this discussion of παράδειγμα with a consideration of the enthymeme (ἐνθύμημα, fC) which he opens by noting: "Enthymeme, according to Neocles, is..."³⁹ What is peculiar here, is that enthymeme is not part of Neocles' sub-divisions of inartistic and artistic proofs, a point to which we shall return. Following the discussion of enthymemes in 157-160, AnSg begins a discussion of propositions (πρόθεσις, kL) in 161-168. A discussion of the topics (τόπος, mH) follows this in 169-182. AnSg concludes his consideration of the inventional aspects of πίστις (proof, jU) with a discussion on refutations (λύσις, hO) of artistic and inartistic proofs in 183-191.

We shall next turn our attention to AnSg's discussion of enthymemes (and an associated concept, epicheiremes [ἐπιχειρήματα, fZ]) and topics (τόπος, mH); the other two subjects -- propositions, and refutations (πρόθεσις, kL, and λύσις, hO) -- will be more easily considered once we have given some attention to Hermogenes.

Section III. Enthymemes, Topics, and Epicheiremes in AnSg

A. The Aristotelian Base

The enthymeme (ἐνθύμημα, fC) is defined by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* and in the *Analytics*. The *Rhetoric* calls it a "rhetorical syllogism",⁴⁰ and later observes:

³⁹AnSg 157. DK translation.

⁴⁰Rht 1.2.8. GBWW translation.

...when it is shown that, certain things being true,
a further and quite distinct proposition must also
be true in consequence, whether invariably or
usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic,
enthymeme in rhetoric...⁴¹

This is followed by the observation that enthymemes are formed from
"probabilities and signs"⁴² (εἰκός, eJ and σημείον, lB). He will
later say that enthymemes are based upon the topics (τόπος, mH),
with most rooted in the special, rather than the common, topics.⁴³
The *Prior Analytics* is somewhat inconsistent with the definitions
offered in the *Rhetoric*, noting that "an enthymeme is a syllogism
starting from probabilities or signs".⁴⁴ As with demonstration
(ἀπόδειξις, cC), Aristotle often employed the term "syllogism" to
mean argument, in general. The conclusion to be drawn is that the
enthymeme represents, for Aristotle, the sort of reasoning present
in rhetorical (i.e., civic) exchanges as opposed demonstrative
(i.e., scientific) exchanges. In short, the Aristotelian enthymeme
is best considered an informal argument which is generally, though
by no means exclusively, probable in nature,⁴⁵ and may be seen in

⁴¹Rht 1.2.9. GBWW translation.

⁴²Rht 1.2.14. GBWW translation.

⁴³Rht 1.2.22.

⁴⁴70a.9. GBWW translation.

⁴⁵With τεκμήριον as a sub-species of enthymematic premises (cf. Figures 3.1, 3.4), the Aristotelian enthymeme clearly has a potential for strict logical validity, but this is not a necessity, and the enthymeme will usually fail to show such validity. Note Aristotle's examples of enthymemes based in maxims at 1394a.25 - 1394b.25. KENNEDY (1991) suggests that the distinction between enthymeme and a strict syllogism was mostly one of formal validity, with the latter being reserved for "tightly reasoned philosophical discourse" and the former employed in "popular speech or writing"

"any of the very frequent explanatory statements of Greek oratory".⁴⁶

Aristotle employs some form of the term *epicheireme* (ἐπιχείρημα, f2) four times⁴⁷ in the *Rhetoric*, none of which reflect a rhetorically technical use. He does, however, employ the word both in its common meaning (to take on, to undertake, set oneself to a task) and as a term for "argument" in the *Topics*.⁴⁸ It was not until Theophrastus that the term *epicheireme* took on the technical definition of a full syllogism, with *enthymeme* taken to mean an abbreviated syllogism, usually one truncated by the suppression of an (assumed) major premise,⁴⁹ and after his time (c. 200 B.C.) the term *epicheireme* became the primary word for the "basic rhetorical argument".⁵⁰

As was noted⁵¹ in Figure 3.1, Aristotle's discussions of the topics are not entirely clear in the *Rhetoric*. He mentions what appear to be materials for the construction of *enthymemes* in 1.3 and

which required less rigorous formal presentation of all its premises and processes. See p. 33, fn. 23; p. 42, fn. 60.

⁴⁶KENNEDY (1991) p. 29. fn.3

⁴⁷1.12.7; 1.12.16; 2.5.22; 3.12.3.

⁴⁸A common use can be seen in, e.g., 120b.8; technical uses in, e.g., 126b.16, 26, 31, and 32. In 16, he equates the *epicheireme* with a dialectical proof or dialectical syllogism.

⁴⁹KENNEDY (1980), p. 80.

⁵⁰KENNEDY (1963), p. 273.

⁵¹By the question marks inserted in the representation of the common topics. See the textual explanation of the Figure.

in 2.19,⁵² presenting four⁵³ common topics which are clearly not in the same category as those common topics outlined in 2.23-24; the latter are lines of reasoning or argumentative approaches to a subject, dealing with the *methods* of presenting one's case. In his discussion of what I have labeled "material topics" -- special topics (εἰδός, eI), and the four former common topics mentioned above -- Aristotle seems to concentrate on the *material* from which enthymematic premises may be drawn. Figure 3.1 represents one possible synthesis of Aristotle's perspective on the relationship between the topics and rhetoric.

B. The Occurrences within AnSg

1. 'Ενθύμημα (fc)⁵⁴

When AnSg takes up the subject of enthymemes,⁵⁵ he provides us with three definitions. Neocles' is offered first. As mentioned above, this originally seems surprising, since the enthymeme is part of Alexander's approach to proof, but does not appear in Neocles' perspective.

Ironically, Neocles' definition seems, on the surface, to be the most consistently Aristotelian of the three.⁵⁶ He sees the

⁵²See KENNEDY's (1991) notes on these sections.

⁵³The potential, actual, consequential, and comparative.

⁵⁴The fc Family has 9 occurrences (1.03 m%) in AnSg.

⁵⁵AnSg 157.

⁵⁶DK reference the Aristotelian definition of the enthymeme at Rht 1.2.9 for comparison with Neocles'. Harpocration's definition (to be considered below) is also Aristotelian, but less detailed in nature.

enthymeme as language (or "a statement": 'Ενθύμημα δέ ἐστίν...λόγος προειρημένων...) flowing from a presupposition or a prior conclusion to a cursory, compact summation of some point relevant to the question under consideration.⁵⁷ We are given no other definite information, and how the enthymeme fits into Neocles' overall perspective remains somewhat unclear.

One possible explanation would be that Neocles saw the enthymeme in methodological terms,⁵⁸ as a means of arguing for any point present in any of the three subspecies of his "proof from fact" (πρᾶγμα, κC). This view would not be inconsistent with the summary of Neocles' position⁵⁹ offered to us. It is also worth noting that just two paragraphs after this definition, AnSg returns to Neocles, and we are there⁶⁰ given comments relevant to what Neocles sees as the primary *methodological* treatment of emotion (πάθος, iT), the other of his species of artistic proof (ἐντεχνος πίστις, jW). The textual arrangement, therefore, may be seen as lending some weight to this (admittedly speculative) explanation.

If true, the above explanation would mean that the enthymeme serves as Neocles' term for the process of arguing a point. This

⁵⁷AnSg 157.

⁵⁸As opposed to Aristotle's classification based largely on the type of argument appropriate to a given audience (popular rather than philosophic) or subject (civic rather than, again, philosophic).

⁵⁹Note, e.g., his preoccupation with the concept of probability (εἰκός, eJ) in 149-154. The idea is, as we have seen (cf. Figure 3.4), an important aspect in Aristotle's approach to the enthymeme.

⁶⁰In AnSg 160.

view is not without some difficulty, however. Neocles' later comments seem to take up "epicheireme" (ἐπιχείρημα, fZ) as the term for a general rhetorical argument,⁶¹ despite his definition of the enthymeme here. It will be necessary to return to this point in Chapter Five.

The second definition of an enthymeme, which is attributed to "some" (ὡς δὲ ἔνιοι, ἐνθύμημά ἐστι...), presents the enthymeme as a conclusion to a previous epicheireme (ἐπιχείρημα, fZ), and insists the enthymeme be accomplished in one period. As we have seen, Aristotle had no discussion of the relationship between these terms; the connection presented here is one to which we will return.

The most general definition of the enthymeme is that of Harpocration who says the enthymeme is language (or "a statement") intended to argue one's point.⁶² We are then given Neocles' (not Harpocration's) discussion of how such argument is implemented. It begins with a proposition (πρόθεσις, kL), which is a statement of one's position and basic approach to the question. This proposition seems to "take form" (τρόπος, mJ) through amplification (αὐξησις, cR) and minimalization (μείωσις, hU) of the relevant points. This is the

⁶¹Note, e.g., his treatment of the epicheireme in 210, 214, and 217 -- all of which derive from Neocles, despite DK's assignment of 217 to Alexander. This entire matter we shall take up in more detail in Chapter Five.

⁶²AnSg 159. ...λόγος πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν λαμβανόμενος τῶν ὑποκειμένων. "...language taken for demonstration of the subject" is the DK translation. "Demonstration" (ἀπόδειξις, cC) is used here in a non-technical sense.

place where emotion (πάθος, iT) is most likely to make a significant contribution, we are told.⁶³

Beyond these definitions, AnSg uses the term enthymeme in only one other context. In sections 248-250, there is a discussion of style and word choice, and Harpocration⁶⁴ recommends "balanced clauses and antistrophe"⁶⁵ (παριώσεις καὶ τὰς ἀντιστροφάς) as the expressions (or style: λέξεις, 583) most appropriate to the enthymeme. He recommends that secondary enthymemes⁶⁶ (ἐπενθύμημα, fM) be constructed in the same way, though he allows them a bit more structural liberty.⁶⁷

What is of most interest in this stylistic discussion, however, is Harpocration's comment on the relationship between the enthymeme and epicheireme, presented incidentally in 248:

...whenever the epicheireme lacks proof [or, more accurately, a confirmation: κατασκευή, 549] from outside itself, not brought in enthymematically [ἐνθυμηματικός, 393] but accompanied with a statement

⁶³AnSg 160.

⁶⁴Harpocration is clearly identified by AnSg as the source for these sections. See 243.

⁶⁵AnSg 249. DK translation.

⁶⁶Secondary enthymemes were a secondary supporting clause; they are used as a central part of a particular enthymematic construction which Hermogenes will discuss at length in *Invention*, and which we will consider in more detail in that context.

⁶⁷AnSg 250.

[κατάστασις,⁶⁸ 551], the figures of speech also become more varied...⁶⁹

Given Harpocration's general definition of the enthymeme, the passage provides some further insight into his view on the relationship between the epicheireme and the enthymeme: the latter is an evidentiary confirmation of the former; it may or may not be present, and there are stylistic considerations to be taken into account on the basis of this difference. For Harpocration, therefore, the epicheireme seems to stand as the primary line of argument,⁷⁰ with enthymemes serving the function of what we would today call "supporting material".

2. Ἐπιχείρημα (f2)⁷¹

Reference is made to the epicheireme in eight distinct contexts within AnSg, each context containing between one and four uses of the term.

In discussing the prooemium,⁷² the first context in which a reference to an epicheireme occurs, we are told⁷³ that the

⁶⁸κατάστασις is distinguished from narration (διήγησις, dT). See 112. These two locations represent the only technical uses of the term in AnSg. The word also occurs in the definition of pathos, but is there used in the more common sense of "state" or "condition."

⁶⁹AnSg 248. DK translation; the bracketed additions are my own.

⁷⁰This would be consistent with Theophrastian developments. See above, fns. 49, 50, and associated textual comments.

⁷¹The f2 family with a 2.28m% in AnSg (and all the 20 occurrences are technical) is notably frequent. The family is central to Hermogenic developments of technical vocabulary, and we will return to its consideration often over the course of our study.

⁷²AnSg 36.

⁷³Alexander is the source assumed by DK.

introduction should contain no confirmations (κατάσκευή, gX), since these are "a matter of headings and epicheiremes"⁷⁴ (κεφαλαιώδης, 567, and ἐπιχείρημα, 466). Headings are "points" within or goals of⁷⁵ an argument; epicheireme here seems to mean, simply, the argument, considered as a method, which will make the point: the process of "arguing it out".

AnSg mentions epicheiremes in a second context,⁷⁶ while discussing Alexander's views on the elements of the narration (διήγησις, dT). Here we are told that whenever there is a presentation of the facts of the case (narration, διήγησις, dT), this will be accompanied by incidental narration (παραδιήγησις, iY), that is by narration outside the bare facts of the case, and introduced to strengthen our own cause. This incidental narration, we are told, will provide topics for epicheiremes.⁷⁷ The point is clear: when one introduces information not immediately part of the case, this information will serve as a starting point for an argumentative process.

The third context in which AnSg employs the term epicheireme is in one of the given definitions of an enthymeme ("...an enthymeme

⁷⁴AnSg 36. DK translation.

⁷⁵Cf. PATILLON (1988), pp. 58f.

⁷⁶AnSg 57. Alexander is the assumed source.

⁷⁷DK inexplicably translate this "providing a topic for *enthymemes*" [emphasis added], but the Greek is clear ("...τότε ἐμπροσθεῖται παραδιήγησις ἐπιχειρημάτων μὲν ἔξουσα τόπον..."), and there are neither textual confusions nor editorial conjectures to justify their version. Their substitution of "enthymeme" for "epicheireme" is clearly an oversight.

is a conclusion of an antecedent epicheireme...⁷⁸), which was mentioned above. Here, too, the epicheireme seems to stand as a statement of some point one wishes to make, with the enthymeme serving as the supporting reason. Greek is filled with examples of such enthymematic expressions, usually introduced by γάρ (for, as, thus...).⁷⁹

In the fourth context where mention of epicheiremes occurs, AnSg is discussing the place of topics (τόπος, mH) in proof (πίστις, jU). The term occurs four times in this context.⁸⁰ We are here told that Alexander defines a topic as "the starting point⁸¹ of an epicheireme (ἐπιχείρημα, fZ), or the starting point of a proof (πίστις, jU) which will lead to an epicheireme."⁸² In 172 we are told that certain matters associated with the topic of definition (ὅρος, iS) provide sources from which epicheiremes may be derived. In both of these instances, epicheireme seems to be used as a term for "argument", simply. Finally in the discussion of topics, AnSg, in 179, makes reference to a set of notes on epicheiremes which he has previously made; the work is lost.

The fifth context in which the term epicheireme occurs is AnSg's discussion of λύσις ("solutions to" or "refutations of" an

⁷⁸AnSg 158. DK translation.

⁷⁹See KENNEDY (1991), p. 29, fn. 3.

⁸⁰Twice in AnSg 169, once each in 172 and 179.

⁸¹The phrase "starting point" is from ἀφορμή; Alexander makes no reference to a "point" or a "heading" (κεφαλαίος, hD) here.

⁸²AnSg 169. DK translation.

opponent's position, h0).⁸³ "Epicheireme" occurs twice in 183, and twice in 184. In every case, it may be translated as "to argue" or "an argument".⁸⁴ Epicheiremes are not the focus in these sections, but the vocabulary occurs incidentally in a discussion which emphasizes that everything said, up to this point in the discourse on proof, might apply equally to arguments in support of or arguments in refutation of a given premise. AnSg's use of epicheireme terminology in these sections is unremarkable.

The vocabulary of epicheiremes occurs next, in its sixth context, in the discussion of epilogues. Here we are told that recapitulation (a summary of the main points of the speech, ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, av), "is a brief exposition of the headings or epicheiremes [κεφάλαιος, 565; and ἐπιχείρημα, 466] that have been previously discussed..."⁸⁵ We are then told in 214 that Neocles has four species of recapitulation, one of which is recapitulation "by epicheireme". In 217, this species is defined and exemplified.⁸⁶ We learn here that the strongest epicheiremes are to be recapitulated in the epilogue. The others, presumably, are passed over.

⁸³AnSg 183-191. Alexander is the assumed source.

⁸⁴When the verb form occurs (ἐπιχειρέω, 465), DK translate with the appropriate tense of "to argue"; where the noun form occurs (ἐπιχείρημα, 466), they use "epicheireme", rather than "argument" in their translation. PATILLON, it is worth noting, consistently employs "arguer" and "l'argument" for the verb and the noun, respectively, in his (French) translations of Hermogenes.

⁸⁵AnSg 210. DK translation.

⁸⁶DK assign AnSg 217 to Alexander, but their evidence is weak, and Neocles is almost certainly the source here. We will take up a more detailed consideration of this matter in Chapter Five.

In 231, the seventh context in which the vocabulary of epicheiremes occurs, we are informed in a discussion on amplification (αὐξησις, cR) in the epilogue, that emotion (πάθος, iT) is created using "the same sources as epicheiremes" employ.⁸⁷

Finally, in 248, the vocabulary of the epicheiremes occurs in reference to stylistic concerns, along with a comment on enthymemes; AnSg's⁸⁸ remarks in this context were considered under the discussion of the use of the vocabulary of enthymemes, above.

3. Τόπος (mH)⁸⁹

The vocabulary of topics occurs in nine distinct contexts within AnSg, not all of which are remarkable or technically relevant to invention.

First, in a discussion of the material of the prooemium,⁹⁰ we are told that the topics of the introduction are the same as those of "circumstance" (περίστασις, jQ). Circumstance was a common term used to denote six basic elements of a rhetorical situation which should be analyzed by the speaker in order to find the "places" one could attack an opponent's argument, or strengthen one's own. The six elements were place (τόπος, mH), time (χρόνος, nD), manner (τρόπος, mJ), person (πρόσωπον, kV), cause (αἰτία, aJ), and act (πρᾶγμα, kC).⁹¹

⁸⁷Neocles is the source here.

⁸⁸The passages derive from Harpocration.

⁸⁹The mH Family has 21 occurrences (2.51 m%) in AnSg.

⁹⁰AnSg 8.

⁹¹Cf. M. HEATH (1995), p. 250.

Second, in AnSg 90, these six elements of circumstance are specifically listed for us, as ways to enhance the narration. Here, topic (τόπος, mH) occurs as the word "place" in the list of the six elements of circumstance.

Third, in AnSg 57, we are informed that incidental narration (παραδιήγησις, iY) provides topics (mH) for epicheiremes. This passage was discussed in the section on the use of the vocabulary of epicheiremes, above.

Fourth, in AnSg 160, we are told that amplification and minimalization (αύξησις, cR and μείωσις, hU), which are methodological treatments of a proposition (πρόθεσις, kL), are each derived from the same topics (mH); the topics are not listed.

Fifth, in AnSg 214, and 218, recapitulation (ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, aV) by topic (mH) is discussed in terms very similar to the discussion of recapitulation by epicheireme.

Sixth, in AnSg 234, we are told that the tragic plays are locations⁹² (mH) where one may go for material to enhance pathological elements of the epilogue. The term is here used in a non-technical way.

Seventh, in discussing clarity within the narration,⁹³ AnSg notes that the art of rhetoric is designed to explore exhaustively

⁹²ὅπως τε ἀφορμὰς ἔξεις εἰς τὸν παθητικὸν τόπον τὰ τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν δράματα. DK translate the relevant phrase "topic of pathos" but this seems unduly confusing; the term does not here appear to be employed in a technical sense. DK reference Quintilian VI.2.20, but the only parallel here is in Quintilian's note that pathos may be thought of as tragic, ethos as comic, in nature. He does not speak of a locus or topic of pathos.

⁹³AnSg 79.

each relevant topic (mH). The rhetorical artist, however, does not use everything the art discovers, but employs brevity in the speech for the sake of clarity, and must therefore choose among the material generated by the art.

Eighth, in the discussion of refutation (λύσις, hO), AnSg⁹⁴ forwards the observation that some topics (mH) are only useful in refutation of a point, others are useful for both confirmational and refutational argument. There is no mention of -- and presumably there are no -- topics useful only for confirmational argument. Refutations are generally taken from the same topics (mH) as one would use in support of a position, though, of course, these would be amplified and employed along a different tack.

Finally, in his most detailed discussion of the topics (τόπος, mH),⁹⁵ AnSg first offers Alexander's definition of the term as "the starting point"⁹⁶ of an epicheireme (ἐπιχείρημα, fZ), or the starting point of a proof" (πίστις, jU) which will lead to an epicheireme.⁹⁷ This is followed by Neocles' observation that some topics are common to all stases (στάσις, lD), while others are "specific to each stasis" (στάσις, lD). Stasis is the fulcrum upon which an argument turns: the argument that an act should be defined as self-defense

⁹⁴AnSg 183-191. Alexander is once again the assumed source.

⁹⁵AnSg 169-182.

⁹⁶The "starting point" here is ἀφορμή; Alexander makes no reference to a "point" or a "heading" (κεφαλή, hD) here.

⁹⁷AnSg 169. DK translation.

rather than murder, for example, employs the "stasis of definition".⁹⁸ The idea was increasingly part of rhetorical analysis after the time of Hermagoras, who had a system of related questions which helped an orator discover the proper stasis on which to focus the argument. The appearance of the term here reflects the increasing importance of stasis in the time; stasis theory, of course, becomes a centerpiece of Hermogenes' inventional theory.

After this comment, AnSg⁹⁹ then offers some praise of Aristotle and an unknown Eudemius for their analysis of topics, and proceeds¹⁰⁰ to name and define ten topics, which he declares to be "the most typical":¹⁰¹ διαιρέσις (division, dG), δύναμις (potentiality, eB), κρίσις (judgment, hG), μάχη (inconsistency, hQ), ὁμοίος (similarity, iM), ὅρος (definition, iS), παράθεσις (comparison, jB), παρέπομαι (adjunct, jJ), περιολή (inclusion, jO), οὐστωιχος (correspondence, lX).

Of these ten, three (διαιρέσις [division, dG], κρίσις [judgment, hG], and ὅρος [definition, iS]) are mentioned in Aristotle's discussion of the twenty-eight valid methodological topics within

⁹⁸The example is a particularly contemporary one, and should be approached with caution. Hermogenes, and his commentators, generally classify self defense as a qualitative (ποιότης, jZ) -- rather than definitional (ὅρος, iS) -- stasis, subdivided as a counterposition (ἀντίθεσις, bG) expressed as a counteraccusation (ἀντέκλημα, bD).

⁹⁹Probably still employing Neocles as a source.

¹⁰⁰On the basis of certain stylistic considerations, DK attribute the remainder of the specific discussion of the topics to Alexander. See their introduction, p. xiii.

¹⁰¹AnSg 182. DK translation.

the *Rhetoric*. The others are included or reflected in Aristotle's *Topics*. There is nothing especially remarkable about the treatment they receive in AnSg, except in one comment, noted above,¹⁰² regarding the relationship between topics and epicheiremes, which reflects Alexander's definition of a topic as a starting point for epicheiremes.

Section IV. Conclusion

At present, enough has been given here to demonstrate a clear Aristotelian foundation underlying the AnSg text. Additionally, textual evidence of numerous significant differences with Aristotle have been presented and considered. We shall next give attention to Hermogenes' ideas of proof and evidence, especially as they appear in *On Invention*, Book 3, and then return to AnSg in order to compare the two schemes.

¹⁰²The comment occurs at AnSg 172, and was discussed in AnSg's use of the vocabulary of epicheiremes.

CHAPTER FOUR: SOME TECHNICAL VOCABULARY IN HERMOGENES

What has influenced my life more than any other single thing has been my stammer. Had I not stammered I would probably . . . have gone to Cambridge as my brothers did, perhaps have become a don and every now and then published a dreary book about French literature.

--Somerset Maugham¹

When genuine passion moves you, say what you've got to say,
and say it hot.

--D. H. Lawrence²

When Hermogenes turned from performance to scholarship, he created a corpus of work which became the foundation of rhetoric in the Greek West for a millennium, and then worked its way into the Latin West in the days of the Renaissance. If one were to attempt to summarize, in a single phrase, the difference in perspective between the authors represented in AnSg and the Hermogenic inventional corpus, one might hazard the observation that the former concentrate on proof, the latter concentrates on argument. That is to say, in their approach to invention, AnSg's sources seem to concentrate on those theoretical issues which produce the *materials* for argument; Hermogenes talks about *arguing*: the corpus of his work is far more interested in the theoretical aspects involved in coordinating lines of reasoning in order to form a cohesive presentation of one's case. One -- the dominant, but by no means

¹Newsweek interview, May 23, 1960.

²*Studies in Classic American Literature* (1924), ch. 2.

only -- aspect of this shift in focus is found in Hermogenes' particular presentation of stasis theory. Another is found in his seemingly original restructuring of the elements of epicheiremes and enthymemes. He arranges these, along with other elements, into a single argumentative figure which, when used in full, invokes a cascading effect: it is designed to move with an inexorable sense from a very contingent given proposition to an impression of its apparent necessity. We will be examining in more detail both of these aspects of the Hermogenic works.

Section I. Stasis

A brief summary of the most important elements in Hermogenes' view of stasis theory may be set out graphically as in Figure 4.1; the actual stases are those which are more thickly framed; there are fourteen. Each stasis is, in the figure, given a brief definition.³ Hermogenes' basic perspective on stasis is adequately discussed in a number of the secondary sources.⁴ While there are some minor disagreements among scholars,⁵ there are no major difficulties with the text, and the overall picture is clear; it need not be repeated

³The definitions given are a pastiche; some are taken directly from the text of *Stasis*, some are my own summary, some are taken from KENNEDY's (1983) discussion, some from HEATH's (1995) commentary.

⁴See, e.g., M. HEATH (1995) pp. 70-79; RUSSELL (1983), ch. 3; PATILLON (1988), pp. 56-78; PATILLON (1997), pp. 56-77; KENNEDY (1983) 80-86; DIETER (1950).

⁵On, e.g., the total number or the exact classifications of some stases. KENNEDY and PATILLON, e.g., consider μετέληψις (objection, a call to dismiss the case either on the basis of lack of jurisdiction or *prima facie* lack of evidence, *hY*) to be a genre, and count its two species as two separate stases. HEATH, on the other hand, sees μετέληψις as the stasis; its two species, like the two species of ambiguity (ἀμφιβολία, *aO*), are viewed as merely exemplary.




Figure 4.1
Hermogenes' System of Stases

in detail here. In essence, Hermogenes, adopting and adapting Hermagoras,⁶ leads the speaker through a series of questions and considerations which are designed to clarify the stasis (στάσις, 1D), the central issue of the problem under consideration; once the stasis is determined, he discusses a series of general ways to argue about that particular stasis, outlining argumentative approaches on both sides of the question.

For Hermogenes, every matter to be decided falls into the classification of a question of fact, definition or quality. Questions of fact are those in which the details of the case are in dispute. For example, "They say I murdered Themistocles, but they have produced no body. Has Themistocles, in fact, been murdered, or has he merely run off with one of the local floozies?" Any such dispute about the direct facts of the case provides one with a stasis of στοιχασμός (conjecture,⁷ 1E).

If one concedes all the facts of the case, one is then faced with a question of whether or not the facts have been correctly categorized and named. If there is disagreement here, this provides one with a stasis of ὅρος (definition, 1S). For example, the penalty for temple robbery is death. A thief is caught stealing the

⁶See PATILLON (1997) pp. 67ff.

⁷Finding correct English terminology for Hermogenes' theory as it is presented in both *Stasis* and *Invention*, is not an easy task. Where conventions exist, I have attempted to follow them; I have otherwise gone with HEATH's (1995) choices, where this was possible without confusing his terminology with our earlier discussion of AnSg. While Heath's terminology is not always ideal, choosing it has the benefit of making the following discussion generally consistent with the best English commentary on *Stasis* that is presently available.

private purse of a person who is engaged in ablutions at the temple; they are both on the temple grounds. The offended party charges him with temple robbery, and demands the thief's death; the thief argues that he was committing private theft, and cannot be put to death. The definition of the act is the stasis of the case.⁸ To take a more contemporary example, when an abused spouse -- say a wife -- concedes the fact of having killed her husband after careful planning, but argues that the act was rather self-defense than premeditated murder, she is invoking the stasis of definition.⁹

If, however, one concedes both the facts and the definition, one must then consider the nature of the situation by examining, as Heath says, the "substantive features of the acts in question, or ... the implications of the law under which the charge is brought",¹⁰ which is to say, the quality (ποιότης, jZ) of the act.

⁸Though it is difficult to see how this -- or most -- legal disagreements of definition could fail to collapse into a stasis of συλλογισμός (assimilation, lM), in which the applicability of a given legal instrument is taken up. This is a point to which [Pseudo]-Hermogenes seems somewhat sensitive in *On Invention*; note his discussion in 3.14.2ff, which opens: "Ὅρος καὶ ἀνθορισμός καὶ συλλογισμός καὶ λύσις τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ τέσσαρα μὲν ἔστιν ὀνόματα. τῇ δὲ δυνάμει δύο." "'Definition' and 'counter-definition', and 'assimilation' and 'refutation of the assimilation' are four terms with two meanings...."

⁹It might be considered definition because the contemporary legal codes define various degrees of murder. Hermogenes would classify a killing which took place in self defense under ἀντέγκλημα, counteraccusation (bD), i.e., an attempt to blame the wronged party for the wrong suffered, and logically, his view of the matter is a difficult one to refute. Note HEATH's (1995) commentary (p. 74) on Hermogenes' phrase "clear and complete."

¹⁰M. HEATH (1995), p. 72. Heath's comments reflect the primary Hermogenic divisions of quality: the logical (λογικός, hM) and the legal (νομικός, iL); each of these is subsequently subdivided into several categories, as seen in Figure 4.1.

For example, a poor man finds Themistocles¹¹ committing adultery with his wife, and immediately murders the admiral.¹² A citizen then charges the poor man with "Harming the Public Good".¹³ The man cannot deny that he killed Themistocles; neither can he deny that the killing of Themistocles harms the state (good admirals being hard to find), and therefor neither the facts of the case nor the definitions are in question. Thus, the poor man must find some other grounds from which to argue. For example, he might argue on the basis of being within his legal rights, which would be a stasis of counterplea (ἀντίληψις, bH), one of the subdivisions of quality (ποιότης, jZ). Or the man might argue on the grounds that he should be excused from the charge because he was overcome with anger and grief in the moment when he was confronted with his betrayal, which would be a stasis of mitigation (συγγνώμη, lF), another of the subdivisions of quality (ποιότης).

¹¹A skilled admiral in the Athenian navy, commander of the Battle of Salamis Straits which crushed Xerxes' fleet and led to the (attempted) withdrawal of Persian troops from Greece. The Persians were cut off by the Spartan hoplites, and, without naval supply lines, decimated.

¹²A thing allowed, but not required, in the declaimer's legal world. The offended party could accept a ransom from the offender, and allow him to live. Hermogenes is, of course, preparing declaimers, not lawyers, and in the world of declamation, there were legal clauses allowing the murder of non-citizens who mounted the walls of the city, adulterers caught in the act, tyrants, and, from time to time, a would-be tyrant. Though such laws were occasionally based on actual Athenian legal codes (as was this one), most were simply inventions to create an exciting setting for the declaimer to work against. See KENNEDY (1983), p. 81; see also RUSSELL (1983), ch. 2 for an entertaining look at what he refers to as "Sophistopolis" -- the legal and social world of the declaimer.

¹³Another favorite charge within the declaimer's world. Its generality allowed it a broad range of applications.

In addition to such issues based in reasoned arguments about the case (what Hermogenes calls the logical [λογικός, 586] aspect of quality, one of the two major divisions of qualitative stases), quality is also subdivided into legal (νομικός, iL) issues such as arguments regarding jurisdiction of the case (παραγραφή, iW) or arguments based in certain ambiguities (ἀμφιβολία, aO) within the law. The full system provides a simple, consistent, clear, and comprehensive methodology for approaching and analyzing a rhetorical situation.

Once the stasis is established, Hermogenes goes on to provide an outline of argumentative approaches, or potential points to be made when arguing within a given stasis. He calls this process of outlining "a division" (διείρεσις, dG) of the question at hand, and the resulting approaches to the subject, i.e., the potential points to be made, are called "headings" or simply "heads" (κεφαλή, hD); they resemble topics,¹⁴ and often overlap with other stases. There are some 41 different headings¹⁵ outlined by Hermogenes. For example,¹⁶ the stasis of conjecture (στοχασμός, lE), is divided (διείρεσις) into nine specific heads (κεφαλή): exception

¹⁴In that they offer an argumentative approach to the rhetorical situation.

¹⁵Or 42; custom, ἔθος, eH, is considered by Hermogenes as an alternative to law, νόμος, iL, when no written law exists. Discussion of each heading may be found in HEATH's (1995) commentary. For the record, the headings are represented by the following conceptual families: bB, bD, bG, bH, bL, bW, cH, cK, cW, cZ, dA, dB, dI (used in two ways to mean intent and alternative intent), dJ, dV, dW, eB (used in two ways to mean both feasibility and capacity, opportunity), eH, eL, fB, gS, hX, hY, hZ, iC, iL, iS, iW, jM, jT, jZ, kD, kE, kQ, kS, kV, kZ, lF, lM, lR.

¹⁶The stasis of στοχασμός is divided in St 3.1-214.

(παραγραφικός, iW), demand for evidence (ἐλέγχων ἀπαίτησις, bW), motive (βούλησις, cZ), capacity (or potentiality: δύναμις, eB), sequence of events (τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους, cK), counterplea (ἀντίληψις, bH), objection (μετάληψις, hY), transposition of cause (μετάθεσις τῆς αἰτίας, hX), and persuasive defense (πιθανὴ ἀπολογία, cH).¹⁷ Each of these heads is, in Hermogenes' discussion, defined, exemplified, and explained.

The divisions presented for each stasis are generally forwarded in an order of logical progression, designed to reflect the manner in which the overall argument would be likely to unfold between the two contending parties. Heath notes that the ancient commentators viewed Hermogenes' divisions as "the 'natural' order of the heads".¹⁸ Nevertheless, both Hermogenes and his commentators emphasize the need for flexibility and adaptation in ordering and filling out the headings, so that they best respond to the specifics of each case.¹⁹

After discussing the division of each stasis into heads, Hermogenes typically follows with a discussion of variations which might complicate the situation. For example, a conjectural stasis involving reciprocal charges, where the speaker must prosecute the opponent while simultaneously defending himself.²⁰

¹⁷Definitions and discussion of these terms may be found in HEATH's (1995) glossaries as well as his commentaries on the relevant terms, pp. 80-101, *passim*.

¹⁸M. HEATH (1995), p. 80.

¹⁹St 3.1-3, e.g.; M. HEATH (1995), p. 80.

While there are exceptions, this pattern represents Hermogenes' general approach within his essay for each of fourteen stases: statement of the stasis, division of the stasis (i.e., the argumentative treatment of the given stasis), followed by discussion of variations to the theme of the given stasis.

A further review of Hermogenes' theory of stasis is here unnecessary.

Hermogenes' treatise contains, of course, a wealth of technical vocabulary, some of it original, most of it adapted. We shall return to the vocabulary of Hermogenes' stasis in the next chapter, when we begin a comparison between the Hermogenic technical vocabulary and that of AnSg. At present, we may proceed to a discussion of Book 3 of *On Invention*.

Section II. Invention

On Invention is far less well known than *On Stasis*. Kennedy has a helpful introductory survey of the piece,²¹ and Patillon provides a French translation along with notes and an introduction.²² Rabe's Greek text runs 120 pages.

The treatise is composed of four books, the first two of which lack any introduction or contextual remarks, seem to be arranged in a progression which does not lead logically to Books Three and Four, and are less consistently clear than the later material. Kennedy

²⁰St 3.251-265.

²¹KENNEDY (1983), pp.86-95.

²²PATILLON (1997). The introduction may be found on pages 77-105; the translation and notes are found on pp. 209-318.

suggests that these first two books may be edited excerpts from the original, longer text;²³ Patillon goes so far as to suggest that they were, perhaps, originally part of a separate work, and could be from an entirely different author²⁴ than the last two books.²⁵

Book 1 deals with issues of the prooemium, Book 2 with the narration; this would lead one to expect Book 3 to deal with proof, and Book 4 with the epilogue. In fact, Book 3 presents argumentative strategies, and Book 4 deals with style and figures, and is more interested in delivery. Though other aspects of the treatise are not without some unique concepts or vocabulary,²⁶ for our purposes Book 3 is by far the most important, and, as we observed in Chapter One, we will find ourselves concentrating our discussion there. Patillon, for example, remarks that the essay's treatment of the epicheireme "is perhaps the most original contribution in the first three books"²⁷ of the treatise. This aspect of the essay is one to which we will need to give more detailed consideration.

A. Premises and Introductions to the Epicheiremes

The text of Book 3, as it is arranged by Rabe, takes on the general form of an outline of argumentative circumstances in which

²³KENNEDY (1983), pp. 886f.

²⁴I.e., different even from the Pseudo-Hermogenic author of Books Three and Four. Cf. Chapter One, fn. 53.

²⁵PATILLON (1997), p. 78.

²⁶See, e.g., 4.2, along with Patillon's notes to that section.

²⁷"...est peut-être l'apport le plus original des trois premiers livres de notre traité." PATILLON (1997), p. 249, fn. 2.

one might reasonably be expected to find a need for evidentiary enhancement of one's case.²⁸ Once these circumstances are outlined, there follows an extensive and original discussion of epicheiremes, which occupies the central part of Book 3²⁹ and which explains in detail how to discover, formulate, and arrange the material of the required evidence.

After a brief introductory dedication and outline of the book,³⁰ the author presents an essay on the nature and place of the pre-confirmation (προκατάσκειν, km).³¹ The pre-confirmation may be, itself, an original contribution of the Hermogenic theory; there are no earlier occurrences³² of the term, though later commentators speak of the pre-confirmation as if it had been a conscious part of rhetorical theory before the Hermogenic author was writing.³³ The pre-confirmation serves the purpose of what today we would call a "preview" of the speech's main points, though in a slightly more

²⁸Rabe orders the manuscript sections of Book 3: 1, 2, 4, 6, 3, 5, 7-15. PATILLON follows, and agrees with, this arrangement, except for an emendation of Book 4.14 after section 3.14, justifying this on the grounds of the consistency of the subject matter (see PATILLON [1997], p. 272). Kennedy speaks approvingly of Rabe's realignment of section 3 (and there is sufficient textual reason to justify the move -- see PATILLON's [1997] notes on pp. 82, 248; KENNEDY [1983], p. 88), but he takes a cooler tone toward Rabe's relocation of section 5 (see KENNEDY [1983], p. 89).

²⁹3.5, 7-11.

³⁰3.1

³¹3.2.

³²Assuming authorship before Apsines' *Figured Problems*; Patillon argues for authorship after Apsines, and this would make Apsines' use of the term the earliest extant employment.

³³KENNEDY (1983), p. 88.

extended form. As a part of the speech, it generally came between the narration and the proof.

In Rabe's text, one next encounters section 4, which serves as an introduction to headings (κεφαλή, hD); here, already, the author, begins an emphasis on the importance of the confirmation (κατασκευή, gX) and epicheiremes (fZ) to establish the orator's case: "For the whole strength of rhetoric rests in these [the headings], and the force of victory is to be found in the confirmation (κατασκευή) of the headings (κεφαλή)".³⁴ He will observe a few lines later that headings are confirmed through epicheiremes.³⁵ These subjects will occupy [Pseudo]-Hermogenes throughout the remainder of Book 3.

The Hermogenic author's discussion in section 3.4 may be graphically summarized in Figure 4.2. He suggests his discussion in 3.4 is devoted to deliberative oratory (πραγματικός, 819),³⁶ but there seems to be no reason that his points could not apply equally well in a judicial setting. His main point is that, regardless of whether an orator is introducing a heading or refuting one, he comes eventually to epicheiremes for his support.

Where refutation (λύσις, hO) is involved, however, the approach to the epicheiremes (fZ) is more complicated and involves

³⁴τὸ γὰρ πᾶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἰσχυρὸν ἐν τούτοις ἴσεται καὶ τὸ τῆς νίκης κράτος ἐν τῇ κατασκευῇ τῶν κεφαλαίων διαφαίνεται. Inv 3.4.5-9.

³⁵... εἴτα κατασκευάζομεν ἐκ τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων... "...which we then confirm with epicheiremes..." 3.4.14-15.

³⁶Inv 3.4.21.




Figure 4.2
The Path to Epicheiremes in Inv 3.4

the preliminary steps of summarizing the opponent's perspective succinctly, and stating the refutation one plans to support with epicheiremes. The four steps involved are, first, the protasis (πρότασις, κX), which announces to the audience the orator's intention to summarize his opponent's view; second, the succinct statement of the opponent's view (ὑποφορά, mU); third, a statement alerting the audience that the orator is prepared to offer an alternative position (ἀντιπρότασις, bK); and, fourth, the statement of the orator's alternative position (ἀνθυποφορά, bC). The alternative position is, of course, the same as the refutation (λύσις, hO) which will be supported with epicheiremes. These four introductory steps to the epicheireme may be varied; the πρότασις and ἀντιπρότασις may be omitted for stylistic reasons; they serve primarily as rhetorical ornaments. Kennedy's remarks on this passage are, however, misleading.³⁷ [Pseudo]-Hermogenes is not quite as dismissive of this four step introduction to the epicheireme as Kennedy implies. While the author considers that the πρότασις and ἀντιπρότασις may be mere embellishment,³⁸ they may also

³⁷KENNEDY (1983), p. 89. Kennedy reads "κόσμος γάρ ἐστι τοῦ λόγου καὶ πλεον οὐδὲν πολλάκις" [3.4.58] in a way that makes it refer to the entire four step introduction of the epicheireme. The phrase, however, refers only to the πρότασις, and a later, similar observation [3.4.88] is made of the ἀντιπρότασις. No such remarks are made of the ὑποφορά or the ἀνθυποφορά, which the Hermogenic author appears to consider as a more important aspect of the process.

³⁸3.4.58; 3.4.88.

enhance the argument considerably in certain situations.³⁹ And while either of them may be omitted without harming either the ὑποφορά or the ἀνθυποφορά, respectively, nowhere does the author say that any of the four may be omitted.⁴⁰ Clearly, however, it is the epicheiremes which serve as the ends of the process, and which bear the argumentative weight.

After this discussion, the text proceeds⁴¹ to lay out three means of assaulting an opponent's premise: one may deny it outright, one may allow it but deny its relevance in the present circumstances, or one may allow it while demonstrating that the premise fails to lead to the opponent's conclusion -- and, in fact, supports one's own. The first two of these lines of attack are taken up in 3.6, with a consideration of denial⁴² (ἐνστάσις, fD) and counter-representation (ἀντιπαράστασις, bJ), which together constitute something of an amplification on the ἀνθυποφορά (bC) from the previous section.⁴³ This is still preliminary material to the

³⁹Cf. 3.4.59-63. Here [Pseudo]-Hermogenes notes that the πρότασις or the ἀντιπρότασις may set a tone (of snide mockery, for example, with a πρότασις) in which the following statement is to be received; it would, thus used, serve a pathological persuasive function ["...so are they all, all honorable men..."].

⁴⁰Cf. KENNEDY (1982), p. 89: "[The author] notes that each of the four parts can sometimes be omitted."

⁴¹Inv 3.6, and the following section in Rabe, 3.3.

⁴²Heath employs "refutation" to convey the meaning of ἐνστάσις, but such a translation runs the risk of confusing λύσις (refutation, hO) with ἐνστάσις. The former is a more general term for any "solution" to a rhetorical difficulty.

⁴³Cf. PATILLON, p. 246, fn.3.

actual epicheiremes (fZ). The author opens his consideration by observing:

One should realize that the *Art of Division* showed denial (ἐνστάσις, fD) and counter-representation (ἀντιπαράστασις, bJ) <to be> headings (κεφαλή, hD) set in opposition to counterplea⁴⁴ (ἀντίληψις, bH).⁴⁵

Which is to say that the two ideas are designed to begin a refutation of an opponent's counterplea, as stated in stasis theory.⁴⁶ The author, however, notes a much broader range of use for these argumentative approaches:

We should attempt, for each heading [κεφαλή, hD] in every stasis [στάσις, lD] to introduce the discussions and confirmations [κατασκευή, gX], with the denial and counter-representation [ἐνστάσις, fD and ἀντιπαράστασις, bJ].⁴⁷

⁴⁴The counterplea (bH) is a qualitative (jZ), logical (hM), judicial (dU) stasis which denies that the act committed (for which one is being prosecuted) constitutes a wrong.

⁴⁵ Ἰστέον, ὅτι τὴν ἐνστασιν καὶ ἀντιπαράστασιν ἐναντία κεφάλαια τῆς ἀντιλήψεως ἢ διαιρετικὴ παρέδωκε τέχνη· Inv 3.6.2-4. The *Art of Division* is assumed to be a lost work of the author, though the description given here adequately summarizes Hermogenes' St 5.34-36.

⁴⁶See St 5. Counterplea is, as we have observed, a stasis in which the orator argues that the act was, *per se*, legitimate, as opposed to a counterposition (ἀντίθεσις, bG) where the illegitimacy of the act is conceded, but one pleads innocence (or asks for mercy) based on mitigating elements within the situation. If an opponent presents a counterplea (ἀντίληψις, bH) rather than a counterposition (ἀντίθεσις, bG), ἐνστάσις and ἀντιπαράστασις constitute the openings of potential refutations (λύσις, hO) to his argument.

⁴⁷Χρὴ δὲ ἡμᾶς καθ' ἡκαστον τῶν κεφαλαίων ἐν πάσῃ στάσει πειρᾶσθαι τὰς μάχας καὶ τὰς κατασκευὰς κατ' εἰκόνα τῆς ἐνστάσεως καὶ ἀντιπαραστάσεως εἰσάγειν· Inv 3.6.10-12. It should be noted that the Hermogenic author's expansion of the denial and counter-representation is slightly less dramatic than it first appears here, as we shall see in Chapter Five.

[Pseudo]-Hermogenes suggests that denial and counter-representation should be sought for in every line of argument within every stasis. This, he says, will make the orator overwhelming, if done properly.⁴⁸ He then proceeds to give examples, notably drawn from deliberative contexts, rather than judicial, as if to prove his point.

By way of definition, recall that the denial (ἐνστάσις, fD) is a direct statement which rejects the premise of the opponent's position. The counter-representation (ἀντιπαράστασις, bJ) accepts the opponent's premise, but denies its applicability in the given situation.⁴⁹ To return to an earlier example of the poor man who kills the adulterous admiral Themistocles: If the man, charged with Harming the Public Good offers the counterplea ("I was within my rights!"), one might reply with denial (ἐνστάσις): "You, being without property, have no rights!" and add a counter-representation (ἀντιπαράστασις): "And even if you were within your rights, it should not have been done now, when the city is on the verge of war!" Each statement will require epicheiremes (fZ), and the supporting material to reinforce the epicheiremes, in order to stand.

The Rabe text then⁵⁰ picks up a discussion of "forced argument" (βίαιος, cX), which is a third form of undermining the

⁴⁸Inv 3.6.13-15.

⁴⁹Cf. HEATH (1995) pp. 251, 259; PATILLON (1997) p. 246, fn 3.

⁵⁰Inv 3.3.

opponent's premise.⁵¹ It works by taking that premise and demonstrating a different development which leads, actually, to one's own (rather than the opponent's) desired conclusion; the author draws several examples from Demosthenes' *On the Embassy*⁵² in which Aeschines' (assumed) premises, in his argument for confirming the treaty, are interpreted as reasons for rejecting that treaty. For example, Aeschines will say that the Chersonese will be made secure by the treaty. Certainly it will, Demosthenes replies, and Athens will bear the honor of being able to claim that she managed to retain her own possessions at the mere cost of sacrificing all of her allies to Philip.⁵³ Here, clearly, Aeschines' premise is employed by Demosthenes to support Demosthenes' own conclusion.

B. [Pseudo]-Hermogenic Argumentative Trope

The next several sections of Book 3 include a lengthy consideration of the epicheireme (f2).⁵⁴ Patillon, as we have seen,⁵⁵ remarks on its originality, as does Kennedy,⁵⁶ who devotes much of his review of *On Invention* to this aspect of the work.⁵⁷

⁵¹The specific term is not used by Aristotle, but it is one of his Common Topics. Cf. Rhet 1398a.

⁵²Demosthenes 19.78, 79, 134.

⁵³Demosthenes 19.78.

⁵⁴Inv 3.5, 7-11

⁵⁵PATILLON (1997), p. 249, fn. 2. Cf. above, fn. 27.

⁵⁶KENNEDY (1983), p. 87, p. 90.

⁵⁷KENNEDY (1983), p. 90-92.

Each emphasizes the sequential nature of the argumentative trope⁵⁸ forwarded in the text, though neither develops the inter-relationship of the various elements of the trope in any detail.⁵⁹ The general view may be graphically summarized as in Figure 4.3. In the briefest possible terms, the Hermogenic author notes, as we have seen, that any heading (κεφαλή, hD), whether our own which needs confirming (gX) or our opponent's which needs refuting (hO), will rest upon epicheiremes (fZ). The epicheireme is any reason given to embrace the position one is forwarding. It will itself be supported by a development (ἐργασία, gB) which creates a sense of confidence in the epicheireme. This development is, in turn, supported with an enthymeme (fC), designed to raise the emotional tension of the argumentative sequence, which is then completed with an epenthymeme (ἐπενθύμημα, fM); an epenthymeme is itself designed to complete the sequence by simultaneously reinforcing the growing sense of persuasive density gathering around the proposition, and to serve as the denouement of the tensions raised in the previous stages of the sequence.

⁵⁸I can think of no other convenient term by which to refer to the whole of this interacting sequence designed for argumentative effect.

⁵⁹While he does outline the distinct sources (aspects of circumstance and common topics) of the different elements (and it will be necessary to consider these in more detail below), KENNEDY simply notes that each stage of the argumentative trope serves as a supporting statement for the previous element. Patillon gives slightly more detail, seeks to contextualize the argumentative trope in relation to its introductory elements, and discusses the enthymeme and epenthymeme in regard to their functional differences; some of his observations are more easily defended than others. I shall take up his comments as necessary in the ensuing discussion.




Figure 4.3
The Nature of Epicheiremes in Inv 3.5ff

1. [Pseudo]-Hermogenic Epicheiremes (Ἐπιχείρημα, fC)

Epicheiremes (fZ) are essentially Greek γάρ colons or periods;⁶⁰ that is to say, the epicheireme is generally -- though not always -- a complete thought introduced by the Greek particle γάρ, "for, because, since." It is, we are told,⁶¹ derived from one of the six elements of circumstance (περίστασις, jQ): place (τόπος, mH), time (χρόνος, nD), manner (τρόπος, mJ), person (πρόσωπον, kV), cause (αἰτία, aJ), or act (πράγμα, kC).

The Hermogenic author takes his example from a hypothetical proposal by Demosthenes to fortify the Chersonese with a canal; the component parts of the example (epicheireme [fZ], development [gB], enthymeme [fC], and epenthymeme [fM]) are outlined by Kennedy in a cursory fashion.⁶² The matter might be better clarified for us if we were to add to these examples a somewhat more contemporary one; let us consider the debate which ensued after the launch pad disaster which killed three Apollo astronauts, early in the nation's efforts to go to the moon. In such a context, say one faced a heading such as, "America should abandon its plans for exploration of the moon", which was forwarded by one's opponents. Introductory material to the epicheireme (cf. Figure 4.2) might look like this: πρότασις (kX) - "My opponents' position is clear..." followed by

⁶⁰For Kennedy's remarks on the particle in relation to Aristotelian enthymemes, see KENNEDY (1993), pp. xii; 29, fn. 3.

⁶¹Inv 3.5.8.

⁶²KENNEDY (1983), pp. 90-91.

ὑποφορά (mU) - "...They believe that, given the present difficulties, we should abandon our commitment to go to the moon..." followed by ἀντιπρότασις (bK) - "...But I say that..." followed by λύσις (hO) through ἐνστάσις (fD) - "...Americans do not turn back in the face of mere difficulties..." This λύσις cannot, of course, stand alone, but requires confirmation (κατασκευή, gX) via epicheiremes.

An epicheireme (fZ) will present one reason for the audience to endorse the λύσις, and will be generated by (i.e., it will concentrate on, or be derived from) one of the six aspects of the circumstances (περίστασις, jQ).

...all epicheiremes [fZ] are derived from circumstance. Circumstance is place time, manner, person, cause, act -- <which covers> all that is in us, and in <our> speech and in <our> behavior, and in <our> judgments, and in <our> principles, and in <our> living.⁶³

An easy example for our lunar problem is an epicheireme from person (πρόσωπον, kV): "For Americans are explorers, and when we cease to explore, we cease to be fully American"; or from cause⁶⁴ (αἰτία, aJ): "For by exploring space we sharpen our technological edge, and enlarge our technological frontiers, here, at home." Either of these epicheiremes⁶⁵ will require one or more developments (ἐργασία,

⁶³ ...πάν ἐπιχείρημα γινόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς περιστάσεως· περίστασις δέ ἐστι τὸ πᾶν ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ λόγοις καὶ πράγμασι καὶ δίκαις καὶ ὑποθέσεσι καὶ βίῳ. τόπος. χρόνος. τρόπος. πρόσωπον. αἰτία. πρᾶγμα. Inv 3.5.6-10.

⁶⁴The term can mean motive or consequence, i.e., the cause of something, or what something causes.

⁶⁵Note that, in Greek, both would be γάρ periods.

gB), and we shall examine those developments (gB) shortly. Before that, however, we must briefly note two things.

First, there is a formal relationship between the circumstances (jQ) and the epicheiremes (fZ), but it is neither rigid nor stifling; on the contrary, the relationship is designed to discover an abundance of argumentative approaches. The author observes that, "frequently, two or three epicheiremes are found from one source".⁶⁶ He then examples this principle with a hypothetical case where Pericles is brought to trial on charges of treason for cooperating with the Lacedemonians. Three epicheiremes from person (πρόσωπον, kV) are given:⁶⁷

1. for Pericles, of all people, would not commit treason;
2. for Pericles would not betray the Athenians, of all peoples;
3. for Pericles would not betray Athens to the Spartans, of all peoples.

Thus, three arguments emerge from a consideration of only one source (person, kV) of epicheiremes. The author notes that this is not always the case, but that it is not infrequent to derive several epicheiremes from a single element of circumstance (jQ).⁶⁸ This observation is followed by a similar point: that a single epicheireme may be discovered from several elements of circumstance:

Just as we have seen that, frequently, one source for an epicheireme leads to the discovery of two or three epicheiremes, we see that in the same way one

⁶⁶Πολλάκις δὲ ἀπὸ μιᾶς γενέσεως καὶ δύο καὶ τρία εὐρίσκεται ἐπιχειρήματα...
Inv 3.5.122-123.

⁶⁷Inv 3.5.129-135.

⁶⁸Inv 3.5.154-155.

epicheireme is frequently found to be common to two or three sources.⁶⁹

Thus, a lawyer may forward an epicheireme which objects to the introduction of certain evidence on the basis of place ("America is a nation of laws, and when the police failed to obtain the proper warrant...") or the lawyer may employ the same epicheireme on the basis of person ("Those of us who are private citizens must know that the police are ruled by the law just as we are, and when the police failed to obtain the proper warrant..."). Depending on which element of circumstance is chosen, there will be a potential difference in the tone of the argument, of course, and wisdom is, therefore, required in order to choose the proper approaches and variations from among the wealth of information.⁷⁰

Which brings us to our second point regarding the Hermogenic epicheireme (fZ). Given this diversity of possibilities, the method is also a means to ferret out the less desirable aspects of an argumentative approach. In other words, where the art of invention, properly applied, discovers only a few epicheiremes, there is ample reason for caution: such a dearth of epicheiremes is likely to highlight an especially weak area of the case, and the orator should take note, and beware.⁷¹

⁶⁹ "Ὅσπερ τοίνυν τοῦτο ἴσμεν. ὅτι πολλάκις ἢ μία γένεσις τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος δύο καὶ τρία παρατυχὸν εὐρίσκει ἐπιχειρήματα, οὕτως ἰστέον, ὅτι καὶ πολλάκις ἐν ἐπιχείρημα εὐρίσκεται κοινὸν καὶ δύο καὶ τριῶν γενέσεων...
Inv 3.5.156-159.

⁷⁰Inv 3.5.180-191. The Hermogenic author will hone this point regarding his argumentative trope in Inv 4.1, demonstrating ways to re-order its parts for maximum effect in specific settings.

⁷¹Cf. Inv 3.5.173-180.

2. [Pseudo]-Hermogenic Development (Ἐργασία, gB)

While epicheiremes (fZ) provide a reason to believe the position forwarded,⁷² they themselves require support. Such support comes from what the Hermogenic author refers to as the development (Ἐργασία, gB).⁷³ In this discussion, two particular points stand out. First, the author begins with a consideration of the formal aspects of the development (gB). He emphasizes the sources of development, which differ from those of the epicheireme:

Every epicheireme is developed (gB) with these <elements> -- <elements> which some understand to be epicheiremes <but which are not> -- specifically: with comparison, with example, with lesser, with greater, with equality, with opposite.⁷⁴

Just as the epicheireme was derived from the elements of circumstance (jQ), the development of an epicheireme is derived from a set of limited topics⁷⁵ which involve some sort of comparison or contrast -- as can be seen in the author's list: comparison

⁷²In either refutation of the opponent's point or confirmation of our own: εἰς τὴν λύσιν ἢ κατασκευὴν; Inv 3.7.11.

⁷³Inv 3.7. For the remainder of the discussion on the Hermogenic argumentative trope, I shall use "development" only in a limited, and technical sense, as the title of this stage of the trope. I mean, invariably, a reference to the gB family, ἔργασία.

⁷⁴ἐργάζεται δὲ πᾶν ἐπιχείρημα ἀπὸ τούτων. ἃ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τινὲς ἐπιχειρήματα. οἷον ἀπὸ παραβολῆς. ἀπὸ παραδείγματος. ἀπὸ μικροτέρου. ἀπὸ μείζονος. ἀπὸ ἴσου. ἀπὸ ἐναντίου. Inv 3.7.6-9.

⁷⁵These involve what Patillon calls (in his discussion of the enthymeme) "confrontational" elements (PATILLON [1997], p. 259, fn. 1). By this Patillon means, simply, that the topics from which developments are drawn necessarily lend themselves to an association of different ideas, rather than the presentation of a single point -- a perspective which will become crucial when we move on to a discussion of the formal elements of the Hermogenic enthymeme. We shall see Patillon's quote in full, below.

(παραβολή, iV), example (παράδειγμα, iX), lesser (μικρός, iE), greater (μέγας, hT), etc.⁷⁶

To take up our lunar example, we have the epicheireme (fZ) from person (kV): "For Americans are explorers, and when we cease to explore, we cease to be fully American" given a development (gB) from an example (iX): "Our forebears did not turn back from exploring this great land even in the face of great difficulty"; or a development (gB) from greater (hT): "And Americans realize that when great difficulties demand so much more from us, this renders the rewards so much more magnificent for us"; or, to take the epicheireme from cause (aJ): "For by exploring space we sharpen our technological edge, and enlarge our technological frontiers, here, at home"; developed (gB) from opposite (ἐναντίος, eY): "but if we

⁷⁶The Hermogenic author is clearly interested in the comparative aspect of this stage of his argumentative trope; the reason becomes clearer as we move on to a consideration of the enthymeme. One may profitably compare PATILLON's (1997) comments, p. 256, fn. 5, where he outlines the comparative nature of each of the examples given in the Hermogenic text. Patillon, however, is a linguist, and is therefore interested in the relationship between semantic expression and the underlying logical structures. While noting the comparative nature of the development in examples given by the Hermogenic author, he never mentions its rhetorical dimension in respect to audience identification -- which appears central to the mind of a rhetorician reading the text. Given his emphasis, Patillon's discussions are helpful, but they repeatedly pass over, without comment, the more significant rhetorical aspects of the Hermogenic text. To take another example, note his preliminary outline of the argumentative sequence, p. 249, fn. 2, where his discussion observes that the enthymeme does not differ from the epicheireme in its nature, but in its use ["Or, l'enthymème pseudo-hermogénien ne diffère pas de l'argument (= Patillon's term for "epicheireme") par sa nature, mais par son emploi."]. For Patillon, the development and the enthymeme "only differ because one applies to the heading, the other to the epicheireme" ["Ils ne diffèrent donc que parce que l'un s'applique au point (= Patillon's term for "heading"), l'autre qu développement."] From a rhetorical point of view, however, the Hermogenic author's enthymeme is quite distinct from the development in its nature, as well as its use, as we shall see.

fail to persevere in the face of difficulties, our technological edge will dull, our frontiers will wither and close in upon us"; or development (gB) from lesser (iE): "And every child knows that falling is part of learning to walk, and if even children see this, how much more should we be undeterred in our struggle to walk among the stars, to broaden the quality of our lives at home, to expand the scope of our dreams -- and those of our children"; the process might continue almost indefinitely.

There may be many examples (iX) or comparisons (iV), etc. for each *epicheireme*,⁷⁷ but a *development* consists of one and only one example, one and only one comparison, etc.⁷⁸ What is important to notice here is that any part of this rich array of supporting material is based in the *sources* of development, the limited topics. Note, further, that these sources of development create what constitutes an identification of the position being forwarded with some aspect of the audience's self-identity, by placing the proposition into a context where the audience sees itself and the proposition united, and in contrast to or in comparison with something *other*.

Once again, examples of the Hermogenic development (gB) presented in English may help clarify its purpose. We may take several of our examples from above and add a development, then note the identification and contrast formed by each. Take the

⁷⁷Inv 3.7.9-16.

⁷⁸Inv 3.7.39-23.

epicheireme from person: "For Americans are explorers, and when we cease to explore, we cease to be fully American" given a development from example: "Our forebears did not turn back from exploring this great land even in the face of great difficulty"; Identification: OUR FORBEARS who persevered and OUR PREMISE to persevere in lunar exploration versus QUITTERS. Or take a development from greater: "And Americans realize that when great difficulties demand so much more from us, this renders the rewards so much more magnificent for us"; Identification: GREATER REWARDS when facing difficulties and OUR PREMISE to continue lunar exploration when facing difficulties versus LESSER or NO rewards for those who do not face difficulties. Or, to take again the epicheireme from cause: "For by exploring space we enrich our technological edge, and enlarge our technological frontiers, here, at home"; with development from lesser: "And every child knows that falling is part of learning to walk, and if even children see this, how much more should we be undeterred in our struggle to walk among the stars, to broaden the quality of our lives at home, to expand the scope of our dreams -- and those of our children." Identification: THOSE WHO KNOW and OUR PREMISE which reflects the wisdom of the long view versus PEOPLE DUMBER THAN TODDLERS.

This inherent comparison⁷⁹ exists by seizing the circumstantial element of the epicheireme and drawing it into

⁷⁹As a rhetorical device (as opposed to, say, a strictly logical one), it is inevitably a comparison and a contrast, of course, so that the audience may be simultaneously united to the orator's proposition, and have this union distinguished from something other in their minds.

relation with something else in such a way as to emphasize the union of the audience's self identity, and the proposition being forwarded for acceptance. Of course, it represents no great insight to note that tapping into audience identification is part of the rhetorical enterprise. What is of significance here is simply to note the author's clear awareness of the fact and to consider his methodological application of its rhetorical impact.⁸⁰

The author specifically proffers, in his discussion of the formal aspects of the development,⁸¹ a warning not to confuse the limited topics (mH) from which developments are derived with the elements of circumstance (jQ), and this brings us to the second of our primary points on Hermogenic development (gB). Just as circumstance (jQ) provides material for the epicheireme (fZ) -- not the heading (hD) -- so also these topics (mH) provide the material for development (gB), not epicheiremes. Though he does not state it directly, there is, inherent in his comment⁸² here, an emphasis upon the interdependent nature of his argumentative trope, as well as the emphasis (which is, in fact, directly stated) upon the distinction of its parts.

⁸⁰This identification as an aspect of the argumentative trope is dealt with implicitly -- but clearly -- in Inv 4.1.

⁸¹Inv 3.7.5-9.

⁸²καὶ ἡ μὲν γένεσις τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων ἀπὸ περιστάσεως. ταῦτα δὲ οὐ καθ' ἕκαστον κεφάλαιον ζητηθήσεται. ἀλλὰ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπιχείρημα. Inv 3.7.9-10.

The remainder of his discussion -- on the enthymeme (fC) and epenthymeme -- will bear out the force of the former point, emphasizing that the figure works as each part stands in relation to the others. That is to say, the effect depends precisely on the interrelationships of each part of the trope.⁸³ Regarding the latter point, the author returns with force to his emphasis upon distinctions of the various parts of the argumentative trope, only a few lines later. After showing how a development from example might support an epicheireme, the author notes:

Frequently, we find not one example, but several, and while (μέν) the inexperienced take these to be epicheiremes, we, in contrast (δέ), do not <take them to be> epicheiremes, but rather developments...⁸⁴

The author is adamant about the distinction, and adamant that it be maintained. But what, exactly, is that distinction?

One clear reply is the functional nature of each stage of the trope: while it is not necessarily a strict chronological sequence,

⁸³This point is not to be confused with an emphasis upon any necessary order of the parts. The Hermogenic author is perfectly clear that the order of the parts may be varied: δεινός γάρ αἰ σοφίσασθαι τὰς τέχνας καὶ ἀποκρύπτειν ὁ ῥήτωρ. καὶ ἄλλοτε μὲν ἄλλως ἐποίει. τῇ τάξει δὲ ἐνταῦθα. [For the powerful speaker, having learned the art, always conceals it, here arranging things one way, there differently. (Inv 4.1.38-40)]; this statement is preceded by an example of just such a variation in the order of the parts of the trope. It is the interior structure of the figure, not its chronological presentation, which provides its forcefulness, as we shall see. While it is convenient to talk about the "first stage" or "second part" of the trope, it should be understood that these are references to the trope as the author originally explains it to us, not references to required sequential steps in its employment.

⁸⁴καὶ πολλάκις οὐχ ἔν ἐύρίσκεται παράδειγμα ἀλλὰ πλείονα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀπείροις ἔδοξε πολλὰ εἶναι ἐπιχειρήματα. ἡμῖν δὲ οὐκ ἐπιχειρήματα ἀλλ' ἐργασία... Inv 3.7.29-31.

it is a set of interrelated aspects which progresses through an expansion (to embrace the audience's identity), and then contracts, returning to its original perimeters with a much greater sense of density. The interrelationships of each aspect of the argumentative sequence are, in fact, designed to take the given premise, and endow it with a sense of persuasive density -- a feeling that the premise forwarded contains much more force than one first thought; it simultaneously, thus, undermines the observers' sense of doubt toward the premise, while undergirding the orator's position with both a sense of reason and an intuition of propriety. This will become clearer once the trope is examined in full. What is pertinent at present is to note that the first two stages have provided in the epicheireme (fZ) a reason to embrace the position being forwarded, and have expanded this reason by uniting it more intimately with a sense of the audience's self-identity; it accomplishes this by taking the circumstantial element of the epicheireme and placing it, in the development (gB), in relation to some aspect of the audience's identity, and highlighting that unity as it stands in contrast to something else..

3. [Pseudo]-Hermogenic Enthymeme ('Ενθύμημα, fC)

The Hermogenic enthymeme (fC) heightens the sense of emotional tension by highlighting the very contrast of identities (Us and Proposition versus Other) inherently brokered in the first two steps of the sequence. It does this in a manner which, unfortunately, largely escapes translation. Patillon's only relevant observation

with respect to the enthymeme within the argumentative sequence is the following:

What allows the Pseudo-Hermogenic enthymeme to take the form of a comparison ... is that the development, from which it emerges (comparison, example, lesser, etc.), always involves a confrontation. -- The implementation of the comparison uses a preferred fashion of the grammatical mode of opposition *on the one hand (men) ... on the other hand (de)...* which I have not made apparent in the translation so as not to burden it.⁸⁵

While on the one hand, the English (or French) repetition of the phrase "*on the one hand ... on the other hand...*", when it appears four or five times on a page of Greek text, certainly becomes tedious, on the other hand, for the Greeks, the μέν ... δέ phrases were a particular form of antithesis, and invoked a particular emotional effect; such structures are extraordinarily common in Greek prose writing. J. D. Denniston observes:

It is characteristic of Greek thought to view an idea in light of its opposite. Antithetical expression is one of the fundamental constituents of Greek style. The contrasted ideas are sometimes hypotactically related: but, in the main, Greek prefers parataxis, by μέν ... δέ (etc.), οὐκ ... ἀλλά.⁸⁶

In parataxis, ideas of similar force or weight are set against one another, while hypotaxis creates a subordination within the

⁸⁵Ce qui permet de donner à l'enthymème pseudo-hermogénien la forme d'un parallèle ..., c'est que le développement, d'où qu'il se tire (comparison, exemple, moins, etc.), opère toujours une confrontation. -- La mise en œuvre du parallèle utilise de façon privilégiée le moule grammatical d'opposition d'une part (*men*) ... d'autre part (*de*)..., que je n'ai pas fait apparaître dans la traduction pour ne pas l'alourdir. PATILLON (1997), p. 259, fn.1.

⁸⁶DENNISTON (1952), p. 70-71.

antithesis. When a μέν ... δέ (or some other)⁸⁷ parataxis was especially lengthy or complex, it might be subdivided into "two shorter, and so sharper, antitheses,"⁸⁸ with each item in each antithesis serving, perhaps, to mirror the parallel item in the parallel antithesis. The emotional impact is difficult to express; it should not be underestimated, but neither should it be overplayed.

Assume, for example, that while walking down the street, one overhears a casual remark from a passer-by: "He's certainly no Nixon in China; I mean look at the...." and then the passer-by is out of ear shot. The statement, clearly leading to some comparative conclusion, invokes an inquisitiveness, heightens curiosity, tweaks interest; one would like to have heard where such a comment was leading. The complexity of the emotional impact of the statement as well as its potentialities -- and to some degree its contextual ambiguity -- convey in simplistic form something of the emotional context that might be brought about by the opening of a μέν ... δέ phrase in Greek, though, of course, there is nothing of the formal structure -- on which much of the impact was founded for a Greek audience. Nevertheless, one is exposed in the overheard, passing comment to a heightened sense of anticipation, to a glimpsed process of identification, and to a tentative intuition of direction. The actual closure of the statement might satisfy or surprise any of

⁸⁷Of course, not all Greek antitheses are marked by μέν ... δέ, but the phrase is an especially common one.

⁸⁸DENNISTON (1952), p. 71.

these elements. Roughly, simply, that is the tension of Greek parataxis.

The Hermogenic enthymeme (fC), as Patillon has observed,⁸⁹ generally takes the form of a μέν ... δέ antithesis. In fact, of the nine examples of enthymemes offered in Inv 3.8 and 3.9, all but one are μέν ... δέ phrases; the other is compacted for emotional effect.⁹⁰ Hermogenes notes specifically that the enthymeme in this example is "unfinished" ("οὐχ ἀπαρτίσσαντος") but that this is done for added emotional impact ("δριμύτητα" -- sharpness).⁹¹

Having outlined the structural elements of the enthymeme (fC), we may note a few further points the Hermogenic author makes in regard to this structure. First of all, he comments on the functional context of enthymemes in the argumentative trope, along with their necessity:

For just as the development confirms the
epicheireme, so also the enthymeme confirms the
development, and, once again, just as we seek for a

⁸⁹See above, fn. 85.

⁹⁰The relevant example is on the particular offensiveness of a citizen's betrayal of his own country. The enthymeme, discussing the degree of the offensive behavior, observes: ...καὶ μάλιστα ἐὰν ὁ πολίτης φαίνεται τούτους ἀδικῶν. οὐς ἔδοκει πρότερον εὖ πεποιημέναι. [...and moreso if the citizen is seen harming those who, previously, he seemed to be treating respectfully!] Inv 3.9.40-41. This is not asyndeton, as no other particle would be expected here, but the impact sought is a similar one: there is clearly a rush toward effect which substantively abbreviates the enthymeme. A more leisurely expression might run: And if, on the one hand, the citizen is seen to be doing harm, and on the other hand, this harm befalls those who, previously, he seemed to be treating well, then [the injury is even more odious]....

⁹¹Inv 3.9.30-34.

development to each epicheireme, in the same way we seek for an enthymeme for each development.⁹²

The enthymeme stands in the same relationship to the development as the development stands in relationship to the epicheireme, and it is, furthermore, just as necessary.

Second, the author observes, "One should realize that many enthymemes are often found from one development".⁹³ This, too sounds familiar: just as a single heading (hD) might yield several epicheiremes (fZ), and each epicheireme might yield several developments (gB), so also each development might yield several enthymemes (fC).

Third, on the structural front, the author notes:

And should someone inquire in what way each enthymeme <is found> from a development, he will search in the same circumstances in which he sought the epicheiremes for securing the heading.⁹⁴

Here, we suddenly return to the elements of circumstance (jQ) (person, place, act, time, manner, cause) with which the epicheireme began, and discover that these elements also serve as the source of enthymemes -- but by now there is a peculiar twist, as we shall see. The author will go on to add a condition which will render the

⁹²ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἐργασία κατασκευάζει τὸ ἐπιχείρημα. οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐνθύμημα κατασκευάζει τὴν ἐργασίαν. καὶ πάλιν ὥσπερ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπιχείρημα ζητοῦμεν ἐργασίαν. οὕτω καθ' ἑκάστην ἐργασίαν ζητοῦμεν ἐνθύμημα. Inv 3.8.16-20.

⁹³Ἰστέον δέ. ὅτι καὶ πολλάκις ἐργασία μία πολλὰ εὕρισκει ἐνθυμήματα... Inv 3.8.27-28.

⁹⁴...καὶ εἰ ζητοῖ τις οὕτω καθ' ἑκάστην ἐργασίαν τὸ ἐνθύμημα. ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν περιστάσεων ζητήσει. ἀφ' ὧν ἐλήθησεν ἂν τὰ ἐπιχειρήματα τοῦ τεθέντος κεφαλαίου. Inv 3.8.28-31.

enthymeme a synthesis of the two previous elements of the argumentative trope, namely the epicheireme (fZ) and the development (gB). In working out one of his examples, the Hermogenic author notes:

...then the enthymeme [follows], which one must include, since, every <enthymeme> is found <to be> a comparison, drawn from the development and referring to it.⁹⁵

On the surface this sounds as if it specifically contradicts the previous statement regarding the sources of enthymemes, but a closer look reveals the opposite.

The enthymeme takes up the specific *condition* highlighted in one of the particular lines of development (gB) -- and such development will always inherently involve a comparative element, recall -- and entwines itself, so to speak, around that line of development, while, with the same *material* sources as the epicheireme, it creates a Greek μέν ... δέ antithesis which highlights the comparative tension already created by the limited topics of the development. In this way, the enthymeme is generated from the elements of circumstance (just like the epicheireme) while simultaneously being both drawn from and referring back to the development, thus increasing the audience's identification with the proposition, as set against that other from which the development has helped to isolate them. Further examples will, perhaps, clarify the process, though it should be remembered that, as we move more

⁹⁵...εἶτα τὸ ἐνθύμημα. ὃ ρητέον ὅτι συγκριτικῶς πᾶν εὐρίσκεται συγκρινόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐργασίας καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ τεῖνον... Inv 3.9.3-5.

deeply into the emotional impact of the argumentative trope as set against its logical structures, English examples grow increasingly weaker and more clearly flawed. Nevertheless, we may attempt the following.

In our argument to continue lunar exploration, we have, for example, taken an epicheireme (fZ) from person (kV): "For Americans are explorers, and when we cease to explore, we cease to be fully American" with its development (gB) from example (iX): "Our forebears did not turn back from exploring this great land even in the face of great difficulty"; with its inherent identification: OUR FORBEARS who persevered and OUR PREMISE to persevere in lunar exploration versus QUITTERS. Such identification might be subjected to an enthymeme (fC) from any of the elements of circumstance (jQ). Take, for example, this enthymeme which incorporates the development from example, and is drawn from the circumstantial element of person (kV): "And while *they*, on the one hand, struggled forward in the face of personal hardship, we, on the other hand, are merely asked to give support to those brave souls who wish to subject themselves to personal hardship for our sakes." Another enthymeme linked to the same development might be formed from act (kC): "And while they suffered hardship, on the one hand, to explore an unknown land, we are struggling, on the other hand, to explore an unknown world."

Another example might be taken up in the epicheireme (fZ) from cause (aJ): "For by exploring space we sharpen our technological edge, and enlarge our technological frontiers, here, at home" with

its development from the lesser (iE): "And every child knows that falling is part of learning to walk, and if even children see this, how much more should we be undeterred in our struggle to walk among the stars, to broaden the quality of our lives at home, to expand the scope of our dreams -- and those of our children" and its inherent identification: THOSE WHO KNOW and OUR PREMISE which reflects the wisdom of the long view versus PEOPLE DUMBER THAN TODDLERS. An enthymeme incorporating the development from lesser, and drawn from place (mH): "And just as our children's world, on the one hand, grows larger as they live and learn and grow and explore, so also will our lives expand as we press on, on the other hand, into space." In this last example, the place of the child's world is set in antithesis to space into which we, as adults are pressing.

These examples are, perhaps, enough to provide a glimpse of the enthymematic contribution to the Hermogenic argumentative trope. The impact, however, might be best noticed in the reproduction of an entire sequence, without the interruption of commentary:

"My opponents' position is clear: they believe that, given the present difficulties, we should abandon our commitment to go to the moon. But I think not: Americans do not turn back in the face of mere difficulties; for Americans realize that when great difficulties demand so much more from us, this renders the rewards so much more magnificent for us. So let it never be said that Americans turned away from challenge in times of difficulty, but rather, let it be said that it was in those very times that they honored their commitments more fully, and pressed on toward their goals -- and their rewards -- more resolutely than ever before."

The sequence closes with an enthymeme drawn from the circumstantial quality of *time* (χρόνος, nD) linked with the development (gB), which was derived from the greater (hT).⁹⁶

We have seen that the Hermogenic author consciously forwarded the enthymeme as a synthesis between the epicheireme and its development, but, though it has been implicit throughout the discussion, one final point needs to be stated directly. While he never uses the term πάθος, emotion (iT), the author is clear that the enthymeme is a decidedly emotive aspect of the argument. He notes that it is designed to produce "sharpness" or "keenness"⁹⁷ (δριμύτης, in Greek) -- impact.⁹⁸ This is apparent throughout his own consideration of the enthymeme and the epenthymeme in Inv 3.8 and 3.9.

4. [Pseudo]-Hermogenic Epenthymeme (Ἐπενθύμημα, EM)

Given the extent of the above discussions, we may dispense with the epenthymeme quite briefly. The discussion in Greek occupies a separate section of the manuscripts,⁹⁹ but consideration

⁹⁶I have, in order to aim more cleanly at effect, dropped the cumbersome "on the one hand... on the other hand..." and replaced it with the partial repetition "So let it never be said... but rather, let it be said" as something of a (very rough) stylistic equivalent.

⁹⁷Inv 3.8.1-5.

⁹⁸PATILLON (1997) translates the term with "mordant" -- "punch". It is, of course, one of the *ideas* of style in Hermogenes' *On Ideas*, but it is unclear whether the use here is meant to mirror specifically that aspect of style. Much more might be said on this topic, but at present, such a discussion would constitute too great a digression.

⁹⁹Inv 3.9.

of the epenthymeme is intimately interwoven with that of the enthymeme, and in fact the author refers to the epenthymeme as "another enthymeme".¹⁰⁰ In every sense, it is identical to the enthymeme with the sole exception of its functional quality.

The epenthymeme is constructed to reinforce the enthymeme, whereas the enthymeme is constructed to reinforce the development. The epenthymeme is built in the same way, and with the same material, as the enthymeme. Its single difference is that it extends and reinforces the effect of the first enthymeme by the addition of something that seems suddenly to occur to the speaker, almost as an afterthought.¹⁰¹

Its contribution to the overall trope seems to be twofold. First, it reinforces a sense, for the audience, of there being much more to back up the speaker's position than can be held in memory or presented -- as though the speaker were overwhelmed with the plethora of reasons undergirding his position. Second, it serves as something of a denouement for the emotional tension raised by the enthymeme.

To take our uninterrupted example, above, an epenthymeme derived from time (χρόνος, nD) might run: "Indeed, have we ever turned our backs and run in troubled times? -- We have not; we will not."

¹⁰⁰...καὶ ἄλλο ἐνθύμημα εὐρεῖν... Inv 3.9.14

¹⁰¹Inv 3.9.18-23.

C. Final Considerations of Book 3

In the final sections of Book 3, [Pseudo]-Hermogenes returns briefly to a consideration of the epicheiremes (fZ), in order to discuss their arrangement.¹⁰² His comments here are unremarkable; he recommends placing the more "panegyric" and more forceful epicheiremes later in the speech so as to build toward a "flourishing zenith" (ἀκμή, aL)¹⁰³ and in order to create a sense of internal, progressive order.¹⁰⁴

[Pseudo]-Hermogenes also spends three sections (3.10-12) discussing one particular heading (κεφαλή, hD), referred to as an argumentative approach "from first to last"¹⁰⁵ (τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους, cK). This head is not, as Kennedy seems to imply,¹⁰⁶ an optional replacement to the argumentative trope outlined above, but rather a separate, specific line of argument¹⁰⁷ which does not employ the system of "confirmation from epicheiremes".¹⁰⁸ Rather, this head is confirmed (κατασκευή, gX) through an emotive emphasis

¹⁰²Inv 3.13.

¹⁰³Inv 3.13.7; ἀκμή is, of course, one of the types of style discussed in Hermogenes' *On the Ideas of Style*. The type is a species of μέγεθος, grandeur, and is translated "florescence" in WOOTEN, (1987). It is primarily covered in *Ideas* 1.10.

¹⁰⁴Inv 3.13.18.

¹⁰⁵HEATH (1995) translates the phrase with the less literal "sequence of events" in *Stasis*.

¹⁰⁶KENNEDY (1983), p. 91.

¹⁰⁷In Hermogenes *Stasis*, the τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους (cK) heading is part of the division of seven of the fourteen stases.

¹⁰⁸κατασκευὴν τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων, 3.10.4-5.

upon several aspects of the circumstances (περίστασις, jQ). This process, called subdivision (ὑποδιαίρεσις, mO), fills the place of the epicheireme by taking up the elements of circumstance, but it is not submitted to the ensuing development (gB) and enthymematic (fC) reinforcement, as it contains an inherent emotive element. Kennedy gives a fine example of subdivision (mO), where the simple statement, "Then he killed his three sons" becomes, "Then, not in a moment of passion but after a time of thought, he did not inform on, but killed, not one son, but three, not someone else's, but his own!"¹⁰⁹

In this same context,¹¹⁰ the Hermogenic author presents what we might today call a "hypothetical argument",¹¹¹ though his term is "fictional epicheireme" (τὸ πλαστόν ἐπιχείρημα, gA). His ensuing discussion¹¹² notes that the fictional epicheireme comes at the end of the argumentative approach "from first to last",¹¹³ but he follows this with observations about the incorporation of the fictional epicheireme (gA) into the argumentative trope, discussed

¹⁰⁹KENNEDY (1983), p. 91. Kennedy's example is a compact presentation of the one discussed in the text in 3.10.14-41.

¹¹⁰Inv 3.11.

¹¹¹This more common phrase, however, runs the risk of creating confusion with the technical Greek term ὑπόθεσις, and so it is preferable to use the more cumbersome "fictional epicheireme". An example of the fictional epicheireme might be: "If someone had advised our forebears to turn over their land and water to Xerxes rather than resist, would they have been heeded? No; rather, they would have been lucky to escape with their lives!" (cf. Inv 3.11.27-32)

¹¹²Inv 3.11.

¹¹³Inv 3.11.1-2.

above, noting that fictional epicheiremes may serve as an addition to the development (gB), and are drawn from the same sources as the development.¹¹⁴

Book 3.14 takes up a consideration of definition (ὅρος, iS), counter-definition (ἀντιορισμός, bB), assimilation (συλλογισμός, lM), and refutation (λύσις, hO) of that assimilation. The author notes that the definition and counter-definition both form arguments based in conditions prior to the act (πρόημα, kC) being judged,¹¹⁵ while assimilation and its refutation both form arguments based upon what follows the act.¹¹⁶ This is how one distinguishes between a stasis of definition and one of assimilation -- which distinction was an ongoing problem in stasis theory, as we noted earlier.¹¹⁷

In Book 3.15, the concluding section of Book 3, the author takes up the idea of representation (διασκευή, dO) which is designed to emotively amplify those elements of circumstance (περιστάσις, jQ) favorable to the speaker's cause through lively description of, for example, the murderer's ruthless disregard of his victim's pleas for mercy, etc. We shall return to these matters in Chapter Five.

Section III. Conclusion

To briefly review the argumentative trope from the beginning, then, we can see that the position forwarded is supplied with a

¹¹⁴Inv 3.11.21-50.

¹¹⁵Inv 3.14.1-15.

¹¹⁶Inv 3.14.27-36.

¹¹⁷See fn. 8, this chapter.

reason which is expanded in a development; this reason and its expansion are more strongly synthesized in an enthymematic parataxis, which begins a contraction of the argument back down to its origins in the elements of circumstance. We find ourselves with a growing sense of the persuasive density present -- but unnoticed -- in the original statement of the position. The trope is finished off with an epenthymeme which reinforces the sense of density, while allowing a denouement to the tensions raised in the "confrontational" nature of the development and enthymeme.

While the Hermogenic text contains other original and adapted technical terms from the realm of invention, none are so densely interlinked as those within the argumentative trope, and they may be dealt with as needed in the following chapter, where comparisons and contrasts are undertaken more directly with AnSg.

CHAPTER FIVE: A COMPARISON OF TECHNICAL VOCABULARY

But in everything there is a reasonable division of labor.
I have written this book ... nothing on earth
would induce me to read it.

--G. K. Chesterton¹

We do not see the power which is in speech because we forget
that all speech is a classification,
and that all classifications are oppressive.

--Roland Barthes²

Chapter Three and Chapter Four have given evidence of some clear differences between the theoretical use of the technical vocabulary of invention in the era preceding the Hermogenic transition and that of the Hermogenic corpus. In this chapter we shall begin the consideration of these distinctions more specifically, pointedly, and clearly. This is best accomplished by classifying the vocabulary into the following orders, which will represent the *general divisions*³ of the present chapter: Unique Vocabulary, (subdivided into vocabulary unique to *AnSg*, vocabulary unique to *Stasis*, vocabulary unique to *Invention*, and vocabulary present in both *Stasis* and *Invention*, but absent in *AnSg*) and Shared Vocabulary (subdivided into vocabulary of the argumentative trope, and vocabulary not directly related to the argumentative trope).

¹*Orthodoxy* (1908), Ch. 1.

²*Barthes: Selected Writings* (1982), "Collège de France Inaugural Lecture" (New York: Oxford Press).

³"General", because -- given the interactive nature of the technical vocabulary under consideration -- it will of course be impossible to keep strictly to these divisions in the following discussion.

I wish to re-emphasize that an exhaustive⁴ consideration of the conceptual families -- i.e., a consideration of every occurrence of every term in every work -- is both impractical and, here, unnecessary to accomplish our goal: the establishment of some clear developments, adaptations, and alterations in the technical vocabulary of invention within the Hermogenic corpus as compared to the prior era of theory. Thus far, our discussion has involved, in varying degrees of depth and comprehensiveness, slightly more than 100 conceptual families from the 340 which are represented on the TVGL.⁵ Some of these have been examined exhaustively, others in a far more cursory fashion. We have drawn explicit Hermogenic and pre-Hermogenic comparisons and parallels with almost none of these. In this chapter, we shall consider some families not previously discussed, as well as revisiting some of the terms we have already examined.

The nature of the present task necessitates some tolerance of minutiae: in Chapter Six, we shall step back and look once more upon the forest; in this chapter, there are trees.

Section I. Unique Vocabulary

Table 2.2, in Chapter Two, lists the conceptual families, and identifies those terms which are unique. This was done in the

⁴When I use the term "exhaustive" in reference to a conceptual family or technical term, I employ it only in the sense defined here: a consideration of every occurrence of that term or family in each of the three works.

⁵The Technical Vocabulary Grand List is found in Appendix I, II.

"category" column, labeled "Ct" in the table. Unique conceptual families were indicated by the following abbreviations:

A: family unique to AnSg;
Hi: family unique to *Invention*;
Hs: family unique to *Stasis*;
Hz: family unique to Hermogenic heuristic corpus, and
occurring in both Hermogenic works.

It will be recalled that AnSg was found to employ 65 unique families, while 89 families are unique to the Hermogenic corpus: *Stasis* has 36 families which occur in neither of the other two works, *Invention* contains 27 families which occur in neither of the other two works, and 26 families occur in both *Stasis* and *Invention*, but have no occurrences in AnSg. Table 5.1 represents a breakdown of these families by m%⁶ range. Within each cell, families are listed from most common to least common. We shall concern ourselves primarily, though by no means exclusively, with those families occurring *most often* in each of the works. This section will, thus, give consideration to all unique families with a frequency which is $\geq 0.50m\%$. The discussion will not be limited only to these families, of course.

A. A Terms: Technical Vocabulary Unique to AnSg

1. The Aristotelian Connection

a. Terminology Related to Proof

Not surprisingly, the most immediately notable aspect of the families unique to AnSg is the frequent inclusion of terminology

⁶The ranges indicated on Table 5.1 are convenient, defensible, and reasonable choices, but they are, of course, essentially arbitrary; one might just as easily have grouped the families into other ranges: Families $\geq .75m\%$; those $.33m\% - .74m\%$, and those $< .33m\%$, for example.

which is specifically Aristotelian in nature. For example, both ἀτεχνος πίστις and ἐντεχνος πίστις (inartistic and artistic proof jV, jW) are terms central to the Aristotelian rhetorical perspective on

Table 5.1
Unique Occurrences by m% Range

Ct	Fams ≥ .50 m%	Fams .25 m% - .49 m%	Fams < .25 m%
A	11: aW, cL, hW, iY, jv, mY, dS, gH, mD, jD, jH	14: aX, fW, gI, hR, jC, jW, lY, bF, fX, iN, kU, lT, lX, mZ	40: aZ, bX, cD, eV, fL, fQ, fY, gF, jI, jJ, jO, lV, aN, aR, bA, cN, dK, dN, eC, eN, eO, fF, fJ, fS, gL, hA, iJ, iP, jA, jK, jR, kB, kO, kT, lI, mC, mT, nA, nF, nG
Hs	12: kQ, dJ, aB, hX, bL, cW, hZ, bI, bO, dB, kS, jT	5: jM, kE, cO, dW, kA	19: bT, dU, eL, gD, gE, gO, kI, lH, bY, dY, eP, fN, fO, gW, hC, iB, iO, iR, lL
Hi	6: dO, mU, aL, lJ, bK, hE	5: gA, dX, fA, iZ, jX	16: kW, eU, aU, dM, fK, jS, bC, bQ, dL, fE, hK, jF, kF, kR, lW, nH
H ⁷	8: cK, bH, kZ, mO, bJ, kM, aD, cE	8: bV, jY, lF, lP, bW, hS, cS, nB	10: bB, cH, eH, kH, lQ, eG, fB, dP, iD, lK
H tot	26	18	45

invention, and are relatively common in AnSg (.80m%, .46m% respectively); neither term, however, has any occurrence in either of the two works of the Hermogenic inventional corpus. Likewise τεκμήριον (infallible sign, mD), with 0.68m%, is central to Aristotle, common in AnSg, and absent from the Hermogenic works. Σημεῖον (fallible sign, lB) is not, on first inspection, unique to

⁷H⁷ m% is figured on the basis of combined total words in *Stasis* and *Invention*.

AnSg; the terminology also appears in *Stasis*. Upon closer inspection, however, the occurrences within *Stasis* are non-technical uses.⁸ Pragmatically, therefore, the 1B family, with a 1.26m% in AnSg, is, in fact, unique to that author. All of these terms are strongly Aristotelian, and have been discussed at some length in Chapter Three.

b. Terminology Related to Narration

Other terminology unique to AnSg and within the Aristotelian tradition⁹ might be found in the phrase ἀρεταὶ διηγήσεως (virtues of narration, dS). The phrase has a 0.68m% in AnSg, but is, once again, absent in both of the Hermogenic works. When AnSg covers the narrative virtues (dS), he first lists the standard qualities¹⁰ of συντομία (brevity, 1U), σαφήνεια (clarity, 1A), and πιθανός (persuasiveness, kK); we shall look briefly at each of these families.

Συντομία (1U) has a robust 2.28m% in AnSg and a meager 0.10m% in *Invention*; furthermore, neither of the two Hermogenic uses occurs in the context of a discussion on narrative virtues (dS).

⁸HEATH (1995), p. 36 translates the occurrence at St 3.29 (...σημείους φαρμάκων...), e.g., as "symptoms of poisoning".

⁹Aristotle is not, of course, the originator of the theory of the three virtues, and seems to have objected to brevity as a narrative virtue (cf., e.g., *Rhetoric* 3.16.4); he does, however, discuss clarity and persuasiveness as *stylistic* virtues (cf. *Rhetoric* 3.2). For narrative virtues within the Aristotelian tradition, see KENNEDY (1963), pp. 70, 80, 115, 121.

¹⁰AnSg 63.

Σαφήνεια (lA), with a 0.46m% in AnSg, also makes a single appearance in *Invention*, giving it a 0.05m% there. The AnSg use of the lA terminology occurs entirely within the discussion of narrative virtues (dS), while the single appearance of the lA terminology within *Invention* is, once again, a non-technical occurrence ("And we will also give an example to clarify..."¹¹).

Πιθανός (kK), not surprisingly, has occurrences in all three works, though it is significantly more common in AnSg: AnSg has a 1.26m%, *Stasis* a 0.10m%, and *Invention* a 0.20m%. Once more, however, in none of the Hermogenic occurrences does one find any of the kK terms employed in relation to narrative virtues (dS); in AnSg, such references account for 6 out of 11 appearances of the kK terminology.

In addition to these three primary virtues, AnSg presents several other terms which "some" have viewed as virtues of narration (ἀρεταὶ διηγήσεως, dS): αὐξησις (amplification, cR), ἡδονή (pleasure, gQ), μεγαλοπρέπεια (grandeur, hR), προσήνεια (mildness, kT), ἐπιείκεια (fairness, fR).

Of these families, hR and kT are unique to AnSg. Μεγαλοπρέπεια (hR) has only one occurrence in AnSg which falls outside of the discussion of narrative virtues (dS), and it is a non-technical appearance of the root verb.¹² Προσήνεια (kT) does not occur outside the discussion of narrative virtues (dS). The

¹¹Καὶ παραδείγματος ἕνεκεν καὶ σαφηνείας... Inv 2.7.33

¹²AnSg 218.

other three terms, αὐξῆσις (cR), ἡδονή (gQ), and ἐπιείκεια (fR) all have Hermogenic occurrences, but they are never employed in the Hermogenic corpus in a discussion of narration (διήγησις, dT) or narrative virtues (dS). Taken as a whole, therefore, the complete technical vocabulary concerning the virtues of narration belongs uniquely to AnSg. This is especially noteworthy as the Hermogenic work *Invention* devotes the bulk of Book 2 to a consideration of various aspects of the narration (dT). Nowhere in this book, however, are the "virtues of narration" (dS) considered. A reasonable explanation for the disappearance of the virtues of narration is, perhaps, to be found in the growing emphasis upon stylistic virtues; the types or ideas of style which would dominate much of Hermogenic rhetorical theory, in general, simply subsumed the discussion of narrative virtue.¹³

2. The cL Family ('Ασάφεια, Obscurity)

'Ασάφεια (obscurity, cL) is another conceptual family which is unique to AnSg. In fact, with a 1.48m%, cL is the second most common¹⁴ conceptual family which is unique to AnSg. While some of the discussion of obscurity (cL) is taken up with style, of course, a surprising number of the references¹⁵ concern narrative obscurity

¹³Cf., e.g., HAGEDORN (1964), pp. 14ff; also, DK, fn. 102, translation of AnSg 101; and WOOTEN (1987), pp. xi-xvii.

¹⁴After aW, with a 1.83m%; the aW family will be taken up later.

¹⁵Exactly half of them. The cL family has four occurrences which are strictly limited to stylistic obscurity, four which concern obscurity in the subject matter, and another five where the terminology is specifically used in reference to both forms of obscurity.

-- intentional obfuscation for the sake of diverting the judge's attention, or avoiding such confusions in the narrative, so as best (that is, so as most persuasively) to present one's case. The discussion of obscurity may be most conveniently summarized diagrammatically, as in Figure 5.1. For our present purposes, the most significant thing to note in regard to ἀσάφεια (cL) is AnSg's observation that obscurity (cL) of subject matter may be brought about through a repetition without ἐργασία (development, gB). 'Εργασία (dB), of course, is central to Hermogenes' argumentative trope, as we have seen. This is a point to which we will return when we more specifically compare AnSg's use of ἐργασία with that of Hermogenes.

A few less important but frequently occurring terms are unique to AnSg as well, and may be reviewed more briefly. These would include φράσις (diction mY), παράκειμαι (correlate, juxtapose, jD), and παρέκβασις (digression, jH).

3. The mY Family (Φράσις, Diction)

Φράσις (diction, mY), 0.80m%, is employed mostly in stylistic discussion; it is found in the TVGL because the term is also used in a consideration of appropriate diction in the presentation of proofs.¹⁶ It has only one occurrence in this context, however.

4. The jD Family (Παράκειμαι, Correlate, Juxtapose)

Παράκειμαι (correlate, juxtapose, jD), 0.57m%, is less significant, occurring in the stylistic discussion of the

¹⁶AnSg 240.




Figure 5.1
Obscurity in AnSg

composition of parallel colons; it also appears briefly as a part of the species of ὅρος (definition, iS) in AnSg's definition of that topic (τόπος, mH). It is otherwise unremarkable.

5. The jH Family (Παρέκβασις, Digression)

Παρέκβασις (digression, jH), 0.57m%, occurs only in the discussion of persuasive aspects of the narration.¹⁷ For many orators, the digression (jH) was a part of the speech, frequently placed just prior to the epilogue, and usually designed to present pathological remarks regarding the character of the opponent; it began the process of a more strident inflaming of the passions, which would be carried on throughout the epilogue.¹⁸ AnSg notes Alexander's rejection of the παρέκβασις (jH) as oxymoronic: if the information brought into the discussion is relevant to the case, it is not a digression; if the information is a digression, it should not be brought into the discussion of the case. About the only remarkable aspect of the consideration of the terminology is that AnSg also observes that "some" have confused the παρέκβασις (digression, jH) with the παραδίηγησις (additional narration, iY), but the two differ.¹⁹

¹⁷AnSg 61, 62, 67.

¹⁸In this capacity, it parallels, to some degree, terminology unique to some aspects of the Hermogenic corpus. See the discussion on διασκευή (representation, dO), below.

¹⁹AnSg 61.

6. The iY Family (Παραδίηγησις, Additional Narration)

Παραδίηγησις (additional narration, iY), is itself a unique family in AnSg, with a 0.80m%. The terminology is present only in discussion on the nature and species of the narration (διήγησις, dT). Παραδίηγησις (iY) is considered a sub-species of narration in which certain facts, external to the precise limits of the case, are allowed to insinuate themselves into the narration, enhancing one's own particular perspective for the judges. Παραδίηγησις (iY) is designed "to increase belief [πίστις, jU]" or for the sake of "amplifications [αὐξήσις, cR] or <to create> prejudice [διαβολή, dE]"²⁰ or to otherwise enhance the persuasive character of the narration.

7. The gH Family (Εὐμάθεια, Receptivity)

Εὐμάθεια (receptivity, gH), 0.68m%, occurs in AnSg's discussion as an audience quality which is a prerequisite to persuasion;²¹ it is yet another frequent family unique to AnSg. Εὐμάθεια (gH) is one of the goals of the proem,²² and AnSg lists three methods for making the audience more receptive to one's position: ἀνανέωσις (transitional review, aX), μερισμός (partition, hW), and προέκθεσις (simple preview, kJ). Of these three latter terms, the aX and hW families are unique to AnSg. Προέκθεσις (kJ), on the other hand, with a 0.57m% in AnSg, also has two occurrences

²⁰AnSg 55. The interpolation is my own; otherwise: DK translation.

²¹AnSg 10.

²²AnSg 9.

(0.10m%) in *Invention*, though neither of the two appearances there represent technical use of the kJ terminology. Pragmatically, therefore, the entire array of terminology here is, once again, unique to AnSg. That said, however, we must note that the hW family (μερισμός), with a healthy 1.14m%, has a number of uses which seem to parallel a different set of vocabulary in Hermogenes; we will later return to this point.

8. The aW Family ('Ανάμνησις, Reminder)

The only other conceptual family unique to AnSg with a frequency greater than or equal to 0.50m% is ἀνάμνησις (reminder, aW). 'Ανάμνησις has 1.83m%, making it the most frequently used terminology which is unique to AnSg. The aW family, however, is used synonymously with ἀνακεφαλαίωσις (recapitulation, aV), a family with technical occurrences in both AnSg and *Stasis*. For that reason, it is best, once again, to postpone discussion of ἀνάμνησις (aW) until our consideration of the vocabulary common to AnSg and Hermogenes.

B. Hs Terms: Technical Vocabulary Unique to *Stasis*

As we saw in Chapter Four, the layout of Hermogenes' *Stasis* generally follows a plan where the stasis (στιάσις, 1D) is defined, then the argumentative approaches to the stasis are outlined; these argumentative approaches are called headings (κεφαλή, hD). One may review the stases in Figure 4.1; the headings are discussed in Heath.²³

²³HEATH (1995), *passim*.

1. Headings and Stases

There are 12 families unique to *Stasis* which have frequencies equal to or greater than 0.50m%, as can be seen in Table 5.1: aB (ἄγραφος, non-documentary), bI (ἀντινομία, conflict of law), bL (ἀντίστασις, counterstatement), bO (ἀντινομάζω, counterdescribe), cW (βίαιος ὁρος, forcible definition), dB (γνώμη νομοθέτου, intent of the lawgiver), dJ (ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοια, letter and intent), hX (μετάθεσις τῆς αἰτίας, transposition of cause), hZ (ἐτέρα μετάληψις, alternative objection), jT (πηλικότης, importance), kQ (πρὸς τι, relative importance), kS (τὸ μὴ προσδιωρισθαι, exclusion of further distinctions). Of these 12 families, seven are the names of headings (κεφαλή, hD) and four are the names of stases (στάσις, 1D). Thus 11 out of 12²⁴ families with a 0.50m% or greater are the names of headings, stases, or both.²⁵ The single exception is ἀντινομάζω (counterdescribe, bO).

2. The bO Family ('Αντινομάζω, Counterdescribe)

'Αντινομάζω (counterdescribe, bO), 0.67m%, is presented by Hermogenes as one of several species of ὁρος (definition, iS),²⁶ and involves a description of the act which is designed to contradict the description, offered by the opponent, which led to the damning

²⁴In fact, of the 17 families unique to *Stasis* with frequencies \geq 0.25m%, 13 are either stases or headings.

²⁵According to the division found in Figure 4.1; HEATH (1995, cf. pp. 70-73), it will be recalled, does not classify the species of μετάληψις (objection, hY) as stases, though KENNEDY (1983, pp. 82ff) and PATILLON (1997, pp. 56-77), in their discussions, do.

²⁶St 3. 51ff.

definition. The standard counterdescription, built upon an example we saw in Chapter Four is this: a thief steals private property from a temple and is accused of temple robbery. The description which leads to the act being defined as temple robbery is given by the prosecution: "You stole property from the temple". The defense, in their own presentation, offers a counterdescription (bO) of the act: "I did not steal the temple's property". The bO terminology does not occur outside the discussion on the stasis of definition (iS).

C. Hi Terms: Technical Vocabulary Unique to Invention

There are six families which are both unique to *Invention* and have a frequency equal to or greater than 0.50m%. Of these, two families may be disposed of quite quickly.

1. The aL ('Ακμή, Flourishing Zenith) and hE (Κόμμα, Komma, Phrase) Families

'Ακμή (flourishing zenith, aL), 0.74m%, and κόμμα (komma, phrase, hE), 0.54m%, are both primarily stylistic terminology. Among their occurrences, each makes one or two appearances in a discussion on specific structural elements which render a presentation more, or less, persuasive.²⁷ Beyond this, the terms are unremarkable with respect to the present considerations.

²⁷ 'Ακμή (flourishing zenith, aL) is, recall, one of the types of style discussed in Hermogenes' *On the Ideas of Style*. 'Ακμή is a species of μέγεθος, grandeur, and is translated "florescence" in WOOTEN, (1987). It is primarily covered in *Ideas* 1.10.

**2. The mU ('Υποφορά, Summary of the Opponent's View)
and bK ('Αντιπρότασις, Statement of Introduction to
Our Own View) Families**

Of the remaining four terms, two have been dealt with at some length in Chapter Four, and need not be summarized in great depth here. These are, ὑποφορά (summary of the opponent's view, mU), 0.93m%, and ἀντιπρότασις (statement of introduction to our own view, bK), 0.54m%. It will be recalled that these were two of four elements which comprised the introduction to the epicheiremes (fZ), epicheiremes themselves being the opening volley in the argumentative trope which confirmed (κατασκευή, gX) our heading (κεφαλή, hD) or our refutation of the opponent's heading (hD). One may review these items in Figure 4.2. Of note in the present context is the fact that ἀνθυποφορά (statement of our own view, bC), a third aspect of this four part introduction to the epicheireme (fZ), is also a family unique to invention. Πρότασις (statement of introduction to the summary of our opponent's view, kX), with a 2.01m%²⁸ in *Invention*, is the only other part of this four-step introduction to the epicheireme. The kX family has two occurrences in AnSg, but both of these are non-technical uses; pragmatically, therefore, the kX family is also unique to the [Pseudo]-Hermogenic work *Invention*. We may observe, therefore, that the Hermogenic authors' four-step introduction to his four-step argumentative trope

²⁸A high frequency, but the family has a number of non-technical occurrences within *Invention*, as well as the technical appearances.

is, in fact, composed of technical terms entirely unique to the work *On Invention*.²⁹

The last two frequent conceptual families which are unique to *Invention* will require a somewhat closer examination.

3. The 1J Family (Σύγκρισις, Comparison)

Σύγκρισις (comparison, co-reference; literally, a "linked judgment", 1J), 0.74m%, is the Hermogenic author's general term for a μέν...δέ parataxis. We have already discussed at some length its relationship to the argumentative trope in *Invention*, Book 3. The term, however, appears in two other contexts within *Invention*.

The first context is a passing reference in 4.1.12 where we are told, in a discussion of figures, that enthymemes "obtain a richer form when they are rounded out by providing a keen comparison [σύγκρισις] <for them>."³⁰ The statement echoes the author's earlier comments on the importance of the comparative parataxis in the enthymematic aspects of his argumentative trope.³¹

²⁹The terms heading (κεφαλή, hD), confirmation (κατασκευή, gX), refutation (λύσις, hO), and epicheireme (ἐπιχείρημα, fZ) are not, of course, unique to *Invention*. Rather, the specific titles of those elements linking a heading introduced by an opponent and the confirmation we give to an alternative proposition are the constituents of the entirely unique technical vocabulary; Cf. Figure 4.2.

³⁰τὰ γὰρ ἐνθυμήματα πάντα στρογγύλως κατὰ τὴν σύγκρισιν ἐκφερόμενα δριμύτης δόξαν πλείονα ἀποφέρεται... Inv 4.1.11ff.

³¹N.B., e.g., that he here, just as he did in his discussion of the argumentative trope, employs the word "δριμύτης" -- sharpness, keenness -- to describe the effect of the parataxis.

The second context in which σύγκρισις (1J) is used comes in Inv 4.14.*passim*.³² This section is given to a discussion of "comparative problems";³³ the title seems to refer to what Hermogenes, in *Stasis*, calls "double" problems:³⁴ situations where one is called upon to defend oneself from a charge while prosecuting one's prosecutor on the same (or a similar) charge.³⁵ The section opens with a consideration of the division (διαίρεσις, dG) of the stases (στάσεις, 1D) of conjecture (στοχασμός, 1E) and definition (ὁρος, 1S).

In conjecture (στοχασμός, 1E), the author of *Invention* recommends doubling the headings (κεφαλή, hD) of motive (βούλησις, cY) and capacity (δύναμις, eB) when faced with a double problem in conjecture (1E). The division (dG) offered here is a simplistic one, and does not parallel that given in Hermogenes' consideration of conjectural (1E) double problems within *Stasis*, though the headings discussed here³⁶ are present in the general division of conjecture (1E) which Hermogenes outlines in *Stasis*.

³²It will be recalled that PATILLON (1997) relocated this section to the end of Book 3, believing its subject matter better fit that location.

³³Περὶ τῶν συγκριτικῶν προβλημάτων Inv 4.14.1.

³⁴Hermogenes nowhere refers to "comparative problems" in *Stasis*, but the types of problems dealt with in Inv 4.14 are dealt with in *Stasis*. Cf. St 3.251ff; 4.51ff.

³⁵Cf. Inv 1.2; here, the prooem is discussed in reference to a sort of doubled condition similar to -- though not identical to -- those covered in Inv 4.14.

³⁶I.e., motive (βούλησις, cY) and capacity (δύναμις, eB).

In definition (ὅρος, iS), [Pseudo]-Hermogenes tells us, one doubles the headings (κεφαλή, hD) of definition (iS) within the stasis of definition (iS). The descriptions and examples given here, in Inv 4.14.14-24, do seem to parallel one aspect of Hermogenes' discussion, in *Stasis*, of double problems within definition. More specifically, the discussion given in *Invention* seems to parallel that found in the first part of Hermogenes' discussion³⁷ of counterdescription (ἀντιονομάζω, bO), a term unique to *Stasis*, and discussed above. Oddly, beyond the title and first line of the section, the term σύγκρισις (lJ) does not appear in 4.14 up to this point.

The author of *Invention* then turns from the consideration of double problems in a judicial context to a discussion of the πραγματικός (deliberative, kC) stasis (lD).³⁸ Here, we once again begin to encounter the lJ terminology as we are told that σύγκρισις (lJ) is a key element in deliberative controversies. The author recommends frequent use of σύγκρισις in arguing for one's own policies. The σύγκρισις is derived, as it was in the argumentative trope, from the elements of circumstance (περίστασις, jQ), setting such elements in one's own position against those in the opponent's position. Σύγκρισις appears here seven times in eight lines.³⁹

³⁷St 4.53-97; but see esp. 53-62.

³⁸Deliberative stases, by their nature, are always something of a double problem: one must forward one's own policy while prosecuting the weakness of alternative positions.

³⁹Inv 4.14.26-33

Unfortunately, the Hermogenic author provides no examples in his discussion of *σύγκρισις* within the *πραγματικός* (deliberative, *kC*) stasis (1D).

4. The dO Family (*Διασκευή*, Representation)

The final family which is unique to *Invention* while possessing a *m*% greater than 0.50 is *διασκευή* (representation, dO), and it, too, requires a closer look; dO has a 1.28*m*%, making it the most frequently used unique family in *Invention*. If coupled with *ἐνδιασκευή* (with or in representation, fA) -- a variant of the dO terminology -- the relative frequency would rise to 1.62*m*%.⁴⁰ *Διασκευή* (dO) occurs in three discrete contexts within *Invention*. The most significant context is in 3.15, which is dedicated to a consideration of the concept of *διασκευή* (dO).

As was mentioned briefly in Chapter Four, *διασκευή* (representation, dO) is primarily a pathological device which amplifies one or more of the six aspects of circumstance (*περίστασις*, jQ) so as to provide an emotive advantage to the speaker's case. One might, for example, discuss at length, and with great passion, the innocent victim's cries for mercy as the offender repeatedly strikes them with his dagger, and so forth. Such representation will portray the weeping, and wailing, the past triumphs, the loves and hopes of those for whom one wishes to elicit sympathy.⁴¹ This

⁴⁰By way of contrast, the second most frequent family which is unique to *Invention* is *ὑποπόρᾳ* (summary of the opponent's view, mU) at 0.93*m*%. Furthermore, all the references of the dO family reflect a technical use of the terminology.

⁴¹Inv 3.15.68-74.

point, amplified with several examples, is the main thrust of Inv 3.15. Before proceeding to a discussion of the next context in which one encounters the dO family, however, a few aspects of the discussion in 3.15 should be briefly noted.

First of all, [Pseudo]-Hermogenes' preliminary outline of the subject in 3.15 makes it difficult to distinguish between διασκευή (representation, dO) and the ὑποδιαίρεσις (subdivision, mO) of the τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους (from first to last, cK)⁴² heading (κεφαλή, hD); this heading (hD) is discussed at some length in 3.10, 11, and 12. Both διασκευή (representation, dO) and ὑποδιαίρεσις (subdivision, mO) appear to be an emotive amplification of the elements of circumstance. [Pseudo]-Hermogenes seems sensitive to this overlap, and offers specific advice about when it is best, on the one hand, to concentrate the emotive amplification in the τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους (from first to last, cK) heading and when, on the other hand, such amplification is better brought in with διασκευή (representation, dO).⁴³ The thrust of his recommendation is that, when the orator judges the act (πράγμα, kC) itself⁴⁴ to lack the necessary aspects which would make for a vivid description, then it is best to gloss over the τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους (cK) and amplify the whole event within the epilogue by means of διασκευή (dO).

⁴²Cf. Chapter Four. N.B., also, that this heading (κεφαλή, hD) appears in Hermogenes' division (διαίρεσις, dG) of fully half the stases (στοίσις, lD) discussed in *Stasis*.

⁴³Inv 3.15.27-59.

⁴⁴Act, it will be recalled, is one of the six elements of circumstance (περίστασις, jQ);

This, of course, does little to clarify the difference between the two, unless one were prepared to solve the problem by suggesting that the author sees διασκευή (dO) as a trope limited to the epilogue. This, however, is specifically ruled out by his discussion on arrangement of διασκευή, at Inv 3.15.27-38, where we are told that διασκευή may occur at the beginning or the end of a speech. One might then hypothesize that the author sees διασκευή as an element of either the prologue or the epilogue, but not the narration, but this too is specifically ruled out by comments he makes in Inv 2.7.⁴⁵ In the end, the author's comments are not particularly helpful, and some confusion over the relationship between διασκευή (dO) and the ὑποδιαίρεσις (subdivision, mO) found in the τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους (cK) heading remains justified.

A second observation regarding [Pseudo]-Hermogenes' discussion in Inv 3.15 centers on an incidental remark the author makes while discussing the dangers of repeating oneself during διασκευή (representation, dO). He notes that some degree of repetition is "necessary when passing from examples (παράδειγμα, iX), either mythical or historical, to the specific material..."⁴⁶ What is of particular interest here is the author's description of the two species of παράδειγμα (iX): they are exactly those of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.⁴⁷ In AnSg, whose overall perspective is far more

⁴⁵Which we will consider below.

⁴⁶ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ παραδείγματος ἢ τοῦ μυθικοῦ ἢ τοῦ ἱστορικοῦ μεταβαίνοντα εἰς τὸ ἴδιον πρᾶγμα... Inv 3.15.61-3.

⁴⁷See Figure 3.1; Cf., also, Rht 1.2; 2.20.

Aristotelian, we discovered that three of his primary sources forwarded three distinct definitions of the παράδειγμα, none of which invoked the Aristotelian species of mythic and historic; here, in the heart of the Hermogenic inventional corpus -- which is far more independent from the Aristotelian perspectives -- we come upon, surprisingly, a perspective of παράδειγμα which is thoroughgoing Aristotelian orthodoxy.

A final point regarding the Hermogenic author's discussion in Inv 3.15 centers on the fact that he never employs the term πάθος (pathos, emotion, iT) in this discussion. Despite the absence of the term πάθος, however, the author does note, specifically, that διασκευή (representation, dO) is not the place for epicheiremes,⁴⁸ and the dO family is clearly, vividly, pathological, as is emphasized even more strongly in the second context in which the dO terminology is found.

This second context in which the διασκευή (representation, dO) family appears is found in Inv 4.14. Here, [Pseudo]-Hermogenes is discussing a stylistic fault which he calls κακοζηλία.⁴⁹ Κακοζηλία (literally, "bad imitation") is, essentially, an affected manner, an improper presentation of emotion, a stylistic failure resulting in melodrama. The term does not appear in Hermogenes' *On the Ideas of Style*, but Hermogenes does not there deal with stylistic failures in

⁴⁸Inv 3.15.1-7; note, esp., 5ff: οὐ μέντοι γε οὔτε αἰτίαις οὔτε λογισμοῖς τοσοῦτον οὔτε ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἐπιχειρήματι. ἀλλὰ μόνῳ τῷ τρόπῳ.

⁴⁹The term is never directly employed in a technical sense with regard to invention, and it does not appear on the TVGL.

any systematic fashion; the term does appear in the writing of other critics including some Aristotelian scholia, though, notably, not in any commentaries on *Rhetoric*. Pseudo-Longinus does employ the term; he uses it, however, not as a class of stylistic failure, but rather in describing the qualities of a stylistic fault which he calls *μειρακιῶδες*, "puerility".⁵⁰ What is of note in Inv 4.14, is that *κακοζηλία* also appeared in Inv 3.15, in an incidental remark, where the author notes that, even in the florescent descriptions of *διασκευή*, the orator must present only the probable:

...and saying anything that departs from the probable (*εἰκός*, eJ), either <about> what was said or <about> what was done, leads the representation (*διασκευή*, dO) into an 'affected manner'.⁵¹

In Inv 4.14, the author repeats this comment, reemphasizing that representations (*διασκευή*) including the improbable will inevitably display the "affected style".⁵² *Διασκευή* is, thus, twice linked to a warning against melodrama, a fact which clearly underscores its pathetic nature.

The only remaining context in which the *διασκευή* (representation, dO) terminology appears is a discussion of the species of narration (*διήγησις*, dT), found in Inv 2.7. Here, we are

⁵⁰Puerility, according to Ps.-Longinus, is "classroom writing", the attempt to be "uncommon", "overelaborate", and "exquisite"; it inevitably ends, he says, in a "cheap affection", *κακοζηλία*. See Ps.-Longinus 3.4. The terms here are from the Loeb translation.

⁵¹...πάν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ λεχθῆναι ἢ πραχθῆναι λεγόμενον εἰς κακόζηλον ἐξάγει τὴν διασκευήν. Inv 3.15.17-19.

⁵²Inv 4.12.5-10.

told by [Pseudo]-Hermogenes that the narration has three species,⁵³ *simple* (ἀπλοῦς, cB) narration, narration with *confirmation* (ἐγκατασκευή, gX) and narration with *representation* (ἐνδιασκευή, fA).⁵⁴ These species of narration are then given a brief treatment. Διασκευή occurs incidentally within this discussion.⁵⁵ When dealing with the species of narration with *representation* (fA), the author provides a quotation from Demosthenes⁵⁶ which demonstrates the use of διασκευή within narration, but offers little more in the way of comment. The dO terminology,⁵⁷ unique to *Invention*, does not occur in the work outside of these three contexts.

D. H_z Terms: Technical Vocabulary Occurring in Both Works of the Hermogenic Inventional Corpus, but Absent in AnSg

There are eight families which are absent from AnSg, but present in both *Invention* and *Stasis*, and which also have a total frequency⁵⁸ equal to or greater than 0.50m%. Of these eight families, three may here be disposed of with brief remarks.

⁵³Inv 2.7.70.

⁵⁴The fA family is also unique to *Invention*, with a 0.34m%.

⁵⁵But [Pseudo]-Hermogenes' treatment clearly indicates that there is a place for διασκευή in the narration.

⁵⁶Inv 2.7.101-108. The quotation is taken from Dem 19.65, in which Demosthenes describes the countryside of the Phocians, ravaged by Philip.

⁵⁷Neither does one find the fA terminology (ἐνδιασκευή) outside of these contexts.

⁵⁸The H_z frequency is factored on the basis of the total number of occurrences in both works, and the total number of words in both works.

1. The aD Family ('Αδίκημα δημόσιον, a Charge of Harming the Public Good)

'Αδίκημα δημόσιον (a charge of harming the public good, aD) we have already encountered in one of our examples in Chapter Four. The aD terminology has a 0.71m% in the Hermogenic corpus. It recurs frequently in the examples given by both Hermogenes and the Hermogenic author of *Invention*; the latter devotes an entire section⁵⁹ to its use in declamation. For the present purposes, however, the terminology is largely unremarkable.

2. The cE Family ('Αποκήρυξις, a Disinheriting of a Son)

'Αποκήρυξις (a disinheriting of a son, cE)⁶⁰ is, like the aD family, a common declamation theme, and we may here pass over it without further comment.

3. The kM Family (Προκατασκευή, Preconfirmation)

Προκατασκευή (preconfirmation, kM) is a bit more complicated. The Hermogenic author devotes a chapter to its consideration⁶¹ and Kennedy remarks that the term is not found prior to *Invention*.⁶² If Patillon's assignation of authorship for *Invention* is correct, however, Kennedy's observation would be inaccurate.⁶³ At any rate, the terminology may be used synonymously with some terms in AnSg, and it is best to take up its detailed consideration in the next

⁵⁹Inv 2.6.

⁶⁰The cE family has a 0.71m%.

⁶¹Inv 3.2.

⁶²KENNEDY (1983), p. 88.

⁶³As we shall see, in the following section.

section, where contrasts between AnSg's work and the Hermogenic works are considered more directly.

Turning our attention to the remaining five terms classified as Hz, we find that each of these five will require a somewhat closer examination.

4. The kZ Family (ῥητός, Legal Instrument)

ῥητός (legal instrument in a given judicial case or deliberative debate; also "letter" [as in *the letter of the law*], kZ) has a 1.20m%. Though common to both, there is, however, a significant disparity between the use of the family in the two Hermogenic works; kZ has a 3.44m% in *Stasis*, and a meager 0.05m% in *Invention*. The single occurrence of the family in *Invention* demonstrates, in fact, a use of the term in its more common, non-technical meaning of "specified".⁶⁴ The terminology is, thus, pragmatically unique to *Stasis*; furthermore, all of its 36 occurrences in that work represent a technical employment of the kZ family, rendering it the most common family in *Stasis* which is not shared with AnSg.

Not surprisingly, given its robust 3.44m% in *Stasis*, Hermogenes uses the term ῥητός (legal instrument, letter kZ) in a variety of settings. Notably, however, the terminology is also employed with three different, though closely interlinked, technical meanings. First of all, it is used as a term for a "verbal instrument" -- a written law, a spoken oracle, a valid will, &c.⁶⁵

⁶⁴Inv 2.7.9.

⁶⁵St 2.74-76.

It is this "verbal instrument" (kZ) which is absolutely required⁶⁶ if a case is to be dealt with as a legal (νομικός, iL) rather than a logical (λογικός, hM) qualitative (ποιότης, jZ) issue (στάσις, lD). When the dispute turns upon the interpretation or application of such a verbal instrument (kZ), then one will divide the argument according to the applicable species⁶⁷ of legal (iL) stasis (lD). Such verbal instruments may or may not be part of deliberative (πραγμαρτικός, kC) debate. A legal instrument (kZ) may become part of deliberative stasis if, for example, the legality of one's proposed policy is called into question, or, to take an alternative example, one may debate the temporary suspension of a given law for the duration of a crisis.⁶⁸ The use of ῥητός (kZ) in the meaning of a verbal instrument accounts for the vast majority of its occurrences in *Stasis*.

The second, subtly different, meaning of ῥητός (letter, kZ) is found in its use at St 11.3 and 11.12. Here, the term communicates something more akin to the content of a law, referencing the "specific provisions", or some part of those provisions, within a particular legal instrument.⁶⁹ ῥητός is used in this context as a

⁶⁶St 2.72-74.

⁶⁷There are six such stases; cf. Figure 4.1.

⁶⁸Cf. St 7.3-7.

⁶⁹In English, we have a similar, subtle, distinction: the word "law" may be used as a reference to the written instrument (Criminal Code of Tennessee, Traffic, Section 4, Paragraph 12, Subparagraph j) or the term may reference some part of the precise contents of that law: Failure to yield right of way at a stop sign; fine: \$70 - \$500. See HEATH (1995), commentary, p. 151. In his translation, Heath

heading within the legal (iL) stasis (1D) of συλλογισμός (assimilation, 1M). Συλλογισμός (1M) is the attempt to broaden the application of given law to cover a set of circumstances not explicitly dealt with in that law. For example, a law prohibits the naming of citizens in a comedy; a playwright composes a comedy in which no citizen is named, but several citizens are easily recognizable by the mask and dress of the actor. The citizens who have been mocked charge the playwright, under the law.⁷⁰ Given this situation, the defense will emphasize the "letter" (ῥητός, kZ) of the law. The prosecutor will counter with an argument that the situation is assimilated (συλλογισμός, 1M) under the law, appealing to the legislator's intention (γνώμη νομοθέτου, dB); each of these are headings within the stasis (1D) of assimilation (1M).

There is a final use of the term ῥητός (letter, kZ) in *Stasis*, but we must approach this final use with caution in order to avoid confusion. ῥητός (kZ) occurs in *Stasis* as part of the technical phrase ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοια ("letter and intent", dJ). Of course, ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοια (dJ) is, for its part, a *separate* family from ῥητός (letter, kZ); the counting of occurrences and figuring of different m% for each family has been kept strictly segregated. That said, we may observe that the phrase ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοια (dJ) is itself unique to *Stasis*, occurring with a 0.86m% in that work. The phrase is a qualitative (ποιότης, jZ) legal (νομικός, iL) stasis (στάσις, 1D)

renders these uses as "letter" rather than his usual "verbal instrument" as a rendering for a member of the kZ family.

⁷⁰Cf. St. 11.8-11.

where the issue at hand turns on a question of what we still today call the "spirit or the letter of the law". A common example given in declamation is of a non-citizen alien who mounts the walls during an attack and saves the city; he is afterwards prosecuted under a law forbidding an alien to ascend the city walls. The letter and intent (ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοια, dJ) will be the crucial stasis.

The kZ family occurs in no other contexts within either Hermogenic work.

5. The bJ Family ('Αντιπαράστασις, Counter-representation)

'Αντιπαράστασις (counter-representation, bJ) represents another frequently occurring family present in *Stasis* and *Invention*, but absent in *AnSg*. The family has a 0.91m% in the combined Hermogenic works, and was discussed in Chapter Four. It will be recalled that ἀντιπαράστασις (bJ) is one of the three methods which the Hermogenic author of *Invention* outlines as a means of undermining the opponent's premise.⁷¹ In *Invention*, the term occurs in four distinct contexts.

The first, and most important by far, of these contexts is found at *Inv* 3.6, where the concept is first defined and discussed. It is not necessary to repeat the discussion in Chapter Four which focused on this section, but a few additional observations relative to *Inv* 3.6 may be forwarded in the present setting.

⁷¹Deny it outright (ἔνστασις, fD), allow the premise, but deny its applicability (ἀντιπαράστασις, bJ), turn it against the opponent (βίαιος, cX).

There is, seemingly, some inconsistency in [Pseudo]-Hermogenes' classification of this term. At 3.6.2 we are told that denial (ἔνστασις, fD)⁷² and counter-representation (ἀντιπαράστασις, bJ) are both headings:

One should know that the *Art of Division* showed denial (ἔνστασις, fD) and counter-representation (ἀντιπαράστασις, bJ) <to be> headings (κεφαλή, hD) set in opposition to counterplea (ἀντίληψις, bH).⁷³

Despite this clear opening statement, however, [Pseudo]-Hermogenes will remark only a few lines later:

We should attempt, for each heading (κεφαλή, hD) in every stasis (στάσις, lD) to introduce the discussions and confirmations (κατασκευή, gX), with the denial and counter-representation (ἔνστασις, fD and ἀντιπαράστασις, bJ).⁷⁴

While he seems at first to classify both denial (fD) and counter-representation (bJ) as headings, his next remarks would seem to indicate that he thought of the concepts not as headings, but rather as introductions -- εἰσαγωγή⁷⁵ in Greek -- to the headings. He similarly describes his four step process of πρότασις (kX), ὑποφορά

⁷²The fD family has two occurrences in AnSg, giving it a 0.23m% there. Both occurrences, however, are non-technical uses; fD is, therefore, pragmatically an Hz term, with technical occurrences in both works of the Hermogenic corpus, but no technical occurrences in AnSg. Considered as an Hz term, it would have a 1.45m%, with a 0.76m% in *Stasis* and a 1.82m% in *Invention*.

⁷³Ἰστέον, ὅτι τὴν ἔνστασιν καὶ ἀντιπαράστασιν ἐναντία κεφάλαια τῆς ἀντιλήψεως ἢ διαιρετικῆ παρέδωκε τέχνη· Inv 3.6.1-3.

⁷⁴Χρὴ δὲ ἡμᾶς καθ' ἡκαστον τῶν κεφαλαίων ἐν πάσῃ στάσει πειρᾶσθαι τὰς μάχας καὶ τὰς κατασκευὰς κατ' εἰκόνα τῆς ἐνστάσεως καὶ ἀντιπαραστάσεως εἰσάγειν· Inv 3.6.10-12.

⁷⁵It is not a technical term, and does not appear on the TVGL.

(mU), ἀντιπρότασις (bK), ἀνθυποφορά (bC)⁷⁶ as, not a group of headings, but rather an "introduction" -- again, an εἰσαγωγή -- to a heading: "And the introduction of the heading is composed of these four <items>...".⁷⁷

When Hermogenes considers the terms in *Stasis*, neither denial (ἐνστάσις, fD) nor counter-representation (ἀντιπαράστασις, bJ) is classified as a heading, *per se*. What we find, however, is that Hermogenes uses the two terms as a type of methodological species of -- that is, the two ways of accomplishing⁷⁸ -- the heading of μετάληψις (objection, hY),⁷⁹ which is itself designed to refute the counterplea.⁸⁰ Hermogenes recommends, at this location, that denial (fD) be used whenever possible; counter-representation (bJ) is presumably always used. The Hermogenic author of *Invention* seems to be in line with this general assessment, except for his peculiar opening statement classifying the two terms as headings (lD). Patillon never remarks on the contradiction in *Invention*, and he

⁷⁶See Figure 4.2.

⁷⁷καὶ ἡ τοῦ κεφαλαίου εἰσαγωγή ἐκ τῶν τεττάρων πεπλήρωται... Inv 3.4.110-111.

⁷⁸Hermogenes specific expression at 3.108 is that the μετάληψις (objection, hY) is "derived from" (γίγνεται) denial (fD) and counter-representation (bJ).

⁷⁹Which is not to be confused with μετάληψις (objection, hY) as a genre of qualitative, legal issues, the species of which are the documentary (ἐγγράφος, eD) and non-documentary (ἀγγραφος, aB) stases. Cf. Figure 4.1. As a heading, μετάληψις (objection, hY) is simply one argumentative response to a counterplea (ἀντίληψις, bH) when counterplea is forwarded by the opponent, either as a heading (hD) or a stasis (lD).

⁸⁰St 5.34-36.

never considers the terms as headings,⁸¹ discussing them simply as amplificatory additions to the ἀνθυποφορά (bC).⁸²

So, does the Hermogenic author of *Invention* view denial (ἐνστάσις, fD) and counter-representation (ἀντιπαράστασις, bJ) as headings? Or as something more akin to a trope which would highlight or introduce a heading? Or as a methodological species of a heading? As long as [Pseudo]-Hermogenes' work entitled *Art of Division* remains lost, we may never know with certainty. What we can conclude is that, if [Pseudo]-Hermogenes was speaking casually -- and less precisely -- at Inv 3.6.1ff when he identified denial (fD) and counter-representation (bJ) as headings (hD), then the remainder of Inv 3.6 is perfectly consistent with, though less rigorous and detailed than, Hermogenes' discussion of denial (fD) and counter-representation (bJ) at St 5.34ff.

In addition to classification, a second question regarding the scope of application arises with respect to denial (ἐνστάσις, fD) and counter-representation (ἀντιπαράστασις, bJ). We have seen that the Hermogenic author of *Invention* opens his account of these two terms with the observation that they are set against ἀντίληψις (counterplea, bH). We have also seen that, a few lines later, he recommends applying the two forms "in each heading of every

⁸¹Cf. PATILLON, p. 246, fn.3, his only relevant comment on these lines.

⁸²Which is, of course, the statement of our own viewpoint in the introduction of an epicheireme (f2) designed to support our refutation (h0) of the opponent's heading (hD). Cf. Figure 4.2.

stasis".⁸³ This is rather a broader recommendation than his first comment, and raises the question of application.

In *Stasis*, Hermogenes stresses that the heading of objection (μετάληψις, hY) always appears whenever counterplea (ἀντίληψις, bH) occurs, and vice-versa.⁸⁴ Objection (hY) he tells us, is derived from denial (fD) and counter-representation (bJ).⁸⁵ He gives no other possible sources or definitions, either here or elsewhere, for the heading of objection (hY). Thus, one may assume that wherever one finds the heading of counterplea (bH), one will find the heading of objection (hY), and with it denial (fD) and counter-representation (bJ). Turning, then, to Hermogenes' division (διαίρεσις, dG; i.e., his "argumentative outline") of each stasis (στάσις, 1D), one discovers, in fact, that the heading of counterplea (bH) shows up in the division (dG) of every stasis except one;⁸⁶ objection occurs in the division (dG) of every stasis. This is certainly a broader application than one might have imagined from Hermogenes' first comments in *Stasis*, where we are told only that the two headings always stand in opposition to one another.

⁸³Inv 3.6.10f.

⁸⁴St 3.104-108. In spite of his comments here, the stasis of ambiguity (ἀμφιβολία, aO) contains the heading of objection (hY) in its division (dG), but there is no mention of counterplea (bH). Cf. HEATH's (1995) comments on p. 154; see, also, footnote 82, below.

⁸⁵St 3.108-121.

⁸⁶The exception is ambiguity (ἀμφιβολία, aO), where it is logically redundant: if the law is read as one argues it should be, there is no need for a counterplea (bH); objection (hY), however, would still be relevant in this stasis, as one argues against the opponent's alternative reading of the law.

Now, we find denial (fD) and counter-representation (bJ) present in one heading of every stasis. Nevertheless, this still falls considerably short of Pseudo-Hermogenes' recommendation in *Invention* that every heading of every stasis receive this treatment. The discrepancy is puzzling; one might be tempted to dismiss the statement in *Invention* as typical Greek hyperbole, but the tone of the discussion in Inv 3.6 does not seem to allow for that solution. What is clear is that this point of application regarding the species of objection (hY) represents a definite difference between the works of *Invention* and *Stasis*.

The other three contexts in *Invention* where one finds discussion of counter-representation (ἀντιπαράστασις, bJ) may be reviewed more quickly; none of them are especially remarkable. At 3.7.3ff, [Pseudo]-Hermogenes has an incidental comment on counter-representation (bJ) while making a comparison between the need for epicheiremes (fZ) to support refutations (λύσις, hO), and the need for developments (ἐργασία, gB) to support epicheiremes (fZ). In the course of making his point, he reminds us that refutations (hO) are "forwarded by denial (ἐνστάσις, fD) or counter-representation (bJ)". An almost identical comparison is made in Inv 3.8, and, again, is largely unremarkable. Finally, in 3.13, in a discussion on the order of the epicheiremes (fZ), one is reminded that the strongest epicheiremes should be placed last, just as one arranges the denial (fD) and counter-representation (bJ) with the strongest last. There are no other occurrences of the bJ terminology in *Invention*.

In *Stasis*, counter-representation (ἀντιπαράστασις, bJ) occurs in three distinct contexts, but we have already discussed two of these in our consideration of the bJ terminology within *Invention*.⁸⁷ The final context in which the bJ family appears within *Stasis*, however, requires a separate comment. In Hermogenes' discussion of the deliberative (πραγματικός, kC) stasis,⁸⁸ we encounter two remarks which invoke both denial (ἐνστάσις, fD) and counter-representation (bJ). At St 7.39-44, we are told that the topic⁸⁹ of feasibility (δύναμις, eB) is subdivided (ὑποδιαίρεσις, mO) into denial (fD) and counter-representation (bJ). The topic of legality (νόμος, iL), is also handled, in the non-documentary (ἄγραφος, aB) species,⁹⁰ through denial (fD) and counter-representation (bJ), though they are not here called a "subdivision" (mO). These comments from *Stasis* have no parallel in *Invention*.

6. The mO Family (ὑποδιαίρεσις, Subdivision)

ὑποδιαίρεσις (subdivision, mO) is itself another frequently occurring family present in both *Stasis* and *Invention*, but absent from *AnSg*; it has a 1.13m%, but here, just as we saw with ῥητός (legal instrument, letter k2) above, there is a gross disparity in

⁸⁷St 3.104-121 and St 5.34-36.

⁸⁸St 7.

⁸⁹Hermogenes divides the deliberative (πραγματικός, kC) stasis into the common topics of legality, justice, advantage, feasibility, honor, and consequence rather than specific headings.

⁹⁰St 7.10-18. Why it should be thus limited is not clear, and indeed there is some ambiguity in the text here; perhaps Hermogenes is merely giving an example of the way denial and counter-representation are to be employed throughout the topic of legality (iL) within the deliberative (kC) issue.

the use of the term in the two works. 'Υποδιαίρεσις (subdivision, mO) has only a 0.10m% in *Stasis*, while carrying a 1.67m% in *Invention*. The single occurrence of the mO family in *Stasis* is, in fact, to be found in the discussion on the topic of feasibility (δύναμις, eB) within the deliberative (πραγματικός, kC) stasis; this occurrence was discussed in the paragraph immediately above. This single use in *Stasis* does not appear to be a particularly technical employment of the mO terminology. At a minimum, therefore, we can observe that the use of the mO terminology here is unrelated to its use within *Invention*.

The mO family (ὑποδιαίρεσις, subdivision) occurs in three distinct contexts within *Invention*.⁹¹ In these contexts, one encounters two distinct technical meanings of the terminology; at one point [Pseudo]-Hermogenes is at pains to explain that the two meanings should not be confused. The first context in which one encounters ὑποδιαίρεσις (subdivision, mO) is found at Inv 1.2. Here, the discussion is entitled "Concerning the Prooemium from Subdivision".⁹² We are told here that subdivision of the prooem occurs in some problems, and not necessarily alone (i.e., presumably it does not constitute the whole of the prooem). There are three species of prooem from subdivision: first, there is the dual subdivision (where two wrongs have been committed and will need to

⁹¹Inv 1.2; 3.10-3.12; 3.15.

⁹²Περὶ τῶν ἐξ ὑποδιαίρεσεως προοιμίων. The titles, of course, are probably additions by later editors, though in this case the title is lifted directly from the first line of the section.

be addressed); second, there is the prejudiced subdivision (where one exploits stereotypes and popular perspectives on a given act and a given individual⁹³); third, there is the "momentum toward intention"⁹⁴ subdivision (where one wishes to punish a particularly hideous action in such a way that it leads to the impossibility of the act being committed again⁹⁵). In this first context, the ὑποδιαίρεσις (subdivision, mO) is a particular species of proem designed to face an unusually complex persuasive challenge.

After Inv 1.2, however, one does not again find any member of the mO family until Inv 3.10. This is the second context in which one encounters discussion of ὑποδιαίρεσις (subdivision, mO). It will be recalled from Chapter Four that ὑποδιαίρεσις (mO) is an emotive confirmation (κατασκευή, gX) of the particular heading known as

⁹³Certain recurring characters in declamation -- Demosthenes, or Critias, or Pericles, for example -- had a given set of assumptions associated with their personalities. Likewise, there were "types" of characters with such prejudices attached to them: the brothel keeper, the dissolute son, the patriotic resident metic, &c. Likewise, certain acts (verbally insulting one's country, heroic fighting in desperate situations) also carried the weight of certain prejudices. When one of the latter and one of the former combined in a declamation theme, a proem from subdivision, dealing with both, would be in order.

⁹⁴τοῦ ἀθρώου πρὸς τὸ μέλλον. Inv 1.2. 54. The phrase is a difficult one in Greek. Patillon translates it "pour en finir une fois pour toutes" ["for once and for all"], which captures one element of the phrase, certainly; the Greek participle μέλλον, however, has a definite -- and in this context, significant -- sense of "intention"; cf. the following footnote.

⁹⁵Cutting off the hands of a thief who has twice robbed the treasury of the oracle, e.g., or the prosecution of an embalmer guilty of necrophilia leading to a general prohibition against embalming. Part of the proem is devoted to the crime *per se*, part to the especially hideous nature of the crime, the latter requiring a persuasive momentum that will unite punishment and policy in a way which assures the community that such significant mores will not again be transgressed (in this way, or by this person, &c.)

"sequence of events" or "first to last" (τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους, cK). As we saw in Chapter Four, this heading (κεφαλή, hD) is not confirmed (gX) through the usual epicheirematic (fZ) support, but rather through the processes of subdivision (ὑποδιαίρεσις, mO) and fictional epicheiremes (τὸ πλαστον ἐπιχείρημα, gA).

With this in mind we may return to Inv 1.2 in order to examine a remark made there on the distinction between ὑποδιαίρεσις (subdivision, mO) as a species of the proem and ὑποδιαίρεσις (mO) as a confirmation (gX) of the τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους (beginning to end, cK) heading (hD). [Pseudo]-Hermogenes notes⁹⁶ that one might confuse the first species of subdivision (mO) within the proem⁹⁷ with the confirmational (gX) subdivision; the distinction to hold in mind, he insists, is that the former always involves two separate charges, while the latter incorporates two or more circumstantial (περίστασις, jQ) elements within the same charge.

There is only one other context in which the mO terminology appears. In Inv 3.15, [Pseudo]-Hermogenes takes up the discussion of the confirmational (gX) subdivision (mO) of the "beginning to end" (cK) heading (hD) in order to discuss, rather unsatisfactorily as we have found, its distinction from διασκευή (representation, dO). We have sufficiently reviewed this setting in our discussion of the dO family, above.

⁹⁶Inv 1.2.18-29.

⁹⁷Dual subdivision (mO), where one must deal with two crimes in one presentation.

7. The cK Family (Τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους, **Beginning to End**)

Τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους (beginning to end, cK) is another family present only in both works of the Hermogenic corpus, and with a total frequency greater than or equal to 0.50m%: the cK family possesses a total frequency of 1.26m%, rendering it the most common terminology classified as an Hz family. This family, however, has figured prominently in several discussions above, and was also considered in Chapter Four; we need not repeat ourselves here. A brief point, however, needs to be made before moving on.

In *Invention*, where the cK family has a 1.03m%, this heading is confirmed by subdivision (ὑποδιαίρεσις, mO) and fictional epicheiremes (τὸ πλαστὸν ἐπιχείρημα, gA), as we have seen. When we turn to *Stasis*, where the cK family has a 1.72m%, these confirmational aspects of the heading are missing. In *Stasis*, the gA family, τὸ πλαστὸν ἐπιχείρημα (fictional epicheireme), has no occurrences at all, though it has a 0.49m% in *Invention*. In *Invention*, the phrase is invariably found in the context of a discussion on confirming the τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους (beginning to end, cK) heading. We saw, above, that subdivision (ὑποδιαίρεσις, mO) has a single occurrence in *Stasis*, and this occurrence was unrelated to the confirmation of the τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους (cK) heading. The two families, gA (fictional epicheireme) and mO (subdivision) are intimately interwoven with the discussion of the cK (beginning to end) family, in *Invention*, but entirely absent from the discussion of the cK (beginning to end) family in *Stasis*. The omission seems striking.

Admittedly, Hermogenes does not spend much time discussing the process of *confirming* (gX) the headings he outlines for his stases -- the terminology of *epicheiremes* (fZ) has only a 0.29m% in *Stasis*, while sporting a dense 4.76m% in *Invention*, for example. Nevertheless the omission of this terminology concerning the confirmation of such a frequent heading⁹⁸ is notable.

8. The bH Family ('Αντίληψις, *Counterplea*)

'Αντίληψις (*counterplea*, bH) is the final frequently occurring family classified as Hz in Table 2.2. The family has a total frequency of 1.20m%, but there is once again a serious discrepancy in the frequency of its use in the two Hermogenic works. It carries a 3.24m% in *Stasis*, and a 0.15m% in *Invention*.

In *Stasis*, the bH terminology is always a reference to either a stasis or a heading. As a stasis, of course, it is a qualitative (jZ), logical (hM), judicial (dU) stasis (lD) which asserts, against the charge brought, the legitimacy of the act in question -- "I was within my rights when I...." As a heading, it performs the same function of asserting legitimacy of the act, but does so as the conclusion of previous arguments, introduction of further arguments, or both.

Within *Invention*, the bH terminology occurs within three contexts. The first⁹⁹ of these we have given some attention to, above: it regards the discussion of ἔνστασις (*denial*, fD) and

⁹⁸Present in half the stases.

⁹⁹Inv 3.6.2ff.

ἀντιπαράστασις (counter-representation, bJ) as headings (?) opposed to the counterplea (ἀντίληψις, bH). We need not repeat that discussion here.

The remaining two contexts in which the bH (ἀντίληψις, counterplea) terminology appears both refer back to the first context, invoking it as an example of opposing one argument to another¹⁰⁰ or the liberty of arranging refutations into the strongest pattern, just as the order of ἔνστασις (denial, fD) and ἀντιπαράστασις (counter-representation, bJ), when opposing ἀντίληψις (bH), may be varied in order to create the strongest and most persuasive presentation.¹⁰¹ Beyond these facts, there is nothing immediately remarkable in the employment of the bH family.

This concludes a survey of every unique family with a frequency equal to or greater than 0.50m%. We may now turn our attention to a review of families which are common to both AnSg and at least one of the Hermogenic works.

Section II. Shared Vocabulary¹⁰²

When one turns from conceptual families which are unique in a given work or author and begins to focus, instead, upon those families which are found in both AnSg and the Hermogenic intentional corpus, the task confronting one becomes markedly more complex. In

¹⁰⁰Inv 3.12.9ff

¹⁰¹Inv 3.13.19ff.

¹⁰²I shall use the adjective "shared" to refer to terminology which occurs in both AnSg and at least one of the Hermogenic works under consideration.

this section, we shall consider a selection of such shared terminology, emphasizing common themes and also noting (often subtle) shifts in meaning.

There are 186 conceptual families -- slightly more than half of the total -- which are shared between the Hermogenic corpus and AnSg. Of these 186 families, 25 occur only in AnSg and *Stasis*, 51 occur only in AnSg and *Invention*, and 110 occur in all three works. We shall concentrate on those families which are directly related, in some fashion, to the major points already broached in our discussions.¹⁰³

A. The Vocabulary of [Pseudo]-Hermogenes' Argumentative Tropes

As we have seen, the argumentative trope of *Invention* Book 3 has two distinct phases. The first phase is an introductory approach to the epicheiremes, consisting of¹⁰⁴ the πρότασις (kX), ὑποφορά (mU), ἀντιπρότασις (bJ), and ἀνθυποφορά (bC). In the discussion within Section I of this chapter, we saw that each of these terms was, at least pragmatically, unique to *Invention*. The second phase of the argumentative trope also consists of¹⁰⁵ four supporting parts: ἐπιχείρημα (epicheireme, fZ), ἐργασία (development, gB), ἐνθύμημα (enthymeme, fC), and ἐπενθύμημα (additional enthymeme, fM). Upon these latter four concepts rests either the κατασκευή

¹⁰³Either in Chapter Three (on AnSg), Chapter Four (on *Stasis* and *Invention*), or in our review of frequently occurring unique vocabulary in Section I of the present chapter.

¹⁰⁴See Figure 4.2.

¹⁰⁵See Figure 4.3.

(confirmation, gX) or the λύσις (refutation, hO) of the κεφαλή (heading, hD). All seven of the families which occur within the second phase of the [Pseudo]-Hermogenic argumentative trope represent shared vocabulary. The relative use of these seven families is summarized in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2
Comparative Frequencies: The Primary Components
of the Argumentative Trope

Fam	Representational Term	An Sg		S T		I nv	
		Fq	m%	Fq	m%	Fq	m%
fC	ἐνθύμημα τό	9	1.03		-	36	1.77
fM	ἐπενθύμημα τό	1	0.11		-	7	0.34
fZ	ἐπιχείρημα τό	20	2.28	2	0.19	97	4.76
gB	ἐργασία ἡ	11	1.26	3	0.29	55	2.70
gX	κατασκευή ἡ	20	2.28	5	0.48	88	4.32
hD	κεφαλή ἡ	21	2.40	48	4.58	58	2.85
hO	λύσις ἡ	6	0.68	3	0.29	60	2.95

We have discussed most of these families at some length in the previous chapters; here we wish to draw specific comparisons between the terminology as it is used in the Hermogenic works and in AnSg.

The vocabulary here is so intricately interwoven, both in the Hermogenic corpus and in AnSg, that it becomes increasingly difficult to discuss any conceptual family in isolation. One may, nevertheless, concentrate on general areas of terminology.

Ἐπιχείρημα (epicheireme, fZ) and ἐνθύμημα (enthymeme, fC) are perhaps the most reasonable places to open such a comparative discussion. Specific and detailed surveys of both the fZ and fC families were offered in Chapter Three (on AnSg) and Chapter Four (on the Hermogenic corpus). With these discussions as a background, the following comparative remarks may be made.

First, [Pseudo]-Hermogenes' definition of the epicheireme (fZ)¹⁰⁶ has a general similarity to the Aristotelian enthymeme (fC); both take the form of an explanatory statement, frequently introduced by γάρ.¹⁰⁷ This raises the question of the relationship between the idea of the epicheireme in AnSg and that presented in *Invention*.

What we see in AnSg is an ongoing development of the Theophrastian process in which the term "epicheireme" is taken more and more as the primary word for a basic rhetorical position or argument. By the time the Hermogenic corpus was the undisputed leader of the inventional field, this transformation was complete, and the concept was somewhat more clearly divided between terms, with κεφαλή (heading hD) becoming the word for a rhetorical position, and ἐπιχείρημα (epicheireme, fZ) becoming the word for the overall rhetorical process or a particular statement giving cause to embrace that position, and ἐνθύμημα (enthymeme, fC) becoming the term for material given in support of the epicheireme. The Hermogenic corpus reflects the view which, in fact, became the perspective of rhetoricians in the later Greek West: for them, enthymemes are always and unmistakably subservient to epicheiremes, which are fundamental statements supporting one's position.¹⁰⁸ In

¹⁰⁶Inv 3.5.

¹⁰⁷For Kennedy's remarks on the particle in relation to Aristotelian enthymemes, see KENNEDY (1993), pp. xii; 29, fn. 3.

¹⁰⁸Cf. KENNEDY (1983), p. 90.

AnSg, this view is present, but not necessarily consistently, and certainly not so cleanly divided.

We have seen, for example, that Harpocraton and Neocles both appear, at first glance, to view the enthymeme in terms which are relatively consistent with Aristotle, while the third definition in AnSg -- attributed to "some" -- is markedly different, reflecting a perspective more generally consistent with the [Pseudo]-Hermogenic outlook on the enthymeme as a support to a previously given epicheireme.¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, when one takes a closer look at even Neocles and Harpocraton, one finds that they, too, are willing to make the enthymeme a supporting clause for an earlier argument. Harpocraton clearly implies as much in AnSg 248, a point we considered in Chapter Three, but it bears emphasizing again here. After defining the enthymeme as language (or a statement) "taken for demonstration of the subject",¹¹⁰ we find in 248 that enthymemes are, for Harpocraton, actually supporting statements for epicheiremes.

Also in Chapter Three, we speculated that Neocles viewed the enthymeme as a *methodological* approach to an argument.¹¹¹ This point we now need to take up in more detail, reviewing, especially,

¹⁰⁹AnSg 157-160. Aristotle, recall, never dealt with the relationship between epicheiremes and enthymemes.

¹¹⁰AnSg 159. DK translation. "Demonstration" (ἀποδείξις, cC) is used here in a non-technical sense.

¹¹¹Rather than the more genuinely Aristotelian view of the enthymeme as a logical class, or form of argument.

AnSg's remarks in 210-221, which DK divide between Neocles and Alexander.

In these sections, epicheiremes are discussed incidentally. Were one to follow the DK division of sources, one would find about half the occurrences of the term "epicheireme" given to Alexander, but the DK division of sources is especially suspect in these sections. Neocles is the recognized¹¹² source of 210-214, and is specifically named at 214; Dilts and Kennedy assume¹¹³ an immediate shift to Alexander in 215, based solely upon the presence, there, of a first-person plural verb.¹¹⁴ Contextually, however, the passages are seamless;¹¹⁵ at least as significantly, they are grammatically seamless as well: the first-person plural of 215 merely continues the expression of that same construction found in 211, 212, and 213. Why DK would suddenly pick out the "we" of 215 as a place to begin an attribution to Alexander is opaque; they offer no comment on the first-person plural in 211-213, and no explanation for their assumption at 215. Alexander is next identified specifically in

¹¹²In 210-213, the stylistic considerations leave almost no doubt about Neoclean paternity; he is named in 214.

¹¹³Their tone is somewhat more tentative than usual, as can be seen in their fn. 209.

¹¹⁴As was discussed in Chapter One, there are some serious difficulties with Alexandrian assignments based solely upon the verb tense. There are first-person plural verbs throughout 210-213, and DK do not question Neocles as the source for these sections.

¹¹⁵In 214, where Neocles is specifically named, we are given four species of recapitulation (ἀνακεφαλαιώσεις, av); each of these species is subsequently taken up (by name) in the four following paragraphs, which DK assign to Alexander. These four are followed by two more paragraphs which provide cursory recommendations applicable to all four species of the recapitulation.

221, where a contextual shift of focus¹¹⁶ would more logically allow for a change of source. If, therefore, Neocles is the source of all of 210-220¹¹⁷ (as seems likely), then we have an expansion of his position, and can more completely approach the question of his views on *epicheiremes*, *enthymemes*, and their relationship.

In AnSg 210-213, Neocles speaks of summarizing, by way of a reminder, the main points of one's presentation. In this context, he observes that on occasion it is fitting to remind the audience only of the headings (*κεφαλή*, hD) of one's case while at other times the orator should remind the audience of the headings and their supporting proofs (*πίστις*, jU). Given Neocles' definition of the *enthymeme*¹¹⁸ from AnSg 157, one might suppose that such proofs would be called *enthymemes*, in Neocles' scheme; this does not, however, seem to be the case.

In AnSg 217, just a few paragraphs after his discussion of headings "and their proofs", Neocles forwards another intriguing observation: here, he outlines his species of "recapitulation (*ἀνακεφαλαίωσις*, aV) by *epicheireme*", and it is interesting to note that the examples he gives would be virtually indistinguishable from a reminder of the headings "with their proofs". Thus, *epicheiremes* seem here to be the term for arguing out a point or heading (hD). If this is so, however, we find ourselves facing the ghost of a

¹¹⁶Onto the *ἐρμηνεία* (style, gC) of the recapitulation.

¹¹⁷Graeven, an earlier editor of the AnSg manuscript, assigned these paragraphs to Neocles, as well. Cf. DK fn. 209.

¹¹⁸Discussed in Chapter Three.

question from Chapter Three: what is an enthymeme, in Neocles? If it is a methodological treatment of a point, how does it differ from an epicheireme? Does Neocles -- like Harpocraton -- see the enthymeme as a statement in support of an epicheireme, as an epicheireme is, we see in 217, an argument supporting a heading?

If Neocles views the enthymeme as a term for a *methodological* treatment¹¹⁹ -- i.e., a process of arguing, of presenting support for a claim, rather than a term for a claim *per se* -- then it might be reasonable to conclude that Neocles, like Harpocraton, views the enthymeme as a support mechanism for an antecedent epicheireme;¹²⁰ recall his definition: language (or, a statement) "concerning something under discussion when some <other> things have been posited, or concerning what is antecedent...".¹²¹ It now appears that "what is antecedent" may be, not the main point (or heading, hD) being argued, but the epicheirematic support of that main point (or heading).

Here we come upon some of the more muddled aspects of the technical vocabulary in AnSg, and it is especially important to be clear. The present problem we are discussing is this: Neocles (and Harpocraton) have definitions of enthymemes presented in AnSg's textual discussion of proof which would indicate, on the surface, a

¹¹⁹The limited textual evidence for this claim was presented in the relevant discussion in Chapter Three.

¹²⁰The conclusion that Neocles and Harpocraton viewed the enthymeme in similar terms is further reinforced by the fact that AnSg uses Neocles' amplification of the relevant material on enthymemes to flesh out the discussion of the terms in Harpocraton's definition.

¹²¹AnSg 157. DK translation.

generally Aristotelian perspective, with enthymeme serving as the term for a rhetorical argument. Furthermore, both Neocles and Harpocraton have definitions which appear somewhat more methodological, or at least seem so in the context of the discussion. Nevertheless, as the AnSg text moves on, and as contexts become more clearly filled in, we find evidence that both authors -- Neocles and Harpocraton -- view the epicheireme, not the enthymeme, as the primary (or, at a minimum, an equally important) term for the rhetorical process of argument. This leads us to ask two questions: first, what is the enthymeme in Neocles and Harpocraton? We have attempted to trace out an answer to this question -- as far as possible -- above; we can conclude firmly, in the case of Harpocraton, and reasonably, in the case of Neocles, that both authors view the enthymeme as a supporting mechanism for an epicheireme.

This brings us to the second question: why, if the enthymeme is a supporting mechanism for an epicheireme, does AnSg devote time and attention to presenting a series of definitions on the enthymeme,¹²² and take nine paragraphs to discuss vocabulary related to the enthymeme¹²³ while effectively passing over the epicheireme? While the fZ terminology (regarding the epicheireme) is more than twice as common than that of the fC family (enthymeme) in AnSg, all epicheirematic occurrences are incidental. Nowhere is the

¹²²AnSg 157-159.

¹²³AnSg 160-168.

epicheireme taken up and discussed independently as a rhetorical tool, though the enthymeme is. Why is this?

The answer to this latter question if pursued exhaustively, would take us into digressions far afield from the narrow focus of the present study. We may only briefly note that the culture was an imperial one, even in AnSg's day, and pause to remember that AnSg is writing seven hundred years before Alhazen would *begin* the process of privileging observation over authority by devastating the geometricians theory of light¹²⁴ with the simple observation -- free from all mathematical proofs and geometric analysis -- that the sun can burn the eyes.¹²⁵ It would be another seven hundred years after Alhazen that observation would finally stand in the coliseum over a thoroughly broken authority, awaiting the thumb of public opinion to determine its next course of action. In brief, the culture of AnSg was an authoritative one, and changes were slow to take root. Consequently, Aristotle's terminology held weight and received attention long after the Aristotelian structures had been significantly reordered. AnSg's highlighting of terminology that, upon inspection, turns out to be other than central to his theory and discussion, allows us a glimpse into the process of change as it operated in his era.

¹²⁴Which held that light necessarily traveled from the eye to the object seen. Ptolemy and Euclid both held this position. An alternative theory -- that light traveled from the object seen to the eye was held by Aristotle.

¹²⁵See POWERS (2000), paragraph 7ff.

More relevant to this study, such highlighting of the off-center allows the contemporary rhetorician the opportunity to see the structural and theoretical imbalance which would, in time, be corrected and reordered under the Hermogenic corpus. AnSg's structural and theoretical imbalance also serves to caution us: it is unwise to dismiss too glibly Hermogenes' efforts as "mere reorganization". Certainly they were reorganizational efforts, and we can already begin to see how, in the area of invention, just as in the area of stasis theory, the Hermogenic corpus takes up the received terminology and concepts, and re-weaves them into a more coherent and consistent whole. This task, however, must be seen for what it was: a bold initiative; we are in our own era so accustomed to reorganization as a lifestyle that we forget the authoritative stability of the world in which Hermogenes lived. His heuristic approaches, as we shall see, pass perfectly through the narrows of necessary innovation on the one hand, and necessary conformity on the other. At present, however, we must return to a more detailed consideration of the technical vocabulary within the text.

We have seen that Alexander's use of the enthymeme is an apparent mystery; after being told that the enthymeme is one of Alexander's species of artistic proof (ἐντεχνος πίστις, jW), the term never again appears in any paragraph where Alexander is a definite source. With the epicheireme (fZ), however, the situation is different. Roughly half the occurrences of the fZ family in AnSg are derived from Alexander. Their consideration will allow us to

touch on another comparative observation with regard to the epicheiremes.

In *Invention*, the epicheireme is derived from one of the six elements of circumstance (περίστασις, jQ). The elements of circumstance are, of course, common places; they are topics, as can be seen in Harpocration's observation that "the topics of the prooemia are those of the circumstances (jQ)".¹²⁶ While, however, the elements of circumstance (jQ) are topics, they are a very particular subset of topics (mH). In *Invention*, the genesis of epicheiremes is strictly and forcefully limited to the elements of circumstance.¹²⁷ We are specifically told that epicheiremes can be derived from nowhere else.¹²⁸ In AnSg 169, however, Alexander flatly states that epicheiremes are derived from topics (mH). This observation is followed by an extensive discussion on topics in general, all of which are clearly suitable, in Alexander's scheme, to serve as the starting point for epicheiremes. Alexander, in other words, does not limit the epicheireme to a genesis in circumstance (jQ), as [Pseudo]-Hermogenes does, but allows it free range, to be derived from any of the topics.

Περίστασις (circumstance, jQ), in fact, occurs in AnSg linked primarily to discussion of the narration (διήγησις, dT), and here one finds a passing comment from Alexander that is worth noting. In

¹²⁶AnSg 8. DK translation.

¹²⁷Inv 3.5.1-10.

¹²⁸Inv 3.5.5-7.

AnSg 50, Alexander objects to an opinion on narration (dT) given by Apollodorus,¹²⁹ who defined narration as "exposition of the circumstances." Alexander criticizes this:

...for the 'circumstance' [jQ] is a combination of persons and actions and emotions and causes and resources and times, but narrations often deal with one of these, not all.¹³⁰

The list given here, of course, deviates from that given in *Invention*.¹³¹ Place (τόπος, mH) and manner (τρόπος, mJ) are both absent, while emotion (πάθος, iT) and resources (ἀφορμή, aA) seem to replace them on the list. Though these are certainly topics, none of the elements listed here appear in Alexander's more detailed discussion of topics in AnSg 171-182. Nevertheless, the discussion here is important since Alexander observes, in AnSg 57, that the narration will always be accompanied by παραδίηγησις (additional narration, iY), which will provide a topic for epicheiremes.¹³² Thus, the topics of circumstance -- which are the topics of the narration -- do, in fact serve as one of the sources of epicheiremes. In AnSg, however, they are clearly not made the exclusive source of epicheiremes, as they are in *Invention*.

Beyond this deviation, however, Alexander's other comments at first appear generally consistent with what one might find in

¹²⁹Apollodorus' definition is similar to, though less detailed than, that given by Neocles in AnSg 46.

¹³⁰AnSg 50. DK translation.

¹³¹And that found in AnSg 90, which agrees with the list in *Inv*.

¹³²AnSg 57; as was noted earlier, DK mistakenly translate this "providing a topic for *enthymemes*" [emphasis added].

Invention or Stasis. One of these comments, in particular, requires a closer examination. In AnSg 36, the text is dealing with construction of the prooemion, and, with Alexander as the source, we are given the following caution:

When making a prooemion, the thought should be derived from the subject, but one should certainly not give a detailed account of the subject or waste confirmations [κατασκευή, gX] on the subject; for the former is a matter for narration, the latter a matter of headings and epicheiremes.¹³³

Note, especially, the closing clause here, which in Greek runs: "...τὸ μὲν γὰρ διηγηματικόν, τὸ δὲ κεφαλαιῶδες καὶ ἐπιχειρηματικόν."¹³⁴ Given that this is a discussion of the prooemion, and that the primary element of the μὲν clause is *narration*, this sets up an expectation of *proofs* as a completion of the parataxis in the δέ clause. The logical structure runs: "Not in the prooem... for, on the one hand *narration*, and on the other hand, *proofs*". In place of *proofs*, however, Alexander presents us with the double elements of "headings and epicheiremes" which are related materially to confirmations (κατασκευή, gX). In this construction, Alexander provides us with a broader glimpse of his perspective on proof.¹³⁵ The position he takes here, that headings (hD) and epicheiremes (fZ) are linked to confirmation (gX) is by no means new; [Pseudo]-Hermogenes would say

¹³³AnSg 36. DK translation, generally. DK here translate κατασκευή as "proof"; I have altered this to "confirmation" in order to avoid confusion, and make the translation more consistent with the vocabulary we have been using to express the relevant Greek term.

¹³⁴Which DK translate: "...for the former is a matter for narration, the latter a matter of headings and epicheiremes."

¹³⁵Cf. Figure 3.2.

much the same thing, of course.¹³⁶ More light, however, is shed on this topic by another incidental remark made in AnSg 193. Here, Alexander (the assumed source of 193) observes, "Sometimes, <when refuting an opponent> we shall place many headings together when their confirmations [κατασκευή, gX] derive from the same topics...".¹³⁷ The issue of topics and their relationship to confirmations we shall take up shortly. At present, we need only note Alexander's view that confirmations are the support for headings. Given Alexander's remarks at AnSg 36, it is perfectly reasonable to assume that these confirmations support the headings with epicheiremes -- once again, a remark with which [Pseudo]-Hermogenes would feel right at home.¹³⁸

The primary question for us at present is how such an outline of confirmations of headings with epicheiremes is linked to Alexander's discussion of artistic proof (ἐντεχνος πίστις, jW). The answer to this question would tell us how Alexander synthesized his Aristotelian framework with the newer perspectives; here we re-open an earlier discussion. It will be recalled that Alexander divides artistic proof (jW) into the species of enthymeme (fC) and example (παράδειγμα, iX). The latter is defined and discussed. The former

¹³⁶Though we should not rush into an assumption that he would mean the same thing, precisely, as Alexander does.

¹³⁷AnSg 193. DK translation, generally. I have once again substituted "confirmation" for the DK translation ("supporting arguments", this time) of κατασκευή.

¹³⁸Though, again, we should be cautious. There are some significant differences.

is not; and yet, when we come to AnSg's discussion of enthymeme, we are given a striking definition, attributed only to "some", in which the enthymeme is "a conclusion of an antecedent epicheireme".¹³⁹ In Chapter Three, we discussed the possibility of attributing such a definition to Alexander, and concluded there was no compelling evidence to do so. In his remarks in AnSg 36 and 193 on proof and refutation, however, we are once again struck with how consistently the definition of enthymeme in AnSg 158 would, in fact, synthesize exactly the perspectives under review. Should the definition be Alexander's, there would follow a perfectly clear and consistent perspective on the epicheireme, the enthymeme, their relationship to one another, and their relationship to Alexander's Aristotelian framework of rhetorical invention. Furthermore, this synthesis would exactly track the definition -- and the ensuing difficulties -- of enthymeme specifically assigned to Neocles and Harpocraton.

More precisely, if such a synthesis were to suppose that confirmations of headings were given by epicheiremes which were themselves supported by enthymemes, this would consistently cover all of Alexander's remarks, and the unassigned definition of enthymeme in AnSg 158. Furthermore, it would also parallel exactly what we have found regarding Neocles' and Harpocraton's view of the enthymeme and the subsequent revelations of its relationship to the epicheireme. Consequently, the synthesis would raise some difficulties which would themselves parallel those problems found in

¹³⁹AnSg 158. DK translation.

the presentation of Harpocraton's and Neocles' views, discussed above; namely, it would leave us wondering why Alexander would choose the term "enthymeme" (as opposed to heading, confirmation, or epicheireme) as the title for one of his species of artistic proofs. Almost any of the other terms would seem more adequately to capture the whole of his system. Again, we would face exactly the same tension we have found in Neocles and Harpocraton: an imbalance between technical terminology and theoretical practice.

Nevertheless, the textual evidence remains incomplete, and allows only the observation that such a conclusion would follow if the definition of AnSg 158 were Alexander's; it does not allow us to conclude that the definition is Alexander's. The identification remains a speculative one on my part. Apart from this speculation, we have no definite information on how Alexander sees confirmations, headings and epicheiremes in relation to his divisions of artistic proofs.

There is, nevertheless, definite textual evidence that Alexander sees headings, confirmations and epicheiremes in connection to one another. The structure here is, however, looser, less tightly defined, and less intricately interwoven than that in [Pseudo]-Hermogenes. Alexander insists, for example, upon a broad range of sources for the epicheireme, and this fact alone proves he views the epicheireme, enthymeme, heading, and confirmation in ways that are profoundly different from [Pseudo]-Hermogenes, despite the overlapping vocabulary.

In fact, the technical vocabulary surrounding the *epicheireme* and *enthymeme* throughout AnSg appears less consistently employed and less precisely inter-related than in the Hermogenic corpus, and we have seen serious evidence of a disparity between the underlying theory and its technical vocabulary.

We have thus far concentrated on only two shared terms, *epicheireme* and *enthymeme*. In the [Pseudo]-Hermogenic argumentative trope, however, these two terms are bridged by the development (*ἐργασία*, gB), and this is the next logical place to turn our attention. Use of the gB family in *Invention* was considered extensively in Chapter Four. The term is without technical occurrences¹⁴⁰ in *Stasis*. In AnSg, the situation is, once again, more muddled. The gB family carries a 1.26m% in AnSg, with 11 occurrences. Of these, two are clearly non-technical.¹⁴¹ The others are generally borderline; in these contexts, the gB terminology is generally associated with technical terms or processes, but the family itself is not clearly employed in a technical sense. Most of these references occur, for example, in phrases such as "One function [*ἐργασία*, gB] of an epilogue is to excite emotions...".¹⁴² There is, however, one occurrence within AnSg which is strikingly technical, and it bears a closer look.

¹⁴⁰The gB family has a 0.29m% in *Stasis*, and is always used there in its common meaning of a "task" or an "action".

¹⁴¹AnSg 145, 189.

¹⁴²AnSg 208. The DK translation.

In AnSg 82, the text is given to a consideration of clarity (1A) and obscurity (cL) as persuasive tools within the narration (dT). In this context, we find the following observation:

Mentioning the same things often also makes the speech unclear; for this is long-winded and tiresome, unless, of course, we manage it by the treatments [ἐργασία, gB] <we give each occurrence>, and now speak as explaining the subject, again as summarizing it, and elsewhere as reminding the hearers; for this way the tiresomeness is avoided.¹⁴³

The interpolation offered by DK here ("...<we give each occurrence>...") clarifies the matter for an English reader unacquainted with the idea of ἐργασία (development, gB) as a technical rhetorical concept. On the other hand, when we drop the interpolation we get the following observation:

...unless, of course, we manage it by the developments [ἐργασία, gB], and now speak as explaining the subject, again as summarizing it, and elsewhere as reminding the hearers...¹⁴⁴

Here, we are given a clear technical employment of the gB terminology. DK seem to concur with this assessment: they footnote their translation with a brief amplification and definition of the Greek term.¹⁴⁵ If, however, this represents a technical view of ἐργασία (gB, 475) in AnSg, that view is markedly different from the

¹⁴³AnSg 82. DK translation.

¹⁴⁴AnSg 82, DK translation, but I have here dropped their interpolation, and substituted *developments* for the DK *treatments*.

¹⁴⁵The specific term here is ἐργασίας, from ἐργασία (475), and though other members of the gB family appear in AnSg, this is the only occurrence of 475 in the AnSg text. The specific word ἐργασία, 475, is the standard word for "development" in *Invention*; the term ἐργον (477), also a member of the gB family, appears in both AnSg and *Invention*, but in neither work does it have technical occurrences.

one which appears in *Invention*. Here in AnSg, the idea of ἐργασία (gB) is equated with specific forms of treatment given the subject matter, namely "explaining"¹⁴⁶ (γινώσκω), "summarizing" (συγκεφαλαιόω, 1I) and "reminding" (ἀνάμνησις, aW). The latter two of these families we will return to in our consideration of synonymous terminology within the works. At present, it is sufficient to note that AnSg seems to present *development* (ἐργασία, gB) without reference to any of the contexts and meanings which would be familiar to a reader of [Pseudo]-Hermogenes' *Invention*. There is no connection to either an epicheireme (fZ) or enthymeme (fC), no mention made of the need for limited topics as sources for the development (gB), no emphasis upon the tense, contrary elements to be presented within the development.

The remaining four families of the argumentative trope which are also shared vocabulary may be addressed much more briefly.

Ἐπενθύμημα (epenthymeme, fM) has only a single occurrence in AnSg, and none in *Stasis*. That single occurrence comes in Harpocration's discussion of the style and structure appropriate to the enthymeme and epenthymeme. His remarks here are completely consistent with [Pseudo]-Hermogenes' comments in *Invention* regarding the style of the epenthymeme. As to its place and purpose, there is little to say except to observe that Harpocration gives no hint,

¹⁴⁶Though AnSg will discuss both "summarizing" and "reminding" at some length, he never again mentions "explaining" (γινώσκω) in this context, and the term is not on the TVGL.

here or elsewhere, of acquaintance with the interwoven structures of the argumentative trope.

Λύσις (refutation, hO), quite simply, means the same thing in all three works.

Κατασκευή (confirmation, gX), however, is a slightly different story; we have touched upon this in our discussion of Alexander's use of the term, above. In a discussion on the refutation of proofs, AnSg¹⁴⁷ makes the following observation: "Sometimes, <when refuting an opponent> we shall place many headings together when their confirmations [κατασκευή, gX] derive from the same topics..."¹⁴⁸ This represents a marked difference from the use of κατασκευή (gX) in the Hermogenic corpus; nowhere in the Hermogenic corpus is the confirmation linked to the idea of topics, but always to headings (hD).

Κεφαλή (heading, hD) has references dispersed throughout the previous remarks; nothing more need be added here.

This completes the survey of shared vocabulary within the [Pseudo]-Hermogenic argumentative trope, and we may now turn our attention to a few other examples of significant shared vocabulary.

B. Some Shared Vocabulary Outside the Argumentative Trope

In this sub-section we shall note the presence of some shared vocabulary which is of interest, but which is not directly related

¹⁴⁷AnSg 193; Alexander is the likely source.

¹⁴⁸AnSg 193. DK translation, generally. I have once again substituted "confirmation" for the DK translation ("supporting arguments", this time) of κατασκευή.

to [Pseudo]-Hermogenes' argumentative trope. The vocabulary presented here is less intricately interwoven than that found in the argumentative trope, and may generally be dealt with more quickly.

'Ανάμνησις (reminder, aW) is actually terminology unique to AnSg, where it has a 1.83 m%, making it, in fact, the most common family in that category. The 16 occurrences of the aW terminology are not, however, consistently technical, and the term is used synonymously with ἀνακεφαλαίωσις (recapitulation, aV), which is a shared term. For that reason it is considered here. The aW family occurs in three distinct contexts within AnSg.

The first AnSg context¹⁴⁹ presents two uses of the terminology; in both cases, the terms occur in quotations (one from Aeschines, one from Demosthenes). Neither use can be considered technical.

The second AnSg context¹⁵⁰ in which one encounters ἀνάμνησις (reminder, aW) is, in fact, AnSg 82: the discussion of ἐργασία (development, gB). Here, as we have seen, a reminder¹⁵¹ is recommended as a method of avoiding obscurity in the subject matter. There is one aW occurrence here.

¹⁴⁹AnSg 12-13.

¹⁵⁰AnSg 82.

¹⁵¹The "reminder" was, essentially an internal summary of the primary sub-points within one section of the speech, or a general review of the main points of the speech, given in the epilogue.

The final context in which the aW family is encountered may be found within AnSg's consideration of the epilogue. Here,¹⁵² some brief observations are in order.

In this discussion, the aW terminology is employed side by side with -- and as a synonym for -- ἀνακεφαλαίωσις (recapitulation, aV). AnSg is certainly not alone in this use. The terms are clearly synonymous in other writers of the time; Apsines, composing at about the same time as AnSg, specifically equates the two terms, for example, in his *Rhetoric*.¹⁵³

Ἀνακεφαλαίωσις (recapitulation, aV), like ἀνάμνησις (reminder, aW), is a review of one's case, or main points. The aV family is a shared term, with a strong 2.51m% within AnSg; it shows a 0.19m% within *Stasis*; there are no occurrences in *Invention*.

In *Stasis*, Heath¹⁵⁴ translates the two occurrences¹⁵⁵ of the terms within the text as "summarize" though he uses the more common "recapitulate" in his commentary on the relevant passages.¹⁵⁶ Hermogenes notes that recapitulation (aV) is common both to the prosecutor and defendant, and is part of what he calls κοινὴ ποιότης (common quality, kA), which includes the epilogue (ἐπίλογος, fV) and

¹⁵²The aW terminology has 13 occurrences, found within the epilogue discussion at 204, 205, 208, 211, 212, 213, 219.

¹⁵³Τοσαυταχῶς οὖν ἀναμινῆσκειν ὑπάρχει. τουτέστι χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀνακεφαλαιώσει καλουμένη· [From such methods does one fashion the reminder, which some call the recapitulation....] Spengel, 390.24-6; (*Epilogue*, 14).

¹⁵⁴HEATH (1995), p. 40.

¹⁵⁵St 3.192, 196.

¹⁵⁶HEATH (1995), pp. 90-91.

secondary speeches (δευτερολογία, dD); κοινή ποιότης is necessary in every presentation.¹⁵⁷ He does not call the κοινή ποιότης a "heading" (κεφαλή, hD), and none of his commentators seem to have made such a connection, but Hermogenes does discuss the κοινή ποιότης in his division of the questions, and he approaches it in a manner similar to his examination of the headings. What is most immediately notable in his consideration of the terminology, however, is his discussion of the differing purposes of the recapitulation (aV) in the prosecution and the defense. The former reviews arguments and evidence; the latter employs the recapitulation primarily as a pathetic device.¹⁵⁸

In AnSg, the terminology of ἀνακεφαλαίωσις (recapitulation, aV) is found only in the text's consideration of the epilogue, though the point is clearly made that the recapitulations occur at any time within the speech. This is an idea shared with Hermogenes. Though Hermogenes' discussion also centers on the epilogue, the example he chooses to illustrate the recapitulation is an internal summary in Demosthenes.¹⁵⁹

Beyond this, however, there are significant differences between Hermogenes' approach to the recapitulation (ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, aV) and that found in AnSg. In AnSg, recapitulation is primarily devoted to argumentative proof, and is specifically contrasted to

¹⁵⁷St 3.187-200.

¹⁵⁸St 3.195-198.

¹⁵⁹Dem 19.177.

emotional appeals in AnSg 203. Here we are told that the epilogue falls into two species, the "practical and the pathetic" and that recapitulation (aV) belongs to the former. A similar distinction is forwarded at 206. We have already seen that recapitulation was defined in 210 as a "brief exposition of the headings and epicheiremes" -- clearly not an emphasis upon emotional appeal. When Neocles outlines and explains his four species of recapitulation¹⁶⁰, all are geared toward an argumentative closing. Though a recapitulation might be possessed of figures,¹⁶¹ its primary thrust for AnSg is clearly not pathetic.

The more pathetic aspects of the oration AnSg associates with the terms παρέκβασις (digression, jH), αὔξησις (amplification, cR) and διατύπωσις (depiction, dQ). These terms may be set against two terms which are unique to the Hermogenic corpus: διασκευή (representation, dO) and ὑποδιαίρεσις (subdivision, mO). Both of these Hermogenic terms were discussed in the first section of this chapter. [Pseudo]-Hermogenes, it will be recalled, sees both representation (dO) and subdivision (mO) as emotive amplification of the elements of circumstance (περίστασις, jQ). Though ὑποδιαίρεσις (subdivision, mO) is a form of support for the τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους (from first to last, cK) heading and διασκευή (representation, dO) is a more general term for intense amplification, the two terms

¹⁶⁰AnSg 214-218.

¹⁶¹AnSg 221.

are not satisfactorily differentiated in the text. Nevertheless, both are clearly intended as emotional forms of support for a case.

The three AnSg terms -- παρέκβασις (digression, jH), αὐξησις (amplification, cR) and διατύπωσις (depiction, dQ) -- are somewhat intriguing in this context, but especially διατύπωσις (depiction, dQ). Παρέκβασις (digression, jH) was dealt with sufficiently in the discussion of terms unique to AnSg. Αὐξησις (amplification, cR), a shared term, is used more or less synonymously throughout all three works, though, as the m% indicates,¹⁶² there is a greater emphasis on the concept in AnSg.

In διατύπωσις (depiction, dQ), however, the situation is somewhat more complicated. Διατύπωσις (depiction, dQ) is also a shared term, used about equally in AnSg and *Invention*; there are no occurrences in *Stasis*.¹⁶³ What is interesting here is that the dQ family occurs in AnSg as one of two primary methods of arousing emotions in the epilogue.¹⁶⁴ Since διατύπωσις (depiction, dQ) is defined as "a clear and elaborated expression of things said plainly and simply in the narration",¹⁶⁵ it sounds as if this is a concept very similar to [Pseudo]-Hermogenes' διασκευή (representation, dO) and ὑποδιαίρεσις (subdivision, mO). It is interesting to note that διατύπωσις (depiction, dQ) occurs most frequently in *Invention* in the

¹⁶²2.05m% in AnSg; 0.57m% in St; 0.10m% in Inv.

¹⁶³0.57m% in AnSg; 0.64m% in Inv.

¹⁶⁴AnSg 233. The other method is, in fact, αὐξησις (amplification, cR): AnSg 230.

¹⁶⁵AnSg 233.

context of [Pseudo]-Hermogenes' discussion of διασκευή (representation, dO); it is there employed exclusively in a non-technical fashion to mean "describe", a word [Pseudo]-Hermogenes uses as a way of communicating how διασκευή (representation, dO) creates its emotional effect. What is, in AnSg, a technical term for a specific pathological effect is, in *Invention*, merely a descriptive term occurring in the context of his discussion of a similar pathological effect.

Μερισμός (partition, division, hW) is also a term unique to AnSg, with a 1.14m%. While it is not a shared term, μερισμός (hW) does appear in one context which raises questions about the authenticity of its categorization as a unique term. We have seen that μερισμός (hW) was presented as one of the three methods of creating receptivity (Εὐμάθεια, gH).¹⁶⁶ In AnSg 13 we are told that μερισμός (hW) is "an outline of the whole subject into parts...". This definition is followed by an example from Demosthenes 19.4. Though the term μερισμός (hW) does not appear in the Hermogenic corpus, it is somewhat telling that this exact example from Demosthenes 19 does appear there: in Inv 3.2, when [Pseudo]-Hermogenes is discussing his προκατασκευή (preconfirmation, hZ):

The preconfirmation [προκατασκευή, hZ] is an earlier part of the speech than the confirmation, as the name makes clear. Its task is the setting out, like a preface, of the headings and questions from which the speech will, with respect to the subject matter,

¹⁶⁶AnSg 10. Alexander is the source here, and in 13.

be formed and filled out, just as can be seen in this quote from Demosthenes....¹⁶⁷

The definition given in AnSg 13 and that given here in Inv 3.2 both point to an overview of the whole subject matter,¹⁶⁸ and both choose exactly the same example from Demosthenes. In this capacity, the two terms appear to reference the same rhetorical task.¹⁶⁹

There is, however, another striking parallel in AnSg. In paragraphs derived from Neocles,¹⁷⁰ a discussion of the πρόθεσις (proposition, kL) reveals that it, too, is "an exposition of the question as if an overview and announcement of the confirmations...".¹⁷¹ In the context of this discussion, we are once again given the example from Demosthenes. This comment is only one in the discussion of πρόθεσις (proposition, kL);¹⁷² there are a number of other examples, and the overall discussion is linked to Neocles' views of proof -- occurring, not insignificantly, in the

¹⁶⁷ 'Η προκατασκευὴ πρεσβύτερόν ἐστι μέρος λόγου τῆς κατασκευῆς. ὡς δηλοῖ καὶ τοῦνομα. ἔργον δὲ αὐτῆς τὸ προεκτίθεσθαι τὰ κεφάλαια καὶ τὰ ζητήματα. οἷς περιπλακεῖς ὁ λόγος συμπληρώσει τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. οἷόν ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο παρὰ τῷ Δημοσθένει Inv 3.2.1-5

¹⁶⁸Which seems, in AnSg, to distinguish μερισμός (hW) from πρόθεσις (kL), which previews the whole subject or only a sub-section of it.

¹⁶⁹προκατασκευή also has occurrences in St 3.285-301, but the term there references a species of complex conjecture (στοχασμός, lE) where the demonstration of x is a prerequisite to the demonstration y; the orator, wishing to establish y, must first engage in a "preconfirmation" (of x) to his case.

¹⁷⁰AnSg 161-168.

¹⁷¹AnSg 161. DK translation.

¹⁷²The kL family has references in both Hermogenic works as well as in AnSg, but the appearances in the Hermogenic corpus are never technical, rendering the term pragmatically unique to AnSg.

context of Neocles' views on the enthymeme. Presently, we can conclude that, seemingly, Alexander's μερισμός (hW), [Pseudo]-Hermogenes' προκατασκευή (preconfirmation, hZ), and Neocles' πρόθεσις (proposition, kL) all were used to reference what we today refer to as a "preview".

Another example of unique terms with common meaning may be seen in the use of two phrases. Διάνοια νομοθέτου (dK), which is unique to AnSg, is clearly synonymous with Hermogenes' γνώμη νομοθέτου (dB). Both refer to the "legislator's intent". In Hermogenes, this is one of the legal (νομικός, iL) qualitative (ποιότης, jZ) headings (κεφαλή, hD). The heading appeals to the spirit, as opposed to the letter, of a law as a means of undermining a prosecution: "When the law says a foreigner should not mount the walls, this is clearly intended as means to protect the city; but I, as a foreigner, mounted the walls to defend the city, and so surely...&c." In AnSg,¹⁷³ the appeal to the legislator's intention serves a very similar function, as one of the methods of refuting inartistic proofs (ἄτεχνος πίστις, jV). Additional methods for refuting inartistic proofs (jV) listed with this one include charges of ambiguity (ἀμφιβολία, aO) in the document, or, AnSg¹⁷⁴ counsels "bring up another law" -- clearly meaning another law which contradicts the one we are being prosecuted under; as such it echoes Hermogenes' stasis of ἀντινομία (conflict between laws, bI). Of

¹⁷³AnSg 188.

¹⁷⁴The likely source is Alexander.

course, ambiguity (ἀμφιβολία, a0) is also one of Hermogenes' stases. Thus, in refuting nonartistic proofs, AnSg takes up many of the same lines of argument to be found in Hermogenes' legal qualitative stases and headings.

One final text requires comment here, and with this comment we will find it necessary to return briefly to the vocabulary of the argumentative trope and note its relation to another aspect of the AnSg text. In AnSg 249, where we are given two intriguing bits of information in one section. First, Harpocration notes that the style appropriate to the enthymeme is parisosis (παρίσωσις, jK) and antistrophe (ἀντιστροφή, bM).¹⁷⁵ The former term is unique to AnSg; the latter has two occurrences in *Stasis*, neither of which are related to the present discussion.¹⁷⁶ Second, Neocles goes on to remark that these two figures -- parisosis (παρίσωσις, jK) and antistrophe (ἀντιστροφή, bM) -- "fit antithetical [ἀντίθεσις, bG] statements" and then observes that "what is antithetical [bG] is more enthymematic [fC]...".¹⁷⁷ There are two comments to be made on Neocles' observations.

¹⁷⁵The former is LANHAM's (1996) isocolon. Parisosis refers to colons of equal length -- LANHAM notes (p. 602) that in the narrowest sense, this would require an equal number of syllables -- and corresponding structure. Antistrophe refers to repetition of words or phrases in differing contexts.

¹⁷⁶Though one is a clearly technical use. In St 1.95 Hermogenes uses the term as a class of conditions which are ἀσύνστατος (cO), lacking stasis. At St 3.178, the term occurs in a semi-technical setting, employed incidentally in a comment on the use of the heading τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους (from first to last, cK).

¹⁷⁷AnSg 249. All the quotations are from the DK translation.

The first comment is to note another obvious parallel in the approach to the enthymeme within [Pseudo]-Hermogenes and within AnSg. In *Invention*, recall, [Pseudo]-Hermogenes is adamant about the presence of a comparative parataxis in his enthymematic contribution to the argumentative trope. The enthymeme -- by picking up the contrast inherent in the limited topics of the development (ἐργασία, gB) and linking these to some element of circumstance -- forms what he calls a σύγκρισις (co-reference, literally, "linked judgment", lJ). Σύγκρισις (lJ) is itself a term unique to *Invention*, and a relatively frequent one at that (0.74m%); it was discussed at length in the first section of this chapter. We may now, in this context, observe that σύγκρισις (lJ) is a relatively unusual term for the sort of parataxis [Pseudo]-Hermogenes is describing in his discussion of the enthymeme in Inv 3.8 and 3.9. The more usual term would, in fact, be antithesis (ἀντίθεσις, bG).

The standard view of antithesis (bG) may be seen in, for example, the following comment from Anaximenes' *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*:¹⁷⁸

An antithesis is that which has both opposite terminology and meaning in contrasting clauses or either one of these. What follows would be opposed in terminology and meaning at the same time: 'It is not just for my opponent [μὲν] to have my property and be wealthy while I, [δὲ] having parted with my substance, am no more than a beggar.' Opposition in words only: 'Let the rich and prosperous give to the poor and needy.' In meaning: 'I [μὲν] nursed him while he was sick, but he has been [δὲ] the cause of the greatest evils to me.' Here the words are not opposed, but the actions are. Antithesis in both respects, meaning and terminology, would be most

¹⁷⁸Long attributed to Aristotle, and preserved in his corpus.

effective, but the two other types are also antithetical.¹⁷⁹

In Greek, two of the three examples constitute a μέν ... δέ parataxis, as the bracketed material indicates. One might easily substitute any of a number other authorities for the quotation given here.¹⁸⁰ Antithesis (bG) is the more common¹⁸¹ term for a construction of parataxis. Returning, then to Harpocration's comments on the enthymeme at AnSg 249, we may confidently conclude that he saw antithesis as an important aspect of the enthymeme; this constitutes another similarity between *Invention* and AnSg expressed in a different technical vocabulary.

Which leads us to our second, and final, observation. This similarity has an alter-ego; there is another peculiar disparity hiding in this technical terminology. If σύγκρισις (co-reference, lJ) is Hermogenes' term for an antithesis (ἀντίθεσις, bG), then how is he using the term antithesis (bG)? Antithesis (bG) has a 0.79m% in *Invention* -- used slightly more often than σύγκρισις (lJ, 0.74m%).¹⁸² [Pseudo]-Hermogenes, in fact, devotes an entire section, Book 4.2, to what he calls antithesis (bG). The discussion here lays the foundation for his consideration of figures and style

¹⁷⁹ RhAlex 26.1.3 - 26.3.8. The translation is taken from KENNEDY (1963), p. 65, though the bracketed material is my own addition.

¹⁸⁰One might have easily quoted Demetrius, *On Style*, 22ff, e.g.

¹⁸¹And, admittedly, more general.

¹⁸²In *Stasis*, the antithesis (bG) has a 2.67m%; this reflects Hermogenes' use of the term as both a stasis and a heading. Neither use (as a heading or stasis) parallels the employment of the term by either AnSg or [Pseudo]-Hermogenes.

throughout Book 4. To here consider it at length is unnecessary, and would inevitably digress into a consideration of style. What can be done is to note the author's general perspective on, and the definition he assigns to, antithesis (bG).

For [Pseudo]-Hermogenes, antithesis (ἀντίθεσις, bG) constitutes a type of hypothetical condition stated in a grammatical inversion from the real condition which it is mirroring, and designed to throw light on that opposite (and real) condition. An example will clarify. Take the statement "A wise people do not hasten to war"; the phrase is clearly designed to suggest that those who hasten to war are foolish. Or consider this statement: "When war is necessary, a wise people do not hesitate"; again, the phrase is designed in the grammatical negative to highlight a positive position which one is seeking to support: the wise hastily assume the responsibilities associated with inevitable conflict. For [Pseudo]-Hermogenes, this is antithesis. Kennedy suggests that it is akin to ὑποδιαίρεσις (subdivision, mO), but [Pseudo]-Hermogenic antithesis seems to have far more in common with the πλαστὸν ἐπιχείρημα (fictional epicheireme, gA) component of the τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους (from first to last, cK) heading of Inv 3.10. Regardless, [Pseudo]-Hermogenic antithesis has absolutely no parallel in AnSg,¹⁸³ despite the overlapping vocabulary.

¹⁸³Or, as we have seen, in *Stasis*, either.

Section III. Conclusion

We have, in this chapter, given moderately extensive and moderately detailed consideration to a selection of the heuristic technical vocabulary present in our chosen works. We have considered a wide range of vocabulary which is unique to each author or corpus, we have seen shared vocabulary representing different concepts, and similar concepts expressed in different vocabulary, and similar terms linked to similar concepts. We have, however, mostly accomplished this survey through a detailed and -- as much as possible -- isolated focus on individual terminology and conceptual frameworks. It is, at last, time to step back from the trees and look once more upon the forest.

CHAPTER SIX: SAILING TO BYZANTIUM

I do not think much of the mosque of St. Sophia. I suppose I lack appreciation.

--Mark Twain¹

But the subjects of the Byzantine empire, who assume and dishonour the names of both Greeks and Romans, present a dead uniformity of abject vices, which are neither softened by the weakness of humanity nor animated by the vigour of memorable crimes.

--Gibbon²

O Queen of Cities! What a multitude of evils
has been poured upon you....

--Photios³

Section I. Distinctions Summarized

We set sail, recall, for Byzantium. While on the one hand the journey has been long, on the other hand, the travel has better equipped us to face Constantinople's robust defenses. By examining the heuristic corpus of Hermogenes and contrasting the technical vocabulary found there with technical vocabulary from the theoretical precursor to the Hermogenic perspective, we have discovered some significant alterations, developments and original contributions. This we have done in some detail. Here, it is wise to pause and review that information with a broader perspective.

Hermogenes' heuristic world is one in which stasis theory has come to dominate the inventional landscape. Such a conclusion is, of course, neither particularly insightful nor especially original;

¹*The Innocents Abroad* (1869), Ch. 33.

²*The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776 - 1787), Ch. 48.

³ Ὡ πόλις βασιλῆς, οἷων κακῶν περικέχυται ὄχλος.... Homily ii.

one might find such a statement in any number of articles on Hermogenes. The present study, however, offers some slightly more detailed and concrete observations to back up this bit of conventional wisdom. A simple review, for example, of the relative frequencies of the stases and headings in Hermogenes and AnSg reveals, as we have seen, that most of the headings and stases are absent in AnSg, or used extremely rarely. Furthermore, we have also seen how AnSg demonstrates an acquaintance with some aspects of stasis theory while allowing that knowledge to operate simultaneously alongside a number of alternative (and somewhat inconsistent) approaches to the rhetorical problem, thus providing a window onto the world Hermogenes would reorder.

Stasis theory, however, has not been the primary focus of this dissertation; stasis theory was necessarily caught in the inventional net we tossed out, but it was not what we went fishing for. When we turn, then, to matters more central to our study, there are other conclusions to be drawn.

The Hermogenic corpus restructures the technical vocabulary of the rhetorical process -- κατασκευή (confirmation, gX), ἐπιχείρημα (epicheireme, fZ), ἐνθύμημα (enthymeme, fC), &c. -- just as it does the technical vocabulary of rhetorical analysis (in *Stasis*), and, for that matter, rhetorical presentation (in *On Style*), as well. We saw in Chapter One that Hermogenes' approach to stasis and style consisted not in a radical departure from the received tradition, but in the reordering and restructuring of the received elements into a more cohesive and useful whole -- internally, and in

relationship to one another, as well. In the same way, we find that some of the most significant and original aspects of invention within the Hermogenic corpus are couched in a powerful reordering and subtle refining of vocabulary clearly operative in the theoretical perspective of the time. The body of the argumentative trope presented in *On Invention*, Book 3, has no unique vocabulary. What it does have is a forceful restructuring of the received vocabulary into a cohesive, operational whole, with a formidable rhetorical punch.

In AnSg this same vocabulary was, as we have seen, loosely linked, opaquely applied, and simplistically structured. The framework of the overall perspective there -- whether Alexander's, Neocles', or Harpocraton's -- echoes the ancient Aristotelian divisions, but in doing so, it seems to improperly prioritize some aspects of the actual operational theory of the day. The Hermogenic author of *Invention* cannot, given his cultural framework, wipe the slate clean. He was constrained by the received tradition. What he could do, and what he did, was to bring cohesion to that system through a subtle but substantive interweaving of the elements in a way that emphasized their coherence to the past tradition.

The Hermogenic restructuring of invention was not, of course, limited only to the elements of the argumentative trope, and we have had the opportunity to note in moderate detail other specific distinctions indicated in the use of the technical vocabulary; this was accomplished via our summaries in Chapters Three and Four, the comparative commentary in Chapter Five and in our examination, in

that same chapter, of unique vocabulary. We have repeatedly seen, for example, how vocabulary unique to AnSg proved itself to be an adapted echo of Aristotelian theory. We have remarked already in this summary on the uniqueness of the vocabulary in *Stasis*. We have also noted, in the preceding chapter, some of the more eccentric uses of vocabulary in *On Invention*, such as the Hermogenic author's particular view of ἀντίθεσις (antithesis, bG). These discussions have provided a perspective on those alterations of the inventional landscape which rested on the bedrock of the Hermogenic corpus. A further attempt to summarize here all the details discussed in the previous chapters would be pointless. Better, by far, to turn our attention to what use might be made of those details.

Section II. Directions Indicated

Of course, this study has narrowly focused on Book 3 of *On Invention*. The text is, recall, untranslated, and much more needs to be done here. There is no doubt that the present study, if it were exactly duplicated with an exclusive and more detailed emphasis on the technical vocabulary of narration, would yield another set of comments equal in size to the present work.

Turning further afield, and closer to our original goal, this study has provided rhetoricians with a tool by which they might begin a tentative exploration of rhetorical developments which were the foundation of rhetoric in Byzantium. So little is known about the rhetorical practice of this period that the first question to address is how quickly and thoroughly the Hermogenic transition actually took root. Conventional wisdom gives a date of, roughly,

the sixth century. But there are peculiarities and inconsistencies here, and those who forward such comments seldom take into consideration the ebb and flow of literary knowledge which followed the waxing and waning fortunes of the iconoclasts.

There is much, much left to explore. How, precisely, might the present study assist in such exploration? As we remarked in Chapter One, once the distinction between the Hermogenic perspective on invention and its earlier counterparts is more thoroughly established, one may employ this distinction in the interrogation of Byzantine texts in order to come to a more complete understanding of their sources and approaches. Here, perhaps, a very brief, very tentative concrete example might prove helpful.

Section III. Application Demonstrated

Here we shall, in a most cursory fashion, attempt to show how the information gained in the previous chapters might assist one to interrogate Photios of Constantinople's *Bibliotheca*.

Photios is generally regarded as "the most important figure in the history of classical studies in Byzantium",⁴ and his influence was widespread:

...since the Renaissance philosophers and philologists have venerated him as the genius who among others was instrumental in transmitting to later generations through the Byzantine period classical and Hellenistic culture.⁵

⁴N. G. WILSON (1983), p. 89; though any recent source dealing with Photios' life could easily have provided a similar quotation.

⁵DVORNIK (1948), p. 1.

His learning has been respected -- sometimes feared -- throughout history. He has been, however, from his own time to today a figure of enormous controversy. No lesser a Byzantinist than Romily Jenkins, in his writing on the history of Byzantium, uses the phrase "unscrupulous and despotic"⁶ to describe the Patriarch. No lesser a scholar than Dvornik, on the other hand, speaks of "a prelate who deserved a better memory"⁷ than the one he has generally been given by Byzantine historians, and then goes on to devote some five hundred pages to setting the record straight. Heretic in the West, Saint in the East, his life is a complex one, and his biography obscure in a number of places. Fortunately, it is here the text of his best know work -- not the minutiae of his life -- that concerns us. Nevertheless, a very brief overview of his life will help contextualize his works.

Photios⁸ was born in the early part of the ninth century; some suggest a date of c. 810. He twice served as Patriarch of Constantinople, living in monastic exile in the interim years of 867 to 878, when he was out of favor. He died sometime around 896. His

⁶JENKINS (1995), p. 168.

⁷DVORNIK (1948), p. 5.

⁸Regarding Photios' biographical details, the most complete text is still the three volume set by HERGENRÖTHER, written in the middle of the 19th century. Much of the information contained there is seriously dated, and has been corrected by DVORNIK (1948), whose conclusions are those widely accepted today. Readily accessible, more general, and up to date biographical overviews may be found in TREADGOLD (1980), ch. 1; WHITE (1981), ch. 1; WILSON (1983), ch. 5; one might also consult NORWICH's 1993 popular history of Byzantium, vol. 2, chs. 5, 6 for a more entertaining and individual view of the Patriarch's life and career.

family was important in Constantinople, and he had some tenuous connections, through marriage, to the court. He chose the life of a bureaucrat, and served on at least one embassy (perhaps to negotiate or serve as a witness to a prisoner exchange) before political and social pressures led him to the throne of the Patriarchy in 858. He went from layman to Patriarch in five successive ordinations on five successive days.

He was chosen, in part, because his family had been iconodules -- supporters of the icons -- during the iconoclastic frictions recently passed,⁹ but he simultaneously had something of a reputation for being a moderate and temperate man when dealing with the now condemned iconoclasts. Ignatius, the patriarch whom Photios replaced after the former's legally questionable (and forcible) dethronement, had tended to more fanaticism in dealing with the iconoclasts, exacerbating tensions in the capital and throughout the empire. Photios' moderation was considered yet another sign of his extraordinary thoughtfulness and depth, at least by those who backed him; Ignatius' party naturally thought otherwise. His reputation as a scholar had been well established before his enthronement, and even his enemies openly acknowledged his brilliance, though the story they circulated was that his erudition had been given to him by a Jewish magician in a pact that involved, among other things, the renunciation of the True Faith of the Cross. The story,

⁹See DVORNIK (1967), for a fuller discussion on the iconoclastic tensions still present when Photios took the Patriarchal Throne.

circulated in Photios' day, shows how generally acknowledged -- and how sometimes threatening -- was his intellect.

The texts that have come down to us from his hand -- and there are many -- indicate a voracious appetite for general knowledge, for information on distant lands, for secular learning and for theological debate of the most intricate type. It was, after all, Photios whose objection to the *filioque*¹⁰ in the creed recited by the Latin West, led to a theological impasse which has not been completely resolved to this day.¹¹ Beyond intellectual curiosity, however, the texts we have received indicate a disciplined and well trained mind; in short, a well educated mind. But the exact nature of that education remains a mystery. Photios never mentions any of his teachers; neither (with the exception of the magician story

¹⁰The term has to do with the procession of the Holy Spirit, and thus involves intricacies of Trinitarian theology. In short, the Latin West, with arguments from Augustine of Hippo's *De Trinitate* and probably in an attempt to strengthen their hand against the Arians' denial of the full divinity of the Son, said in the creed that the Holy Spirit proceeds "from the Father and the Son" -- thus stressing the Son's equality to the Father. The Eastern Churches claimed this confused the personal nature of the Trinitarian revelation, replacing it with an instrumentalist or "naturalist" view of the Trinity, thus weakening the relational aspect of the actions of the Godhead in the redemption of the individual soul. Richard HAUGH gives a fine, readable history of the tensions. See also R. G. HEATH (1972); DVORNIK, (1948).

¹¹Photios' erudite, detailed and intricate arguments are most thoroughly outlined in his *Λόγος περὶ τῆς τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος μυσταγωγίας*. [On the Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit]. While the theological difficulty is still unresolved, it is worth noting that the upcoming translations of the Creed, endorsed by the Catholic Liturgical Committee, seriously weaken the *filioque*, saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds "from the Father through the Son" (as opposed to the present "from the Father and the Son") in the interest of "greater theological accuracy of translation, and in charity toward our brothers and sisters of the Eastern Churches." [Quotations from Fr. John Horgan of the Vatican College].

mentioned above) do any of those who correspond with him or write about him. And yet he was the leading literary figure of the great Byzantine renaissance that came to flower at the end of the Iconoclastic controversy.

Photios' works are numerous. He has left us, in addition to an immense amount of personal correspondence,¹² *The Amphilochian* (a series of letters addressing theological questions that were presented to him),¹³ a *Lexicon* from his youth,¹⁴ eighteen homilies,¹⁵ numerous theological tracts,¹⁶ and his most famous work, *The Bibliotheca*.¹⁷

Like most things in Photios' life, the composition of the *Bibliotheca* is a matter of some controversy. The facts are these: The *Bibliotheca* is a collection of commentaries on, criticisms of, reflections about, and excerpts from, various books read by Photios. The authorship of the text is not, and has never been, in question. Three hundred eighty-six distinct works are dealt with. The

¹²MIGNE, vol. 102; BALETTA (1864); LAOURDAS and WESTERINK (1983-85), have published the most recent critical text.

¹³MIGNE, vol. 101; LAOURDAS and WESTERINK (1983-85), have published the most recent critical text.

¹⁴NABER (1965); THEODORIDIS (1982). The latter is the better text, but has so far appeared in one volume, representing the first half of the lexicon, only. Volume 2 is pending.

¹⁵MIGNE, vol. 102; LAOURDAS (1959). There is an excellent, eloquent translation of all the homilies of Photios by Cyril MANGO (1958).

¹⁶MIGNE, vol. 102.

¹⁷MIGNE, vols. 103-104; HENRY (1959-1978) has published the most recent critical text, along with a French translation and a brief introduction.

Bibliotheca is a lengthy work, running to 1,632 pages in eight volumes in Henry's edition,¹⁸ which constitutes nearly 50,000 lines of Greek text. There are some twenty-five manuscripts containing more or less complete copies of the text; these are descended from only two manuscript families, A and M, dating to the tenth and twelfth centuries, respectively.¹⁹ There is no significant general variation in the manuscripts with one exception. A contains an introduction and conclusion (absent in M), giving the *Bibliotheca* the form of a (very lengthy) letter addressed to Tarasius, a brother of Photios. The historicity of such a brother is well established through numerous independent references. The introduction makes clear that the work was composed at Tarasius' request, to give him an overview of books which Photios had read, but he had not. The request was occasioned, according to the introduction, so that Tarasius might have some comfort during Photios' absence, while he (Photios) was away on an embassy "to the Assyrians" having received an imperial appointment to accompany the embassy.²⁰

Around (and beyond) these facts, there has been enormous speculation, most of which need not concern us here. What we wish is to example how the review of technical vocabulary just completed might assist one in first approaching this enormous -- and

¹⁸HENRY (1959-1978). Henry's ninth volume is a selective index.

¹⁹HENRY (1959-1978), vol. 1, pp. xxvii - xxxvi summarizes the history, which is contained in full in E. MARTINI, 1911, *Textgeschichte der Bibliothek des Patriarchen Photios von Konstantinopel*.

²⁰TREADGOLD (1977), p. 343ff; also TREADGOLD (1980), chs. 1, 2 deal extensively with the introduction and conclusion of the text.

enormously significant -- Byzantine text. Nevertheless, a quick review of the research on Photios is in order, if only to emphasize the limited attention invention has received in Byzantine criticism.

René Henry notes, in his consideration of the *Bibliotheca* as a source for dating Proclus' *Chrestomatie*:

One could say that, without [the *Bibliotheca*], a good number of works known today would be completely lost. One might also say that the reports left by Photios provide dense material for the design of first books... as well as for modest "inaugural dissertations."²¹

His observations are well justified. Of the books Photios reviews in the *Bibliotheca*, we know of thirteen only in translations from the Greek (into Latin, Coptic, or Slavic), another fifty-one only in Greek fragments, an additional twenty-seven in a form substantially truncated from the one Photios had available to him, and one-hundred and ten of the works Photios reviews are lost to us, entirely.²² Also true to Henry's observations, a smorgasbord of indigestible studies on Photios and, especially, his *Bibliotheca* have appeared, covering everything from the circumstances of composition to the history of the manuscript after its writing, to Photios' own views within the *Bibliotheca* on everything from the Jewish priesthood to Roman history to the Attic Orators.²³

²¹On sait que, sans elle [the *Bibliotheca*], bon nombre d'ouvrages seraient aujourd'hui complètement inconnus. On sait aussi que les comptes rendus laissés par Photius ont fourni la matière à des livres de premier plan...aussi bien qu'à de modestes «dissertations inaugurales». HENRY (1934), p. 615.

²²TREADGOLD (1980), p. 9.

²³See, e.g., DILLER (1962); HÄGG (1973); MAAS (1990); MENDELS (1986); SMITH (1992); WILSON (1968).

Among these past studies are some which have focused, to varying degrees and for differing reasons, on the question of the rhetorical perspective or rhetorical vocabulary contained in the *Bibliotheca*, though such studies must be approached with some caution. Henry's article on Proclus and Photios' technical vocabulary of style,²⁴ for example, actually concentrates on the vocabulary of *Proclus*, as reported in Photios. The reason, as Henry makes clear, is that the *Chrestomatie* "contains a theory of style of which Photios has captured the essence. This theory gives an important clue to the date of Proclus...."²⁵ In other words, "the author [Henry] takes it as a given that Codex 239 of Photios faithfully reflects the theory of Proclus",²⁶ and the vocabulary employed there is of interest as a method to explore Proclus, not Photios.

Furthermore, and quite apart from such complications, the briefest examination of the literature concerning Photios' *Bibliotheca* indicates, as with Hermogenes, a singular preoccupation with the issue of style.

Gunter Hartmann has a valuable study on many of Photios' literary criticisms, though he is sometimes unreasonably critical;

²⁴HENRY (1934).

²⁵L'ouvrage [the *Chrestomathie*] contenait une théorie du style dont Photius a gardé la quintessence. Cette théorie donne un repère important pour dater Proclos.... HENRY (1934), p. 616.

²⁶L'auteur admet en fait que le *Codex* 239 de Photius reflète fidèlement la théorie di Proclos... HENRY (1934), p. 618.

he denounces Photios' "medieval moralizing" for example,²⁷ though it is difficult to see how Photios' moralizing is any different than, say, Philostratus', and indeed is less heavy handed than Philostratus in a number of cases. Additionally, Hartmann's sense of the rhetorical dimension in Photios' work is somewhat limited, as evidenced in, to take one example, this comment: "Classical literary theory provided him [Photios] with a scheme for criticism, but he does not rarely tear himself away from the all too confining tutelage of rhetoric: he speaks and interprets out of his own era".²⁸ Hartmann's rhetorical insensitivities notwithstanding, his conclusions are important. He notes, on several occasions, that Photios' scheme of criticism is generally rooted in the received tradition, but has, also, an element of independence.²⁹

Van Hook's two articles³⁰ on the literary criticisms of Photios, while somewhat dated -- they are from the beginning of the previous century -- are still valuable in indicating the stability of the standard judgment on Photios' criticisms, namely: that they contain strands of both the expected and unexpected. Regarding Photios' originality, Van Hook notes that the Patriarch "does not

²⁷HARTMANN (1928), p. 54

²⁸Die antike Literarästhetik gibt ihm das Schema für die Kritiken; doch er reißt sich nicht selten von der allzu lastenden Bevormundung durch die Rhetorik los, er erklärt und fühlt aus dem Bewußtsein seiner Zeit heraus. HARTMANN (1928), p. 54.

²⁹See, e.g., HARTMANN (1928), p. 29: "Mag dies Schema auch in der Hauptsache alte Tradition sein, so finden sich immerhin manche eigene Zusätze...." [Though the scheme is on the whole within the old tradition, one nevertheless finds some of his own additions....]

³⁰VAN HOOK (1907, 1909).

use overmuch the stereotyped terms of the later rhetoricians"³¹ and goes on to list "a few terms which are striking by reason of infrequent occurrence in previous literature".³² All thirteen of the terms he then presents are related to questions of style. Van Hook makes no attempt to account for Photios' deviation from the inherited tradition.

Bernhard Wyss has an enlightening article devoted to Photios' comments on the style of St. Paul in the New Testament. Such comments are made not in the *Bibliotheca*, but in Photios' epistles and in the *Amphilochia*. They are important, however, for their conclusions that a number of Photios' passages clearly indicate a familiarity with Hermogenes' theory of style.³³ Hartmann also provides compelling evidence for Photios' acquaintance with Hermogenes' *Ideas of Style*, and Hartmann's textual arguments are in fact rooted in the *Bibliotheca* itself;³⁴ such conclusions are also echoed in Henry's doctoral dissertation.³⁵

George Kustas recognizes the vocabulary of Hermogenes' ideas of style in Photios, but argues that Photios means something outside

³¹VAN HOOK (1909), p. 186, n. 4.

³²VAN HOOK (1909), p. 186, n. 4.

³³See, e.g., WYSS (1955), p. 243ff.

³⁴HARTMANN (1928), p. 8-9.

³⁵HENRY (1932), pp. 108ff. Besides the Patriarch's acquaintance with Hermogenes' ideas of style, Henry considers several other aspects of the vocabulary of style in Photios. The survey does not, however, examine Photios' technical vocabulary in areas other than style.

the usual Hermogenic associations with those terms,³⁶ a claim for which he finds some support in Hartmann's article as well.³⁷

The most detailed study of Photios' use of rhetorical vocabulary is by Emil Orth,³⁸ who examines and compares Photian stylistic vocabulary with that of earlier critics. Orth's interest lies in discovering whether the Patriarch is or is not basing his judgments of the authors he critiques on past judgments -- in short whether Photios is plagiarizing previous critics. Orth's conclusions are clear: "In virtually every author critiqued, there is no trace of Photian dependence on an earlier critic".³⁹ The exceptions (which Orth discusses) are Photios' consideration of the ten Attic Orators in which the Patriarch acknowledges Caecilius as a source, and in which whole sentences are shared with Pseudo-Plutarch.⁴⁰ This overall critical independence of Photios in his *Bibliotheca* is echoed by Henry, who notes that Orth has proved the point "beyond any doubt".⁴¹

³⁶KUSTAS (1962), p.153-155. See esp. p. 154, n.4.

³⁷HARTMANN (1928), p. 33-34.

³⁸ORTH's (1928, 1929) two volumes, *Photiana* and *Die Stilkritik des Photios und älterer Kritiker*, contain a reliable and considerable amount of analysis of Photian vocabulary of style, but are largely unreliable with respect to their speculations on Photios' life and methods of composition (on which, see TREADGOLD, 1980).

³⁹"Bei fast allen kritisierten Autoren ist keine Abhängigkeit des P von einem früheren Kritiker zu bemerken." ORTH (1929), p. 56.

⁴⁰See Rebekah SMITH (1992), for a further discussion of the topic.

⁴¹"Dans le domaine de la critique littéraire, par exemple, il est vrai que les patients travaux d'E. Orth ont établi, sans contestation possible, l'originalité des jugements que Photios porte sur la valeur des ouvrages qu'il résume...." HENRY (1934), p. 614.

We can see that studies of Photios and the *Bibliotheca*, almost without exception, have given practically exclusive attention to Photios' ideas of style as they are expressed within the body of his criticism, and that, further, such studies are not infrequently insensitive to the rhetorical dimension of the work.⁴² Finally, it should be noted that Photios' *Bibliotheca* is, in all probability, the most studied literary artifact of Byzantium. We once again find that, for the rhetorician, there is much to be done around Constantinople. Here, we may at last pick up the present study, as a means to interrogate the *Bibliotheca*.

If the Hermogenic perspective was thoroughly established by the sixth century, Photios is composing his *Bibliotheca* some three hundred years into the Hermogenic hegemony. One would expect to find the Hermogenic perspective more thoroughly represented in Photios than, say, the Aristotelian vocabulary. Oddly, this is not the case at all. When we take exactly the same conceptual families which we have used in the present study and search them out in Photios, we discover that, among unique vocabulary, Photios is actually slightly more likely to use a unique AnSg family than he is a unique family from the Hermogenic corpus.⁴³ This is peculiarly striking, especially when one notes that, of the three categories of

⁴²This is remarkably similar to what we found when we surveyed the secondary literature on Hermogenes.

⁴³Of the 65 families unique to AnSg, Photios uses 63% (41) of them, while using 59% (53) of the 89 terms unique to Hermogenes. One would certainly have expected a stronger showing of Hermogenic terminology.

unique Hermogenic vocabulary⁴⁴ we have reviewed, the group least likely to show up in the *Bibliotheca* is the unique vocabulary from *Stasis*.

Admittedly, Photios was not teaching his brother how to declaim, and he reviewed a large range of literature; but absolutely no less than 32 of his codices are devoted to orators.⁴⁵ One would not have been amiss to expect a somewhat stronger showing of the technical vocabulary of stasis.

One might also note that ἀντίθεσις (bG) has nine occurrences in Photios' *Bibliotheca* (giving it a 0.02m%). Do these nine occurrences reflect an understanding of the terminology as it appears in *On Invention*, or do they reflect the more common use of the bG vocabulary?

We find three of the four unique (introductory) elements of the argumentative trope do, in fact, have occurrences in Photios, though the relative frequencies of the ones that do occur are also quite low.⁴⁶ As for the body of the argumentative trope, again we see that three out of four of these families are present (epenthymeme, fM, is the missing term), and with somewhat stronger

⁴⁴Families unique to *Stasis*, unique to *Invention*, and present in both of these without occurrence in AnSg.

⁴⁵TREADGOLD (1980); see his indices.

⁴⁶The families and Photian relative frequencies are: kX: 0.12m%; mU: 0.03m%; bJ: -; bC: 0.03m%.

relative frequencies than we found in the introductory elements, though the showing is still not robust.⁴⁷

Is Photios less dependent upon the Hermogenic corpus than conventional wisdom would lead us to expect? Is he rounding out his rhetorical perspective with the sort of semi-Aristotelian theory represented in AnSg? Or is he embracing and supplementing his perspective from entirely different, and perhaps unexpected, sources -- say, Arabia?⁴⁸

Of course, without a close scrutiny of the text, we cannot answer these questions. What we can note is that this dissertation has provided us with a set of detailed observations with which we might go to Photios and begin a fruitful scrutiny. The present study provides us direction on where to look, and a general perspective on what to expect when we look there. It is a modest tool bag, but at least, with it, we can begin to chip away at Byzantium's impenetrable walls.

⁴⁷The families and Photian relative frequencies are: fZ: 0.27m%; fC: 0.11m%; fM: -; gB: 0.88m%.

⁴⁸We are so accustomed to considering the two worlds of Byzantium and Arabia as enemies that we are in danger of forgetting how much influence the Orient had in Byzantium. More than one Emperor was conversant in Arabic, and there are striking similarities between some of the more ornate aspects of Byzantine epistles and formal Arabic, which prizes grace of expression over almost all other considerations.

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**APPENDIX I:
TECHNICAL VOCABULARY GRAND LIST
(TVGL)**

aB	1	ἄγραφος -ον	aN	37	ἄλληγορικός -ή -όν
aC	2	ἄγων ό	aO	38	ἀμφιβάλλω
aC	3	ἄγωνία ή	aO	39	ἀμφιβολία ή
aC	4	ἄγωνιάω	aO	40	ἀμφίβολος -ον
aC	5	ἄγωνίζομαι	aP	41	ἀμφισβητέω
aC	6	ἄγωνιστικός -ή -όν	aP	42	ἀμφισβήτημα τὸ
aD	7	δημόσιον ἀδίκημα	aP	43	ἀμφισβητηματικός -ή -όν
aE	8	ἀδοξέω	aQ	44	ἀμφισβητήσιμος -ον
aE	9	ἀδοξία ή	aQ	45	ἀμφισβήτησις ή
aE	10	ἀδοξος -ον	aQ	46	ἀμφισβήτητος -ον
aF	11	ἀδυνατέω	aR	47	ἀναδιπλόομαι
aF	12	ἀδύνατος τὸ	aR	48	ἀναδίπλωσις ή
aF	13	ἀδύνατος -ον	aS	49	ἀναδρομή ή
aG	14	αἰρέω	aS	50	ἀνάδρομος -ον
aH	15	αἰσχύνη ή	aT	51	ἀναιρέω
aH	16	αἰσχυντέον	aU	52	ἀνακαλέω
aH	17	αἰσχυντικός -ή -όν	aV	53	ἀνακεφαλαιώ
aH	18	αἰσχύνω	aV	54	ἀνακεφαλαίωσις ή
aI	19	αἰτέω	aV	55	ἀνακεφαλαιωτικός -ή -όν
aI	20	αἴτημα -ατος τό	aU	56	ἀνάκλησις ή
aI	21	αἴτησις ή	aU	57	ἀνακλητικός -η -ον
aI	22	αἰτητός -όν	aW	58	ἀναμνησκω
aJ	23	αἰτία ή	aW	59	ἀνάμνησις ή
aJ	24	αἰτιάζομαι	aW	60	ἀναμνηστικός -όν
aJ	25	αἰτιάομαι	aW	61	ἀναμνηστής -όν
aJ	26	αἴτιος -α -ον	aX	62	ἀνανεοόμαι
aJ	27	αἴτιος ό	aX	63	ἀνανέωσις ή
aK	28	ἀκέφαλος -ον	aX	64	ἀνανεωτικός -ή -όν
aL	29	ἀκμάζω	kK	65	ἀναπείθω
aL	30	ἀκμαῖος -α -ον	aY	66	ἀνασκευάζω
aL	31	ἀκμή ή	aY	67	ἀνασκευαστικός -ή -όν
aM	32	ἀκολουθέω	aY	68	ἀνασκευή ή
aM	33	ἀκολουθία, ή	aZ	69	ἀνατρέπτικός -ή -όν
aM	34	ἀκόλουθος -ον			
aN	35	ἄλληγορέω			
aN	36	ἄλληγορία ή			

Appendix I cont.

aZ	70	ἀνατρέπω	bK	106	ἀντιπροτείνω
aS	71	ἀνατρέχω	bK	107	ἀντιπροτίθημι
aZ	72	ἀνάρτησις -εως ή	bL	108	ἀντιστασιάζω
aZ	73	ἀνατροπή ή	bL	109	ἀντίστασις ή
bA	74	ἀναχαιτίζω	bL	110	ἀντιστατικός -ή -όν
bA	75	ἀναχαίτισις ή	bM	111	ἀντιστρέφω
bA	76	ἀναχαίτισμα τὸ	bM	112	ἀντιστρέφων
bA	77	ἀναχαίτισμος ὁ	bM	113	ἀντιστροφή ή
bB	78	ἀνθορίζω	bM	114	ἀντίστροφος -ον
bB	79	ἀνθορισμός ὁ	bN	115	ἀντιτάξις ή
bB	80	ἀνθοριστικός -ή -όν	bN	116	ἀντιτάσσω
bC	81	ἀνθυποφέρω	bN	117	ἀντιτάττω
bC	82	ἀνθυποφορά ή	bN	118	ἀντιτίθημι
bD	83	ἀντεγκαλέω	bO	119	ἀντονομάζω
bD	84	ἀντέγκλημα τὸ	bO	120	ἀντονομάζων
bD	85	ἀντεγκληματικός -η -ον	bO	121	ἀντονομασία ή
bE	86	ἀντεξετάζω	bP	122	ἀξία ή
bE	87	ἀντεξέτασις ή	bQ	123	παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν
bE	88	ἀντεξεταστέος -α -ον	bR	124	ἀξιοπιστοσύνη ή
bE	89	ἀντεξεταστικός -ή -όν	bR	125	ἀξιοπιστία ή
bF	90	ἀντιδιηγέομαι	bR	126	ἀξιόπιστος -ον
bF	91	ἀντιδιηγήσις ή	bP	127	ἀξιος -ία -ιον
bG	92	ἀντίθεσις ή	bP	128	ἀξιόω
bG	93	ἀντιθετικός -ή -όν	cO	129	ἀξύστατος -ον
bG	94	ἀντίθετος -ον	bS	130	ἀπαγγελία ή
bH	95	ἀντιλαμβάνω	bS	131	ἀπαγγέλλω
bH	96	ἀντιληπτέον	bS	132	ἀπαγγελτικός -ή -όν
bH	97	ἀντιληπτικός -ή -όν	bT	133	ἀπάχω
bH	98	ἀντίληψις ή	bT	134	ἀπαχωγή ή
bI	99	ἀντινομία ή	bT	135	ἀπαχωρός -όν
bI	100	ἀντινομικός -ή -όν	bU	136	ἀπάθεια ή
bJ	101	ἀντιπαράστασις ή	bU	137	ἀπαθής -ές
bJ	102	ἀντιπαραστατικός -ή -όν	bV	138	ἀπαιτέω
bJ	103	ἀντιπαραστατικῶς	bV	139	ἀπαίτησις ή
bJ	104	ἀντιπαρίστημι	bW	140	ἐλέγχων ἀπαίτησις (ή)
bK	105	ἀντιπρότασις ή	bV	141	ἀπαιτητικός -ή -όν
			bX	142	ἀπεριεργάστος -ον
			bX	143	ἀπεριεργία ή
			bX	144	ἀπερίεργος -ον

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bY	145	ἀπερίστατος -ον	cL	183	ἀσάφεια ἡ
bZ	146	ἀπίθανος -ον	cL	184	ἀσαφής -ές
bZ	147	ἀπιθανότης ἡ	cM	185	ἀστείζομαι
cA	148	ἀπιστέω	cM	186	ἀστειολογία ἡ
cA	149	ἀπιστητικός -ή -όν	cM	187	ἀστεῖος -α -ον
cA	150	ἀπιστία ἡ	cM	188	ἀστεῖος -ον
cA	151	ἄπιστος -ον	cM	189	ἀστεϊσμός ὁ
cA	152	ἀπιστοσύνη ἡ	cN	190	ἀσύνδετος -ον
cB	153	ἄπλαστος -ον	cO	191	ἀσυστασία ἡ
cB	154	ἀπλόος -η -ον	cO	192	ἀσύστατέω
cB	155	ἀπλούς -ῃ -οῦς	cO	193	ἀσύστατος -ον
cB	156	ἀπλώω	cP	194	ἀτέλεια ἡ
cC	157	ἀπόδεικνυμι	cP	195	ἀτέλεστος -ον
cC	158	ἀποδεικτικός -ή -όν	cP	196	ἀτελεύτητος -ον
cC	159	ἀπόδειξις ἡ	cP	197	ἀτελής -ές
cD	160	ἀποκαθίστημι	cQ	198	ἀτεχνέω
cD	161	ἀποκαταστάσις ἡ	cQ	199	ἀτεχνής -ές
cD	162	ἀποκατασταστικός -ή -όν	cQ	200	ἀτεχνία ἡ
			cQ	201	ἀτεχνος -ον
cE	163	ἀποκήρυκτος -ον	cR	202	αὔξάνω
cE	164	ἀποκήρυξις ἡ	cR	203	αὔξη ἡ
cE	165	ἀποκηρύσσω	cR	204	αὔξεις ἡ
cF	166	ἀπόλαυσις ἡ	cR	205	αὔξητικός -ή -όν
cF	167	ἀπόλαυσμα τὸ	cR	206	αὔξιμος -ον
cF	168	ἀπολαυστικός -ή -όν	cR	207	αὔξω
cF	169	ἀπολαυστός -ον	cS	208	ἀφάνεια ἡ
cF	170	ἀπολαύω	cS	209	ἀφανής -ές
cG	171	ἀπολογέομαι	cS	210	ἀφανίζω
cG	172	ἀπολογητικός -ή -όν	cT	211	ἀφηγέομαι
cG	173	ἀπολογία ἡ	cT	212	ἀφήγημα τὸ
cH	174	πιθανὴ ἀπολογία	cT	213	ἀφηγηματικός -ή -όν
cI	175	ἀπορέω	cT	214	ἀφήγησις ἡ
cI	176	ἀπορία ἡ	aA	215	ἀφορμάω
cI	177	ἄπορος -ον	aA	216	ἀφορμή ἡ
cJ	178	ἀποστρέφω	cU	217	βαρύς -εῖα -ύ
cJ	179	ἀποστροφή ἡ	cU	218	βαρύτης ἡ
cJ	180	ἀπόστροφος -ον	cU	219	βαρυτόνος -ον
kP	181	ἀπροοιμίαστος -ον	cV	220	βασανίζω
cK	182	τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους	cV	221	βασανιστέος -α -ον
			cV	222	βασανιστής ὁ

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cV	223	βάσανος ἡ	dH	263	διάλεξις ἡ
cX	224	βία ἡ	dI	264	διανέομαι
cX	225	βιάζω	dI	265	διανοητικός -ῆ -όν
cX	226	βίαιος -α -ον	dI	266	διάνοια ἡ
cX	227	βίαιος -ον	dJ	267	ρήτὸν καὶ διάνοια
cW	228	βίαιος ὅρος	dK	268	διάνοια νομοθέτου
cX	229	βιάω	dI	269	διανοίχω
cY	230	βούλευσις ἡ	dL	270	διαορίζω
cY	231	βουλευτήριος -ον	dM	271	διαπορέω
cY	232	βουλευτικός -ῆ -όν	dM	272	διαπόρησις ἡ
cY	233	βουλευτός -ῆ -όν	dM	273	διαπορητικός -ῆ -όν
cY	234	βουλεύω	dN	274	διαρθρόω
cZ	235	βούλησις ἡ	dN	275	διάρθρωσις ἡ
cZ	236	βουλητέος -α -ον	dN	276	διάρθρωτικός, -ῆ, -όν
cZ	237	βουλητός -ῆ -όν	dO	277	διασκευάζω
cZ	238	βούλομαι	dO	278	διασκευή ἡ
dA	239	γνωματεύω	dP	279	διαστασιάζω
dA	240	γνώμη ἡ	dP	280	διαστάσις ἡ
dB	241	γνώμη νομοθέτου	dP	281	διαστατικός -ῆ -όν
dA	242	γνωμονικός -ῆ -όν	dP	282	διάστατος -ον
dC	243	δεινός	dF	283	διατίθημι
dC	244	δείνωσις ἡ	dQ	284	διατυπώω
dC	245	δεινωτικός -ῆ -όν	dQ	285	διατύπωσις ἡ
dD	246	δευτορολογέω	dQ	286	διατυπωτικός -ῆ -όν
dD	247	δευτορολογία ἡ	dR	287	διηγέομαι
dE	248	διαβάλλω	dR	288	διήγημα τὸ
dE	249	διαβολή ἡ	dT	289	διηγηματικός -ῆ -όν
dE	250	διαβολία ἡ	dS	290	ἀρεταὶ διηγήσεως
dE	251	διαβολικός -ῆ -όν	dT	291	διήγησις ἡ
dE	252	διάβολος -ον	dT	292	διηγητικός -ῆ -όν
dF	253	διάθεσις ἡ	dU	293	δικαιολογία ἡ
dG	254	διαίρεσις ἡ	dU	294	δικαιολογικός -ῆ -όν
dG	255	διαιρετικός -ῆ -όν	dU	295	δικαιολόγος ὁ
dG	256	διαιρετός -ῆ -όν	dV	296	δίκαιος -α -ον
dG	257	διαίρῃω	dV	297	δίκαιος -ον
dH	258	διαλέχομαι	dV	298	δικαιοσύνη ἡ
dH	259	διαλέχω	dW	299	μόριον τοῦ δικαίου
dH	260	διαλεκτική ἡ	dV	300	δικαιῶω
dH	261	διαλεκτικός -ῆ -όν	dV	301	δικανικός -ῆ -όν
dH	262	διάλεκτος ἡ	dX	302	δίλημμα τὸ

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dX	303	διλήμματον τό	eH	341	ἔθος τὸ
dX	304	διλήμματος -ον	eH	342	ἔθω
dY	305	διορίζω	eI	343	εἰδικός -ή -όν
dY	306	διόρισις ἡ	eI	344	εἶδος τὸ
dY	307	διορισμός ὁ	eJ	345	εἰκός τὸ
dY	308	διοριστικός -ή -όν	eK	346	εἰσφορά νόμου
dZ	309	διπλασιασμός ὁ	eL	347	ἐκβαίνω (τὸ ἐκβησόμενον)
dZ	310	διπλός -η -ον	eM	348	ἐκθεις ἡ
dZ	311	διπλοῦς -ῆ -οῦν	eM	349	ἐκθεςμος -ον
dZ	312	διπλός	eM	350	ἐκθετικός -ή -όν
eA	313	δοκέω	eM	351	ἐκτίθημι
eA	314	δόξα ἡ	eN	352	ἐκτός (τό)
eA	315	δοξάζω	eO	353	ἐκτρέπω
eA	316	δοξασία ἡ	eO	354	ἐκτροπή ἡ
eA	317	δόξασμα τὸ	eO	355	ἐκτροπός -όν
eA	318	δοξαστής ὁ	eP	356	ἐκφράζω
eA	319	δοξαστικός -ή -όν	eP	357	ἐκφρασις ἡ
eA	320	δοξαστός -ή -όν	eP	358	ἐκφρατικός -ή -όν
eA	321	δόξις ἡ	eQ	359	ἐλασσώ
eB	322	δύναμαι	eQ	360	ἐλάσσων -ον
eB	323	δύναμις ἡ	eQ	361	ἐλαττώ
eB	324	δυναμός	eQ	362	ἐλάττων -ον
eB	325	δυνατός -ή -όν	eR	363	ἐλεγκτικός -ή -όν
eC	326	δυσπαρακολούθητος -ον	eR	364	ἐλεγχος ὁ
eC	327	δυσπαρακόλουθος -ον	eR	365	ἐλέγχω
eD	328	ἐχγραπτος -ον	eS	366	ἐλεεινός -ή -όν
eD	329	ἐχγραφή ἡ	eS	367	ἐλεέω
eD	330	ἐχγραφος -ον	eS	368	ἐλεος ὁ
eD	331	ἐχγράφω	eT	369	ἐλλειπτικός -ή -όν
eF	332	ἐκκαλέω	eT	370	ἐλλείπω
eF	333	ἐκκλημα τό	eT	371	ἐλλειψις ἡ
eF	334	ἐκκληματίζω	eU	372	ἐλπίζω
eF	335	ἐκκληματικός -ή -όν	eU	373	ἐλπίς ἡ
eF	336	ἐκκλησις ἡ	eU	374	ἐλπιστικός -ή -όν
eG	337	ἐκκωμιάζω	eU	375	ἐλπιστός -ή -όν
eG	338	ἐκκωμιαστικός -ή -όν	eV	376	ἐμβοάω
eG	339	ἐκώμιον τὸ	eV	377	ἐμβόημα τό
eG	340	ἐκώμιος -ον	eV	378	ἐμβόησις ἡ
			eW	379	ἐμπίπτω

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eW	380	ἐμπίπτων	fJ	419	ἐπαναχωγή ἡ
eX	381	ἐμφαίνω	fJ	420	ἐπαναχωγός -όν
eX	382	ἐμφασις ἡ	aV	421	ἐπανακεφαλαιόομαι
eX	383	ἐμφατικός -ή -όν	fK	422	ἐπαναλαμβάνω
eY	384	ἐναντιόομαι	fK	423	ἐπαναλήψις ἡ
eY	385	ἐναντίος -α -ον	fL	424	ἐπαναμνησκω
eY	386	ἐναντιότης ἡ	fL	425	ἐπανάμνησις ἡ
eZ	387	ἐνάρχεια ἡ	fM	426	ἐπενθυμέομαι
eZ	388	ἐνάρχης -ες	fM	427	ἐπενθύμημα τό
fA	389	ἐνδιασκευάζω	fM	428	ἐπενθύμησις ἡ
fA	390	ἐνδιασκευή	fN	429	ἐπιβατήριος -ον (τό)
fB	391	ἐνδοξος -ον	fO	430	ἐπιγραφή ἡ
fC	392	ἐνθυμέομαι	fO	431	ἐπιγραφικός -ή -όν
fC	393	ἐνθυμέω	fO	432	ἐπιγράφω
fC	394	ἐνθύμημα τό	fP	433	ἐπιδείκνυμι
fC	395	ἐνθυμηματικός -ή -όν	fP	434	ἐπιδεικτική ἡ
fC	396	ἐνθυμηματώδης -ες	fP	435	ἐπιδεικτικός -ή -όν
fC	397	ἐνθυμίζομαι	fQ	436	ἐπιδιηγέομαι
fC	398	ἐνθυμίζω	fQ	437	ἐπιδιήγησις ἡ
fD	399	ἐνίστημι	fR	438	ἐπιείκεια ἡ
fD	400	ἐνστασις ἡ	fR	439	ἐπιεικέυομαι
fD	401	ἐνστατικός -ή -όν	fR	440	ἐπιεικής -ές
fE	402	ἐντέλλω	fS	441	ἐπιζεύχνυμι
fF	403	ἐντεχνάζω	fS	442	ἐπιζεύχνυω
fF	404	ἐντεχνής -ές	fS	443	ἐπίζευξις ἡ
fF	405	ἐντεχνία ἡ	fT	444	ἐπίθεσις ἡ
fF	406	ἐντεχνος -ον	fT	445	ἐπίθετον τό
fE	407	ἐντολή ἡ	fT	446	ἐπίθετος -ον
fE	408	ἐντολικός -ή -όν	fT	447	ἐπιθεωρέω
fG	409	ἐπαγγελία ἡ	fU	448	ἐπιθυμέω
fG	410	ἐπαγγέλλω	fU	449	ἐπιθυμητικός -ή -όν
fG	411	ἐπαγγελτικός -ή -όν	fU	450	ἐπιθυμία ἡ
fH	412	ἐπάχω	fV	451	ἐπιλέγω
fH	413	ἐπαχωγή ἡ	fV	452	ἐπιλογίζομαι
fH	414	ἐπαχωγικός -ή -όν	fV	453	ἐπιλογικός -ή -όν
fI	415	ἐπαινετός -ή -όν	fV	454	ἐπίλογος ό
fI	416	ἐπαινέω	fW	455	ἐπιρρώννυμι
fI	417	ἐπαινος ό	fW	456	ἐπιρρωννύω
fJ	418	ἐπανάχω	fW	457	ἐπιρρώομαι
			fW	458	ἐπίρρωσις ἡ

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FX 459	ἐπιστήμη ἡ	GH 497	εὐμάθεια ἡ
FX 460	ἐπιστημονίζω	GH 498	εὐμαθής -ές
FX 461	ἐπιστημονικός -ή -όν	GH 499	εὐμαθία ἡ
FY 462	ἐπιχαιρεκακέω	GH 500	εὐμαθίη ἡ
FY 463	ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἡ	GI 501	εὐμνημόνευτος -ον
FY 464	ἐπιχαιρέκακος -ον	GJ 502	εὐνοέω
FY 465	ἐπιχαιρεσίκακος -ον	GJ 503	εὐνόησις ἡ
FY 466	ἐπιχαίρω	GJ 504	εὐνοία ἡ
FZ 467	ἐπιχειρέω	GJ 505	εὐνοῖζομαι
FZ 468	ἐπιχείρημα τό	GJ 506	εὐνοϊκός -ή -όν
GA 469	τὸ πλαστὸν . ἐπιχείρημα	GJ 507	εὐνοος -ον
FZ 470	ἐπιχειρηματικός -ή -όν	GJ 508	εὐνους -ουν
FZ 471	ἐπιχείρησις ἡ	GK 509	εὕρεσις ἡ
FZ 472	ἐπιχειρητική ἡ	GK 510	εὕρετικός -ή -όν
FZ 473	ἐπιχειρητικός -ή -όν	GK 511	εὕρετός -ή -όν
GB 474	ἐρχάζομαι	GK 512	εὕρησις ἡ
GB 475	ἐργασία ἡ	GK 513	εὕρισκω
GB 476	ἐργασιατικός -ή -όν	GL 514	εὐφημέω
GB 477	ἔρχον τὸ	GL 515	εὐφημία ἡ
GC 478	ἐρμηνεία ἡ	GL 516	εὐφημίζω
GC 479	ἐρμήνευμα τό	GL 517	εὐφημισμός ὁ
GC 480	ἐρμηνευτικός -ή -όν	GL 518	εὐφημος -ον
GC 481	ἐρμηνεύω	GM 519	εὐχή ἡ
IZ 482	ἐσχηματισμένως	GM 520	εὐχήμων -ον
GD 483	έτερορρέπεια ἡ	GM 521	εὐχομαι
GD 484	έτερορρεπέω	GN 522	ζητέω
GD 485	έτερορρεπής -ές	GN 523	ζήτημα τό
GD 486	έτερορροπία ἡ	GO 524	πολιτικὸν ζήτημα
GD 487	έτερορροπός -όν	GP 525	ζητήσιμος -ον
GE 488	εὐθυδίκαιος -ον	GP 526	ζήτησις ἡ
GE 489	εὐθυδικία ἡ	GP 527	ζητητικός -ή -όν
GE 490	εὐθύδικος -ον	GQ 528	ἥδομαι
GF 491	εὐλογέω	GQ 529	ἡδονή ἡ
GF 492	εὐλογητικός -ή -όν	GQ 530	ἡδονικός -ή -όν
GF 493	εὐλογητός -ή -όν	GR 531	ἡθικεύομαι
GF 494	εὐλογία ἡ	GR 532	ἡθικός -ή -όν
GF 495	εὐλόχιστος -ον	GR 533	ἥθος τό
GF 496	εὐλόχος -ον	GS 534	θέσις ἡ
		GT 535	θεωρέω
		GT 536	θεώρημα τό

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gT	537	θεωρητικός -ή -όν	hG	576	κρίνω (κρινόμενον)
gT	538	θεωρητός -ή -όν	hG	577	κρίσιμος -ον
gT	539	θεωρία ή	hG	578	κρίσις ή
gU	540	θυμός ό	hG	579	κριτικός -ή -όν
gU	541	θυμόω	hI	580	κῶλον τὸ
gV	542	ισάζω	hK	581	λειτουργία ή
gV	543	ισάζων	hL	582	λεκτική ή
gV	544	ισαία ή	hL	583	λεκτικός -ή -όν
gV	545	ἴσος -η -ον	hL	584	λεξικός -ή -όν
gW	546	κακοπλαστία	hL	585	λέξις ή
gW	547	κακόπλαστος -ον	hM	586	λογίζομαι
gX	548	κατασκευάζω	hM	587	λογικός -η -ον
gX	549	κατασκευαστικός -ή -όν	hM	588	λόγιος -α -ον
gX	550	κατασκευαστικῶς	hM	589	λογισμός ό
gX	551	κατασκευή ή	hM	590	λογιστικός -ή -όν
gX	552	κατασκευόω	hM	591	λόγος ό
gY	553	κατάστασις ή	hN	592	λυπέω
gY	554	καταστατικός -ή -όν	hN	593	λύπη ή
gZ	555	καταφέρω	hN	594	λυπηρός -ά -όν
gZ	556	καταφορά ή	hO	595	λύσιμος -ον
gZ	557	καταφορέω	hO	596	λύσιος -α -ον
gZ	558	καταφορικός -ή -όν	hO	597	λύσις ή
hA	559	καταψευδομαρτυρέω	hO	598	λύω
hB	560	κατηγορέω	hP	599	μάρτυρ ό, ή
hB	561	κατηγόρημα τὸ	hP	600	μαρτυρέω
hB	562	κατηγορητικός -ή -όν	hP	601	μαρτυρία ή
hB	563	κατηγορία ή	hP	602	μαρτυρικός -ή -όν
hB	564	κατηγορικός -ή -όν	hP	603	μαρτύριον τό
hB	565	κατήγορος -ον	hP	604	μάρτυς ό, ή
hC	566	τελικὰ κεφάλαια	hQ	605	μαχέομαι
hD	567	κεφάλαιος -α -ον	hQ	606	μάχη ή
hD	568	κεφαλαίω	hQ	607	μαχησμός ό
hD	569	κεφαλαιώδης -ες	hQ	608	μαχητικός -ή -όν
hD	570	κεφαλή ή	hQ	609	μάχιμος -η -ον
hE	571	κόμμα τὸ	hQ	610	μάχιμος -ον
hE	572	κομματικός -ή -όν	hQ	611	μαχισμός ό
hE	573	κομματικῶς	hQ	612	μάχομαι
hF	574	κρείσων -ον	hR	613	μεγαλοπρέπεια ή
hF	575	κρείττων -ον	hR	614	μεγαλοπρεπέομαι
			hR	615	μεγαλοπρεπής -ές

Appendix I cont.

hT 616	μέγας -γάλη -χα	iG 655	μνήμη ή
hT 617	μέγεθος τό	iG 656	μνημονειός -όν
iC 618	μεθίστημι	iG 657	μνημόνευμα τό
hS 619	μεθοδεύω	iG 658	μνημονευτικός -ή -όν
hS 620	μεθοδικός -ή -όν	iG 659	μνημονευτός -ή -όν
hS 621	μέθοδος ή	iG 660	μνημονεύω
hU 622	μειώω	iG 661	μνημονικός -ή -όν
hU 623	μείωσις ή	iG 662	μνημονιός -όν
hU 624	μειωτικός -ή -όν	iH 663	μονομέρεια ή
hU 625	μειωτός -ή -όν	iH 664	μονομερής -ές
hV 626	μελετάω	iJ 665	μυθοποιέω
hV 627	μελέτη ή	iJ 666	μυθοποιία ή
hV 628	μελετηρός -ά -όν	iJ 667	μῦθος ό
hV 629	μελετητικός -ή -όν	iJ 668	μυθωδικός -ή -όν
hW 630	μερίζω	iK 669	νοέω
hW 631	μερισμός ό	iK 670	νόημα τὸ
hW 632	μεριστικός -ή -όν	iK 671	νόησις ή
hW 633	μεριστός -ή -όν	iK 672	νοητικός -ή -όν
hX 634	μετάθεσις τῆς αἰτίας	iK 673	νοητός -ή -όν
hY 635	μεταλαμβάνω	iL 674	νομίζω
hY 636	μετάληψις ή	iL 675	νομικός -ή -όν
hZ 637	έτέρα μετάληψις	iL 676	νόμιμος -η -ον
iA 638	μεταξύ	iL 677	νόμος ό
iB 639	μεταξύ τούτων	lF 678	ξυγχνώμη ή
iC 640	μετάστασις ή	lF 679	ξυγχνώμων -ον
iC 641	μεταστατικός -ή -όν	iM 680	ὅμοιος -α -ον
iD 642	μίχθυμι	iM 681	ὁμοιότης ή
iD 643	μιχθύω	iM 682	ὁμοιόω
iE 644	μικρός -ά -όν	iN 683	ὁμοιωματικός -ή -όν
iE 645	μικρότερος -α -ον	iN 684	ὁμοιώσις ή
iE 646	μικρύνω	iN 685	ὁμοιωτικός -ή -όν
iD 647	μικτός -ή -όν	iO 686	ὁμωνυμέω
iF 648	μιμέομαι	iO 687	ὁμωνυμία ή
iF 649	μιμηλός -ή -όν	iO 688	ὁμωνυμικῶς
iF 650	μίμησις ή	iO 689	ὁμωνυμίοι τά
iF 651	μιμητική ή	iO 690	ὁμωνύμιος -α -ον
iF 652	μιμητικός -ή -όν	iO 691	ὁμώνυμος τό
iG 653	μιμνήσκομαι	iO 692	ὁμώνυμος -ον
iG 654	μιμνήσκω	iP 693	ὀνοματοποιέω
		iP 694	ὀνοματοποιήσις ή

Appendix I cont.

iP	695	ὀνοματοποιία ἡ	jA	734	παραζητέω
iP	696	ὀνοματοποιός ὁ	jA	735	παραζήτησις ἡ
iQ	697	ὀρχή ἡ	jA	736	παραζητητικός -ή -όν
iQ	698	ὀρχίζω	jB	737	παράθεσις ἡ
iS	699	ὀρίζω	jB	738	παραθετέος -ά -όν
iS	700	ὀρικός -ή -όν	jB	739	παραθεωρέω
iS	701	ὀρισμός ὁ	jC	740	παραιτέομαι
iS	702	ὀριστικός -ή -όν	jC	741	παραίτησις ἡ
iR	703	ὄρο οἱ	jC	742	παραιτητικός -ή -όν
iS	704	ὄρος ὁ	jD	743	παράκειμαι
iT	705	παθαίνω	jE	744	παραλειπτικός -ή -όν
iT	706	πάθη ἡ	jE	745	παραλειπτός -όν
iT	707	παθητικός -ή -όν	jE	746	παραλείπω
iT	708	πάθος τὸ	jE	747	παράλειψις ἡ
iU	709	πανηγυρίζω	jF	748	παραμυθέομαι
iU	710	πανηγυρικός	jF	749	παραμυθητικός -ή -όν
iU	711	πανήγυρις ἡ	jF	750	παραμυθητός -ή -όν
iV	712	παραβάλλω	jF	751	παραμυθία ἡ
iV	713	παραβολή ἡ	jF	752	παραμύθιον τὸ
iV	714	παραβολικός -ή -όν	jG	753	παρασκευάζω
iV	715	παραβολικῶς	jG	754	παρασκευάσις ἡ
iW	716	παραγραφή ἡ	jG	755	παρασκευαστικός -ή -όν
iW	717	παραγραφικός -η -ον	jG	756	παρασκευαστός -όν
iW	718	παραγράφω	jG	757	παρασκευή ἡ
iX	719	παράδειγμα τὸ	jH	758	παρεκβαίνω
iX	720	παραδειγματίζω	jH	759	παρέκβασις ἡ
iX	721	παραδειγματικός -ή -όν	jH	760	παρεκβατικός -ή -όν
iX	722	παραδειγματώδης -ες	jH	761	παρεκβατικῶς
iX	723	παραδείκνυμι	jI	762	παρένθεσις ἡ
iX	724	παραδείκνυω	jI	763	παρένθετος -ον
iX	725	παράδειξις ἡ	jI	764	παρενθήκη ἡ
iY	726	παραδιηγέομαι	jJ	765	παρέπομαι
iY	727	παραδιήγημα τὸ	jK	766	παρισώω
iY	728	παραδιήγησις ἡ	jK	767	παρίσωμα τό
iZ	729	παραδοξολογέω	jK	768	παρίσωσις ἡ
iZ	730	παραδοξολογία ἡ	jK	769	παρισωτικός -ή -όν
iZ	731	παραδοξολόγος -ον	jL	770	πειθανάγκη ἡ
iZ	732	παραδοξία ἡ			
iZ	733	παράδοξος -ον			

Appendix I cont.

jL 771	πειθήμων -ον	jY 810	πλασματώδης -ες
jL 772	πειθός -ή -όν	jY 811	πλάσσω
jL 773	Πείθω ή	jY 812	πλαστός -ή -όν
jL 774	Πείθω	jY 813	πλάττω
jM 775	περιέχω (περιέχον καὶ περιεχόμενον)	jZ 814	ποιότης ή
jN 776	περιοδεύω	kA 815	κοινή ποιότης
jN 777	περιοδικός -ή -όν	kB 816	πολυσχημάτιστος -ον
jN 778	περίοδος ή	kC 817	πράγμα τὸ
jO 779	περιοχή ή	kC 818	πραγματεία ή
jP 780	περισσός -ή -όν	kC 819	πραχμάτευμα τὸ
jP 781	περισσότης ή	kC 820	πραχματεύομαι
jQ 782	περίστασις ή	kC 821	πραγματικός -ή -όν
jQ 783	περιστατικός -ή -όν	kC 822	πρακτικός -ή -όν
jP 784	περιττός -ή -όν	hR 823	πρέπω
jP 785	περιττότης ή	kD 824	προβάλλω
jR 786	περίφρασις ή	kD 825	πρόβλημα τὸ
jR 787	περιφράσσω	kD 826	προβληματικός -ή -όν
jR 788	περιφραστικός -ή -όν	kD 827	προβολή ή
jR 789	περιφράττω	kE 828	έτέρα προβολή
jS 790	πεύσις ή	kD 829	προβοληματώδης -ες
jS 791	πευστικός -ή -όν	kF 830	προχυμνάω
jT 792	πηλικότης ή	kF 831	προχύμνασμα τὸ
kK 793	πιθανός -ή -όν	kG 832	προδιηγέομαι
kK 794	πιθανότης ή	kG 833	προδιήγησις ή
kK 795	πιθανόω	kH 834	προδιορθόομαι
jU 796	πιστεύω	kH 835	προδιόρθωσις ή
jU 797	πίστις ή	kI 836	προειλημμένος τη κρίσει
jV 798	ἄτεχνος πίστις	kJ 837	προέκθεσις ή
jW 799	έντεχνος πίστις	kJ 838	προεκτίθημι
jU 800	πιστός -ή -όν	kL 839	πρόθεσις ή
jU 801	πιστός	kL 840	προθετικός -ή -όν
jX 802	πλαχιάω	kL 841	προθεωρία ή
jX 803	πλαχιασμός ὁ	kM 842	προκατασκευαστικός -ή -όν
jX 804	πλάχιος -α -ον	kM 843	προκατασκευάζω (- ομενος)
jY 805	πλάσις ή	kM 844	προκατασκευή ή
jY 806	πλάσμα τὸ	kN 845	προκατάστασις ή
jY 807	πλασματικός -ή -όν		
jY 808	πλασματογράφος -ον		
jY 809	πλασματογραφέω		

Appendix I cont.

kN	846	προκατασταστικός -ή -όν	1A	885	σαφήνεια ή
			1A	886	σαφηνέω
kO	847	προλογέω	1A	887	σαφηνίζω
kO	848	προλογίζω	1A	888	σαφηνιστικός -ή -όν
kO	849	πρόλογος ό	1B	889	σημείον τὸ
kP	850	προοιμιάζομαι	1B	890	σημειώω
kP	851	προοιμιακός -ή -όν	1B	891	σημειώδης -ες
kP	852	προοιμιαστέον	1C	892	σκοπεύω
kP	853	προοίμιον τὸ	1C	893	σκοπέω
jG	854	προπαρασκευάζω	1C	894	σκοπός ό ή
kQ	855	πρός τι	1D	895	στάσιμος -ον
kR	856	προσαγγελία ή	1D	896	στάσις ή
kR	857	προσαγγέλλω	1D	897	στατικός -ή -όν
kS	858	προσδιορίζω	1E	898	στοχάζομαι
kS	859	τὸ μὴ προσδιωρίσθαι	1E	899	στοχασμός ό
kT	860	προσήνεια ή	1E	900	στοχαστικός -ή -όν
kT	861	προσηνής -ές	1F	901	συγχιχνωμονέω
kU	862	προσοχή ή	1F	902	συγχιχνώσκω
kV	863	πρόσωπον τὸ	1F	903	συχνώμη ή
kW	864	προσωποποιέω	1F	904	συχνωμονέω
kW	865	προσωποποιία ή	1F	905	συχνωμονικός -ή -όν
kW	866	προσωποποικῶς	1F	906	συχνωμοσύνη ή
kW	867	προσωποποιός -όν	1F	907	συχνώμων -ον
kV	868	πρόσωπος ό	1F	908	συχνώσκω
kX	869	πρότασις ή	1G	909	συγκατάθεσις ή
kX	870	προτάσσω	1G	910	συγκαταθετικός -ή -όν
kX	871	προτατικός -ή -όν	1H	911	συγκατοσκευάζω (τὸ -όμενος)
kX	872	προτάττω	1H	912	συγκατασκευαστικός -ή -όν
kX	873	προτείνω	1H	913	συγκατασκευαστικῶς
kL	874	προτίθημι	1H	914	συγκατασκευή ή
kY	875	προτρεπτικός -ή -όν	1H	915	συγκατασκευόω
kY	876	προτρέπω	1G	916	συγκατατίθημι
mM	877	ρήτήρ ό	1I	917	συγκεφαλαιώω
mM	878	ρήτορεία ή	1I	918	συγκεφαλαίωμα τὸ
mM	879	ρήτορεύω	1I	919	συγκεφαλαίωσις ή
mM	880	ρήτορική ή	1I	920	συγκεφαλαιωτικός -ή -όν
mM	881	ρήτορικός -ή -όν			
kZ	882	ρήτός -ή -όν			
mM	883	ρήτωρ ό ή			
kZ	884	ρήτῶς			

Appendix I cont.

1J	921	συγκρίνω	1V	959	συνωνυμέω
1J	922	σύγκρισις ή	1V	960	συνωνυμία ή
1J	923	συγκριτικός -ή -όν	1V	961	συνώνυμος -ον
1J	924	σύγκριτος -ον	1W	962	σύστασις ή
1K	925	συζεύγνυμι	1W	963	συστατικός -ή -όν
1K	926	συζευκτικός όν	1W	964	συστατός -όν
1K	927	σύζευξις ή	1X	965	συστοιχέω
1L	928	συλληπτικός -ή -όν	1X	966	συστοιχία ή
1L	929	σύλληψις ή	1X	967	σύστοιχος -ον
1M	930	συλλογίζομαι	1Y	968	σχετλιάζω
1M	931	συλλογισμός ό	1Y	969	σχετλιασμός ό
1M	932	συλλογιστία ή	1Y	970	σχετλιαστικός -ή
1M	933	συλλογιστικός -ή			-όν
		-όν	1Z	971	σχῆμα τὸ
1N	934	συμβαίνω	1Z	972	σχηματίζω
1N	935	συμβεβηκός -ή -όν	1Z	973	σχηματικός -ή -όν
1O	936	συμβούλευμα τὸ	1Z	974	σχηματισμός ό
1O	937	συμβουλευτικός -ή	1Z	975	σχηματοποιέω
		-όν	1Z	976	σχηματότης ή
1O	938	συμβουλεύω	mA	977	σῶμα τὸ
1P	939	συμπεπλεγμένος	mA	978	σωματικός -ή -όν
1P	940	συμπλέκω	mA	979	σωματοποιέω
1Q	941	συμπλοκή ή	mB	980	τάξις ή
1Q	942	συμπλοκός -όν	mB	981	τάσσω
1R	943	συμφέρον τὸ	mB	982	τάττω
1R	944	συμφερτός -ή -όν	mC	983	ταυτολογέω
1R	945	συμφέρω	mC	984	ταυτολογία ή
1S	946	συνθεσία ή	mC	985	ταυτολογικῶς
1S	947	σύνθεσις ή	mC	986	ταυτολόχος -ον
1S	948	συνθετικός -ή -όν	mD	987	τεκμήριον τὸ
1S	949	σύνθετος -ον	mD	988	τεκμηριώω
1T	950	σύνταξις ή	mD	989	τεκμηριώμα τὸ
1T	951	συντάσσω	mD	990	τεκμηρίωσις ή
1T	952	συντάττω	mF	991	τέλειος -α -ον
1S	953	συντίθημι	mF	992	τελειόω
1U	954	συντομεύω	mF	993	τέλεος -α -ον
1U	955	συντομία ή	mF	994	τελεόω
1U	956	συντομολογία ή	mE	995	τελευταῖος -α -ον
1U	957	συντομολόχος -ον	mE	996	τελευτάω
1U	958	σύντομος -ον	mE	997	τελευτέω

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mE	998	τελευτή ή	mS	1037	υπόμνησις ή
mF	999	τελέω	mS	1038	υπομνήσκω
mF	1000	τελίσάζω	mS	1039	υπομνηστικός -ή -όν
mF	1001	τέλος τὸ	mT	1040	υπόστασις ή
mG	1002	τεχνάζω	mP	1041	υποτίθημι
mG	1003	τεχνάομαι	mU	1042	υποφέρω
mG	1004	τέχνη ή	mU	1043	υποφορά ή
mG	1005	τεχνήμων -ον	mV	1044	φανερὸς -ά -όν
mG	1006	τεχνητικός -ή -όν	mV	1045	φανερὼ
mG	1007	τεχνικός -ή -όν	mW	1046	φθονερία ή
mH	1008	τοπικός -ή -όν	mW	1047	φθονεροποιὸς -όν
mH	1009	τόπος ὁ	mW	1048	φθονερὸς -ά -όν
mJ	1010	τροπή ή	mW	1049	φθονέω
mJ	1011	τροπικός -ή -όν	mW	1050	φθονητικός -ή -όν
mJ	1012	τρόπος ὁ	mW	1051	φθονητὸς -ή -όν
mK	1013	υπερβατὸν τὸ	mW	1052	φθόνος ὁ
mK	1014	υπερβατὸς -ή -όν	mW	1053	φθονὸς -ά -όν
mK	1015	υπερβατὸς -όν	mX	1054	φοβέω
mL	1016	υπερβολάδην	mX	1055	φοβητέος -α -ον
mL	1017	υπερβολή ή	mX	1056	φοβητικός -ή -όν
mL	1018	υπερβολικός -ή -όν	mX	1057	φοβητὸς -ά -όν
mL	1019	υποβάλλω	mX	1058	φόβος ὁ
mO	1020	υποδιαίρεμα τό	mY	1059	φράζω
mO	1021	υποδιαίρεσις ή	mY	1060	φράσις ή
mO	1022	υποδιαιρετικός -ή -όν	kP	1061	φροιμιαστέον
mO	1023	υποδιαιρετὸς -ή -όν	kP	1062	φροίμιον
mO	1024	υποδιαιρέω	mZ	1063	χαρακτήρ ὁ
mP	1025	υπόθεσις ή	mZ	1064	χαρακτηριάζω
mP	1026	υποθετικός -ή -όν	mZ	1065	χαρακτηρίζω
mQ	1027	υποκρίνομαι	mZ	1066	χαρακτηρικός -ή -όν
mQ	1028	υπόκρισις ή	mZ	1067	χαρακτήριον τό
mQ	1029	υποκριτικός -ή -όν	mZ	1068	χαρακτήρισμα τό
mR	1030	υπολαμβάνω	mZ	1069	χαρακτηρισμός ὁ
mR	1031	υπολήμψις ή	mZ	1070	χαρακτηριστικός -ή -όν
mR	1032	υπολήψις ή	nA	1071	χεῖρον
mO	1033	υπομερισμός ὁ	nB	1072	χράομαι
mS	1034	υπομιμνήσκω	nB	1073	χράω
mS	1035	υπομνεία ή	nC	1074	χρεία ή
mS	1036	υπόμνημα τό	nC	1075	χρειή ή

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nD	1076	χρόνος	ὁ
nE	1077	χρῶμα	τὸ
nE	1078	χρωματίζω	
nE	1079	χρωματικός	-ή -όν
nE	1080	χρωμάτινος	-η -ον
nF	1081	ψέχω	
nG	1082	ψευδομάρτυρ	ὁ, ἡ
nG	1083	ψευδομαρτυρέω	
nG	1084	ψευδομαρτυρία	ἡ
nG	1085	ψευδομαρτύριον	τό
nG	1086	ψευδομάρτυς	ὁ, ἡ
nH	1087	ψόγιος	-α -ον
nH	1088	ψόχος	ὁ
nI	1089	ψυχή	ἡ
nI	1090	ψυχήιος	-ή -όν
nI	1091	ψυχικός	-ή -όν

**APPENDIX II:
TECHNICAL VOCABULARY GRAND LIST (TVGL)
ARRANGED IN CONCEPTUAL FAMILIES**

aA 215	ἀφορμάω	aN 35	ἀλληγορέω
aA 216	ἀφορμή ή	aN 37	ἀλληγορικός -ή -όν
aB 1	ἄγραφος -ον	aN 36	ἀλληγορία ή
aC 2	ἄγων ό	aO 38	ἀμφιβάλλω
aC 4	ἄγωνιάω	aO 40	ἀμφίβολος -ον
aC 5	ἄγωνίζομαι	aO 39	ἀμφιβολία ή
aC 6	ἄγωνιστικός -ή -όν	aP 41	ἀμφισβητέω
aC 3	ἄγωνία ή	aP 43	ἀμφισβητηματικός -ή -όν
aD 7	δημόσιον ἀδίκημα	aP 42	ἀμφισβήτημα τό
aE 8	ἀδοξέω	aQ 44	ἀμφισβητήσιμος -ον
aE 9	ἀδοξία ή	aQ 46	ἀμφισβήτητος -ον
aE 10	ἄδοξος -ον	aQ 45	ἀμφισβήτησις ή
aF 11	ἀδυνατέω	aR 47	ἀναδιπλόομαι
aF 13	ἀδύνατος -ον	aR 48	ἀναδίπλωσις ή
aF 12	ἀδύνατος τό	aS 50	ἀνάδρομος -ον
aG 14	αἰρέω	aS 71	ἀνατρέχω
aH 16	αἰσχυντέον	aS 49	ἀναδρομή ή
aH 17	αἰσχυντικός -ή -όν	aT 51	ἀναιρέω
aH 18	αἰσχύνω	aU 56	ἀνάκλησις ή
aH 15	αἰσχύνη ή	aU 57	ἀνακλητικός -η -ον
aI 20	αἴτημα -ατος τό	aU 52	ἀνακαλέω
aI 21	αἴτησις ή	aV 53	ἀνακεφαλαιόω
aI 22	αἰτητός -όν	aV 55	ἀνακεφαλαιωτικός -ή -όν
aI 19	αἰτέω	aV 421	ἐπανακεφαλαιόομαι
aJ 24	αἰτιάζομαι	aV 54	ἀνακεφαλαίωσις ή
aJ 25	αἰτιάομαι	aW 58	ἀναμιμνήσκω
aJ 26	αἴτιος -α -ον	aW 60	ἀναμνηστικός -όν
aJ 27	αἴτιος ό	aW 61	ἀναμνηστός -όν
aJ 23	αἰτία ή	aW 59	ἀνάμνησις ή
aK 28	ἄκεφαλος -ον	aX 62	ἀνανεοόομαι
aL 29	ἄκμάζω	aX 64	ἀνανεωτικός -ή -όν
aL 30	ἄκμαῖος -α -ον	aX 63	ἀνανέωσις ή
aL 31	ἄκμή ή	aY 66	ἀνασκευάζω
aM 32	ἀκολουθέω		
aM 34	ἀκόλουθος -ον		
aM 33	ἀκολουθία, ή		

Appendix II cont.

aY	67	ἀνασκευαστικός -ή -όν	bJ	104	ἀντιπαρίστημι
aY	68	ἀνασκευή ή	bJ	101	ἀντιπαράστασις ή
aZ	69	ἀνατρέπτικός -ή -όν	bK	106	ἀντιπροτείνω
aZ	72	ἀνάτρηψις -εως ή	bK	107	ἀντιπροτίθημι
aZ	73	ἀνατροπή ή	bK	105	ἀντιπρότασις ή
aZ	70	ἀνατρέπω	bL	108	ἀντιστασιάζω
bA	75	ἀναχαίτισις ή	bL	110	ἀντιστατικός -ή -όν
bA	76	ἀναχαίτισμα τὸ	bL	109	ἀντίστασις ή
bA	77	ἀναχαίτισμος ὁ	bM	111	ἀντιστρέφω
bA	74	ἀναχαιτίζω	bM	112	ἀντιστρέφων
bB	78	ἀνθορίζω	bM	114	ἀντίστροφος -ον
bB	80	ἀνθοριστικός -ή -όν	bM	113	ἀντιστροφή ή
bB	79	ἀνθορισμός ὁ	bN	116	ἀντιτάσσω
bC	81	ἀνθυποφέρω	bN	117	ἀντιτάττω
bC	82	ἀνθυποφορά ή	bN	118	ἀντιτίθημι
bD	83	ἀντεχκαλέω	bN	115	ἀντιτάξις ή
bD	85	ἀντεγκληματικός -η -ον	bO	120	ἀντονομάζων
bD	84	ἀντέγκλημα τὸ	bO	121	ἀντονομασία ή
bE	86	ἀντεξετάζω	bO	119	ἀντονομάζω
bE	88	ἀντεξεταστέος -α -ον	bP	127	ἄξιος -ία -ιον
bE	89	ἀντεξεταστικός -ή -όν	bP	128	ἀξιόω
bE	87	ἀντεξέτασις ή	bP	122	ἀξία ή
bF	90	ἀντιδιηγέομαι	bQ	123	παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν
bF	91	ἀντιδιηγήσις ή	bR	124	ἀξιοπιστοσύνη ή
bG	93	ἀντιθετικός -ή -όν	bR	126	ἀξιόπιστος -ον
bG	94	ἀντίθετος -ον	bR	125	ἀξιοπιστία ή
bG	92	ἀντίθεσις ή	bS	131	ἀπαγγέλλω
bH	95	ἀντιλαμβάνω	bS	132	ἀπαγγελτικός -ή -όν
bH	96	ἀντιληπτέον	bS	130	ἀπαγγελία ή
bH	97	ἀντιληπτικός -ή -όν	bT	133	ἀπάγω
bH	98	ἀντίληψις ή	bT	135	ἀπαγωγός -όν
bI	100	ἀντινομικός -ή -όν	bT	134	ἀπαγωγή ή
bI	99	ἀντινομία ή	bU	136	ἀπάθεια ή
bJ	102	ἀντιπαραστατικός -ή -όν	bU	137	ἀπαθής -ές
bJ	103	ἀντιπαραστατικῶς	bV	138	ἀπαιτέω
			bV	141	ἀπαιτητικός -ή -όν
			bV	139	ἀπαίτησις ή
			bW	140	ἐλέγχων ἀπαίτησις (ή)
			bX	142	ἀπεριεργάστος -ον

Appendix II cont.

bX	143	ἀπεριεργία ἡ	cK	182	τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι
bX	144	ἀπερίεργος -ον			τέλους
bY	145	ἀπερίστατος -ον	cL	184	ἄσαφής -ές
bZ	147	ἀπιθανότης ἡ	cL	183	ἄσάφεια ἡ
bZ	146	ἀπίθανος -ον	cM	185	ἄστειζομαι
cA	148	ἀπιστέω	cM	186	ἄστειολογία ἡ
cA	149	ἀπιστητικός -ή -όν	cM	187	ἄστειος -α -ον
cA	151	ἄπιστος -ον	cM	188	ἄστειος -ον
cA	152	ἀπιστοσύνη ἡ	cM	189	ἄστεισμός ὁ
cA	150	ἀπιστία ἡ	cN	190	ἄσύνδετος -ον
cB	153	ἄπλαστος -ον	cO	129	ἄξύστατος -ον
cB	154	ἄπλός -η -ον	cO	191	ἄσυστασία ἡ
cB	156	ἄπλῶ	cO	192	ἄσύστατέω
cB	155	ἄπλους -ῆ -οῦς	cO	193	ἄσύστατος -ον
cC	157	ἀπόδεικνυμι	cP	194	ἄτέλεια ἡ
cC	158	ἀποδεικτικός -ή -όν	cP	195	ἄτελεστος -ον
cC	159	ἀπόδειξις ἡ	cP	196	ἄτελεύτητος -ον
cD	160	ἀποκαθίστημι	cP	197	ἄτελής -ές
cD	162	ἀποκατασταστικός -ή -όν	cQ	198	ἄτεχνέω
			cQ	199	ἄτεχνής -ές
cD	161	ἀποκαταστάσις ἡ	cQ	201	ἄτεχνος -ον
cE	163	ἀποκήρυκτος -ον	cQ	200	ἄτεχνία ἡ
cE	165	ἀποκηρύσσω	cR	202	αὐξάνω
cE	164	ἀποκήρυξις ἡ	cR	203	αὐξη ἡ
cF	167	ἀπόλαυσμα τὸ	cR	205	αὐξητικός -ή -όν
cF	168	ἀπολαυστικός -ή -όν	cR	206	αὐξίμος -ον
cF	169	ἀπολαυστός -ον	cR	207	αὐξω
cF	170	ἀπολαύω	cR	204	αὐξησις ἡ
cF	166	ἀπόλαυσις ἡ	cS	209	ἄφανής -ές
cG	171	ἀπολογέομαι	cS	210	ἄφανίζω
cG	172	ἀπολογητικός -ή -όν	cS	208	ἄφάνεια ἡ
cG	173	ἀπολογία ἡ	cT	211	ἄφηέομαι
cH	174	πιθανὴ ἀπολογία	cT	212	ἄφήγημα τὸ
cI	175	ἀπορέω	cT	213	ἄφηγηματικός -ή -όν
cI	177	ἄπορος -ον	cT	214	ἄφήγησις ἡ
cI	176	ἀπορία ἡ	cU	217	βαρύς -εῖα -ύ
cJ	178	ἀποστρέφω	cU	219	βαρυτόνος -ον
cJ	180	ἀπόστροφος -ον	cU	218	βαρύτης ἡ
cJ	179	ἀποστροφή ἡ	cV	220	βασανίζω
			cV	221	βασανιστέος -α -ον

Appendix II cont.

cV	222	βασανιστής ὁ	dH	261	διαλεκτικός -ή -όν
cV	223	βάσανος ἡ	dH	262	διάλεκτος ἡ
cW	228	βίαιος ὅρος	dH	263	διάλεξις ἡ
cX	224	βία ἡ	dI	264	διανέομαι
cX	225	βιάζω	dI	265	διανοητικός -ή -όν
cX	226	βίαιος -α -ον	dI	269	διανοίγω
cX	229	βιάω	dI	266	διάνοια ἡ
cX	227	βίαιος -ον	dJ	267	ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοια
cY	231	βουλευτήριος -ον	dK	268	διάνοια νομοθέτου
cY	232	βουλευτικός -ή -όν	dL	270	διαορίζω
cY	233	βουλευτός -ή -όν	dM	271	διαπορέω
cY	234	βουλεύω	dM	273	διαπορητικός -ή -όν
cY	230	βούλευσις ἡ	dM	272	διαπόρησις ἡ
cZ	236	βουλητέος -α -ον	dN	274	διαρθρώω
cZ	237	βουλητός -ή -όν	dN	276	διαρθρωτικός, -ή, -όν
cZ	238	βούλομαι	dN	275	διάρθρωσις ἡ
cZ	235	βούλησις ἡ	dO	277	διασκευάζω
dA	239	γνωματεύω	dO	278	διασκευή ἡ
dA	242	γνωμονικός -ή -όν	dP	279	διαστασιάζω
dA	240	γνώμη ἡ	dP	281	διαστατικός -ή -όν
dB	241	γνώμη νομοθέτου	dP	282	διάστατος -ον
dC	243	δεινός	dP	280	διαστάσις ἡ
dC	245	δεινωτικός -ή -όν	dQ	284	διατυπώω
dC	244	δείνωσις ἡ	dQ	286	διατυπωτικός -ή -όν
dD	246	δευτορολογέω	dQ	285	διατύπωσις ἡ
dD	247	δευτορολογία ἡ	dR	287	διηγέομαι
dE	248	διαβάλλω	dR	288	διήγημα τὸ
dE	250	διαβολία ἡ	dS	290	ἄρετὰ διηγήσεως
dE	251	διαβολικός -ή -όν	dT	289	διηγηματικός -ή -όν
dE	252	διάβολος -ον	dT	292	διηγητικός -ή -όν
dE	249	διαβολή ἡ	dT	291	διήγησις ἡ
dF	283	διατίθημι	dU	294	δικαιολογικός -ή -όν
dF	253	διάθεσις ἡ	dU	295	δικαιολόγος ὁ
dG	255	διαιρετικός -ή -όν	dU	293	δικαιολογία ἡ
dG	256	διαιρετός -ή -όν	dV	297	δίκαιος -ον
dG	257	διαίρῃω	dV	298	δικαιοσύνη ἡ
dG	254	διαίρεσις ἡ	dV	300	δικαιόω
dH	258	διαλέχομαι	dV	301	δικανικός -ή -όν
dH	259	διαλέγω	dV	296	δίκαιος -α -ον
dH	260	διαλεκτική ἡ	dW	299	μόριον τοῦ δικαίου

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dX	303	διλήμματον τό	eG	339	ἐγκώμιον τό
dX	304	διλήμματος -ον	eH	342	ἔθω
dX	302	δίλημμα τό	eH	341	ἔθος τό
dY	305	διορίζω	eI	343	εἰδικός -ή -όν
dY	307	διορισμός ό	eI	344	εἶδος τό
dY	308	διοριστικός -ή -όν	eJ	345	εἰκός τό
dY	306	διόρισις ή	eK	346	εἰσφορά νόμου
dZ	310	διπλόος -η -ον	eL	347	ἐκβαίνω (τό ἐκβησόμενον)
dZ	311	διπλοῦς -ή -οῦν	eM	349	ἐκθεσμος -ον
dZ	312	διπλόω	eM	350	ἐκθετικός -ή -όν
dZ	309	διπλασιασμός ό	eM	351	ἐκτίθημι
eA	313	δοκέω	eM	348	ἐκθεσις ή
eA	315	δοξάζω	eN	352	ἐκτός (τό)
eA	316	δοξασία ή	eO	353	ἐκτρέπω
eA	317	δόξασμα τό	eO	355	ἐκτροπός -όν
eA	318	δοξαστής ό	eO	354	ἐκτροπή ή
eA	319	δοξαστικός -ή -όν	eP	356	ἐκφράζω
eA	320	δοξαστός -ή -όν	eP	358	ἐκφρατικός -ή -όν
eA	321	δόξις ή	eP	357	ἐκφρασις ή
eA	314	δόξα ή	eQ	359	ἐλασσώω
eB	322	δύναμαι	eQ	360	ἐλάσσων -ον
eB	324	δυναμόω	eQ	362	ἐλάττων -ον
eB	325	δυνατός -ή -όν	eQ	361	ἐλαττώω
eB	323	δύναμις ή	eR	363	ἐλεγκτικός -ή -όν
eC	327	δυσπαρακόλουθος -ον	eR	365	ἐλέγχω
eC	326	δυσπαρακολούθητος -ον	eR	364	ἐλεγχος ό
eD	328	ἐχγραπτος -ον	eS	366	ἐλεεινός -ή -όν
eD	330	ἐχγραφος -ον	eS	367	ἐλεέω
eD	331	ἐχγράφω	eS	368	ἐλεος ό
eD	329	ἐχγραφή ή	eT	369	ἐλλειπτικός -ή -όν
eF	332	ἐγκαλέω	eT	370	ἐλλείπω
eF	334	ἐκκληματίζω	eT	371	ἐλλειψις ή
eF	335	ἐκκληματικός -ή -όν	eU	372	ἐλπίζω
eF	336	ἐκκλησις ή	eU	374	ἐλπιστικός -ή -όν
eF	333	ἐκκλημα τό	eU	375	ἐλπιστός -ή -όν
eG	337	ἐγκωμιάζω	eU	373	ἐλπίς ή
eG	338	ἐγκωμιαστικός -ή -όν	eV	376	ἐμβοάω
eG	340	ἐγκώμιος -ον	eV	377	ἐμβόημα τό
			eV	378	ἐμβόησις ή

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eW	380	ἐμπίπτων	fJ	418	ἐπανάχω
eW	379	ἐμπίπτω	fJ	420	ἐπαναχωχός -όν
eX	381	ἐμφαίνω	fJ	419	ἐπαναχωχή ή
eX	383	ἐμφατικός -ή -όν	fK	422	ἐπαναλαμβάνω
eX	382	ἐμφασις ή	fK	423	ἐπαναλήψις ή
eY	384	ἐναντιόομαι	fL	424	ἐπαναμιμνησκω
eY	386	ἐναντιότης ή	fL	425	ἐπανάμνησις ή
eY	385	ἐναντίος -α -ον	fM	426	ἐπενθυμέομαι
eZ	388	ἐνάρχης -ες	fM	428	ἐπενθύμησις ή
eZ	387	ἐνάρχεια ή	fM	427	ἐπενθύμημα τό
fA	389	ἐνδιασκευάζω	fN	429	ἐπιβατήριος -ον (τό)
fA	390	ἐνδιασκευή	fO	431	ἐπιγραφικός -ή -όν
fB	391	ἐνδοξος -ον	fO	432	ἐπιγράφω
fC	392	ἐνθυμέομαι	fO	430	ἐπιγραφή ή
fC	393	ἐνθυμέω	fP	434	ἐπιδεικτική ή
fC	395	ἐνθυμηματικός -ή -όν	fP	435	ἐπιδεικτικός -ή -όν
fC	396	ἐνθυμηματώδης -ες	fP	433	ἐπιδείκνυμι
fC	397	ἐνθυμίζομαι	fQ	436	ἐπιδιηγέομαι
fC	398	ἐνθυμίζω	fQ	437	ἐπιδιήγησις ή
fC	394	ἐνθύμημα τό	fR	439	ἐπικεύομαι
fD	399	ἐνίστημι	fR	440	ἐπικής -ές
fD	401	ἐνστατικός -ή -όν	fR	438	ἐπιείκεια ή
fD	400	ἐνστασις ή	fS	441	ἐπιζεύγνυμι
fE	407	ἐντολή ή	fS	443	ἐπίζευξις ή
fE	408	ἐντολικός -ή -όν	fS	442	ἐπιζεύγνυω
fE	402	ἐντέλλω	fT	444	ἐπίθεσις ή
fF	403	ἐντεχνάζω	fT	446	ἐπίθετος -ον
fF	404	ἐντεχνής -ές	fT	447	ἐπιθεωρέω
fF	406	ἐντεχνος -ον	fT	445	ἐπίθετον τό
fF	405	ἐντεχνία ή	fU	448	ἐπιθυμέω
fG	410	ἐπαγγέλλω	fU	449	ἐπιθυμητικός -ή -όν
fG	411	ἐπαγγελτικός -ή -όν	fU	450	ἐπιθυμία ή
fG	409	ἐπαγγελία ή	fV	451	ἐπιλέχω
fH	412	ἐπάχω	fV	452	ἐπιλογίζομαι
fH	414	ἐπαχωχικός -ή -όν	fV	453	ἐπιλογικός -ή -όν
fH	413	ἐπαχωχή ή	fV	454	ἐπίλογος ό
fI	415	ἐπαινετός -ή -όν	fW	455	ἐπιρρώννυμι
fI	416	ἐπαινέω	fW	456	ἐπιρρωννύω
fI	417	ἐπαινος ό	fW	457	ἐπιρρώομαι
			fW	458	ἐπίρρωσις ή

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FX	460	ἐπιστημονίζω	gH	499	εὐμαθία ἡ
FX	461	ἐπιστημονικός -ή -όν	gH	500	εὐμαθίη ἡ
FX	459	ἐπιστήμη ἡ	gH	497	εὐμάθεια ἡ
FY	462	ἐπιχαιρεκακέω	gI	501	εὐμνημόνευτος -ον
FY	464	ἐπιχαιρέκακος -ον	gJ	502	εὐνοέω
FY	465	ἐπιχαιρεσίκακος -ον	gJ	503	εὐνόησις ἡ
FY	466	ἐπιχαίρω	gJ	505	εὐνοίζομαι
FY	463	ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἡ	gJ	506	εὐνοϊκός -ή -όν
FZ	467	ἐπιχειρέω	gJ	507	εὐνοος -ον
FZ	470	ἐπιχειρηματικός -ή -όν	gJ	508	εὐνους -ουν
FZ	471	ἐπιχειρήσις ἡ	gJ	504	εὐνοια ἡ
FZ	472	ἐπιχειρητική ἡ	gK	510	εὐρετικός -ή -όν
FZ	473	ἐπιχειρητικός -ή -όν	gK	511	εὐρετός -ή -όν
FZ	468	ἐπιχείρημα τό	gK	512	εὐρησις ἡ
gA	469	τὸ πλαστόν	gK	513	εὐρίσκω
		ἐπιχείρημα	gK	509	εὐρεσις ἡ
gB	474	ἐργάζομαι	gL	514	εὐφημέω
gB	476	ἐργασιατικός -ή -όν	gL	516	εὐφημίζω
gB	477	ἐρχον τό	gL	517	εὐφημισμός ὁ
gB	475	ἐργασία ἡ	gL	518	εὐφημος -ον
gC	479	ἐρμήνευμα τό	gL	515	εὐφημία ἡ
gC	480	ἐρμηνευτικός -ή -όν	gM	520	εὐχήμεν -ον
gC	481	ἐρμηνεύω	gM	521	εὐχομαι
gC	478	ἐρμηνεία ἡ	gM	519	εὐχή ἡ
gD	483	ἐτερορρέπεια ἡ	gN	522	ζητέω
gD	484	ἐτερορρεπέω	gN	523	ζήτημα τό
gD	486	ἐτερορροπία ἡ	gO	524	πολιτικὸν ζήτημα
gD	487	ἐτερορροπός -όν	gP	525	ζητήσιμος -ον
gD	485	ἐτερορρεπής -ές	gP	527	ζητητικός -ή -όν
gE	488	εὐθυδίκαιος -ον	gP	526	ζήτησις ἡ
gE	490	εὐθύδικος -ον	gQ	528	ἥδομαι
gE	489	εὐθυδικία ἡ	gQ	530	ἡδονικός -ή -όν
gF	491	εὐλοθέω	gQ	529	ἡδονή ἡ
gF	492	εὐλοχητικός -ή -όν	gR	531	ἡθικεύομαι
gF	493	εὐλοχητός -ή -όν	gR	532	ἡθικός -ή -όν
gF	495	εὐλόχιστος -ον	gR	533	ἡθος τό
gF	496	εὐλόχος -ον	gS	534	θέσις ἡ
gF	494	εὐλοχία ἡ	gT	535	θεωρέω
gH	498	εὐμαθής -ές	gT	537	θεωρητικός -ή -όν
			gT	538	θεωρητός -ή -όν

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gT	539	θεωρία ἡ	hG	577	κρίσιμος -ον
gT	536	θεώρημα τὸ	hG	579	κριτικός -ή -όν
gU	541	θυμῶ	hG	578	κρίσις ἡ
gU	540	θυμός ὁ	hI	580	κῶλον τὸ
gV	542	ἰσάζω	hK	581	λειτουργία ἡ
gV	543	ἰσάζων	hL	582	λεκτική ἡ
gV	544	ἰσαία ἡ	hL	583	λεκτικός -ή -όν
gV	545	ἴσος -η -ον	hL	584	λεξικός -ή -όν
gW	546	κακοπλαστία	hL	585	λέξις ἡ
gW	547	κακόπλαστος -ον	hM	586	λογίζομαι
gX	548	κατασκευάζω	hM	587	λογικός -η -ον
gX	549	κατασκευαστικός -ή -όν	hM	588	λόγιος -α -ον
gX	550	κατασκευαστικῶς	hM	590	λογιστικός -ή -όν
gX	552	κατασκευῶ	hM	591	λόγος ὁ
gX	551	κατασκευή ἡ	hM	589	λογισμός ὁ
gY	554	καταστατικός -ή -όν	hN	592	λυπέω
gY	553	κατάστασις ἡ	hN	594	λυπηρός -ά -όν
gZ	555	καταφέρω	hN	593	λύπη ἡ
gZ	557	καταφορέω	hO	595	λύσιμος -ον
gZ	558	καταφορικός -ή -όν	hO	596	λύσιος -α -ον
gZ	556	καταφορά ἡ	hO	598	λύω
hA	559	καταψευδομαρτυρέω	hO	597	λύσις ἡ
hB	560	κατηγορέω	hP	599	μάρτυρ ὁ, ἡ
hB	561	κατηγόρημα τὸ	hP	600	μαρτυρέω
hB	562	κατηγορητικός -ή -όν	hP	601	μαρτυρία ἡ
hB	564	κατηγορικός -ή -όν	hP	602	μαρτυρικός -ή -όν
hB	565	κατήγορος -ον	hP	603	μαρτύριον τό
hB	563	κατηγορία ἡ	hP	604	μάρτυς ὁ, ἡ
hC	566	τελικὰ κεφάλαια	hQ	605	μαχέομαι
hD	568	κεφαλαίῳ	hQ	607	μαχησμός ὁ
hD	569	κεφαλαιώδης -ες	hQ	608	μαχητικός -ή -όν
hD	567	κεφάλαιος -α -ον	hQ	609	μάχιμος -η -ον
hD	570	κεφαλή ἡ	hQ	610	μάχιμος -ον
hE	571	κόμμα τὸ	hQ	611	μαχισμός ὁ
hE	573	κομματικῶς	hQ	612	μάχομαι
hE	572	κομματικός -ή -όν	hQ	606	μάχη ἡ
hF	574	κρείσσω -ον	hR	614	μεγαλοπρεπεύομαι
hF	575	κρείττων -ον	hR	615	μεγαλοπρεπής -ές
hG	576	κρίνω (κρινόμενον)	hR	823	πρέπω
			hR	613	μεγαλοπρέπεια ἡ

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hS 619	μεθοδεύω	iG 656	μνημονειός -όν
hS 620	μεθοδικός -ή -όν	iG 657	μνημόνευμα τό
hS 621	μέθοδος ή	iG 658	μνημονευτικός -ή -όν
hT 617	μέγεθος τό	iG 659	μνημονευτός -ή -όν
hT 616	μέγας -γάλη -χα	iG 660	μνημονεύω
hU 622	μειόω	iG 661	μνημονικός -ή -όν
hU 624	μειωτικός -ή -όν	iG 662	μνημονιός -όν
hU 625	μειωτός -ή -όν	iG 655	μνήμη ή
hU 623	μείωσις ή	iH 664	μονομερής -ές
hV 626	μελετάω	iH 663	μονομέρεια ή
hV 628	μελετηρός -ά -όν	iJ 665	μυθοποιέω
hV 629	μελετητικός -ή -όν	iJ 666	μυθοποιία ή
hV 627	μελέτη ή	iJ 668	μυθωδικός -ή -όν
hW 630	μερίζω	iJ 667	μῦθος ό
hW 632	μεριστικός -ή -όν	iK 669	νοέω
hW 633	μεριστός -ή -όν	iK 670	νόημα τὸ
hW 631	μερισμός ό	iK 672	νοητικός -ή -όν
hX 634	μετάθεσις τῆς αἰτίας	iK 673	νοητός -ή -όν
hY 635	μεταλαμβάνω	iK 671	νόησις ή
hY 636	μετάληψις ή	iL 674	νομίζω
hZ 637	έτέρα μετάληψις	iL 675	νομικός -ή -όν
iA 638	μεταξύ	iL 676	νόμιμος -η -ον
iB 639	μεταξύ τούτων	iL 677	νόμος ό
iC 618	μεθίστημι	iM 680	ὅμοιος -α -ον
iC 641	μεταστατικός -ή -όν	iM 682	ὁμοιόω
iC 640	μετάστασις ή	iM 681	ὁμοιότης ή
iD 642	μίχθυμι	iN 683	ὁμοιωματικός -ή -όν
iD 643	μιχνύω	iN 685	ὁμοιωτικός -ή -όν
iD 647	μικτός -ή -όν	iN 684	ὁμοιώσις ή
iE 645	μικρότερος -α -ον	iO 686	ὁμωνυμέω
iE 646	μικρύνω	iO 687	ὁμωνυμία ή
iE 644	μικρός -ά -όν	iO 688	ὁμωνυμικῶς
iF 648	μιμέομαι	iO 689	ὁμωνυμίοι τά
iF 649	μιμηλός -ή -όν	iO 690	ὁμωνύμιος -α -ον
iF 651	μιμητική ή	iO 692	ὁμῶνυμος -ον
iF 652	μιμητικός -ή -όν	iO 691	ὁμῶνυμος τό
iF 650	μίμησις ή	iP 693	ὀνοματοποιέω
iG 653	μιμνήσκομαι	iP 694	ὀνοματοποίησις ή
iG 654	μιμνήσκω	iP 696	ὀνοματοποιός ό
		iP 695	ὀνοματοποιία ή

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iQ 698	ὀρχίζω	jA 735	παραζήτησις ἡ
iQ 697	ὀρχή ἡ	jB 738	παραθετέος -ά -όν
iR 703	δύο ὄροι	jB 739	παραθεωρέω
iS 699	ὀρίζω	jB 737	παράθεσις ἡ
iS 700	ὀρικός -ή -όν	jC 740	παραιτέομαι
iS 701	ὀρισμός ὁ	jC 742	παραιτητικός -ή -όν
iS 702	ὀριστικός -ή -όν	jC 741	παραίτησις ἡ
iS 704	ὄρος ὁ	jD 743	παράκειμαι
iT 705	παθαίνω	jE 744	παραλειπτικός -ή -όν
iT 706	πάθη ἡ	jE 745	παραλειπτός -όν
iT 707	παθητικός -ή -όν	jE 746	παραλείπω
iT 708	πάθος τὸ	jE 747	παράλειψις ἡ
iU 709	πανηγυρίζω	jF 748	παραμυθέομαι
iU 710	πανηγυρικός	jF 749	παραμυθητικός -ή -όν
iU 711	πανήγυρις ἡ	jF 750	παραμυθητός -ή -όν
iV 712	παραβάλλω	jF 752	παραμύθιον τὸ
iV 714	παραβολικός -ή -όν	jF 751	παραμυθία ἡ
iV 715	παραβολικῶς	jG 754	παρασκευάσις ἡ
iV 713	παραβολή ἡ	jG 755	παρασκευαστικός -ή -όν
iW 717	παραγραφικός -η -ον	jG 756	παρασκευαστός -όν
iW 718	παραγράφω	jG 757	παρασκευή ἡ
iW 716	παραγραφή ἡ	jG 854	προπαρασκευάζω
iX 720	παραδειγματίζω	jG 753	παρασκευάζω
iX 721	παραδειγματικός -ή -όν	jH 758	παρεκβαίνω
iX 722	παραδειγματώδης -ες	jH 760	παρεκβατικός -ή -όν
iX 723	παραδείκνυμι	jH 761	παρεκβατικῶς
iX 724	παραδείκνυω	jH 759	παρέκβασις ἡ
iX 725	παράδειξις ἡ	jI 763	παρένθετος -ον
iX 719	παράδειγμα τὸ	jI 764	παρενθήκη ἡ
iY 726	παραδιηγέομαι	jI 762	παρένθεσις ἡ
iY 727	παραδιήγημα τὸ	jJ 765	παρέπομαι
iY 728	παραδιήγησις ἡ	jK 766	παρισώω
iZ 729	παραδοξολογέω	jK 767	παρίσωμα τό
iZ 730	παραδοξολογία ἡ	jK 769	παρισωτικός -ή -όν
iZ 731	παραδοξολόγος -ον	jK 768	παρίσωσις ἡ
iZ 732	παραδοξία ἡ	jL 770	πειθανάγκη ἡ
iZ 733	παράδοξος -ον	jL 771	πειθήμων -ον
jA 734	παραζητέω		
jA 736	παραζητητικός -ή -όν		

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jL	772	πειθός -ή -όν	jZ	814	ποιότης ή
jL	773	Πείθω ή	kA	815	κοινή ποιότης
jL	774	Πείθω	kB	816	πολυσχημάτιστος
jM	775	περιέχω (περιέχον καὶ περιεχόμενον)			-ον
jN	776	περιοδεύω	kC	818	πραγματεία ή
jN	777	περιοδικός -ή -όν	kC	819	πραχμάτευμα τό
jN	778	περίοδος ή	kC	820	πραγματεύομαι
jO	779	περιοχή ή	kC	821	πραγματικός -ή -όν
jP	781	περισσότης ή	kC	822	πρακτικός -ή -όν
jP	784	περιττός -ή -όν	kC	817	πράγμα τό
jP	785	περιττότης ή	kD	824	προβάλλω
jP	780	περισσός -ή -όν	kD	826	προβληματικός -ή -όν
jQ	783	περιστατικός -ή -όν	kD	827	προβολή ή
jQ	782	περίστασις ή	kD	829	προβοληματοώδης -ες
jR	787	περιφράσσω	kD	825	πρόβλημα τό
jR	788	περιφραστικός -ή -όν	kE	828	έτέρα προβολή
jR	789	περιφράττω	kF	831	προχύμνασμα τό
jR	786	περίφρασις ή	kF	830	προχυμνάω
jS	791	πευστικός -ή -όν	kG	832	προδιηχέομαι
jS	790	πεύσις ή	kG	833	προδιήχησις ή
jT	792	πηλικότης ή	kH	834	προδιορθόομαι
jU	796	πιστεύω	kH	835	προδιόρθωσις ή
jU	800	πιστός -ή -όν	kI	836	προειλημμένος τη
jU	801	πιστός			κρίσει
jU	797	πίστις ή	kJ	837	προέκθεσις ή
jV	798	ἄτεχνος πίστις	kJ	838	προεκτίθημι
jW	799	ἐντεχνος πίστις	kK	65	ἀναπείθω
jX	802	πλαχιάζω	kK	793	πιθανός -ή -όν
jX	804	πλάχιος -α -ον	kK	794	πιθανότης ή
jX	803	πλαχιασμός ό	kK	795	πιθανόω
jY	805	πλάσις ή	kL	840	προθετικός -ή -όν
jY	807	πλασματικός -ή -όν	kL	841	προθεωρία ή
jY	808	πλασματογράφος -ον	kL	874	προτίθημι
jY	809	πλασματογραφέω	kL	839	πρόθεσις ή
jY	810	πλασματώδης -ες	kM	842	προκατασκευαστικός
jY	811	πλάσσω			-ή -όν
jY	812	πλαστός -ή -όν	kM	843	προκατασκευάζω (-
jY	813	πλάττω			ομενος)
jY	806	πλάσμα τό	kM	844	προκατασκευή ή

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kN	846	προκατασταστικός -ή -όν	1B	890	σημειώω
kN	845	προκατάστασις ή	1B	891	σημειώδης -ες
kO	847	προλογέω	1B	889	σημείον τὸ
kO	848	προλογίζω	1C	892	σκοπεύω
kO	849	πρόλογος ὁ	1C	893	σκοπέω
kP	181	ἀπροοιμίαστος -ον	1C	894	σκοπός ὁ ή
kP	850	προοιμιάζομαι	1D	895	στάσιμος -ον
kP	851	προοιμιακός -ή -όν	1D	897	στατικός -ή -όν
kP	852	προοιμιαστέον	1D	896	στάσις ή
kP	1061	φροιμιαστέον	1E	898	στοχάζομαι
kP	1062	φροίμιον	1E	900	στοχαστικός -ή -όν
kP	853	προοίμιον τὸ	1E	899	στοχασμός ὁ
kQ	855	πρός τι	1F	678	ξυγχνώμη ή
kR	856	προσαγγελία ή	1F	679	ξυγχνώμων -ον
kR	857	προσαγγέλλω	1F	901	συγχιγνωμονέω
kS	858	προσδιορίζω	1F	902	συγχιγνώσκω
kS	859	τὸ μὴ προσδιωρίσθαι	1F	904	συγχνωμονέω
kT	861	προσηνής -ές	1F	905	συγχνωμονικός -ή -όν
kT	860	προσήνεια ή	1F	906	συγχνωμοσύνη ή
kU	862	προσοχή ή	1F	907	συγχνώμων -ον
kV	868	πρόσωπος ὁ	1F	908	συγχνώσκω
kV	863	πρόσωπον τὸ	1F	903	συγχνώμη ή
kW	864	προσωποποιέω	1G	910	συγκαταθετικός -ή -όν
kW	866	προσωποποικῶς	1G	916	συγκατατίθημι
kW	867	προσωποποιός -όν	1G	909	συγκατάθεσις ή
kW	865	προσωποποιία ή	1H	912	συγκατασκευαστικός -ή -όν
kX	870	προτάσσω	1H	913	συγκατασκευαστικῶς
kX	871	προτατικός -ή -όν	1H	914	συγκατασκευή ή
kX	872	προτάττω	1H	915	συγκατασκευόω
kX	873	προτείνω	1H	911	συγκατασκευάζω (τὸ -όμενος)
kX	869	πρότασις ή	1I	918	συγκεφαλαίωμα τὸ
kY	875	προτρεπτικός -ή -όν	1I	919	συγκεφαλαίωσις ή
kY	876	προτρέπω	1I	920	συγκεφαλαιωτικός -ή -όν
kZ	884	ρήτῶς	1I	917	συγκεφαλαιόω
kZ	882	ρήτός -ή -όν	1J	921	συγκρίνω
1A	886	σαφηνέω	1J	923	συγκριτικός -ή -όν
1A	887	σαφηνίζω			
1A	888	σαφηνιστικός -ή -όν			
1A	885	σαφήνεια ή			

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1J 924	σύγκριτος -ον	1V 960	συνωνυμία ή
1J 922	σύγκρισις ή	1W 963	συστατικός -ή -όν
1K 926	συζευκτικός όν	1W 964	συστατός -όν
1K 927	σύζευξις ή	1W 962	σύστασις ή
1K 925	συζεύγνυμι	1X 965	συστοιχέω
1L 928	συλληπτικός -ή -όν	1X 967	σύστοιχος -ον
1L 929	σύλληψις ή	1X 966	συστοιχία ή-
1M 930	συλλογίζομαι	1Y 968	σχετλιάζω
1M 932	συλλογιστία ή	1Y 970	σχετλιαστικός -ή
1M 933	συλλογιστικός -ή		-όν
	-όν	1Y 969	σχετλιασμός ό
1M 931	συλλογισμός ό	1Z 482	έσχηματισμένως
1N 935	συμβεβηκός -ή -όν	1Z 972	σηματίζω
1N 934	συμβαίνω	1Z 973	σηματικός -ή -όν
1O 936	συμβούλευμα τò	1Z 974	σηματισμός ό
1O 937	συμβουλευτικός -ή	1Z 975	σηματοποιέω
	-όν	1Z 976	σηματότης ή
1O 938	συμβουλεύω	1Z 971	σχῆμα τò
1P 939	συμπεπλεγμένος	mA 978	σωματικός -ή -όν
1P 940	συμπλέκω	mA 979	σωματοποιέω
1Q 942	συμπλοκός -όν	mA 977	σῶμα τò
1Q 941	συμπλοκή ή	mB 981	τάσσω
1R 943	συμφέρον τò	mB 982	τάττω
1R 944	συμφερτός -ή -όν	mB 980	τάξις ή
1R 945	συμφέρω	mC 983	ταυτολογέω
1S 946	συνθεσία ή	mC 985	ταυτολογικῶς
1S 948	συνθετικός -ή -όν	mC 986	ταυτολόχος -ον
1S 949	σύνθετος -ον	mC 984	ταυτολογία ή
1S 953	συντίθημι	mD 988	τεκμηριόω
1S 947	σύνθεσις ή	mD 989	τεκμηριώμα τò
1T 950	σύνταξις ή	mD 990	τεκμηρίωσις ή
1T 952	συντάττω	mD 987	τεκμήριον τò
1T 951	συντάσσω	mE 995	τελευταῖος -α -ον
1U 954	συντομεύω	mE 996	τελευτάω
1U 956	συντομολογία ή	mE 997	τελευτέω
1U 957	συντομολόχος -ον	mE 998	τελευτή ή
1U 958	σύντομος -ον	mF 991	τέλειος -α -ον
1U 955	συντομία ή	mF 992	τελειόω
1V 959	συνωνυμέω	mF 993	τέλεος -α -ον
1V 961	συνώνυμος -ον	mF 994	τελεόω

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mF	999	τελέω
mF	1000	τελίσάζω
mF	1001	τέλος τὸ
mG	1002	τεχνάζω
mG	1003	τεχνάομαι
mG	1005	τεχνήμων -ον
mG	1006	τεχνητικός -ή -όν
mG	1007	τεχνικός -ή -όν
mG	1004	τέχνη ἡ
mH	1008	τοπικός -ή -όν
mH	1009	τόπος ὁ
mJ	1010	τροπή ἡ
mJ	1011	τροπικός -ή -όν
mJ	1012	τρόπος ὁ
mK	1014	ὑπερβατός -ή -όν
mK	1015	ὑπερβατός -όν
mK	1013	ὑπερβατόν τὸ
mL	1016	ὑπερβολάδην
mL	1018	ὑπερβολικός -ή -όν
mL	1019	ὑποβάλλω
mL	1017	ὑπερβολή ἡ
mM	877	ῥητήρ ὁ
mM	878	ῥητορεία ἡ
mM	879	ῥητορεύω
mM	881	ῥητορικός -ή -όν
mM	883	ῥήτωρ ὁ ἡ
mM	880	ῥητορική ἡ
mO	1020	ὑποδιαίρεμα τό
mO	1022	ὑποδιαίρετικός -ή -όν
mO	1023	ὑποδιαίρετός -ή -όν
mO	1024	ὑποδιαιρέω
mO	1033	ὑπομερισμός ὁ
mO	1021	ὑποδιαίρεσις ἡ
mP	1026	ὑποθετικός -ή -όν
mP	1041	ὑποτίθῃμι
mP	1025	ὑπόθεσις ἡ
mQ	1027	ὑποκρίνομαι
mQ	1029	ὑποκριτικός -ή -όν
mQ	1028	ὑπόκρισις ἡ

mR	1030	ὑπολαμβάνω
mR	1031	ὑπολήμψις ἡ
mR	1032	ὑπολήψις ἡ
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(ITV)
FOR THE TEXT OF AnSg**

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**APPENDIX IV:
THE INDEX OF TECHNICAL VOCABULARY
(ITV)
FOR THE HERMOGENIC CORPUS**

N.B. -- Terms not appearing in this index
have no occurrences in the Hermogenic corpus

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cE 165	αποκτηρύσσω		απεκηρύχθησαν 10.52 αποκηρύσσει 1.113: 2.45	αποκηρύσσεται 4.13.81: 4.13.109 απεκήρυξεν 3.10.21 αποκηρύσσει 4.13.96
cF 170	απολαύω			απελαύομεν 2.2.15
cG 171	απολογέομαι		απολογουμένους 5.110 απολογήσασθαι 3.262 απολογήσεται 1.69: 3.311	απολογούμενος 4.13.82 απολογώμεθα 1.1.152: 2.5.27: 2.6.17: 3.4.11 απολογουμένους 1.1.110 απολογουμένων 1.1.12: 1.1.139[5]
cG 173	απολογία ή		απολογία 3.237 απολογίαν 3.255: 3.270	απολογίας 1.3.3: 1.3.23: 2.5.35: 4.5.7 απολογία 4.5.8 απολογίας 3.3.25
cH 174	πιθανή απολογία		1.123: 3.5: 3.158: 3.176: 3.239: 3.299	4.14.12
cI 175	απορέω			απορεί 3.15.55 απορήσασα 3.6.32 αποροίη 3.15.54
cI 176	απορία ή			απορίαν 3.5.174 απορίας 3.5.170
cI 177	απορος -ον		απορον 1.102	απορα 3.5.181 απορον 3.14.9: 3.15.38
cJ 179	αποστροφή ή			αποστροφήν 4.3.29
cK 182	τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀχρι τέλους		3.5: 3.79: 3.85: 3.88: 3.96: 3.122: 3.130: 3.159: 3.172: 3.233: 3.242: 3.293: 4.7: 4.9: 4.12: 5.31: 6.11: 6.15	1.2.21: 1.2.29: 1.5.10: 1.5.14: 1.5.45: 1.5.46: 3.10.1: 3.10.2: 3.10.6: 3.10.8: 3.10.10: 3.10.17: 3.11.1: 3.11.7: 3.11.20: 3.11.22: 3.12.1: 3.12.3: 3.15.40: 3.15.47: 4.4.64

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CM 187	ἀστεῖος -α -ον			ἀστεῖον 3.2.33	
CO 193	ἀσυστατος -ον		ἀσυστατα 1.86 ἀσυστάτων 1.87; 1.116		
CP 194	ἀτέλεια ἡ			ἀτέλειαν 3.4.79; 4.3.35; 4.3.109; 4.3.120; 4.3.127; 4.3.131; 4.3.133	
CP 197	ἀτελής -ές		ἀτελεῖς 3.217; 3.218 ἀτελής 2.11; 2.11 ἀτελής 3.240; 3.266 Ἀτελής 3.220; 3.226 ἀτελοῦς 3.230	ἀτελῆ 4.3.34; 4.3.108; 4.3.120; 4.3.127; 4.3.129; 4.3.134	
CQ 201	ἀτεχνος -ον			ἀτέχνοις 4.10.23 ἄτεχνον 1.3.22; 2.1.15	
CR 202	αὔξανω		αὔξων 4.11 αὔξιν 3.209 αὔξεται 3.80	αὔξιν 3.13.5; 4.4.173	
CR 204	αὔξησις ἡ		αὔξησεως 5.118; 5.121 αὔξησιν 6.10		
CS 209	ἄφανής -ές		ἄφανει 1.65 ἄφανές 1.84; 2.3; 2.4; 2.9 ἄφανής 3.9; 3.232		
CS 210	ἄφανίζω			ἄφανισθέντος 2.2.4	
CT 211	ἀφηγέομαι			ἀφηγήσατο 4.11.12 ἀφηγήσασθαι 1.1.35 ἀφηγησόμεθα 2.7.27[1][1]	
CT 214	ἀφήγησις ἡ			ἀφήγησιν 3.15.26 ἀφήγησις 3.15.4	

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aa	216	ἀφορμή ἡ			ἀφορμὰς 1.1.29 ἀφορμή 4.3.97
cU	217	βαρύς -εἶα -ύ			βαρεῖαν 2.6.12
cV	220	βασανίζω		βασανίζων 3.30	
cV	223	βάσανος ἡ		βάσανοι 3.332: 6.73 βασάνοις 3.304 βασάνων 3.305	
cX	224	βία ἡ		βία 4.76 βίᾱ 4.74 βίας 4.79	βίας 2.5.32: 4.4.188
cX	225	βιάζω		βεβιάσθαι 4.75 βιάζω 5.82 βιασθεῖσα 2.105 βιασαμένου 2.105: 10.80 ἐβιάσατο 2.106: 4.68: 10.79	βιάζετο 4.9.32 βιαζομένων 4.9.39 βίασαι 3.10.93
cX	227	βίαιος -ον		βίαιον 3.110: 4.92 βίαιος 4.72: βιαίῳ 4.71 βιαίως 3.176	βίαια 2.5.33 βιαιότερον 3.6.39 βιαίου 3.3.1 βιαιότατον 3.6.13
cW	228	βίαιος ὅρος		6.8: 6.34: 6.39: 9.5: 10.16: 10.83: 11.3: 11.29	
cY	231	βουλευτήριος -ον			βουλευτήριον 1.1.9
cY	234	βουλεύω		βουλεύεσθαι 1.109: 7.6 βουλεύεται 1.104 βουλεύεσθαι 6.51 βουλεύονται 1.118: 2.35	βεβουλεύεσθαι 2.7.30 βουλευομένων 4.13.7 ἐβουλεύω 3.14.24 βουλευόμεθα 1.1.10: 2.2.10 βουλεύεσθαι 3.14.22 βουλευόμενοι 2.2.2: 4.1.31 βουλεύονται 2.2.5: 2.2.9: 2.2.10: 2.2.29: 2.2.47: 2.3.15

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cZ	238	βούλομαι	βούλεται 3.103; 3.153; 5.132; 8.13 βουλόμενος 11.16; 11.18 έβούλετο 11.21; 11.25 έβουλόμην 8.45 βουλομένους 3.147 έβουλόθης 3.260 ήβουλόθην 3.259	βούλεσθαι 4.13.39 βούλεται 3.2.54; 3.7.44; 3.7.45; 4.13.15; 4.13.16; 4.13.80 βούλει 1.5.43; 3.10.35; 4.4.67 βουληθήναι 4.14.6; 4.14.7 βούλονται 1.1.172 βούλοιο 4.3.148; 4.3.150; 4.3.153; 4.3.155 βούλομαι 1.1.148 βουλομένοις 3.2.11; 3.2.91; 3.2.103; 4.2.18 βουλόμενος 3.10.65 βουλώμεθα 1.1.73 έβούλεσθε 3.11.60 έβούλετο 4.2.60 γνώμην 1.1.19
dA	240	γνώμη ή	γνώμαις 5.103 γνώμη 4.45; 5.49; 6.53; 8.49; 10.17; 12.33 γνώμη 3.156; 3.327; 4.6; 4.46; 4.47; 4.49; 5.5; 5.25; 6.9; 8.28; 9.6; 11.6; γνώμης 3.326; 6.18; 9.14; 12.35 4.3; 4.23; 10.45; 11.3; 11.16; 12.3; 12.17	
dB	241	γνώμη νομοθέτου		
dC	243	δεινώω		δεινώσαι 2.7.89

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dD	247	δευτερολογία ή	δευτερολογία 3.188	
dE	248	διαβάλλω	διαβαλεί 3.35 διαβάλλειν 3.42; 11.18 διαβεβλημένα 1.30	
dE	249	διαβολή ή	διαβολή 11.28	διαβολήν 2.4.48
dG	254	διαίρεσις ή	διαίρει 3.219; 4.95 διαίρεσις 1.22 διαίρεσως 1.7; 1.10; 1.134; 1.142; 1.153; 1.163; 2.148; 5.57; 6.55; 6.65; 7.57 διαίρειν 2.103; 3.298; 5.100; 5.112; 6.58; 10.19; 12.7; 12.9 διαίρεσις 3.217; 3.339; 4.97; 7.53	διαίρειν 4.14.3
dG	255	διαίρετικός -ή -όν	διαίρετικού 6.80	διαίρετικήν 3.4.3 διαίρετικής 3.4.5 διαίρετική 3.6.3
dG	257	διαίρειω	διαίρεισθαι 1.24; 1.78 διαίρειται 3.3; 3.224; 4.2; 5.2; 5.120; 7.2; 8.25; 9.2; 11.2; 11.8; 12.2 διαίρετέον 2.58 διαίρουµεν 10.42 διαίρειν 5.110 διαίρήσει 1.155; 5.117 διαίρήσεις 2.30; 2.39; 4.58; 4.108; 4.116; 10.7; 11.33 διαίρήσοµεν 2.47 διαίρήται 2.79 διαίροίη 5.139 διαίρούµενον 2.96 διαίρουµένου 2.98 διαίρουνται 6.3 διαίρουντες 5.50; 8.38 διαίρων 10.41; 10.57 διελείν 3.262; 3.288; 5.95	διελών 1.1.5 διηρηµένης 3.14.10 διαιρουμένη 4.13.106 διαιρουμένης 3.2.106 διαιρουσι 4.2.54 διήρει 3.9.6

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dI 266	διάνοια ή		διάνοια 6.5; 6.27; 9.10; 9.17; 10.8; 10.11; 10.29; 10.35; 10.44 διανοίαις 2.86 διανοία 3.129; 6.7; 6.12; 6.17; 9.3; 9.4; 10.7; 10.10; 10.19; 12.3 διανοίας 2.82	διάνοια 4.3.89; 4.3.90; 4.4.31 διανοίας 3.14.10; 4.4.32; 4.4.138 διάνοιαν 4.4.6; 4.4.10; 4.4.38
dJ 267	τὸ ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοιαν		2.83; 2.84; 2.100; 2.134; 3.125; 8.14; 9.2; 10.3; 10.10; 10.18	
dL 270	διαορίζω			διωρισμένα 3.2.76
dM 271	διαπορέω			διαπορήσαι 3.2.42
dM 273	διαπορητικός -ή -όν			διαπορητικῶς 4.3.66
dO 277	διασκευάζω			διασκευάζεται 2.7.68; 3.15.8 διασκευάζει 2.7.84 διασκευάζοντα 3.15.13 διασκευάζοντες 3.15.69 διασκευάζοντος 3.15.5 διασκευάζόντων 3.15.51 διασκευάσαι 3.15.80 διασκευασθῆναι 3.15.34 διασκευάσασθαι 3.15.71

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d0	278	διασκευή ή		διασκευάς 4.12.7 διασκευή 3.15.2; 3.15.24 διασκευή 3.15.38; 3.15.48; 3.15.57; 3.15.60 διασκευήν 2.7.69; 3.15.19; 3.15.86; 3.15.89 διασκευής 2.7.82; 3.15.1; 3.15.46; 3.15.52; 3.15.54
dP	280	διαστάσεις ή	διαστάσεως 2.110 διάστασιν 2.116	διαστάσει 3.14.42
dP	283	διατίθημι	διέθετο 2.117 διετέθην 3.138	διετέθησαν 1.1.20
dQ	284	διατυπώ		διατυπών 4.9.10 διατυπούντες 3.15.48 διατυπούντων 3.15.24
dQ	285	διατύπωσης ή		διατυπώσεων 3.15.71 διατυπώσει 3.15.12 διατύπωσις 3.15.2; 3.15.4; 3.15.20; 3.15.75; 4.9.16 διατύπωσιν 3.15.26; 3.15.34; 3.15.39
dR	287	διηχέομαι		διηγείται 2.7.68; 2.7.120; 2.7.121 διηγούμενοι 2.4.57 διηγώσομαι 1.1.16
dR	288	διήχημα τὸ		διήχηματα 4.12.6 διήχηματι 4.12.23
dT	289	διηχηματικός -ή -όν		διηχηματικόν 1.4.27 διηχηματικῶς 4.8.10

dt	291	διήγησις ή		διήγησει 2.7.67; 2.7.73; 3.15.31 διηγήσεις 2.3.22; 2.6.24 διηγήσεσι 2.7.3; 3.15.35 διήγησις 2.1.2 διήγησις 2.4.10; 2.4.18; 2.4.31; 2.4.45; 2.7.5; 2.7.75; 2.7.85; 2.7.100; 2.7.113; 3.15.28 διηγήσεων 2.7.110 διηγήσεως 2.1.1; 2.1.6; 2.1.10; 2.1.16; 2.3.24; 2.3.37; 2.4.10; 2.4.26; 2.4.36; 2.5.40; 2.7.1; 2.7.8; 2.7.28; 2.7.70; 2.7.102; 2.7.122; 3.2.53 διήγησιν 2.1.4; 2.1.15; 2.4.57; 2.5.13; 2.5.25; 2.6.14; 2.7.29; 2.7.69; 3.2.37; 3.2.45; 3.2.52; 3.15.37
du	293	δικαιολογία ή	δικαιολογία 2.38	
du	294	δικαιολογικός -ή -όν	δικαιολογικών 7.22	
dv	296	δικαιος -α -ον	δίκαιον 2.25; 3.202; 7.22; 8.19 δικαίου 1.16; 5.3; 5.7; 5.12 δικαίω 7.2 δικαίως 10.64	δίκαια 1.1.166 δίκαιον 2.2.16; 2.3.11; 3.2.6; 3.4.76; 3.3.9; 3.5.35 δικαίος 3.4.102 δικαίων 3.3.18 δικαίως 3.2.50; 3.4.96; 3.10.35
dw	299	μόριον του δικαίου	5.1; 5.7; 5.12	
dv	301	δικανικός -ή -όν	δικανικόν 1.139 δικανικώς 1.139	δικανικήν 3.2.31
dx	302	δίλημμα το		δilhμματα 4.6.14; 4.6.31; 4.6.36

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dx	303	διλήμματον τό		διλήμματον 4.6.2; 4.6.8; 4.6.18; 4.6.37 διλημμάτου 4.6.1
dy	305	διορίτω	διορίζειν 9.20	
dz	311	διπλοῦς -ῆ -οῦν	διπλαῖ 5.54 διπλᾶ 2.19; 4.56 διπλῇ 2.99; 3.26; 5.112; 10.59; 10.63 διπλῇ 3.218 διπλοῖ 3.218; 4.53 διπλοῖς 4.57; 4.58; 10.5 διπλοῦ 3.250 διπλοῦν 10.2 διπλοῦς 3.249; 3.251; 3.266; 3.275; 3.276; 4.98 διπλῶν 3.283; 5.99	διπλῇ 3.9.46; 3.13.2; 4.14.24 διπλῇ 3.2.35 διπλῇν 3.11.46 διπλοῖς 4.14.3; 4.14.21 διπλοῦν 1.5.13; 4.13.32 διπλῶς 4.14.14
ea	313	δοκέω	δοκεῖ 1.6; 10.12 δοκούντος 2.43	δοκεῖ 1.1.178; 3.5.126; 4.2.35; 4.4.177; 4.12.17; 4.13.102 δοκεῖν 1.1.162; 1.4.10; 3.2.48; 3.2.50; 3.2.66; 3.2.81; 3.5.153; 3.5.160; 3.5.169; 3.9.19; 3.13.5; 4.2.36; 4.12.32; 4.13.27 δοκῇ 4.13.76 δοκοῖν 2.5.9 δοκοῦν 4.13.39 δοκοῦσιν 3.7.7 δοκῶ 2.2.31; 2.2.49; 2.7.14 δοκῶν 3.13.18 δόξαντα 3.4.23; 3.4.26; 3.4.30 δόξης 3.10.99 ἐδοκεῖ 3.9.41; 4.10.30 ἐδόξανμεν 4.13.88 ἐδοξε 3.7.30 ἐδοξεν 3.1.14; 4.12.18

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eA 314	δόξα η	δόξα 7.62; 7.68	δόξαι 3.10.86; 4.3.69; 4.11.10 δόξαν 3.5.76; 3.8.2; 3.8.4; 3.8.37; 3.9.13; 3.13.7; 4.1.12; 4.6.3 δόξης 1.5.23; 2.3.17
eA 315	δοξάζω	δόξη 3.328	δόξη 1.1.58; 3.5.148; 3.5.151
eB 322	δύναμαι	δυνάμενα 1.78; 5.113; 10.13 δυνάμενον 1.84; 2.59; 2.61; 5.74 δυναμένου 1.128 δύνασθαι 1.25; 5.125 δύναιντ' 5.16 δύνασαι 8.21 δύναται 1.24; 1.35; 3.120; 3.148; 3.170; 4.78; 5.43; 5.46; 5.101; 5.122 δυναθήναι 10.14	δυναθήναι 2.6.15; 2.7.55; 4.12.36; 4.14.9 δυναθῶ 1.1.149 δυνάμενα 4.13.103 δύναιτ' 4.3.12; 4.3.46; 4.3.92 δύναιτο 3.5.7; 3.10.12; 4.3.115 δυνάμεθα 1.2.71; 1.5.27; 2.7.66; 3.9.17 δυναμένης 3.5.178 δυνάμενοι 4.13.19 δυνάμενον 3.5.79; 3.11.5; 4.4.174; 4.9.30; 4.10.4 δυναμένων 3.15.11; 4.8.19; 4.12.12; 4.13.92 δύνασαι 3.10.93; 3.15.80; 3.15.89 δύνασθαι 1.5.31; 1.5.38; 3.5.160; 3.8.21; 4.5.3; 4.8.9; 4.8.26 δύναται 1.2.11; 3.2.63; 3.10.23; 3.10.24; 3.10.26; 3.10.38; 3.14.6; 3.14.8; 4.2.28; 4.3.83; 4.3.112; 4.3.114; 4.3.117; 4.3.122; 4.3.138; 4.4.93; 4.5.8; 4.8.21; 4.9.27 δυναθῇ 3.15.16 δύνηται 3.5.13 δυνώμεθα 1.3.5; 1.3.8; 1.4.4; 2.7.23; 2.7.26; 3.3.5 δυνάμενος 3.5.82 ἰδυνάμην 1.3.5; 1.3.8; 1.3.13; 1.3.17; 1.3.20; 1.3.22 ἰδυναθήν 3.5.77 ἰδύναντο 4.7.17

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eB 325	δυνατός -ή -όν	δυνατόν 3.202: 7.39: 7.45 δυνατώ 7.3	
eD 330	εγγραφος -ον	εγγραφον 2.92: 9.7 εγγραφος 2.128: 2.129: 7.4: 7.4: 8.2: 8.3 εγγράφω 2.90: 2.93: 7.10: 9.24	
eF 332	εγκαλέω	εγκαλεί 1.130	
eF 333	εγκλημα τό	εγκλημάτων 5.101 εγκλήματα 5.113 εγκλήματι 4.89: 11.20 εγκλήματος 3.190	εγκλημάτων 2.4.5 εγκλήματα 1.1.13: 1.1.140: 1.1.166: 3.2.23 εγκλήματος 2.5.3: 3.4.15
eG 338	εγκωμιαστικός -ή -όν	εγκωμιαστικά 3.61 εγκωμιαστικούς 1.46 εγκωμιαστικών 3.57: 4.39	
eG 339	εγκώμιον τό		εγκωμίων 4.14.29
eH 341	εθος τό	εθος 7.12 εθών 1.15	εθει 3.5.101: 4.2.21 εθος 3.4.23: 3.4.27: 3.4.30

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eI 344	Εἶδος τὸ	εἶδη 1.8: 1.115: 1.133: 1.137: 2.127: 3.283: 3.334: 4.51: 5.53: 5.56: 5.125: 5.137: 6.55: 11.32 εἶδος 1.86: 1.87: 4.118 εἶδους 1.135: 5.109: 6.80	εἶδη 1.2.9: 2.1.18: 4.4.4: 4.4.39 εἶδος 2.1.9: 3.2.64: 3.4.62: 3.3.2: 4.4.57: 4.9.24 εἶδους 4.10.13
eJ 345	Εἰκός τὸ	εἰκός 3.295: 3.296: 5.38	εἰκός 1.1.21: 3.5.64: 3.5.66: 3.5.129: 3.5.131: 3.5.133: 3.15.10: 3.15.14: 3.15.18: 4.12.8: 4.12.10: 4.14.6: 4.14.7: 4.14.9: 4.14.9 εἰκότα 3.4.107 εἰκότος 3.15.16: 4.2.35: 4.12.7 εἰκότων 3.5.56
eK 346	Εἰσφορά νόμου		2.3.2: 2.3.20: 2.3.21: 2.3.35: 3.2.114
eL 347	Ἐβαίνω (τὸ ἐβησόμενον)	ἐβησόμενον 7.71 ἐβησομένην 7.3	
eM 351	Ἐκτίθημι	ἐκτίθεμαι 10.58	ἐκτίθης 4.13.89
eP 357	Ἐκφρασις ἡ	ἔκφρασις 10.62	
eQ 362	Ἐλάττων -ον	ἔλαττον 11.38 ἐλάττωνος 11.42	ἔλαττον 4.13.98
eR 363	Ἐλεγκτικός -ή -όν		ἐλεγκτικόν 4.4.80
eR 364	Ἐλεγχος ὁ	ἔλεγχον 3.51 ἔλεγχος 2.5	ἐλέγχους 3.4.13: 3.4.15: 3.4.17: 3.4.18: 3.4.20: 3.5.33: 3.5.35: 3.5.162
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eS 367	ἐλεέω	ἐλεήσας 3.137	
eS 368	ἐλεος ὁ	ἐλεον 6.75 ἐλεος 3.332 ἐλέου 3.206	
eT 370	ἐλλείπω		ἐλλείπον 4.3.38 ἐλλείψει 4.10.15
eU 372	ἐλπίζω		ἐλπίζεται 3.4.70 ἐλπίζομεν 1.1.161
eU 373	ἐλπίς ἡ		ἐλπίδος 2.2.18
eW 379	ἐμπίπτω	ἐμπέπτωκεν 4.28; 6.21 ἐμπέση 3.287; 4.110 ἐμπίπτει 1.39; 3.97; 5.32 ἐμπίπτει 5.25; 6.11; 10.86 ἐμπίπτων 3.284; 3.286; 4.109	ἐμπέση 4.14.33 ἐμπίπτει 3.5.26; 3.5.112
eX 381	ἐμφαίνω		ἐμφαίνει 4.13.28; 4.13.107 ἐμφαίνεται 1.1.14; 1.1.57; 4.10.10 ἐμφαίνεται 1.1.169 ἐμφανισμένην 2.1.15 ἐμφανισμένης 2.2.18 ἐμφανισμένου 4.10.5 ἐμφανισμένων 1.1.14; 3.15.12 ἐμφανίσωμεν 4.13.21 ἐμφανίσιτο 1.1.55

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eX 382	Εμφασις ή			έμφασει 4.13.103 έμφασεις 4.13.70 έμφασιν 4.13.3; 4.13.19; 4.13.73; 4.13.83; 4.13.91; 4.13.112; 4.13.116
eY 384	Έναντιόμοι		έναντιούνται 3.157	
eY 385	Έναντίος -α -ον		έναντία 3.104; 3.143 έναντίον 1.104 έναντίου 11.39 έναντίων 2.26; 2.98 τούναντίον 6.79	έναντία 3.6.3; 3.3.21; 4.13.30; 4.13.31 Έναντία 4.13.4 έναντίας 4.6.6 τούναντίον 1.1.152; 3.7.37; 4.2.67 έναντίον 3.3.4; 3.3.29; 3.3.38; 3.11.52; 3.11.55; 4.2.4; 4.2.53; 4.2.55; 4.2.64; 4.12.49; 4.13.3; 4.13.4; 4.13.12; 4.13.15 έναντίου 3.7.9; 3.7.21; 3.7.37; 3.9.35; 3.11.44; 3.11.47; 3.11.57; 3.11.60; 4.2.73 έναντίων 3.11.40; 4.13.72 έναντίωμα έναντίωμα 4.12.3
eZ 387	Ένάρχεια ή			ένάρχεια 4.2.73
eZ 388	Ένάρχης -ες			έναργώς 3.3.38; 4.7.8; 4.11.22; 4.11.23
FA 390	Ενδιάσκευος (ένδιασκεύως)			ένδιασκευα 2.7.112 Ένδιάσκευον 2.7.102 ένδιάσκευος 2.7.71; 2.7.81 ένδιασκεύω 2.7.79 ένδιασκεύως 2.7.121; 3.15.31
FB 391	Ένδοξος -ον		ένδοξω 7.3	ένδοξον 1.1.75; 3.5.130 ένδοξότεροι 2.4.43

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FC 394	ένθυσμα τό		ένθυσμάτων 3.1.10; 4.1.3 ένθυσμα 3.8.28; 3.8.32; 3.8.37; 4.1.11 ένθυσματι 3.9.2; 3.9.11; 3.9.34; 3.9.40; 3.9.45; 3.9.47 ένθυσματος 3.4.38; 3.8.1; 3.9.31; 4.1.41; 4.1.43 ένθυσμα 3.6.31; 3.8.2; 3.8.10; 3.8.15; 3.8.18; 3.8.20; 3.8.25; 3.8.29; 3.9.2; 3.9.4; 3.9.10; 3.9.14; 3.9.19; 3.9.20; 3.9.36; 4.1.35; 4.1.47; 4.3.11
FC 395	ένθυσματικός -ή -όν		ένθυσματική 4.3.12
FD 399	ένιστημι		ένεστη 2.5.14 ένεστησάμην 1.1.43; 1.1.71; 1.1.88; 1.1.95 ένιστασθαι 1.1.101 ένίσταται 3.14.18 ένιστάμενος 3.12.15 ένστάντος 1.4.9; 2.7.36 ένστηράμενος 3.2.84
FD 400	ένστασις ή	ένστασιν 3.10.9 ένστασις 3.11.0 ένστάσει 3.11.6; 5.34; 7.14; 7.17; 7.20; 7.40	ένστασις 3.6.5; 3.6.8; 3.6.28; 3.6.40; 3.3.36; 3.13.22; 3.13.29; 4.4.86 ένστάσει 3.3.27 ένστάσεως 3.6.1; 3.6.11; 3.6.12; 3.3.35; 3.7.3; 3.8.6; 3.8.11; 3.8.22; 3.13.30 ένστασιν 3.6.2; 3.6.22; 3.6.38; 3.3.40; 3.13.20
FD 401	ένστατικός -ή -όν		ένστατικῶ 3.6.35 ένστατικῶς 3.6.17; 3.6.19

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FE 402	ΕΝΤΕΛΛΩ			έντειλαμένου 3.10.89
FG 409	ΕΠΑΧΘΕΛΙΑ ή			έπαγγελία 3.4.46; 3.4.48; 3.4.74 έπαγγελίαν 3.2.44; 3.2.48; 3.2.50; 3.2.54; 3.2.65 έπαγγελίας 3.2.26; 3.2.58
FG 410	ΕΠΑΧΘΕΛΛΩ		έπαγγέλλεται 5.97	έπαγγέλλεσθαι 3.2.50 έπαγγέλλω έπαγγελλομένω 3.11.12; 3.11.13 έπηγγείλατο 3.2.49; 3.2.59 έπηγγελλόμην 3.11.56
FH 412	ΕΠΑΧΩ			έπάγοντα 3.2.46 έπήγαγον 3.10.50
FI 416	ΕΠΑΙΝΕΩ			έπαινεσόμεθα 2.4.56 έπαινούμεθα 3.5.109 έπαινούμενον 1.1.76; 3.15.78
AV 421	ΕΠΑΝΑΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΟΜΑΙ		έπανακεφαλαιουμένων 3.192	
FK 422	ΕΠΑΝΑΣΜΒΑΝΩ			έπαναλαβόντες 3.9.25 έπαναλαβών 3.9.21
FM 426	ΕΠΕΝΘΥΜΕΘΑΙ			έπενθυμούμενοι 3.9.26
FM 427	ΕΠΕΝΘΥΜΗΜΑ ΤΟ			έπενθυμημάτων 3.8.37 έπενθυμήματος 3.9.13; 3.9.31 έπενθύμημα 3.9.1; 3.9.19; 3.9.43
FN 429	ΕΠΙΒΑΤΗΡΙΟΣ -ΟΝ (ΤΟ)		έπιβουλεύω έπιβουλεύων 6.19	
FO 432	ΕΠΙΧΡΑΦΩ		έπιγραψαμένων 6.54	
FP 433	ΕΠΙΔΕΙΚΝΥΜΙ			έπέδειξε 2.6.10 έπιδείξομεν 3.6.36

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FR 435	ΕΠΙΔΕΙΚΤΙΚΟΣ -ή -όν	ΕΠΙΔΕΙΚΤΙΚΟΝ 1.141 - ΤΙΚΩΣ 1.140	
FR 438	ΕΠΙΕΪΚΕΙΑ ή		ΕΠΙΕΙΚΕΙΑΣ 2.5.36
FR 444	ΕΠΙΘΕΣΙΣ ή	ΕΠΙΘΕΣΩΣ 3.75: 3.89: 3.102: 3.128: 3.137: 3.170	
FR 450	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ ή		ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑΝ 2.7.60
FR 454	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΟΣ ό	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΟΙ 3.187: 3.203: 3.211 ΕΠΙΛΟΓΟΥΣ 3.209: 3.212	
FR 467	ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΕΩ	ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΩΜΕΝ 1.148 ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΕΙ 5.25	ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΕΙ 3.5.31 ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΟΥΝΤΕΣ 3.5.14 ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΟΥΝΤΟΣ 3.14.44
FR 468	ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΜΑ τό		ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΜΑ 1.4.23: 3.4.37: 3.6.30: 3.5.7: 3.5.34: 3.5.49: 3.5.141: 3.5.159: 3.5.173: 3.7.7: 3.7.11: 3.7.16: 3.7.24: 3.7.36: 3.7.40: 3.7.43: 3.8.7: 3.8.12: 3.8.17: 3.8.19: 3.11.2: 3.11.26: 3.13.26: 3.14.36: 4.1.32: 4.3.7: 4.3.11 ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΜΑΙ 3.4.31: 3.5.6: 3.14.5: 3.14.7: 4.14.11: 4.14.20 ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΜΑΤΩΝ 3.1.7: 3.1.8: 3.4.14: 3.4.20: 3.4.25: 3.4.41: 3.4.49: 3.4.56: 3.6.21: 3.6.29: 3.6.34: 3.5.1: 3.5.121: 3.7.1: 3.7.4: 3.7.10: 3.7.13: 3.8.23: 3.8.24: 3.10.5: 3.10.7: 3.13.1: 3.13.2: 3.13.27: 3.13.33: 3.14.10: 4.1.2: 4.1.7: 4.13.36 ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΜΑΤΑ 3.6.25: 3.6.27: 3.5.3: 3.5.65: 3.5.123: 3.5.158: 3.5.170: 3.5.178: 3.7.7: 3.7.31: 3.7.31: 3.8.30: 3.13.13: 4.14.8 ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΜΑΤΙ 3.5.184: 3.5.189: 3.7.42: 3.15.7: 4.1.46 ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΜΑΤΟΣ 3.4.32: 3.4.35: 3.5.157: 3.7.6: 3.7.14: 3.7.15: 3.7.18: 3.7.27: 3.8.9: 3.13.15: 4.3.5: 4.3.52

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gA	469	τὸ πλάστον ἐπιχείρημα		πλαστὰ 3.11.21; 3.11.39; 3.15.43 πλαστή 3.11.4 πλάστον 3.11.2; 3.11.3; 3.11.25; 3.11.29; 3.11.35 πλαστοῦ 3.11.53
fZ	471	ἐπιχειρήσεις ἢ		ἐπιχειρήσεων 3.2.14
gB	474	ἐργάτομαι		ἐργάζεται 3.7.6; 4.4.161 ἐργάσαντο 1.1.26; 1.1.174 ἐργάσθαι 3.3.21 ἐργασμένοι 2.4.7 ἐργαζόμενον 4.3.29 ἐργάζονται 3.1.9 ἐργάσαιο 3.9.35 ἐργασάμενος 3.5.186 ἐργασάμην 2.7.24 ἐργασμένον 1.2.56 ἐργάσω 4.14.16 ἐργαζόμενοι 4.4.40
gB	475	ἐργασία ἢ		ἐργασία 3.7.19; 3.7.26; 3.7.31; 3.7.32; 3.8.13; 3.8.17; 3.8.27; 3.11.26; 3.11.33; 4.1.33 ἐργασίαις 3.11.23 ἐργασιῶν 3.1.8; 3.8.24; 4.1.3; 4.1.7 ἐργασία 3.7.37; 3.8.10; 3.8.36; 4.1.42 ἐργασίαν 3.4.38; 3.6.30; 3.6.31; 3.7.42; 3.7.46; 3.8.9; 3.8.18; 3.8.19; 3.8.20; 3.8.29; 3.8.32; 3.9.15 ἐργασίας 3.4.36; 3.7.1; 3.7.5; 3.7.15; 3.8.25; 3.9.5; 4.2.56

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gB	477	ἔργον τὸ	ἔργοις 3.124; 3.130 ἔργου 1.149	ἔργον 3.2.3; 3.14.24 ἔργω 3.9.17
gC	478	ἐρμηνεία ἢ		ἐρμηνεία 4.4.50 ἐρμηνεία 4.2.14; 4.4.40; 4.12.15 ἐρμηνείαν 1.1.33; 3.5.182; 4.3.58 ἐρμηνείας 2.7.21; 3.4.61; 3.13.3; 4.3.38; 4.3.53; 4.8.2
gC	481	ἐρμηνεύω		ἐρμηνεύειν 4.3.9 ἐρμηνεύεται 4.11.4 ἐρμηνευθέν 2.7.15 ἡρμηνεύσθαι 1.5.16
1Z	482	ἐσχηματισμένως		ἐσχηματισμένως 4.13.65; 4.13.68
gD	485	ἐτερορρηπής -ές	ἐτερορρηπές 1.117; 1.120	
gE	489	εὐθυδικία ἢ	εὐθυδικίας 2.130; 2.136	
gJ	504	εὐνοία ἢ	εὐνοία 9.21	εὐνοίαν 1.1.125 εὐνοίας 1.1.88; 1.1.111; 2.6.19; 2.7.12
gJ	506	εὐνοϊκός -ή -όν		εὐνοϊκῶς 2.7.46
gJ	508	εὐνους -ουν		εὐνους 2.6.18; 2.7.10
gK	509	εὐρεσις ἢ	εὐρέσεως 1.11; 1.12; 7.59	εὐρέσει 4.13.74 εὐρέσεων 1.1.50 εὐρέσεως 1.1.3; 2.2.1; 3.4.2; 3.11.6; 4.1.4 εὐρεσιν 1.2.54; 1.3.2; 2.1.21; 3.8.33; 3.9.31 εὐρεσις 1.1.2; 2.1.10; 3.4.35; 3.4.36; 3.4.37 εὐρέσεις 2.1.19

Appendix IV cont. gk 513	εὐρίσκω	εὐρεθίη 1.133; 3.335 εὔρηται 3.255; 3.269; 3.295; 3.317; 8.29 εὔροις 3.38 εὔρων 2.144; 3.292; 4.30 εὐρίσκεισθαι 3.149; 3.337; 5.56 εὐρίσκειται 3.86; 3.140; 4.29; 6.31; 8.4; 12.10 εὐρεθείσης 4.35 εὔρηνται 3.169 εὐρίσκηται 3.105 εὐρισκόμενα 3.59 εὐρισκομένων 3.213 εὔρων 7.60 εὐρίσκων 10.56	εὐρεθείη 3.5.28; 4.12.8 εὐρεθέν 3.9.11; 3.9.19 εὐρεθῇ 1.4.3 εὐρέθη 3.7.15 εὔρείν 2.1.4; 3.3.15; 3.5.6; 3.9.14 εὐρήσεις 3.11.20; 3.11.52 εὔρηται 3.7.18; 3.12.2; 3.14.8 εὐρίσκει 3.5.158; 3.8.28 εὐρισκομεν 3.4.89; 3.11.66; 4.1.15 εὔροι 1.1.97; 3.6.28; 4.3.63 εὔρομεν 4.3.15 εὔρον 3.2.43; 3.2.64 εὔρων 3.9.23 εὐρίσκειται 1.1.53; 1.1.111; 1.2.4; 1.2.31; 1.4.27; 3.1.11; 3.5.7; 3.5.123; 3.5.145; 3.5.154; 3.5.159; 3.7.29; 3.8.3; 3.8.33; 3.9.4; 3.11.8; 3.11.41; 4.2.32 εὐρίσκοιτο 3.15.28 εὐρεθείσης 3.7.2 εὐρεθέντα 1.2.6; 3.8.37 εὐρεθῆναι 3.8.36 εὔρήκαμεν 3.1.13 εὐρήσατε 3.3.33 εὐρίσκετε 3.5.63 εὐρίσκηται 4.13.37 εὐρισκόμενα 1.1.180 εὐρισκομένη 1.5.4; 3.10.10 εὐρομένους 3.4.78 εὔρων 1.2.34; 2.7.26
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gM	519	ΕΥΧΉ Ή		ΕΥΧΉΣ 1.1.175	
gM	521	ΕΥΧΟΜΑΙ		ΕΥΞΑΙΤΟ 4.3.44 ΕΥΧΟΜΑΙ 15.21	
gN	522	ΖΗΤΕΩ	<p>ΖΗΤΕΙΝ 1.18</p> <p>ΖΗΤΕΪΤΑΙ 3.333</p> <p>ΖΗΤΟΥΜΕΝ 2.9</p> <p>ΖΗΤΗΣΑΙ 2.126</p>	<p>ΖΗΤΕΙΝ 3.5.3; 3.5.55; 3.11.40; 4.14.26</p> <p>ΖΗΤΕΪΣ 3.2.27 ΖΗΤΗΣΕΙ 3.8.30</p> <p>ΖΗΤΗΣΟΜΕΝ 2.5.6; 2.5.34; 2.7.26</p> <p>ΖΗΤΗΤΕΟΝ 2.1.11 ΖΗΤΟΙΉ 3.8.28</p> <p>ΖΗΤΟΥΜΕΝ 3.8.19; 3.8.20</p> <p>ΖΗΤΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ 4.2.6 ΖΗΤΟΥΜΕΝΟΥ 4.2.4</p> <p>ΖΗΤΟΥΜΕΝΩΝ 3.2.32</p> <p>ΖΗΤΟΥΝΤΕΣ 1.1.171; 2.5.3; 3.12.7</p> <p>ΖΗΤΟΥΝΤΩΝ 2.7.19; 3.6.22; 3.6.24; 3.6.26</p> <p>ΖΗΤΕΙ 3.11.51</p> <p>ΞΗΤΗΣΕΝ 3.8.30</p> <p>ΖΗΤῆ 3.14.13</p> <p>ΖΗΤΗΣΑΝΤΕΣ 2.7.22</p> <p>ΖΗΤΟΙΗΣ 3.2.24</p> <p>ΖΗΤΗΘΗΣΕΤΑΙ 3.7.10</p>	
gN	523	ΖΗΤΗΜΑ Τὸ	<p>Ζήτημα 3.25; 3.287; 3.295; 4.31; 4.110; 4.115; 7.5; 8.4; 8.6; 12.6; 12.11</p> <p>Ζητήμασι 1.39; 12.10</p> <p>Ζητημάτων 1.23; 1.78; 1.143; 1.161; 4.29; 6.67</p> <p>Ζητήματα 1.114; 3.325</p> <p>Ζητήματι 3.188; 12.34</p> <p>Ζητήματος 1.64; 1.157; 2.2; 3.300; 6.6; 6.35; 10.78; 12.8</p>	<p>Ζητημάτων 3.2.95</p> <p>Ζητήματα 3.2.4</p> <p>Ζητήματος 2.1.9</p>	

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gO 524	πολιτικὸν ζήτημα	1.10; 1.13		
gP 526	ζήτησις ή	ζητήσεις 2.124 ζητήσεως 4.105; 4.114; 8.23 ζήτησιν 2.13; 2.22; 2.27; 2.31; 2.74; 2.77; 2.129; 2.137 ζήτησις 2.15; 2.24; 2.81; 2.96; 2.99; 2.122; 2.131; 4.120; 4.122; 8.14; 9.2; 10.20	ζητήσεις 2.1.18 ζητήσεως 3.11.19	
gQ 529	ήδονή ή		ήδονής 1.1.29	
gR 532	ήθικός -ή -όν	ήθικά 1.31		
gS 534	θέσις ή	θέσει 5.5; 6.8; 8.27; 9.5; 12.5 θέσιν 3.133 θέσις 5.44; 5.45; 6.42; 8.47; 10.16; 10.85	θέσεως 3.4.39	
gT 535	θεωρέω		θεωρούμεν 3.4.63	
gT 536	θεώρημα τὸ	θεώρημα 3.42	θεωρημάτων 2.7.34	
gT 539	θεωρία ή	θεωρίαν 7.52	θεωρία 4.4.137 θεωρίας 3.5.182 θεωρίαν 3.2.31; 3.5.175; 3.11.47 θεωρίας 2.7.101; 3.2.27; 3.4.60; 3.11.64	
gU 540	θυμός ό		θυμόν 4.7.10	
gV 542	ισάζω	ισάζειν 1.76; 10.10; 10.12 ισάζει 3.257; 3.282; 10.40; 10.44 ισάζον 1.91 ισάζοντα 1.48; 3.271		
gV 545	ισός -η -ον	ισού 11.34	ισόν 4.4.26 ισού 3.7.9; 4.8.17	

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GW	547	κακόπλαστος -ον	κακόπλαστον 1.120	
9X	548	κατασκευάζω	κατασκευάζει 3.111 κατασκευάζεται 3.319; 3.325 κατασκευάζεται 3.312	κατασκευάζει 1.2.29; 2.7.69; 2.7.83; 3.4.35; 3.4.37; 3.4.38; 3.8.17; 3.8.18; 3.9.31; 3.10.6; 4.13.17 κατασκευάζομεν 3.4.13 κατασκευάσμεν 3.4.7 κατασκευάζειν 3.14.5; 3.14.7; 4.13.11 κατασκευάζοιμεν 3.5.4 κατασκευάζεσθαι 3.15.37 κατασκευαζόμενος 4.3.18 κατασκευάζοντα 3.2.54 κατασκευάζοντες 2.7.76; 3.15.36; 3.15.47; 4.14.10; 4.14.10 κατασκευαζόντων 3.15.50 κατασκευαζούσας 4.13.10 κατασκευάζωμεν 4.13.5 κατασκευάζων 3.14.12; 3.14.14; 3.14.22; 4.4.21; 4.4.54; 4.4.76; 4.4.82; 4.4.85; 4.4.92 κατασκευασθῆναι 3.2.115; 4.13.42 κατασκευασθρησμένης 3.2.107 κατεσκευάζεις 4.4.88 κατεσκευάσα 4.4.96 κατεσκευάσεν 3.2.59 κατασκευασθήσεται 2.3.9; 3.5.95. ἐπικατασκευασθήσεται 3.14.28

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gX	549	κατασκευαστικός -ή -όν		έγκατάσκευα 2.7.112 έγκατάσκευος 2.7.70; 2.7.93 έγκατασκευού 2.7.117 έγκατασκευώ 2.7.75
gX	551	κατασκευή ή	κατασκευής 5.8	κατασκευαίς 3.2.14 κατασκευάς 3.4.25; 3.6.10 κατασκευή 1.2.22; 1.5.20; 1.5.27; 1.5.29; 1.5.38; 4.13.54 κατασκευή 3.2.26; 3.2.80; 3.4.9; 3.15.45 κατασκευήν 2.7.28; 2.7.78; 3.2.46; 3.2.49; 3.2.69; 3.4.31; 3.7.4; 3.7.6; 3.7.12; 3.7.15; 3.7.17; 3.7.27; 3.8.7; 3.10.5; 3.15.51; 4.4.166 κατασκευής 1.5.5; 3.2.3; 3.4.10; 3.4.19; 3.4.40; 3.4.49; 4.12.18; 4.13.35 κατασκευών 2.7.80
gY	553	κατάστασις ή		καταστάσεως 2.1.1
gZ	555	καταφέρω	κατενεχθέντος 3.168	κατενεχθήναι 4.12.50
gZ	556	καταφορά ή		καταφορά 4.5.6; 4.5.8
gZ	557	καταφορέω		κατάφοροι 3.5.51

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hB	560	κατηγορέω	κατηγορεῖ 4.47 κατηγορεῖν 4.34; 4.79; 10.65 κατηγορεῖς 5.84 κατηγορημένα 3.194 κατηγορῆσαι 3.263 κατηγοροῦντας 5.111 κατηγορῶν 3.50	κατηγορεῖς 3.5.190; 4.6.22; 4.6.27; 4.6.29 κατηγορεῖς 3.4.92; 3.5.188 κατηγορήσοντα 1.1.82 κατηγορουμένου 2.5.3 κατηγοροῦντας 1.1.98 κατηγοροῦντες 1.1.54; 1.3.4; 3.5.44 κατηγοροῦντων 1.1.12; 1.1.139 κατηγορήσω 3.3.15 κατηγοροῦντα 3.4.80; 3.4.85 κατηγορῶμεν 1.1.142; 2.5.2; 2.5.32; 2.6.2; 3.4.16
hB	563	κατηγορία ἡ	κατηγορία 2.44	κατηγορίαις 1.3.3; 2.5.31 κατηγορία 4.5.6 κατηγορίαν 1.1.63; 3.2.79 κατηγορίας 3.2.87; 3.2.103; 3.2.124
hB	565	κατήγορος -ον	κατήγορος 3.93; 3.172; 3.175; 3.200; 5.46; 5.116; 6.15 κατηγόρου 3.80; 3.82; 5.119; 5.135; 12.27 κατηγόρω 5.134 κατηγόρων 3.189	κατήγοροι 3.5.42 κατηγόροις 1.1.163 κατήγορος 2.6.8 κατηγόρους 1.1.52
hC	566	τελικά κεφάλαια	3.201	

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hD	567	κεφάλαιος -α -ον	<p>κεφάλαια 1.10; 1.23; 1.143; 1.154; 3.83; 3.87; 4.117; 9.32; 10.15; 10.42</p> <p>κεφαλαίοις 3.258; 3.264; 3.274; 4.58; 4.124; 5.63; 7.24; 10.4</p> <p>κεφάλαιον 3.64; 3.164; 3.177; 4.59; 4.95; 4.108; 5.73; 6.30; 6.35; 10.18; 10.22; 10.74</p> <p>κεφαλαίου 10.77</p> <p>κεφαλαίω 4.59; 4.108; 5.92; 10.43</p> <p>κεφαλαίων 1.163; 3.210; 3.263; 4.110; 5.52; 5.75; 7.54; 8.39; 10.9; 10.58; 11.7; 12.11</p>	<p>κεφάλαια 3.2.4; 3.2.29; 3.2.58; 3.6.3; 3.5.94; 3.10.4</p> <p>κεφαλαίοις 3.2.25; 3.2.94; 3.2.101; 3.2.106; 4.14.4</p> <p>Κεφάλαιον 3.4.10</p> <p>κεφάλαιον 3.4.16; 3.4.22; 3.4.36; 3.4.39; 3.4.43; 3.4.57; 3.6.4; 3.6.7; 3.6.14; 3.6.18; 3.5.2; 3.5.26; 3.5.33; 3.5.47; 3.5.64; 3.5.97; 3.5.112; 3.7.3; 3.7.10; 3.7.23; 3.8.10; 3.12.11</p> <p>κεφαλαίου 3.2.12; 3.4.109; 3.7.11; 3.8.6; 3.8.31; 3.13.14; 3.13.16; 3.13.28; 3.13.35</p> <p>κεφαλαίω 2.1.10; 3.2.112</p> <p>κεφαλαίων 3.1.4; 3.2.22; 3.2.65; 3.2.68; 3.2.88; 3.2.104; 3.4.1; 3.4.2; 3.4.6; 3.4.9; 3.6.10; 3.10.3; 3.14.45</p>
hE	571	κόμμα τὸ		<p>κόμμα 4.4.10; 4.4.12; 4.4.19; 4.4.25; 4.4.30; 4.4.32; 4.4.32; 4.4.37</p> <p>κόμματα 4.4.22; 4.4.34</p> <p>κόμματος 4.4.9</p>
hF	575	κρείττων -ον		<p>κρείττων 3.5.72</p> <p>κρείττον 4.3.38; 4.4.176</p>

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hg 576	κρίνω (κρινόμενον)	κρίνει 3.15; 3.32; 3.306; 4.70; 8.35 κρίνεις 5.77 κρινόμενα 3.4; 3.252; 5.129 κρινόμενοι 2.68 κρινόμενον 1.57; 1.67; 1.80; 2.3; 2.10; 2.23; 3.221 κρινομένων 3.72; 3.228; 4.39 κρινωμεν 7.61 κρίνων 3.75 κρίνειν 4.34 κρίνοιεν 1.49 κρίνεσθαι 3.11; 3.12; 3.16; 3.24; 3.231; 5.12 κρίνεται 1.54; 1.58; 1.70 κρίθεις 3.21 κρίνηται 3.98; 3.150; 3.243; 3.267; 3.277 κρινόμενος 2.66; 2.132 κρινομένου 1.68; 3.245; 5.67 κρίνω 7.76	κρίναι 3.10.86 κρίνομεν 1.1.9 κρινόμενον 3.2.89 κρίνοντας 1.3.20; 1.3.21 κρίνοντες 1.3.8 κρίνειν 1.3.6; 1.3.9; 3.5.56 κρίνεσθαι 3.5.37 κρίνεται 1.1.45; 1.1.60; 1.1.68; 1.1.94; 1.1.156; 1.2.41; 1.2.48; 1.3.11; 1.3.16; 2.5.12; 2.6.7; 2.7.131; 3.5.128; 3.10.46 ἐκρίνα 3.10.55; 3.10.90 ἐκρινόμενον 3.5.191 ἐκρίνον 3.10.85; 3.10.87 κρινόμενος 1.3.25; 1.3.29; 3.5.29 κρινομένου 3.5.35 κρίνονται 1.2.14; 2.5.18; 3.15.67
hg 578	κρίσις ή	κρίσει 1.127 κρίσεως 1.83; 7.60 κρίσιν 1.35; 3.78; 5.60; 5.65; 5.114; 5.118; 5.122 κρίσις 2.37; 3.142; 3.165; 3.166	κρίσει 1.1.171; 2.1.12 κρίσεις 1.3.27; 2.6.24; 3.5.39 κρίσεων 3.5.162 κρίσεως 2.5.28 κρίσιν 1.2.11; 3.2.67 κρίσις 1.1.8

hI	580	κῶλον το		κῶλα 2.7.20; 3.15.50; 4.4.120; 4.4.125 κῶλά 4.4.19 κῶλοις 15.16; 2.7.7; 2.7.23; 2.7.26; 2.7.66; 2.7.124; 2.7.127; 4.2.27; 4.3.103; 4.4.6; 4.4.40; 4.9.28 κῶλον 15.19; 15.24; 4.3.88; 4.4.10; 4.4.14; 4.4.18; 4.4.23; 4.4.25; 4.4.52; 4.4.57; 4.4.180; 4.9.10; 4.9.29 κῶλου 4.4.9; 4.4.33 κῶλω 4.9.26; 4.9.35 κῶλων 3.15.49; 4.2.13; 4.3.58; 4.3.87; 4.3.99
hK	581	λειτουργία ἢ		λειτουργίας 3.4.79
hL	585	λέξεις ἢ	λέξει 353	λέξει 2.2.22; 2.2.26; 3.12.18; 4.12.11 λέξεις 4.7.4
hM	586	λογίζομαι		ἐλογίσατο 2.7.56 λόγισαι 4.13.88
hM	587	λογικός -η -ον	λογικός 2.72 λογική 1.14 λογικήν 2.29 λογικῶν 8.8	
hM	588	λόγιος -α -ον	λογίων 12.10	
hM	589	λογισμός ὁ	λογισμοίς 3.246	λογισμοί 2.7.29 λογισμοίς 3.2.69; 3.15.7 λογισμός 3.6.27; 3.6.32 λογισμούς 2.7.65 λογισμῶν 2.7.56

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hM	591	λόγος ο	<p>λόγοι 4.12.31</p> <p>λόγοις 2.7.92; 3.2.57; 3.4.70; 3.6.7; 3.5.9; 3.5.86; 3.5.89; 3.5.92; 3.5.92</p> <p>λόγον 3.2.18; 3.2.25; 3.2.26; 3.2.60; 3.4.33; 3.4.54; 3.4.84; 3.4.101; 3.3.5; 3.10.95; 3.11.53; 3.13.6; 3.13.26; 3.13.30; 3.14.9; 4.1.41; 4.4.123; 4.4.132; 4.4.172; 4.10.33; 4.12.24; 4.13.56</p> <p>λόγος 1.11.34; 2.3.10; 3.2.5; 3.2.68; 3.2.106; 3.2.113; 3.2.124; 3.4.47; 3.4.51; 3.13.16; 4.3.156; 4.4.48; 4.4.137; 4.4.153; 4.9.2; 4.11.3; 4.13.12; 4.13.37</p> <p>λόγου 1.1.35; 2.7.16; 3.2.2; 3.2.13; 3.2.31; 3.4.59; 3.9.18; 3.10.22; 4.1.1; 4.1.5; 4.2.2; 4.2.55; 4.4.5; 4.4.121; 4.4.139; 4.4.139; 4.5.2; 4.6.2; 4.8.2; 4.8.23; 4.11.1; 4.11.8; 4.11.10; 4.11.17; 4.12.18; 4.13.10; 4.13.22</p> <p>λόγους 1.1.133; 3.4.98; 3.10.100; 4.4.99; 4.13.71</p> <p>λόγω 1.1.105; 1.5.13; 2.7.89; 3.2.16; 3.2.37; 3.2.38; 3.2.55; 3.2.82; 3.2.97; 3.4.88; 3.11.64; 4.1.13; 4.4.138; 4.9.42; 4.9.48; 4.10.12; 4.11.9; 4.12.19; 4.13.28</p> <p>λόγων 1.1.124; 1.4.20; 2.7.74; 3.4.65; 3.4.69; 3.4.72; 3.5.166; 4.4.66 [109]</p>
hN	592	λυπέω	<p>λυπέισθαι 3.5.177</p> <p>λελυπημένους 1.1.42</p> <p>λυπούμαι 4.13.98</p>

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hN	593	λύπη ή		λύπη	2.24	λύπη	1.1.39
hO	597	λύσις ή	λύσιν 1.102		λύσεις 2.3.3; 2.3.20; 2.3.21; 4.13.38 λύσεων 3.1.6 λύσεως 3.4.11; 3.4.29; 3.4.47; 3.4.74; 3.4.111; 3.3.2; 3.7.2; 3.7.5 λύσιν 3.4.36; 3.7.12; 3.12.1; 3.14.6; 3.14.34; 4.6.5 λύσις 2.3.36; 3.4.48; 3.4.56; 3.4.82; 3.4.92; 3.4.109; 3.5.105; 3.5.118; 3.7.23; 3.8.10; 3.8.21; 3.14.2; 4.3.71		
hO	598	λύω	λυθείη 10.73 λυθήσεσθε 3.128		ἔλυσαν 2.5.23 λελύσθαι 1.1.130; 1.1.136; 1.2.70; 2.3.8; 2.4.54 λύσαι 2.3.11; 3.8.6; 4.6.8; 4.6.11 λύσει 2.3.11; 3.4.44 λύειν 2.3.15; 3.4.17; 3.4.27; 3.4.30 λύοιμεν 3.5.3; 3.5.5 λύοντες 4.13.70; 4.14.11; 4.14.12 λύοντι 3.12.3 λύσε 4.11.25; 4.11.29 λύσομεν 3.12.7; 3.12.12 λύωμεν 2.3.5		
hP	600	μαρτυρέω	μαρτυρούσιν 3.44		μαρτυρεῖν 3.5.52		
hP	604	μάρτυς ό, ή	μάρτυρας 3.34; 3.39 μάρτυρες 3.27; 3.33; 3.46; 3.53 μαρτύρων 3.42; 3.52 μάρτυσι 3.39		μάρτυρας 3.5.31; 3.5.40; 3.5.44; 3.5.45; 3.5.47; 3.5.54 μαρτύρων 3.5.37; 3.5.39; 3.5.57; 3.5.60; 3.5.62		

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hQ	605	μαχεομαι			μάχεσθαι 3.10.32 μαχομένους 2.4.43
hQ	606	μάχη ή		μάχη 2.99	μάχας 3.6.10 μάχης 2.7.37
hQ	609	μάχιμος -η -ον			μαχιμώτατοι 4.7.17
hT	616	μέγας -γάλη -γα		μέγα 4.25; 5.27; 11.29 μεγάλα 10.72 μεγάλων 1.2; 6.46 μέγας 7.27 μέγιστα 10.71 μεγίστης 1.151; 12.20 μέγιστον 1.6 μείζον 4.26; 5.27; 6.33; 9.30; 11.37 μείζονα 1.42 μείζονος 11.35	μέγα 4.9.14 μεγάλας 4.4.44; 4.4.148 μεγάλην 4.12.28 μεγάλοιο 4.12.21; 4.12.34 μεγάλων 3.5.69 μέγαν 3.5.130 μέγας 3.3.17; 3.5.143; 4.11.6 μέγιστον 1.1.123 μείζον 3.3.15 μείζονα 3.8.3; 3.10.64 μείζονας 4.12.25 μείζονι 3.3.32 μείζονος 1.3.20; 1.3.21; 3.7.9; 3.10.60; 3.10.68 μειζόνων 3.9.27 μείζων 2.7.126
hT	617	μέχεθος τό			μεγέθει 4.10.28 μέγεθος 4.7.16
iC	618	μεθίστημι		μεθιστή 2.58 μεθιστάντα 6.71 μεθίστησι 2.49; 2.60	

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hS	619	μεθoδoύω	μεθoδoύειν 3.121: 6.81 μεθoδoύει 10.41 μεθoδoύoμεν 7.15		
hS	621	μέθoδoς ή	μέθoδoν 1.162 μέθoδoς 1.165: 5.135 μεθόδω 10.3	μέθoδoς 3.12.2	
hU	622	μείoω	μείoυν 3.209		
hU	623	μείωσις ή	μείωσeως 5.119: 5.121		
hV	626	μελετάω	μελετώμεν 1.139 μελετώμενα 1.116	έμελετώμεν 4.13.65: 4.13.68 μελετάται 4.13.74 μελετώνται 4.13.34 μελετώντες 4.14.15	
hV	627	μελέτη ή		μελέτη 4.13.76 μελέτην 3.2.78	
hV	629	μελετητικός -ή -όν		μελετητικός 4.14.21	
hX	634	μετάθεσις τής αίτίας	3.6: 3.122: 3.125: 3.131: 3.135: 3.141: 3.186: 3.236: 3.286: 3.294		
hY	635	μεταλαμβάνω	μεταλαμβάνει 8.34 μεταλαμβάνοντες 2.141		
hY	636	μετάληψις ή	μετάληπει 2.123: 3.6: 3.107: 4.20: 5.4: 5.41: 6.8: 8.26: 9.5: 12.5 Μεταλήψεως 4.35 μεταλήψεως 3.84: 8.1 μετάληψιν 2.122: 3.20 μετάληψις 3.104: 3.109: 4.5: 4.34: 5.34: 6.31: 8.2: 8.32: 9.28: 10.17: 10.63: 11.5: 12.28		

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hZ	637	έτέρα μετάληψις	5.5: 5.40: 6.8: 6.47: 8.27: 9.5: 8.42: 10.16	
iA	638	μεταξύ	μεταξύ 1.97: 4.110: 5.75	μεταξύ 3.252: 3.2.97
iB	639	μεταξύ τούτων	1.59	
iC	640	μετάστασις ή	μεταστάσει 6.77 μεταστάσεως 2.63: 2.70: 6.2: 6.69 μετάστασιν 2.61 μεταστάσει 6.79	
iC	641	μεταστατικός -ή -όν	μεταστατική 6.7 μεταστατικά 6.72	μεταστατικῶ 3.5.186
iD	642	μίχθυμι		ἐμίχθη 1.2.69
iE	644	μικρός -ά -όν	μικρά 6.46: 10.71 μικρόν 1.9 σμικρόν 1.34: 3.19 σμικρᾶς 1.150	μικρά 1.5.30 μικρόν 3.10.74 μικροτέρῳ 3.11.48 μικροτέρων 3.10.51: 3.10.53 μικροτέρα 4.4.33
iD	647	μικτός -ή -όν	μικτή 6.61	
iF	648	μυμέομαι		μυμείσθαι 3.5.138 μυμοῖτο 4.3.62
iG	653	μυμνήσκομαι		μυμνημένος 3.11.53 μυμνησθῆναι 4.1.43
iG	655	μνήμη ή	μνήμη 11.27	μνήμην 3.15.35 μνήμης 3.2.47: 3.2.53
iG	660	μνημονεύω		μνημονεύσης 3.15.87
iH	664	μονομερής -ές	μονομερές 1.87: 1.119	

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iK	669	νόμος			νοείται 3.10.21; 4.2.39; 4.11.24 νοούμενον 4.11.9 νοῶσαι 4.13.23
iK	670	νόημα τὸ			νόημα 3.5.172; 4.4.39; 4.4.141; 4.4.141 νόημασι 3.2.73 νοημάτων 3.2.93; 3.6.21; 3.5.5; 3.5.180; 3.5.181; 4.3.116; 4.4.3; 4.4.140; 4.4.169; 4.4.171 νοήματα 1.1.36; 3.6.28; 3.6.32; 3.5.171; 4.3.74; 4.13.56; 4.13.60; 4.13.64; 4.13.67 νοήματι 3.2.101; 3.4.86; 4.2.39; 4.4.138 νοήματος 4.2.55; 4.3.83; 4.4.49
iL	674	νομίζω		νομίσας 10.48 νομίζω 3.229; 3.336 νομισθέντος 1.16	ἐνόμισα 1.4.25 νομίζειν 1.1.136; 3.5.172 νομίζεται 4.3.140; 4.3.149; 4.3.156 νομίζοντας 2.2.51 νομίσθη 1.1.62; 1.1.81
iL	675	νομικός -ή -όν		νομικός 2.73 νομικήν 2.28 νομικόν 3.25 νομικῶν 7.10; 7.11; 8.5	
iL	676	νόμιμος -η -ον		νόμιμον 2.25; 3.202; 7.10; 7.12; 8.18 νομίμῳ 7.2	νόμιμον 3.2.108; 3.2.110; 3.2.111 νομίμῳ 3.2.107; 3.2.114; 3.2.116 νομίμων 3.2.97

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iL 677	νόμος ο	νόμοι 3.24 νόμον 10.46 νόμον 2.114; 8.10; 11.12; 12.36 νόμος 5.13; 5.34; 7.6; 8.16; 10.34; 11.10; 12.16 νόμου 2.17; 10.33; 10.83 νόμους 2.75; 10.31 νόμω 2.88; 8.9; 8.13; 9.10; 10.38; 11.10 νόμων 1.15; 10.67; 10.76	νόμοι 3.2.90; 3.2.102 νόμοις 1.1.96; 3.5.101; 4.2.21 νόμον 1.1.44; 1.1.128; 1.1.130; 1.1.136; 1.2.70; 2.3.5; 2.3.6; 2.3.8; 2.3.12; 2.3.15; 2.3.17; 2.3.23; 2.3.25; 2.3.28; 2.3.30; 2.3.37; 2.3.39; 2.7.130; 3.2.98; 3.10.15 νόμος 4.13.24 νόμου 2.3.13; 2.3.27; 2.3.35; 2.6.5; 3.2.114; 3.2.115; 3.4.76; 3.10.16 νόμους 1.1.100; 3.2.8; 3.2.66; 4.3.70; 4.3.71 νόμω 3.15.82; 3.15.82 νόμων 2.3.1; 2.3.2; 2.3.3; 2.3.20; 2.3.21; 3.2.76; 3.2.77; 3.2.79; 3.2.125; 3.2.126
iM 680	ὁμοιος -α -ον	ὅμοια 1.32; 4.48; 5.15; 5.19 ὁμοίως 2.122; 3.196; 3.196; 3.225; 3.261; 3.274; 4.57; 4.61; 5.87; 5.106; 5.116; 6.11; 6.34; 7.62; 11.33	ὅμοια 4.7.5; 4.7.10 ὁμοίοις 1.2.68 ὅμοιος 4.8.7 ὁμοίων 3.10.43; 3.10.53; 3.10.56; 4.7.2 ὁμοίως 1.1.109; 2.1.8; 2.2.20; 2.4.2; 2.5.32; 2.5.35; 2.6.22; 2.7.125; 3.5.45; 3.5.63; 3.8.24; 3.11.15; 3.14.34; 4.4.83; 4.4.114; 4.8.12; 4.10.20; 4.13.113; 4.14.14; 4.14.31
iM 681	ὁμοιότης ή		ὁμοιότητι 4.4.60 ὁμοιότητος 4.8.20
iO 691	ὁμώνυμος τό	ὁμώνυμος 6.5	
iQ 697	ὀρχή ή		ὀρχήν 1.1.39; 3.3.10
iQ 698	ὀρχίζω		ὀρχίζεται 2.7.135

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iS	699	ὀρίζω		ὀριεῖται 4.14 ὠρισάμην 10.4 ὠρισμένα 1.28; 1.42; 2.76 ὠρίσαντο 6.74 ὠρισμένον 3.57; 4.38 ὠριστο 4.71	ὀρίζοντες 3.5.47; 4.9.26 ὀρίσας 3.5.34; 3.10.10 ὀρίσαντες 3.5.64 ὀρισθείσα 3.10.39
iS	700	ὀρικός -ή -όν		ὀρικῇ 2.15 ὀρικῇν 2.14 ὀρικών 6.14; 6.16 ὀρικῶ 6.11 ὀρικῶς 8.6	ὀρικῆς 3.2.72
iS	702	ὀριστικός -ή -όν		ὀριστικῶς 3.173	
iR	703	δύο ὀροι		4.118	
iS	704	ὀρος ὁ		ὄρον 11.8 ὄρος 4.2; 4.8; 4.13; 5.17; 6.34; 6.39; 8.40; 9.25; 10.12; 10.16; 10.43; 10.83; 11.15; 11.29 ὄρου 4.1; 4.125 ὄρω 2.125; 4.2; 4.21; 5.3; 5.6; 5.49; 6.3; 6.4; 6.8; 6.53; 8.26; 9.4; 9.5; 11.3; 11.4; 11.28; 11.31 ὄρων 4.52	ὄροις 4.14.14; 4.14.21 ὄρον 3.14.4; 3.14.10; 3.14.12 ὄρος 3.2.112; 3.13.24 ὄρος 3.14.2 ὄρου 3.2.78; 3.2.80; 3.2.110; 3.13.21; 3.14.1 ὄρους 2.2.52; 2.2.57 ὄρω 4.14.3 ὄρων 2.2.45; 3.2.72
iT	706	πάθη ἢ		πάθη 3.197	
iT	707	παθητικός -ή -όν			παθητικοίς 1.5.17
iT	708	πάθος τὸ		πάθει 3.124; 3.134 πάθος 3.208; 6.74 πάθους 3.205	πάθεισιν 2.2.28

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iV	710	πανηγυρικός			πανηγυρικά 3.13.4; 3.13.5; 4.1.10 πανηγυρική 1.5.47 πανηγυρικών 1.5.12 πανηγυρικών 1.5.13 πανηγυρικών 3.13.10 πανηγυρικώτερα 1.5.11 πανηγυρικώτερα 3.13.10
iV	712	παραβάλλω		παραβαλλόμενοι 10.51	
iV	713	παραβολή ή			παραβολήν 4.4.181; 4.9.41; 4.10.15 παραβολής 3.7.8; 3.7.20; 3.7.42; 4.1.10; 4.3.64; 4.9.42 παραβολών 4.4.174
iV	714	παραβολικός -ή -όν			παραγραφικόν 3.5.26
iW	716	παραγραφή ή		παραγραφή 2.127; 3.18; 8.4 παραγραφών 2.130; 2.137; 3.21; 8.7 παραγραφής 3.25	
iW	717	παραγραφικός -η -ον		παραγραφικόν 3.8; 5.74; 8.20; 8.30 παραγραφικού 5.9 παραγραφικῶ 3.4; 8.25	
iW	718	παραγράψω		παραγράφεται 3.24	
iX	719	παράδειγμα τὸ		παράδειγματα 11.34 παράδειγματος 10.23; 11.9 παράδειγμα 2.63; 2.67; 2.104; 3.20; 3.87; 3.100; 3.230; 4.67; 6.12	παράδειγμάτων 3.5.24; 3.5.128; 4.4.69; 4.4.173 παράδειγματα 1.2.10; 1.2.61; 3.7.33; 4.4.165; 4.4.179 παράδειγματος 1.5.31; 2.2.29; 2.7.33; 3.7.8; 3.7.19; 3.7.20; 3.7.22; 3.7.26; 3.7.32; 3.8.14; 3.11.23; 3.11.27; 3.11.33; 3.13.26; 3.15.62; 3.15.64; 4.4.144 παράδειγμα 3.7.29; 3.9.3; 3.15.87; 4.4.65

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iX	721	παραδειγματικός -ή -όν		παραδειγματικά 4.1.10
iZ	733	παράδοξος -ον		παράδοξα 3.15.15 παράδοξον 4.12.32 παραδοξότατον 3.3.2 παραδοξότερον 3.6.38 παραδόξω 2.2.36 παραδόξως 3.5.27
jB	737	παράθεσις ή	παράθεσις 2.92	
jE	746	παραλείπω	παρελίπομεν 7.55	παραλειπόμενα 2.7.64 παραλειπομένων 2.7.65 παραλείπων 4.2.58 παραλειφθέν 2.7.22 παραλειφθέντος 2.7.36; 2.7.49 παραλειφθέντων 2.7.47 παραλιπόντες 2.6.20
jE	747	παράλειψις ή		παράλειψιν 2.5.7; 2.5.30; 2.5.35; 2.5.37
jF	751	παραμυθία ή		παραμυθία 2.7.59
jG	753	παρασκευάζω	παρασκευάσασθαι 3.167; 3.182 παρασκευάζειν 3.207 παρασκευαζόμενοι 3.181 παρασκευάζονται 3.180 παρεσκευασάμην 3.171	παρασκευάσει 2.7.57 παρεσκευάζεν 4.4.47 παρεσκευάζετο 4.4.152 παρεσκευακότι 1.1.28 παρεσκευασμένοι 4.6.5 παρεσκευάσται 4.6.21

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774	πείθω	ἔπεισε 4.10; 5.70; 6.37 πεπεισμένα 352	ἔπεισε 3.2.19 ἔπεισεν 1.2.22; 1.2.27 πείθει 4.7.6 πειθόμενοι 1.1.164 πείθεσθαι 3.11.26; 4.13.45; 4.13.48; 4.13.58 ἐπείσθησαν 3.11.27 πείθοντο 4.7.7
775	περιέχω (περιέχον καὶ περιεχόμενον)	10.19; 10.75; 12.4; 12.22	
776	περιοδεύω		περιοδεύσαι 4.3.67
777	περιοδικός -ή -όν		περιοδικῶς 4.3.8; 4.3.10; 4.8.9 περιοδικήν 4.3.75
778	περίοδος ἡ		περίοδοις 3.10.58 περίοδον 3.10.25; 4.2.41; 4.3.9; 4.3.57; 4.3.75; 4.3.75 περίοδος 3.15.52; 4.2.29; 4.3.2; 4.3.5; 4.3.7; 4.3.10; 4.3.12; 4.3.43; 4.3.52; 4.3.86; 4.3.96; 4.3.117 περίοδου 4.2.14; 4.3.1; 4.3.10; 4.3.51; 4.3.60 περίοδους 3.15.52; 4.1.9; 4.3.17; 4.3.55 περίοδων 4.3.62; 4.3.63
780	περισσός -ή -όν		περιττάς 3.5.169
782	περίστασις ἡ	περίστασιν 2.98	περιστάσεων 3.8.30; 4.14.35 περιστάσεως 2.3.2; 2.3.3; 2.3.21; 3.6.24; 3.6.26; 3.5.8; 3.7.10; 3.8.8; 3.15.9; 4.14.32 περίστασιν 2.3.19; 3.5.46 περίστασις 3.5.8; 3.10.6

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jP	784	περιττός -ή -όν	περιττόν 3.335; 5.137	περιττής 4.2.34 περιττοτέραν 3.9.33; 3.9.44; 3.9.47
jS	790	πεύσις ή		πεύσιν 4.4.125; 4.4.127
jT	792	πηλικότης ή	πηλικότης 4.25; 5.26; 11.28 πηλικότητι 4.3; 5.31; 11.4	
kK	793	πιθανός -ή -όν	πιθανῶ 1.82	πιθανήν 4.14.12 πιθανῶς 1.1.113; 3.5.12; 3.15.13
jU	796	πιστεύω	πιστεύειν 1.103; 3.35 πιστεύσaiμεν 3.38	πιστεύειν 3.11.32 πιστευθεῖς 2.7.47
jU	797	πίστις ή	πίστεων 1.100	πίστεις 3.6.29
jU	800	πιστός -ή -όν		πιστόν 4.12.32
jX	804	πλάχιος -α -ον		πλάγια 4.13.3; 4.13.30; 4.13.32 πλαγίου 4.13.11; 4.13.17 πλαγίων 4.13.72
jY	805	πλάσις ή	πλάσις 1.123	πλάσεως 3.11.47
jY	806	πλάσμα τὸ		πλάσμα 3.11.56
jY	811	πλάσσω		πλάσαντες 3.15.42 πλάττεις 3.11.9; 3.11.15 πλάττων 3.10.12; 3.11.45
jY	813	πλάττω	πλάττει 1.106 πλαττομένοις 12.10	πλαττόμενον 3.11.5; 3.11.7 πλαττομένου 3.12.12 πλάττειν 3.11.40 πλάττεται 3.11.54
jZ	814	ποιότης ή	ποιότης 2.26; 2.39; 4.36; 5.49; 6.52; 8.48; 10.17; 12.33 ποιότητα 2.24; 4.45 ποιότητι 4.6; 4.49; 5.5; 6.9; 8.27; 9.6; 11.6; 12.5 ποιότητος 3.75	
kA	815	κοινή ποιότης	3.7; 3.187; 4.48;	

κC 817	<p>πρᾶγμα τὸ</p> <p>πραγμάτων 152: 1.156; 3.51; 3.118; 3.220; 3.229; 3.266</p> <p>πράγματα 1.21; 1.75; 3.4; 3.52; 3.240; 3.252; 3.267; 3.272</p> <p>πράγματι 3.47; 3.166</p> <p>πράγματος 1.36; 1.68; 2.5; 2.15; 2.24; 2.31; 2.33; 2.43; 2.91; 3.222; 3.235; 3.312; 3.328; 7.58; 8.22; 11.2; 11.11</p> <p>Πρᾶγμα 1.70</p> <p>πρᾶγμα 1.67; 1.80; 2.9; 2.13; 2.22; 2.27; 2.29; 2.59; 2.89; 2.138; 2.140; 3.178; 3.238; 3.301; 4.8; 4.89; 4.99; 5.123; 7.29; 8.34; 8.35</p> <p>πράγμασι 2.7.4; 3.5.9; 3.5.107; 3.15.14; 4.2.61; 4.3.141; 4.4.180</p> <p>πραγμάτων 1.15; 1.2.32; 1.2.34; 2.1.18; 2.6.24; 2.7.46; 2.7.48; 2.7.52; 3.5.60; 3.9.30; 4.1.37; 4.2.23</p> <p>πράγματα 1.1.13; 2.7.71; 2.7.90; 4.4.51; 4.9.43; 4.9.45; 4.10.10; 4.10.25</p> <p>πράγματι 3.5.178; 3.9.17; 3.11.24; 3.14.28; 3.15.17; 3.15.43; 4.4.56; 4.9.2; 4.11.21</p> <p>πράγματος 1.2.20; 1.5.11; 2.1.5; 2.7.123; 3.2.42; 3.4.15; 3.4.19; 3.5.32; 3.5.34; 3.5.49; 3.5.66; 3.5.78; 3.5.87; 3.5.99; 3.5.105; 3.5.114; 3.5.161; 3.7.36; 3.7.41; 3.8.12; 3.8.35; 3.9.43; 3.10.9; 3.10.43; 3.10.44; 3.10.78; 3.10.81; 3.14.11; 3.14.13; 3.14.15; 3.14.16; 3.14.21; 3.14.25; 3.15.3; 3.15.20; 3.15.75; 4.2.45; 4.2.50; 4.9.19; 4.9.39; 4.10.2; 4.11.5; 4.11.20; 4.14.23</p> <p>πρᾶγμα 1.1.7; 1.1.10; 1.1.17; 1.1.37; 1.5.44; 2.1.3; 2.4.50; 2.7.15; 2.7.74; 2.7.127; 2.7.134; 3.4.55; 3.5.10; 3.5.16; 3.5.20; 3.5.49; 3.5.67; 3.5.69; 3.5.78; 3.5.87; 3.5.111; 3.5.119; 3.5.173; 3.9.7; 3.9.7; 3.9.29; 3.10.78; 3.10.82; 3.12.5; 3.15.6; 3.15.34; 3.15.39; 3.15.42; 3.15.54; 3.15.58; 3.15.63; 4.2.65; 4.4.52; 4.7.12; 4.7.13; 4.7.19; 4.9.10; 4.9.38; 4.11.10; 4.11.12; 4.11.16; 4.11.19; 4.13.46; 4.13.59; 4.13.75; 4.14.23</p> <p>πράγμασιν 2.7.40; 4.3.152 [133]</p>
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kC 818	πραγματεία ή	πραγματείας 1.150	
kC 821	πραγματικός -ή -όν	πραγματικὴν 8.18 πραγματικῇ 7.56 πραγματικῆς 7.1 πραγματικῇ 2.32; 2.33; 7.2	πραγματικῆς 3.2.113; 3.12.2 πραγματικωτάτης 1.1.3 πραγματικαῖς 3.4.21 πραγματικῇ 4.14.25
kD 824	προβάλλω	προβαλλόμενος 12.32 προβάλλεται 5.28 προβαλλομένου 2.85	
kD 825	πρόβλημα τὸ	πρόβλημα 3.73 προβλημάτων 1.135; 1.145 προβλήματα 1.139	προβλήμασιν 1.25; 2.1.9 2.3.32; 2.5.6; 2.5.30; 2.7.68; 3.5.28 προβλήμασι 1.1.9; 4.2.10 προβλημάτων 1.4.24; 2.1.18; 4.13.1; 4.13.2; 4.13.35; 4.14.1 προβλήματα 4.13.66; 4.14.2 προβλήματι 1.1.56; 1.1.173; 1.2.35; 1.2.38; 2.1.11; 2.1.15; 2.3.12; 2.5.13; 3.9.46; 4.4.94 προβλήματος 1.1.25; 2.1.2; 2.7.34; 3.15.2 προβολῆς 3.2.75; 3.2.118
kD 827	προβολή ή	προβολή 4.7; 4.10; 5.6; 5.11; 6.10; 8.30; 9.7; 9.10; 10.27; 11.11; 12.15; προβολῇ 4.2; 5.2; 6.3; 8.25; 9.3; 10.7; 10.8; 11.2; 12.2; προβολήν 6.15	
kE 828	ἐτέρα προβολή	10.7; 10.33; 12.3; 12.16	
kF 830	προχυμνάτω		προχυμνασθέντες 4.12.31

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KG 832	προδιηχέομαι			προδιηγούμενοι 2.4.55 προδιηγούμεθα 2.5.4
KG 833	προδιήγησις ή			προδιηγήσεις 2.3.3; 2.5.38; 2.6.23 προδιήγησις 2.4.18; 2.5.12 προδιήγησιν 2.1.7; 2.1.14
KH 834	προδιόρθομαι		προσδιωρίσθαι 9.3; 9.15; 9.19; 9.24; 10.10; 10.39	
KH 835	προδιόρθωσις ή			προδιορθώσαι 4.12.40
KI 836	προειλημμένος τή κρίσει		1.84; 1.27	
KJ 838	προεκτίθημι			προεκτίθεσθαι 3.2.4; 3.2.28
KM 843	προκατασκευάζω (-ομενος)		προκατασκευαζόμενος 3.285; 3.299 προκατασκευαζόμενου 3.324 προκατασκευασθῆναι 3.301	προκατασκευάζει 4.12.22 προκατασκευάζοντα 3.2.52 προκατασκευάζεν 4.12.35
KM 844	προκατασκευή ή			προκατασκευή 3.2.2; 3.2.67; 3.2.95; 3.2.108; 3.2.109 προκατασκευή 3.2.85; 3.2.121; 4.12.14; 4.12.41 προκατασκευήν 3.2.34; 3.2.36; 3.2.45 προκατασκευής 3.1.14; 3.2.1; 3.2.16; 3.2.29; 3.2.64; 3.2.83; 3.2.105; 3.2.111

κΝ	845	προκατάσταςις ή		προκαταστάσεων 2.7.2 προκαταστάσεως 2.1.10; 2.1.21 προκαταστάσεων 2.4.3 προκατάστασιν 2.1.6; 2.2.11; 2.2.17 προκατάστασις 1.4.27; 2.3.24; 2.3.36; 2.4.9; 2.4.18; 2.4.26; 2.4.35; 2.4.44; 2.4.48
κΡ	850	προοιμιάζομαι		προοιμιαζόμεθα 1.3.9
κΡ	853	προοίμιον τὸ	προοίμια 3.204; 3.207; 3.211 προοιμίους 3.214 προοιμίου 3.215	προοίμια 1.1.16; 1.1.53; 1.1.159; 1.1.171; 1.3.2; 3.2.36; 3.2.51 προοιμίους 4.4.17 προοίμιον 1.1.21; 1.1.40; 1.1.61; 1.2.11; 1.2.16; 1.2.20; 1.2.28; 1.2.31; 1.2.64; 1.3.7; 1.3.25; 1.4.2; 1.4.27; 1.5.3; 1.5.9; 1.5.15; 2.7.9; 4.2.42; 4.2.43; 4.13.97 προοιμίου 1.1.49; 1.1.51; 1.5.1 προοιμίων 1.1.1; 1.1.2; 1.1.179; 1.2.1; 1.2.2; 1.2.53; 1.3.1; 1.4.1; 1.5.18; 4.4.18
κQ	855	πρός τι	4.2; 4.26; 4.114; 4.116; 5.3; 5.27; 5.31; 6.2; 6.6; 6.32; 9.4; 9.30; 10.16; 10.22; 10.57; 10.67; 11.3; 11.30	
κR	857	προσαγγέλλω		προσαγγέλλει 4.13.15
κS	858	προσδιορίζω	προσδιώρισεν 9.16	
κS	859	τὸ μὴ προσδιορίσθαι	9.3; 9.15; 9.19; 9.24; 10.10; 10.39	

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kv	863	πρόσωπον τὸ	<p>πρόσωπα 1.74; 3.3; 3.25i; 3.27i; 3.277; 4.98; 5.129</p> <p>προσώποις 4.100; 7.46</p> <p>πρόσωπον 2.139; 3.57; 3.22i; 3.23i; 4.38; 5.13</p> <p>πρόξωπον 1.80; 2.7; 2.60</p> <p>προσώπου 1.26; 1.36; 3.235; 3.28i; 4.49; 4.119</p> <p>προσώπω 3.47; 3.56; 4.37; 5.3</p> <p>προσώπων 1.25; 1.45; 1.52; 1.156; 3.72; 3.77; 3.226; 3.248; 3.276; 4.4i; 11.26</p> <p>πρόξωπα 1.2i</p> <p>προξώπου 9.13</p>	<p>πρόσωπα 1.169; 3.5.140</p> <p>προσώποις 1.2.3i</p> <p>πρόσωπον 1.1.1i; 1.1.75; 1.1.83; 1.2.36; 3.5.10; 3.5.16; 3.5.20; 3.5.135; 4.4.89; 4.14.28</p> <p>πρόξωπον 3.5.133</p> <p>προσώπου 3.5.36; 3.5.52; 3.5.70; 3.5.80; 3.5.88; 3.5.108; 3.5.115; 3.5.123; 3.5.126; 3.5.127; 3.5.136; 3.5.161; 3.5.164; 3.7.17; 3.7.18; 3.7.24; 3.8.35</p> <p>προξώπου 3.5.100</p> <p>προσώπων 1.1.4; 3.15.12</p>
kw	865	προσωποποιία ἡ		<p>προσωποποιίαι 3.10.98</p> <p>προσωποποιίαις 3.15.10</p> <p>προσωποποιῶν 3.15.53</p>
kx	869	πρότασις ἡ		<p>προτάσεων 4.3.144</p> <p>πρότασι 3.4.43; 3.4.87; 4.3.39; 4.3.42; 4.3.105; 4.3.106</p> <p>προτάσεις 1.1.50; 4.3.128; 4.3.132</p> <p>πρότασις 1.1.51; 1.5.29; 1.5.36; 3.4.45; 3.4.52; 3.4.57; 3.4.61; 3.4.71; 3.4.77; 3.4.99; 4.3.102; 4.3.124; 4.3.147; 4.3.152</p> <p>πρότασεων 4.3.113</p> <p>πρότάσεως 1.5.3; 1.5.20; 1.5.26; 1.5.38; 3.4.41; 3.4.69; 3.4.89; 3.4.91; 3.4.110; 4.2.34; 4.3.61; 4.3.94</p> <p>πρότασιν 1.5.7; 4.2.37</p>

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kX	873	προτείνω		προτείνειν 4.6.9 προταθέντων 4.3.99
kL	874	προτίθημι	προθείς 1.162 προτεθέντος 2.2	προθῆς 4.4.108 προϋθηκεν 3.2.23 προϋτίθετο 4.2.45; 4.2.50
kY	876	προτρέπω	προτρέποντας 3.145	
mM	880	ῥητορική ἢ	ῥητορικῆς 1.9; 1.19; 5.95	ῥητορικῆς 3.1.4; 3.4.7
mM	881	ῥητορικός -ῆ -όν	ῥητορικὴν 1.2; 6.55	ῥητορικὴ 4.10.7 ῥητορικὴν 3.1.12 ῥητορικοῦ 4.2.52 ῥητορικῶ 3.11.64 ῥητορικωτέρα 2.7.77
kZ	882	ῥητός -ῆ -όν	ῥητά 2.74; 2.74; 2.78; 2.95 ῥητοῖς 2.76 ῥητόν 2.27; 2.28; 2.79; 2.81; 2.84; 2.110; 2.138; 11.12 ῥητοῦ 2.104; 2.128; 2.130; 2.137; 3.17; 3.20; 7.5; 7.8; 8.26; 9.3; 10.7; 10.8; 10.27; 12.2; 12.3; 12.15 ῥητῶ 2.89; 9.13; 9.15; 11.3 ῥητῶν 2.97; 10.20; 10.21	ῥητῶ 2.7.9
mM	883	ῥήτωρ ὁ ἡ	ῥήτορας 5.14 ῥήτορες 3.267 ῥήτωρ 1.38; 1.41; 5.43; 7.51	ῥήτορα 1.2.25; 3.2.29; 3.2.43; 3.6.13 ῥήτορι 3.2.41 ῥήτορος 2.7.16; 4.3.59; 4.11.4 ῥητόρων 3.2.117 ῥήτωρ 1.2.23; 2.7.90; 3.5.11; 3.5.89; 3.10.100; 4.1.39; 4.2.38; 4.2.67; 4.6.21

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1B	889	σημεῖον τὸ	σημεῖα 3.165; 3.312 σημείοις 3.29; 3.160; 3.160; 3.278 σημείου 2.6	
1C	893	σκοπέω	σκόπει 7.46 σκοπεῖν 3.76; 3.129; 9.13	σκοπήσετε 1.1.166 σκοπητέον 1.1.17 σκοπούμενος 3.3.14 σκοπούντων 2.3.14 σκόπει 4.12.19 σκοπεῖν 1.1.10; 3.3.19; 4.2.47
1D	896	στάσις ἢ	στάσεσιν 6.27 στάσει 6.6; 10.5 στάσεις 1.144; 2.147; 10.4 στάσεων 2.72; 6.57; 7.10; 7.11; 8.8 στάσιν 1.157; 2.14; 2.28; 8.5 στάσις 1.158; 2.14	στάσει 3.6.10 στάσεων 3.4.4; 3.12.7; 3.12.10 στάσεως 3.2.72; 3.2.106; 3.2.109; 3.2.111
1E	899	στοχασμός ὁ	στοχασμοῖς 3.77; 3.139; 3.242; 4.58 στοχασμός 2.4; 2.5; 3.3; 3.86; 3.227; 3.248; 3.277; 3.326; 3.331 στοχασμοῦ 1.163; 2.149; 3.2; 3.216; 3.298 στοχασμῶ 2.124; 3.105; 3.149; 3.189; 4.109; 5.33; 7.21 στοχασμῶν 3.217; 3.283; 3.334; 4.51	
1E	900	στοχαστικός -ῆ -όν	στοχαστικόν 2.135 στοχαστικῶς 3.301; 4.43	

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1F	903	συγχνώμη ή συγχνώμης	συγχνώμης 6.78 συγχνώμην 2.63; 6.69 συγχνώμης 2.67; 2.69; 3.33; 6.2; 6.74; 6.77	συγχνώμην 3.9.38 συγχνώμης 3.10.97; 4.2.48
1F	905	συγχνωμονικός -ή -όν	συγχνωμονική 6.7 συγχνωμονικῶ 5.91 συγχνωμονικῶς 3.135	
1H	911	συγκατοσκευάζω (τὸ -όμενος)	συγκατοσκευαζόμενος 3.285; 3.311	
1G	916	συγκατατίθημι	συγκατέθετο 4.112	
1J	921	συγκρίνω		συγκρίνομεν 4.14.33 συγκρινόμενον 3.9.5 συγκρίνοιτο 4.14.29 συγκρινόμενα 4.14.26; 4.14.31
1J	922	σύγκρισις ή		συγκρίσει 3.8.34 συγκρίσεις 4.14.28 σύγκρισιν 4.1.12; 4.14.30; 4.14.32
1J	923	συγκριτικός -ή -όν		συγκριτικών 3.8.33 συγκριτικά 4.14.2 συγκριτική 3.9.46 συγκριτικών 4.14.1 συγκριτικῶς 3.9.4
1K	925	συζεύχυνμι	συνεζευγμένους 3.284	συνεζευγμένην 3.2.35
1L	929	σύλληψις ή	σύλληψιν 4.63	
1M	930	συλλογίζομαι	συλλογίσασθαι 3.193	

1M	931	συλλογισμός ο	συλλογισμών 2.90 συλλογισμός 2.91; 4.17; 4.21; 5.20; 8.37; 9.23; 10.11; 10.44; 11.2; 11.8; 11.14 συλλογισμού 11.1 συλλογισμῶ 4.3; 8.26; 9.4; 11.3 συλλογισμῶν 11.32	συλλογισμὸν 3.14.4 συλλογισμός 3.14.2; 3.14.27 συλλογισμού 3.14.3; 3.14.7; 3.14.34
1N	934	συμβαίνω	συμβαίνει 2.78 συμβεβηκός 1.160 συμβέβηκε 12.33 συμβεβηκότης 6.10	συμβαίνει 3.5.28; 3.5.176; 3.10.62; 3.14.43; 4.2.47 συμβαίνοντων 3.14.35; 4.14.23 συμβάν 1.259 συμβῆ 4.12.49 συνέβη 2.3.26; 2.6.13 συμβαίνειν 3.14.12 συμβάντα 4.9.34 συμβάντων 2.3.10 συμβέβηκε 2.7.98 συμβεβηκότης 2.3.19
1O	937	συμβουλευτικός -ή -όν	συμβουλευτικόν 1.140 συμβουλευτικῶς 1.140	
1O	938	συμβουλεύω	συμβουλεύει 5.43 συμβουλεύειν 5.40 συμβουλεύη 1.104 συμβουλεύων 6.36 συνεβούλευσα 5.81	συμβουλεύει 1.1.85; 2.4.12; 3.5.146; 3.12.17 συμβουλεύσων 1.1.31 συμβουλεύων 3.12.19 συνεβούλευε 3.11.30
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1Q	941	συμπλοκή ή	συμπλοκήν 1.32; 1.36; 5.99; 5.100 συμπλοκής 5.103	συμπλοκής 4.3.48
1R	943	συμφέρον τὸ	συμφέρον 3.202; 4.24; 7.25	
1R	944	συμφορτός -ή -όν	συμφέρον 1.18; 2.25	
1R	945	συμφέρω	συμφέροντι 3.200; 7.3; 7.62 συμφέροντος 1.16	συμφέρει 3.7.24; 4.6.16 συμφέροντα 4.3.27 συμφέροντι 3.6.16 συμφέροντος 1.1.101 συμφέρειν 1.1.136 συνήνεγκε 3.11.34
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1S	953	συντίθημι		συντίθεται 4.4.5; 4.4.62 συντίθημι 4.3.128
1U	958	σύντομος -ον		συντόμως 4.3.53; 4.3.54
1W	962	σύστασις ή		σύστασιν 4.4.174

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12	971	σχῆμα τὸ		<p>σχῆμάτων 4.1.1: 4.1.5: 4.4.140</p> <p>σχήματα 4.4.66</p> <p>σχήματα 3.10.71: 4.3.62: 4.4.118</p> <p>σχῆματι 3.10.71: 3.11.19: 4.1.14: 4.2.43: 4.3.2: 4.3.10: 4.3.43: 4.4.60: 4.4.120: 4.4.131: 4.13.9: 4.13.21: 4.13.62</p> <p>σχήματος 4.3.51: 4.4.60: 4.4.61: 4.4.109: 4.4.136: 4.13.69: 4.13.74: 4.13.87</p> <p>σχῆμα 1.3.18: 3.8.33: 3.10.24: 3.10.27: 4.2.2: 4.2.32: 4.2.40: 4.2.54: 4.3.10: 4.3.28: 4.3.37: 4.3.52: 4.3.64: 4.3.83: 4.3.143: 4.4.73: 4.4.77: 4.4.80: 4.4.87: 4.4.98: 4.4.112: 4.4.121: 4.4.133: 4.6.2: 4.6.9: 4.6.38: 4.8.2: 4.8.5: 4.8.23: 4.13.73</p> <p>σχήμασιν 3.10.40: 4.3.33</p>
12	972	σχηματίζω		<p>ἐσχηματισμένα 4.13.66</p> <p>ἐσχηματισμένοις 4.13.53</p> <p>ἐσχηματισμένων 4.13.1: 4.13.2</p> <p>σχηματίζει 4.3.54</p> <p>σχηματίσεις 3.10.86</p> <p>σχηματισθεῖσα 4.3.91.</p> <p>σεε αὐτοῦ</p> <p>μετασχηματίζουσιν 4.4.103</p> <p>μετασχηματιζομένη 4.3.113</p>
μα	977	σῶμα τὸ	<p>σῶμα 1.55: 2.8: 3.132: 3.222: 3.241</p> <p>σώματα 2.68</p> <p>σώματος 3.63</p>	<p>σῶματι 1.2.69: 3.10.54</p> <p>σῶμα 3.13.17</p>

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mB	980	τάξις ἡ	τάξιν 3.118; 11.40	τάξεως 3.13.1; 4.3.71 τάξει 3.2.25; 4.1.40 τάξιν 1.1.154; 3.2.58; 3.6.36; 3.13.7; 4.1.38; 4.2.14; 4.4.175 τάξις 3.8.4; 3.13.2
mB	982	τάττω		τάττοντα 3.2.52 τάττει 3.2.36 τάττειν 2.7.43 τάττεται 3.6.39
mF	993	τέλεος -α -ον	τελείαν 3.20 τελεία 3.17; 8.3 τέλειοι 3.218 τέλειον 2.11; 2.23 τέλειος 3.251; 3.275 τελείου 3.216; 3.250 τελείω 3.225 τελείως 3.288; 4.123 τέλεον 3.210 τελεωτάτης 1.151	
mE	995	τελευταῖος -α -ον		τελευταῖα 3.13.5; 4.4.179 τελευταῖον 2.5.10; 3.2.10; 3.13.14; 3.13.20; 3.13.28; 4.4.171
mE	996	τελευταῶ	έτελεύτα 3.278	τετελευτηκότος 1.1.166
mE	998	τελευτή ἡ		τελευτῇ 3.15.79
mF	999	τελέω		τελείσθαι 3.15.10

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mG 1003	ΤΕΧΝΑΣΜΑΙ		ΤΕΧΝΑΣΘΑΙ 4.2.25 ΤΕΧΝΑΤΑΙ 3.5.112
mG 1004	ΤΕΧΝΗ Ή	τέχναις 5.48 τέχνη 7.57 τέχνη 5.44 τέχνην 6.54 τέχνην 1.3; 7.58 τέχνης 5.94	τέχνας 1.1.34; 3.2.61; 4.1.39 τέχνη 3.6.4; 3.6.33; 3.14.8 τέχνην 1.2.3; 1.2.61; 3.2.27; 3.4.3; 3.11.65; 4.4.61 τέχνης 3.4.5; 3.5.178; 3.13.6; 4.1.42; 4.4.175; 4.4.177 ΤΕΧΝΩΝ 3.2.62
mG 1007	ΤΕΧΝΙΚΟΣ -Ή -ΟΝ	ΤΕΧΝΙΚΟΝ 3.42	ΤΕΧΝΙΚΟΝ 2.1.21
mH 1008	ΤΟΠΙΚΟΣ -Ή -ΟΝ	τοπική 6.23; 10.60 τοπικῶς 3.189; 12.27	
mH 1009	ΤΟΠΟΣ Ο	τόποις 1.46 τόπον 1.26; 2.139; 2.145; 6.22 τόπω 3.48	τόποις 3.2.73; 4.14.34 τόπον 3.5.15; 3.5.19; 3.5.22; 3.5.23 τόπος 3.5.10; 3.5.143; 3.10.7; 4.7.18 τόπου 3.5.38; 3.5.58; 3.5.91; 3.5.116; 3.5.141; 3.5.161; 3.5.162; 3.5.165; 3.8.34; 4.7.12 τόπους 3.4.104 τόπων 3.1.7

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mJ 1010	τροπή ή			Τροπή 4.10.2 τροπής 4.9.48; 4.10.1; 4.10.14; 4.10.21; 4.12.12 τροπών 4.9.37
mJ 1011	τροπικός -ή -όν			τροπική 4.12.11
mJ 1012	τρόπος ό	τρόπον 2.139; 4.19; 5.76; 5.124; 6.44 τρόπου 1.135; 8.46 τρόπους 1.137; 3.8 τρόπω 3.48 τρόπων 5.22; 6.63		τρόποι 2.7.70; 3.15 τρόποις 2.15; 2.7.5; 2.7.111 τρόπον 1.1.22; 1.1.53; 1.1.180; 1.4.5; 2.2.48; 2.4.55; 2.5.33; 3.5.15; 3.5.19; 3.13.32; 4.2.3; 4.3.6; 4.8.13; 4.9.24 τρόπος 2.7.67; 2.7.69; 2.7.83; 3.5.10 τρόπου 2.7.80; 3.8.34; 3.15.10 τρόπους 3.15.37; 4.12.5 τρόπω 2.7.76; 2.7.79; 3.2.83; 3.5.180; 3.10.58; 3.15.8; 3.15.10 τρόπων 2.1.8; 3.5.4
mK 1013	υπερβατόν τό			υπερβατώ 4.3.91
mK 1014	υπερβατός -ή -όν			υπερβατά 4.3.54
mL 1017	υπερβολή ή			υπερβολήν 1.4.3
mL 1019	υποβάλλω			υποβαλεῖν 3.5.178 υποβάλλει 3.5.169 υποβαλλομένης 3.4.6

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mO	1024	υποδιαίρῶ			υποδιαίρειν 3.10.12 υποδιαιρούμεν 3.10.52 υποδιαιρούντες 1.2.11; 1.2.37; 3.10.47 υποδιαιρήσεις 3.10.19; 3.10.20; 3.10.21
mP	1025	υπόθεσις ή	υπόθεσιν	7.71	υπόθεσαι 3.5.10 υποθέσεως 1.1.7; 2.1.20 υπόθεσιν 3.2.5 υπόθεσις 2.1.3
mQ	1027	υποκρίνομαι			υπεκρίνατο 1.3.19
mR	1030	υπολογισμῶν	υπέλαβεν 12.19 υπολογισμῶντες	3.37	υπείληπται 1.1.18 υπελάμβανον 1.3.26 υπειλημμένον 1.1.152 υπολήγεσθε 1.1.165
mR	1032	υπολήψις ή			υπολήψεις 1.1.11; 1.1.15; 1.1.54; 1.1.141; 1.1.146; 1.1.153; 1.2.33; 1.2.35 υπολήψεων 1.1.4 υπολήψεως 1.1.1; 1.1.179; 1.2.7; 1.4.26 υπόληψις 1.1.110; 1.1.157

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πS 1036	υπόμνημα τό		υπομνήματα 11.22	
πP 1041	υποτίθημι			υπεθύμην 2.4.54 υπετίθεσαν 2.2.45 υποτεθέντος 4.3.82
πU 1043	υποφορά ή			υποφορά 3.4.46; 3.4.53; 3.4.70; 3.4.73; 3.4.79; 3.4.91; 3.4.99; 3.4.101 υποφορά 3.4.43 υποφοραί 4.13.35 υποφοραίς 3.13.17 υποφοράν 3.4.58; 3.5.190 υποφοράς 3.4.46; 3.4.62; 3.4.110; 3.3.22; 4.13.42 υποφορών 4.13.53
πV 1044	φανερός -ά -όν		φανερά 2.109; 5.11; 5.134; 6.10; 10.23; 10.43 φανερών 2.4; 2.10; 2.23; 9.25 φανερου 2.6; 2.9; 3.327 φανερών 9.20 φανερώτερον 11.9	φανερά 4.9.6 φανερών 3.5.154 φανερώς 1.1.126; 3.3.27; 4.13.85
πW 1052	φθόνος ό		φθόνον 3.146 φθόνου 3.206	φθόνον 1.1.55 φθόνου 1.1.55
πX 1054	φοβέω			φοβήται 3.5.154 φοβούμενος 3.5.53; 4.12.22 φοβούμεθα 4.3.28
πX 1058	φόβος ό		φόβον 7.76 φόβου 3.205	

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nB	1073	χράω			ἔχρησεν 2.4.10; 4.13.79 κέχρησθε 4.3.141; 4.3.152 χρήσαντος 2.4.19
nC	1074	χρεῖα ἢ	χρεῖα 3.121		χρεῖα 4.3.111; 4.11.8 χρεῖαν 2.2.42 χρεῖας 2.5.40
nD	1076	χρόνος	χρόνοις 3.16 χρόνον 2.139; 2.145; 3.14; 4.43; 8.33; 11.27 χρόνῳ 1.4; 2.143; 3.48		χρόνοις 4.14.34 χρόνον 3.5.15; 3.5.19; 3.5.22; 3.5.23; 4.8.5 χρόνος 3.5.10 χρόνου 3.5.75; 3.5.82; 3.5.189; 3.8.34 χρόνῳ 4.10.22 χρόνων 3.2.20; 3.14.42
nE	1077	χρῶμα τὸ	χρῶμα 1.69 χρώματα 3.148		χρῶμα 4.14.10
nH	1088	ψόγος ὁ			ψόγων 4.14.29
nI	1089	ψυχὴ ἢ	ψυχῆς 3.62; 3.205; 3.208; 6.74		ψυχὴ 4.4.177 ψυχῇ 3.11.68

VITA

Mark Williams was born. After this, he did many things. He has a dog. He completed most of this dissertation while living in Jerusalem where he wandered the streets in ragged clothing, staring gape-mouthed at the marvels around him. Tourists sometimes offered him coins, mistaking him for an idiot beggar. He presently lives in Vancouver, Canada, with his wife who is, as you might imagine, a rare and extremely understanding woman who has a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Physics. They have a son named, of all things, Dante Benedict Williams.

DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate: Mark Williams

Major Field: Speech Communication

Title of Dissertation: Some Technical Vocabulary of Rhetorical Invention
in the Treatise of Anonymous Seguerianus, Hermogenes'
On Stasis, and Book 3 of the [Pseudo-]Hermogenic work
On Invention


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
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Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:





Date of Examination:

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